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JAPAN'S AIR POWER OPERATIONS:
THE EMPLOYMENT
OF MILITARY AVIATION
IN THE POST WAR ERA

MICHAEL BRYANT HUGHES

JAPAN'S AIR POWER OPTIONS:

The Employment of Military Aviation in the Post-War Era

A Thesis

Presented to the Faculty

of the

Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy

Tufts University.

by

LIEUTENANT COMMANDER MICHAEL BRYANT HUGHES

United States Navy //

In partial fulfillment of the requirements for the

Degree Doctor of Philosophy

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ABSTRACT

Japan's military policies, particularly its air power policies, have not been closely related to contemporary national security requirements. The military organization which has evolved in post-war Japan has reflected to a degree Japan's perception of its milieu, but its orientation and posture has often been affected by special groups or factions with distinct interests. Those internal pressures have resulted in a military organization which has sacrificed operational capacity for the establishment of an organizational core from which a broader range of military options could be undertaken in the future.

This study examines the evolution of the Japanese Air Self-Defense Force and those related organizations responsible for the use of air power in the defense of Japan. Historical, political, strategic, social and institutional factors have affected this evolution over the first twenty years of Japan's independence after World War II; they have been discussed in order to clarify Japan's air power goals. The study is based on the assumption that detailed examination of a force structure can test related policies and permit assessment of any presumptions concerning the basis of the policies. Moreover, it has been further hypothesized that close assessment of one aspect of national security policy can provide a different perspective and new insights to the whole of that policy.

In order to test the noted assumptions and reach the stated conclusions the Air Self-Defense Force has been studied from a somewhat different perspective. Its characteristics and capabilities have been evaluated in terms of stated government policies, and thesis organization reflects the assumption that a nation's security policies can be tested by the force structure's orientation. Therefore, the study begins with

some discussion of the theoretical parameters of national security policy and a general review of Japan's post-war attitudes toward the security problem. After examining the Japanese perceptions of threat and the variables which condition and limit policy, the process whereby policy is formulated has been traced in detail in order to identify those groups which participate in it.

The bureaucratic nature of the process and its institutionalization during the post-war era have increased its significance. The relative influence of the parties in the relatively inflexible evolution has also affected interpretation of the policy.

Finally, the air power structure as it existed in 1972 has been examined in detail, in order to delineate the policy choices which, in fact, have been undertaken. In addition, the actual capabilities of the force structure condition the perceptions of Japanese policy-makers, and aid in assessing the probability that specific defense options might be exercised in the future.

Previous studies in the general area of Japanese defense policy have not examined institutional details of the force structure or its operational capability. They have arrived at widely varying conclusions regarding Japanese policy, and have cited the Self-Defense Forces as example of their deductions. Academic efforts in this area have often utilized a general approach to security policy rather than the specific, functional method used here.

The conventional body of knowledge concerning Japanese security policy has contained certain assumptions. Those include:

Japanese defense policy was developed early in the occupation and did not change for the first twenty years of independence. It proposed reliance on the United States for external defense and emphasized

autonomous capability for internal stability;

Japanese political leadership has taken an active and informed role in defense policy formulation. Therefore, the first assumption may be considered a cohesive policy reflecting the views of various interest groups and implemented throughout the national government;

Strategic thought in Japan has been definitive and cohesive, and groups reflecting this body of thought have had access to the political leadership and have supported the previously mentioned defense policy;

The rearmament steps which have been taken have been contrary to the basic policy and have been the result of United States pressure, particularly during the first ten years after the Korean War began;

The Japanese military forces which have resulted from the above policy have remained small, but become quite effective. They were built to complement the U.S. force structure in Asia, but have achieved a certain autonomous capability to defend the home islands;

Japanese national security policy has continued to be uniquely limited by the strong currents of pacifism and anti-militarism in the society;

On the other hand, there have been indications, for example in defense spending, that the military has achieved a larger role in Japanese decision-making. Some danger of resurgent Japanese militarism has arisen.

These conventional wisdoms regarding Japanese national security policy are challenged in this study and an alternative series of deductions have been proposed:

Defense policy has not remained constant since 1947. The evolution of the air power structure demonstrated Japan's increasing concern with an external defense capability;

The evolution of defense policy has reflected both external and internal pressures. While the United States played a significant role in the birth of the Air Self-Defense Force, the impetus for its development and the emphasis it was accorded were not the result of American pressures. Initiative for the policy evolution came primarily from defense-oriented groups within the Japanese policy-making structure;

The political leadership has not been active in policy formulation and has acted only reluctantly, when the press of events or consensus below has forced recognition of policy evolution. This has reflected the historical sensitivity to military policy in Japan, but also reflected Japan's belief that it has faced a very limited threat in Asia;

Strategy has not been discussed thoroughly in post-war Japan. No cohesive body of thought has developed, and strategic theories have not had a great deal of influence within the Japanese decision-making process;

Military policies have been limited by social and political factors, however the nature and severity of those restrictions have not been so extreme as to constrain policy-makers unnaturally. The receding memory of World War II and a growing Japanese national awareness have contributed to Japan's acceptance of its military establishment;

The resultant force structure was not an American invention, nor has its role been determined by political pressures or social factors. The air power structure has not contributed to the maintenance of internal security; it has not emphasized operational coordination with the United States forces; it has had an extremely limited operational capacity, whether autonomously or otherwise; and the policies which have guided the Air Self-Defense Force have not aspired to those objectives;

Recent increases in the defense budget and the selection of military equipment have not reflected increased military influence. The direction

and pace of Japanese military development has been primarily the result of political-economic pressures. Military options in policy implementation have continued to receive relatively little discussion or consideration by the Japanese government.

The isolation and disregard of the military has created a situation where it has been allowed to control its own evolution within strict economic limitations. Budgetary allocation stressing operational capacity has been eschewed by the military planners, and the Air Self-Defense Force has developed into the nucleus of a larger air force rather than a combat ready organization. It has stressed an ability to exercise future options rather than maintenance of operational capabilities.

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A study such as this which attempts to investigate a contemporary social subject must rely heavily on information directly provided by participants and current observers. This thesis is no exception and regrettably, it is impossible to recognize all those who helped within this short preface. Before acknowledging the efforts of a few of the many upon whom I relied during the past eighteen months, I wish to recognize the United States Navy which released me from normal duties thereby making it possible for me to pursue the study. Without its financial and administrative support, the necessary research would have been incalculably more difficult.

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ACRONYMS

AAM	Air-to-air missiles
AC&W	Aircraft control and warning
ADC	Air Defense Command
ADF	Air Defense Force
ADM	Admiral
AEW	Airborne Early Warning
AF	Air Force
ASC	Air Staff College
ASO	Air Staff Office
ASOC	Air Support Operations Center
ATC	Air Training Command
BADGE	Base Air Defense Ground Environment
CAP	Combat Air Patrol
COL	Colonel
COMUSJAPAN	Commander, United States Forces Japan
COS	Chief of Staff
CPO	Central Procurement Office
CSF	Coastal Safety Force
DBP	Defense Build-up Plan
DG	Director-General
DPC	Defense Production Committee
DSP	Democratic Socialist Party
ECCM	Electronic counter counter-measures
ECM	Electronic counter-measures
EPA	Economic Planning Agency
FEAF	Far Eastern Air Forces

5AF	Fifth Air Force
FTC	Flying Training Command
GCI	Ground Controlled Intercept
GNP	Gross National Product
GOJ	Government of Japan
IJA	Imperial Japanese Army
IJN	Imperial Japanese Navy
JASDF	Japan Air Self-Defense Force
JCP	Japan Communist Party
JDA	Japan Defense Agency
JGSDF	Japan Ground Self-Defense Force
JMSDF	Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force
JSC	Joint Staff Council
JSP	Japan Socialist Party
LCOL	Lieutenant Colonel
LDP	Liberal Democratic Party
LGEN	Lieutenant General
MAAG	Military Assistance Advisory Group
MAP	Military Assistance Program
MDAO	Mutual Defense Assistance Office
MITI	Ministry of International Trade and Industry
MSA	Mutual Security Agreement
NDC	National Defense Council
NM	Nautical miles
NSA	National Safety Agency
NSF	National Safety Force
PARC	Policy Affairs Research Council
PK	Probability of kill

POL	Petroleum, oil and lubricants
SAM	Surface-to-air missile
SJAC	Society of Japanese Aircraft Constructors
TRDI	Technical Research and Development Institute
TTC	Technical Training Command
USAF	United States Air Force
USN	United States Navy
VADM	Vice Admiral
VCOS	Vice Chief of Staff
VTOL	Vertical take-off and landing

TABLE OF CONTENTS

JAPAN'S AIR POWER OPTIONS:

The Employment of Military Aviation in the Post-War Era

Page

Abstract.	i
Acknowledgements.	vi
Acronyms.	xi
I. AIR POWER AND THE SCOPE OF DEFENSE POLICY	1
II. THE NEED FOR MILITARY FORCES.	18
Chapter 1 Japan in Asia	20
Chapter 2 Strategic Thought in Japan.	53
III. INTERNAL VARIABLES: THE SOCIETY AND THE INSTITUTION.	76
Chapter 3 The Constitution, Politics and the Social Milieu	79
Chapter 4 A Bitter History.	113
Chapter 5 The Birth of the Air Self-Defense Force	133
IV. THE FORMULATION OF DEFENSE POLICY	155
Chapter 6 Policies and Strategies	157
Chapter 7 The Decision-Making Process	205
V. THE READY FORCE STRUCTURE	233
Chapter 8 Personnel Utilization	235
Chapter 9 The Allocation of Resources	275
Chapter 10 Operational Capability.	301
VI. THE POTENTIAL FORCE STRUCTURE	346
Chapter 11 The Aircraft Industry	348
Chapter 12 Research and Development.	363
VII. POLICY OPTIONS AND THE FUTURE	381

	Page
SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY	392
Official Documents.	392
Reference Works	398
Newspapers.	400
Books	401
Articles.	404
Unpublished Material.	413
Interviews.	415

To My Son,
Richard Bryant Hughes

I.

AIR POWER AND THE SCOPE OF DEFENSE POLICY

This study focuses on the evolution of air power and air power doctrine in Japan in the era since World War II. Air power is a complex concept, difficult to define and delimit. An air force is a bureaucracy and an institution; aerospace is an environment; an aircraft is a unit within a weapons system; air defense is a functionally oriented mission.

An air force, or any military organization, may be treated through diverse academic orientations. It may be studied internally, either from a historical perspective or through institutional assessment. An air force may be compared to the society to which it belongs. The conclusions of a treatise of this nature might be drawn in terms of the institution's compatibility with society or the degree to which societal characteristics are reflected in the organization. A military organization may also be evaluated solely in terms of functional performance.

The present study examines the Japanese Air Self-Defense Force from a different perspective. This force will be evaluated as a reflection of past Japanese policy towards the use of air power for national security, and as an indication of the directions of Japanese policy toward the future use of air power. Such an approach only has value if air power policies are essential to military policy and in turn, relevant to national security policy.

In an international system comprised of states capable of exercising force in their external relations, the survival of the social unit is related to its capability to respond to acts of force directed against it. There are varied methods of dealing with the actual or potential threat of force, and the sum of all these measures might be called the state's national security policy.

A state must concern itself with different levels and types of threats. Classical military threats include direct assaults against

the national territory or other essential extensions of the state. The threat may also be indirect: a state may face internal disruption, or it may be denied access to natural resources or the use of international seas and airspace.

National security policy, or the response to these various contingencies, may include political, legal, economic or counter-force measures designed to deter such potential or actual threats. Within the international system as it has evolved in the post-war era to 1972, foreign policy and defense policy are interrelated; they defy separation.¹ Raymond Aron includes all related policies and actions in the general title, "diplomatic-strategic behavior", indicating that defense and foreign policy are two aspects of a continuum which should not be separated.² The balance between the means of effecting national security policy depends on the state's national experience and in part on the nature of the international system to which the state belongs.

When Japan regained its status as a sovereign nation-state on April 28, 1952, the relative importance of military alternatives had been deemphasized by its historical experience. The disastrous result of World War II had thoroughly discredited their efficacy. Japan's leaders were aware of the latent hostility which could be excited through emphasis on its military capability. A legacy of mistrust existed among the nations which Japan had dominated during the war. The Soviet Union and

¹The systemic interpretation included here relies on Raymond Aron, Peace and War, A Theory of International Relations (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1968) and Stanley Hoffman, Gulliver's Troubles; or the Setting of American Foreign Policy (New York: McGraw Hill Book Company, 1968). I have relied on Aron for his concept of political-strategic interaction and his concept of power in international relations. Hoffman's views of the recent evolution of the international system are also integral to the concepts discussed here.

²Aron, op. cit., p. 88.

the Chinese People's Republic were among the states who refused to sign a peace treaty with Japan; instead they had signed a treaty specifically hostile to Japan.

The Japanese homeland had been devastated in the war and Japan devoted itself to recovery. Japanese initiatives were limited and the government dealt with its many problems through an extensively revised form of government as a result of a new Constitution, drafted and adopted during the Occupation. The resultant pragmatic policies were focused inward and external policies were primarily reactive. There has been little or no attempt to project Japan's power or ideals outside its national boundary; economic advancement and more recently, social and public welfare have been emphasized.

Japan's focus on domestic concerns did not relieve it of attention to national survival problems as long as a theoretical possibility existed that another state or states could take action inimical to it. The nature of the problem was quite different for Japan because the international system which it faced in 1952 differed greatly from the pre-war one. The basic systemic structure had changed and a bi-polar system dramatically divided the world into two hostile camps.

Normal international intercourse between the two spheres was largely suspended. States theoretically faced three choices: they could become members of either sphere, or opt for a non-aligned neutralist position.

In reality, Japan did not have a full range of options because it bordered a division of the bi-polar system where sphere boundaries were sharply defined. The United States had occupied Japan after the war and led one of the juxtaposed sets of coalitions. The Japanese government negotiated the Peace Treaty almost exclusively through the United States. The U.S. envoy, John Foster Dulles, represented the Japanese to the other

signatories. The United States intended that Japan join the "free-world". The neutralist option was not viable in light of the geo-political and other realities.

'Free World' membership was not an inimical prospect to the Japanese conservative leadership. The basic political orientation of the bureaucrats who were in power was similar to that of the United States leadership in that they supported the status-quo and felt considerable antipathy towards internal or external communist movements. Japan continued to choose membership in the same camp of the bi-polar system after it achieved independence. Options offered by opposition parties have included armed or unarmed neutrality, strict or leaning neutrality, or a socialist orientation; all have been rejected by the electorate.

The bi-polar system which has dominated the 1950's and 1960's has been an important consideration in the Japanese security problem. Although states may deal with each other in various types and levels of intercourse, military interactions are discouraged within spheres by the dominant state. On the other hand, inter-bloc transactions have carried some presumption of hostility which has suggested emphasis on military means of exercising power in these relations.

National military policy has not been historically important in post-war Japan for two reasons. Military action relevant to inter-bloc confrontation would rarely be undertaken on a national basis without approval, coordination and support from the super-power. In addition, certain system boundaries are high-risk, sensitive points of confrontation where military acts could escalate rapidly. The superpowers discourage military action in these areas, such as Central Europe and Northern Asia.

As a result of these national and international factors, Japan has established a hierarchy of interests and potentialities which emphasize

its economic strength. It has become a global giant in economics, literally trading around the world. In contrast, the Japanese government has played a limited diplomatic and political role, concentrating on the United Nations and regional activities. This has been dramatized by a total commitment to forego military actions beyond the defense of its territory.

The government's emphasis on diplomatic cooperation is one method of effecting national security although Japan has recognized United Nations ineffectiveness, and implicitly the limits of diplomatic action: "thus it must be said that there is a long way to go before achieving international society and the establishment of peace (through the United Nations)."³ The government's emphasis on the improvement of domestic economic conditions, and recent increases in economic aid programs and international development financing also may be considered relevant to national security.

Systemic reinforcement of the deemphasis on military means in international relationships began to disintegrate in the latter half of the 1960's. An evolving military balance between the super-powers and a growing independence of national units within the spheres have contributed to deemphasis of the bi-polar system. The Sino-Soviet dispute, the policies of the Nixon administration in Asia, the United States-Chinese detente and limited disharmony in the United States-Japanese relationship have signalled increasing political diversification in Asia. The growth of Soviet naval forces in Asian waters, preoccupation of the United States Seventh Fleet, reduction of U.S. forces, and Chinese

³Japan Defense Agency, The Defense of Japan, October 1970, official translation, p. 9. This was the first defense white paper which the Japanese government has published since World War II.

nuclear capacity indicate that the forementioned policies have been implemented at the strategic level.

Military measures remain a possible means of exercising influence in the international system, and the increasing multi-centrism of the international system increases the possibility that force might be used in bilateral conflicts as well as inter-bloc confrontations. A multi-centric system increases the possibility that applications of force would not generate a multilateral response in that such a system more closely corresponds to a theoretical group of independent units capable of exercising military force in any relationship. The previous assumptions concerning military response relevant to the bi-polar era may no longer be valid in all future situations. Some minimum level of autonomous counterforce capacity, to include thwarting an attack and limiting damage, would then be likely to become an integral part of national security policy. Therefore, the evolving multi-centric system which Japan faces generates a new and complex series of questions. Japan must decide if its previous deemphasis of military measures in national security policy can continue to provide most efficiently for its security.

In addition to systemic modifications, Japan's growing economic infrastructure, a source of power and vulnerability, has increased the likelihood that its perceptions of threat may change.⁴ Increased probability that unilateral military action may be required also has increased the probability that Japan is evaluating individual power relationships between itself and its potential adversaries. Those relationships consist of comparisons of all elements of national power.

⁴Herman Kahn, The Emerging Japanese Superstate: Challenge and Response (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall Inc., 1970) described the tremendous growth of Japan in the 1950's and 1960's and projected continued expansion of the economic base.

Military elements constitute a basic ingredient of the power relationship and resultant policy.

If military measures have some likelihood of becoming a more important aspect of Japanese national security policy, there remains the problem of defining the specific parameters of these measures and their affect on Japan's basic orientation. Before Japan's current policy or future policy towards military methods of effecting security may be determined, its past attitudes and the basis of those attitudes are relevant.

Over the past two decades, Japanese defense policy, or the lack of it, has not been the subject of significant academic discussion outside Japan. In the bi-polar world of 1952, Japanese military policy would have had little meaning. The United States' concern for Japanese security increased as the confrontation with the Soviet Union evolved although it demonstrated some interest early in the Occupation.⁵ Its decision to deny occupation rights in Hokkaido to the Soviet Union may have been the first post-war measure taken to preserve Japanese cohesion. As the Occupation evolved, and the negotiations for independence began, the leaders of the United States and Japan did not openly disagree on national security policy. The Japanese attitude has been the subject of speculation, primarily because the United States government displayed a rather inflexible attitude. Japan, it felt, must deal with the security problem in a manner satisfactory to the United States before independence. John Foster Dulles testified before Congress that the Peace Treaty and the Security Treaty could not be separated: "yes, they

⁵See Herbert Feis, Contest Over Japan (New York: W. W. Norton Company, 1967) where he described the lengthy, bitter dispute over control of Japan as the war ended.

are very definitely interdependent; they interlock."⁶ As a result, the Peace Treaty and the U.S.-Japanese Security Treaty went into effect simultaneously. The terms and implementation of the Security Treaty left the newly independent Japan with a national defense policy which included foreign military bases on Japanese soil. From that day forward, national defense policy has been one of the most controversial subjects in Japan.⁷

There are at least three diverse theories which purport to explain the basis of Japanese policies regarding the employment of its military forces in the post-war era. The first explanation has described Japanese policy as only a derivative of United States' Asian security policy. Japan functioned as the acquiescent partner who planned and executed only what she was bid. This view was held by both opponents and supporters of the policy. The Japanese Socialist Party recently reiterated its opinion concerning the matter:

⁶U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Japanese Peace Treaty and Other Treaties Relating to Security in the Pacific, 82nd Congress, 2nd Session Hearings January 21, 22, 23 and 25, 1952 (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1952), p. 62. Even the title of the hearings suggests the interdependence Mr. Dulles referred to. For an excellent discussion of the various aspects of these early negotiations, see John K. Emmerson, Arms, Yen and Power, The Japanese Dilemma (New York: Dunellen, 1971), Chapter 3, and Martin E. Weinstein, Japan's Postwar Defense Policy, 1947-1968 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1971) also Michael B. Hughes, "Guardianship to Partnership: The Evolution of the United States Base Structure in Japan, 1952-1970," April 20, 1971, unpublished (MALD Thesis), Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, chapter II, where I discuss the various U.S. attitudes toward the Peace Treaty and Security Treaty.

⁷I am not suggesting the Security Treaty was signed under duress or contrary to the basic goals and beliefs of the Japanese leaders. However, the timing of the Treaty, the secrecy of negotiations, Constitutional aspects and the implementing U.S. forces illustrate and explain the uncertainty and controversy surrounding the subject, whatever the positions of the leaders on both sides, or the rational advantage to either state.

(The time has come to end)....the period of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty - an era of Japan's subordination to and dependence on the United States... and in which Japan has been forced to cooperate with the Asian strategy of the United States.⁸

This acquiescence is not necessarily viewed as a positive or willing attitude on the part of the Japanese government. It has been characterized as "essentially passive - an effort to hold in balance" American demands and the pacifist feelings of the Japanese people.⁹ At one level of abstraction such an explanation is a truism. The defense of Japan was an integral part of American security policy, and as Hoffman observed, "everyone's heart misses a beat while the superpowers 'confront' one another. No one else much matters then."¹⁰ Japan, like any other nation-state within the sphere of a superpower, had limited options. Perhaps the key to this first theory is that it sees the Japanese government acting without autonomous goals and acquiescing to United States policy except where limited by internal factors such as politics, social attitude, economics and the Constitution.

The other major theories do not disagree with the above concept of the international system. They do, however, believe that the Japanese government operated with positive objectives. The first of these theories became popular during the establishment of the National Police

⁸ Sugiyama Shozo, ed., Japan Socialist Review, November 15, 1969, p. 3, organ of the Socialist Party of Japan. This view has also been evident in non-hostile sources such as George F. Kennan, "Japanese Security and American Policy", Foreign Affairs, Volume 43, No. 1, October 1964, 14-28; James H. Buck, "The Japanese Self-Defense Forces," Asian Survey, (September 1967), VII, No. 9, 597-613, Major Gilbert M. Billings Jr., "Japan's Air Self-Defense Force," Air University Review, Vol. XVI, No. 5/July/August 1965), 71.

⁹ Weinstein, op. cit., p. 7.

¹⁰ Op. cit., p. 34.

Reserve and it foresaw the "resurgence of Japanese militarism." It is a conspiracy theory which postulates that the Japanese government is planning the rearmament of Japan eventually leading to military dominance and the expansionist policies of the 1930's. Accusations to that effect were quite common in early 1952 while the Status of Forces Agreement was being reached, and from January to June in 1954 when the Defense Agency was organized.¹¹ The viewpoint received less attention afterward, although each new defense build-up plan or defense budget has elicited charges of a similar nature.

The past three years have seen a revival of this explanation of Japan's defense programs, and accusations have been heard from two rather disparate sources: The Chinese People's Republic and the United States Congress.¹² The tremendous Japanese economic growth, and the popularization of jishu boei, autonomous defense, in Japan have appeared to rekindle the theory. During a recent Diet controversy over the Fourth Defense Build-up Plan, the opposition parties repeatedly assailed the "dangerous trend toward unlimited militarism and failure of civilian control."¹³ Although these charges are often polemic attacks, the basis of the charge is that Japan again plans to project its power primarily through

¹¹Japanese newspapers during this period were filled with such charges, see particularly Tokyo Shimbun, April 21, 22, 1952, Japanese Press Summary, February 12, 29, 1952, Yomiuri Shimbun, March 26, 27, 1953. For a current, and academic source supporting this view see Myung-kin Yiu, "The Prospect of Japanese Rearmament," Current History, Vol. 60, No. 356 (April 1971), 193 ff.

¹²Premier Chou En-Lai began his criticism in 1968 and has continued to charge that Japanese militarism is "being revived." The United States-Chinese Joint Statement, February, 1972, is an indication of the emphasis placed on this issue by the Chinese. U.S. House of Representatives Foreign Affairs Committee, Survey Report, 1970, "warned against Japanese militarism."

¹³Japan Times, February 26, 1972.

military measures.

Although this theory and others will be criticized throughout this volume, it is important to note some of the assumptions relevant to such an explanation of Japanese military policy. Japan would have to maintain secrecy regarding its final goals and implementation; those wishing military dominance (presumably including the uniformed establishment) would require access to the political decision-making process; and if such an evolution has been and is occurring, the military budget and inventory would reflect weaponry associated with the projection of power.

A third theory which seeks to explain the rationale behind the development of the Japan Self-Defense Forces has been expounded by Martin Weinstein.¹⁴ He also concluded that Japan has not been passive regarding the military aspects of national security policy; it instead took the initiative in 1947 and developed a policy based on its own assessment of the evolving situation in Asia.

It concluded that the only viable defense to the major threat, which was the Soviet Union, lay in dependence on the United States. The resultant policy has been actively and continuously pursued since first proposed and, in essence, consists of two major pillars:

(1) A mutual defense agreement with the United States which would include a guarantee against direct attack

(2) Japanese forces capable of maintaining internal security.¹⁵

¹⁴ Japan's Postwar Defense Policy is Weinstein's principle work on the subject. Also see a recent edited volume, James William Morley, ed., Forecast for Japan: Security in the 1970's (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1972), for a less theoretical, and current series of studies which generally reach conclusions similar to Weinstein; Japanese defense policy has been reached autonomously and has deemphasized military options.

¹⁵ Weinstein, op. cit., p. 42.

The Japanese government has not always been successful in implementing these goals, and American demands have led to some rearmament steps outside the policy framework. Nevertheless, Weinstein has contended that the two forementioned goals have shaped the government's approach to the security treaties with the United States, and to the allotment of resources to the Self-Defense Forces.

This explanation of Japanese defense policy also contains assumptions which deserve a fuller discussion. If the Japanese force structure has been oriented toward internal security, its organization and equipment should reflect such emphasis. Weinstein capsulized the decision-making process by contending that "Prime Ministers Yoshida, Hatoyama, Kishi, Ikeda and Sato have made defense policy."¹⁶ If the decision-making process is not that simple, it becomes necessary to explain the goals of groups which have an interest in security and to ascertain their access to the process whereby policy is formulated.

A basic difficulty with these explanations of Japanese defense policy is that each one has concluded by contending that the Self-Defense Forces illustrate the validity of their evaluation. This contradiction is possible because in each case the force structure has not been evaluated definitively.

A closer examination of the Japanese force structure would appear to clarify analysis of Japanese defense policy in two respects. Neither policy nor strategy operates in a vacuum. The means of implementation of military policy lies, at least partially, in the force structure. The roles, capabilities and priorities within that structure should help to define previous policies.

¹⁶Weinstein, op. cit., p. 41.

An American military strategist has concluded that "wars are won on sound strategy implemented by well trained forces which are adequately and effectively equipped."¹⁷ Therefore, one sure means of delimiting future policy orientations and strategic options is to determine the character of the force structure, its training and equipment.

The allotment of resources within the force structure, the training and operational capacity of the structure, and the command network which direct it not only define and clarify policy and strategy, but will act, over time, to modify those policies with which they conflict. Therefore, it would appear that any definitive discussion of defense policy should base itself, in part, on close evaluation of the force structure.

The task of analyzing the entire Self-Defense Force in detail and relating that analysis to the framework of national security policy would be an unmanageable task. In an effort to limit the study, yet reflect the relationship between policy and force structure, the Air Self-Defense Force and air power policy will be used to illustrate the relationship which has been postulated.

Air power and the air force functionally limit the scope of the study, but should accurately define the force structure-policy relationship. Upon the establishment of the Japan Defense Agency, air power was emphasized by the first Director General, Mr. Kimura Tokutaro, who announced the Japanese Air Self Defense Force (JASDF) would be the principal weapon used in the defense of Japan.¹⁸ Commentators have regularly referred to the JASDF as the "frontline force," the force most

¹⁷General Albert C. Wedemeyer, U.S. Army, Wedemeyer Reports (New York: Devin-Adair Company, 1958), p. 74.

¹⁸Pacific Stars and Stripes, Japan ed., July 3, 1954, p. 1.

operationally ready within the Japanese defense forces.¹⁹

Air power may play a great variety of roles and be used in different strategies, but the combination of a particular weapons system and its associated training and tactics is of limited flexibility. Therefore, data in this area will be relatively reliable in reinforcing or disposing of certain assumptions about the air power aspect of defense policy.

Air power is a very significant element in the projection of military power; and while it is conceivable, it is unlikely that any industrial, modern nation-state would attempt to project its power without the use of aviation. Therefore, study of the structure built to implement air power should aid in reaching definitive conclusions about that aspect of national defense policy. Such an approach must have limitations, and it should be noted that any conclusions reached regarding defense policy beyond the immediate aspect of air power may be reached only through inference or association.²⁰

Aviation may be employed in several functional military roles. Aircraft and missiles may be used to attack other aircraft or missiles on an intercept mission, as in defense against a bomber force. This same air to air role may be used to achieve air superiority over any given space or territory. Aircraft may attack targets on the land or sea to achieve tactical or strategic goals. Aircraft weapon systems

¹⁹See Buck, loc. cit., p. 605-610; Aoki Hideo, "Jishu Boei to Nippon no Boei no Ryoku," (Autonomous Defense and Japan's Air Defense Capabilities), Gunji Kenkyu, July 1971, pp. 160-162; and Martin E. Weinstein, "Japan's Air Self-Defense Force, Restrained But Powerful," Air Force and Space Digest, Volume 50, No. 12, December 1967.

²⁰The lack of substantive reinforcement to conclusions about defense policy is endemic to anyone who studies the subject horizontally; in other words, those who emphasize only the making of the policy, or only the proclamation of the policy and the milieu in which either of those occurs.

may be used in close air support at the battle front; they may be used in interdiction, or interruption of the supply lines between the source and the front; and they may be used in strategic bombing or attack at the source of the adversary's supply. Air power may be used to attack naval targets on the surface or beneath it. It also may be used to obtain intelligence or to carry out reconnaissance. Aviation may serve to supply a military force and to give it mobility.

The portion of the thesis dedicated to analysis of the force structure will focus on the Japanese Air Self-Defense Force (JASDF). All aviation activities are not administered and operated by the JASDF; the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) and the Japan Ground-Self Defense Force (JGSDF) have a Naval Air Force and Aviation Section, respectively. The roles of these two branches will be considered and all aspects of air power will be examined through discussions of milieu, policy, strategy and command capacity. However, in relation to manpower, training and operations, cohesion of the study is preserved by focusing on the JASDF. All of the above-noted air power functions will be discussed in some degree, although capacity in some areas is nonexistent and the responsibility for execution of others is rather vague.

The organization of the study depends on the presumption that force structure does reflect the perceptions and the resultant security policies of the policy-makers. It therefore begins where the policy-makers begin, with an assessment of the power balance in Northern Asia. The respective national strengths and relevant force structures in Asia will be discussed primarily in terms of Japanese perceptions.

The decision-maker must consider another series of factors relevant to his own state before he begins constructing policy. The following section of the study will pursue these internal parameters which include

geo-political characteristics, natural resources, social indices and national traits. Institutional and historical factors peculiar to the Air Self-Defense Force are particularly relevant to the formulation of air power policy. The policy-maker must understand these national self-limitations as well as the potential adversary's capabilities.

The next step is the process through which the policy is formulated. It may include a formalized bureaucratic evolution or a more simple personal or elitist group decision. Decision-making can be complicated in the most totalitarian societies, and in Japan it has become a complex, highly bureaucratic process. Japan's political leadership has demonstrated little interest or expertise; as a result, the process itself has determined the access of various interest groups and clarified their goal orientation.

Uniformed planners, civilian defense bureaucrats, politicians, industrialists and others have demonstrated interest in Japanese defense policies. While the policy formulation process contributes to understanding the relative influence of these groups, two subsequent sections analyze the existing and potential aspects of the force structure and thereby demonstrate functional areas in which policy has been dominated by particular groups. The force structure in Japan previously has received little academic attention, and that which it has received has been superficial and uncritical.²¹

²¹The JASDF has been called a "sizable and very efficient force," and there are many who have expressed this opinion. See Edwin O. Reishchauer, Japan: The Story of a Nation (Tokyo: Charles E. Tuttle, 1970) p. 297; or Weinstein, "Restrained But Powerful," loc. cit., p. 65; or Buck, loc. cit., p. 610. Emerson, Arms and Power, pp. 127-151, discusses the SDF in slightly more critical terms, but again, passes over its operational status in a few paragraphs. Or Under Secretary U. Alexis Johnson in Senate testimony: "Japan has the capability (to defend) against a major conventional attack." U.S. Congress, Subcommittee

The failure to examine the force structure rigorously has led to misinterpretations of the basis of Japan's attitude toward military means of effecting national security policy. I intend to demonstrate that Japan's leaders have not perceived any threat, and therefore, the bureaucracy has not been required to reach a consensus on military policies. The social and institutional parameters have not severely constrained policy-makers; as a result, the process by which policy was formulated has become extremely important. The force structure illustrates the isolation in which the uniformed planners work; it also indicates the industrial influence and economic motivation in defense development. The irreconciled, and in some cases contradictory policy proposals, have resulted in a force structure capable of exercising a variety of future options, but having limited operational capacity. These perspectives will present a less rational and cohesive, but more realistic interpretation of Japanese national security policy, its past and its future.

on U.S. Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad of the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad, Japan and Commitments Abroad, Japan and Okinawa, 91st Congress, 2nd Session, Hearings (Washington: U.S. G.P.O., 1970), p. 1167.

II.

THE NEED FOR MILITARY FORCE

A military force structure is presumed to be a means of effecting military policy, which is, in turn, one method of effecting national security. National security policy describes those measures and positions taken by a state to contend with the threats which it perceives.

Any proposal or action which was viewed as inimical to a state's interest could be considered a threat. However, few states act in the interest of other states, and such an unlimited definition of threat would equate national security policy to all of a state's external policies. The concept may be limited to deal with those hostile measures or actions which directly or potentially endanger the survival of the state.

There are at least three distinct areas in which a state's survival may be challenged. One, of course, is direct attack against the territory of the state. Secondly, a state can be subjected to indirect attack, as when it is deprived of essential rights of passage or access to resources and markets upon which it depends. The state's existence may also be threatened by internal dissension initiated or exacerbated through external influence.

The possible use of military forces in response to the first type of threat is obvious; such forces also have application in the second situation, particularly if the required access or resources were denied through use of force. A military organization could be required to maintain martial order or curtail external influences in the event of indirect aggression.

It is possible to agree that such threats exist conceptually, but to disagree as to their reality. Moreover, threat exists as perceived by the state threatened; whatever the balance, that perception is the key to the attitudes and actions of the state.

The two chapters in this section therefore will emphasize the Japanese perception of their international environment. The first chapter deals with the geo-political balance in Asia, and discusses Japanese policies which condition and limit the government's evaluation of threat. The second chapter focuses on the nature of the threat as suggested by Japanese strategic thought. Strategic theories are at least partially generated by threat or the projected anticipation of threat. The resultant strategies provide additional evidence of Japanese perceptions regarding the probable levels and forms of violence with which it might have to deal.

Chapter 1

JAPAN IN ASIA

Certain of Japan's geo-political and social characteristics may be identified in terms of strategic strengths and weaknesses. Although these elements are internal, and independent of the states surrounding Japan, they directly pertain to Japan's interpretation of threat.

Direct attack on Japan is complicated by its insular status. The four major islands which constitute the bulk of Japanese territory are separated from mainland Asia by 125 miles at their closest point of approach. However, the nation stretches more than 1300 miles along the Asian littoral, presenting a long, exposed coast to the continental nations.


Moreover, it is heavily populated, having 106,000,000 inhabitants in 1970; and even within the limited territory there is a pronounced concentration of population and industrial resources. Such a concentration presents a vulnerable target and urbanization continues; more than 75 percent of the population was classified urban in 1970.¹ The population is principally located along what has become a super megalopolis, stretching around the Keihin industrial area and extending west through Nagoya, Osaka and Hiroshima to the northern coast of Kyushu. This area, illustrated in Figure 1-1, is approximately 500 nautical miles (NM) long and 100 NM wide at its widest point; it produced more than 75 percent

¹Economic Planning Agency, Economic Survey of Japan (Tokyo: Japan Times Ltd., July 30, 1971), p. 113.

FIGURE 1-1. Industrial Concentration in Japan

0 150 250 Miles
0 132 220 N.M.

//// Industrial Concentrations



Source: Teikoku's Atlas.

of the total industrial output of Japan in 1969.²

The rapidly expanding economic infrastructure also leaves Japan more vulnerable to indirect attack. The Japanese gross national product (GNP), which was the equivalent of 3.6 billion dollars in 1947, will increase to 276 billion dollars in 1972.³ Japan is heavily dependent on importation to fuel its industrial complex; it has the largest merchant fleet in the world and became the world's third largest trader in 1970, exchanging almost 20 billion dollars per year.⁴ The oceans surrounding Japan, barriers to direct attack, also make Japan potentially vulnerable to indirect pressures.

The ocean does limit the potential for massive infiltration aimed at creating internal dissension. Social and economic factors make the possibility of indirect aggression even more remote. The Japanese are a remarkably homogeneous population, in race, language, ethos and social customs. Minority groups are too small to constitute problems. Per capita income has risen from the equivalent of 34 dollars per year in 1947 to more than 2090 dollars per year in 1972.⁵ Japan has appeared to be capable of dealing with the rising expectations of its people.

²See Teikoku's Complete Atlas of Japan (Tokyo: Teikoku-Shoin Company, Ltd., 1969), p. 16. Some estimates made in Japan during 1971 suggested that an even greater percentage of industrial output was concentrated in the megalopolis. Suffice to say that the heart of industrial Japan lies within the relatively small rectangle.

³Economic Planning Agency, op. cit., pp. 152-153, the 1972 estimate is my own, interpellated from the 1970 GNP at official growth figures (8%) for 1971 and estimate for 1972 (5.5%), and converting at current exchange rates.

⁴Ibid., p. 83. I did not consider flags of convenience in classifying the Japanese merchant fleet largest.

⁵Ibid., p. 152-153, calculated in the same manner described in FN3.

Japan, from this base, has chosen to deemphasize military methods of national security during the 1950's and 1960's despite the large military structures present in the People's Republic of China, North Korea and the Soviet Union. Some of the factors which have determined Japan's national security policy have been mentioned already, however, the factors and in some cases, the policies themselves contribute to Japan's perception of threat. To the extent that the policies reinforce or alter perceptions, they contribute to future policy and therefore pertain to the current discussion.

Japan has no official enemy. Government statements scrupulously avoid any reference to a possible adversary. A secret military planning document which was written within the Japan Defense Agency (JDA) was leaked in 1965, and a significant portion of the resultant furor arose because China and North Korea had been used as enemies in this mock operations plan.⁶ Prime Minister Sato was forced to testify in the Diet that the government did not "look upon any country as its potential enemy."⁷ More recently, General Uemura, a recently retired JASDF Chief of Staff, testified at a trial in Hokkaido involving the ASDF in which he indirectly acknowledged that the Soviet Union was a probable enemy. The revelation made news throughout the country.⁸

⁶This incident known as the "Mitsuya Kenkyu" or "Three Arrows Plan" had been prepared as a joint operation study two years before in the Joint Staff Office of the JDA. A paper drill or operational analysis type plan, it of course had no direct connection to Japanese policy, nor was it an expression of same.

⁷Mainichi Daily News, February 11, 1965, background information provided by Major Torino Masaru, JASDF.

⁸Asahi, January 28, 1972. As explained when I discuss this matter in an interview with Major Torino on February 5, 1972, General Uemura simply did not deny an allegation made by a defense attorney.

Japan has refused to consider using military force outside its territory. It has repeatedly asserted that troops will not be dispatched overseas, that no interests outside the national territory will be defended by the Self-Defense Forces.⁹ The Constitution forbids resorting to armed means to settle international disputes, and in October 1971, Director General (DG) Nishimura declared that the principle would be "applied to the protection of our overseas economic interests and assets."¹⁰

Japanese nuclear policy, as commonly expressed during the 1970's, has consisted of the three no's: it will make no, allow no and have no nuclear weapons in Japan.¹¹ The very existence of the adamant non-nuclear policy has had an effect. Japan's lack of military nuclear capability has been equated with lack of capacity to deal with a nuclear threat. An adversary's nuclear force structure has been disregarded except for the "nuclear umbrella" which normally has been presumed to be provided by the United States. The effect of the Security Treaty on Japan's non-nuclear policy may be subject to question. In October 1971, Director General Nishimura remarked that: "even if the nuclear umbrella of the United States should be removed from Japan the situation will not change."¹² It might be argued that this attitude toward nuclear

⁹Defense of Japan, pp. 38-39, The New Defense Build-up, pp. 3-5.

¹⁰Nishimura Naomi, Director General of JDA, Philosophy of Self-Defense - Strategy of Limited Response, October 11, 1971, text of speech delivered to the Foreign Correspondent's Club of Japan, p. 8.

¹¹See Chapter 2 for a discussion of Japanese non-nuclear policy.

¹²Nishimura, Philosophy, p. 38, there was a very Freudian slip in the printed text of the speech which actually read, "the unclear umbrella of the United States." This quotation is drawn from a response to a question rather than from the actual text.

armaments is the norm of national behavior; all nations, with the exception of France, China and perhaps India, have continued to be willing to rely on the nuclear deterrent of the superpowers. The Japanese case is peculiar in that Japan has a technical capability to develop nuclear weapons and is surrounded by neighboring states who do have nuclear arsenals.

The policies which have been mentioned have reflected the disparity between the military forces capable of exerting influence on Japan and its autonomous capacity to respond to the threat with force. Any apparent incongruities between its national force structure and national interests may represent an unconventional emphasis on defensive methodologies, but have primarily been explained in terms of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty.

It has in fact been argued that the national defense structure is tasked only with the maintenance of internal order while all other aspects of national defense are to be effected through implementation of the Security Treaty:

These forces were to maintain internal security, and by doing so were to contribute to the creation of a mutual defense relationship with the United States, which was to include a guarantee of Japan's external security.¹³

Regardless of the validity of this assessment, the Security Treaty has served as a substitute for various aspects of a conventional national defense structure. Thus the Security Treaty has been relied on to provide a counter-force response to various modes and levels of external threat. Such a policy tends to assume a bi-polar world, or at least a near totality of common interests between the United States and Japan.

¹³Weinstein, Defense Policy, p. 106.

It is in such a situation that any threat to Japan would prove an identical threat to the United States; the U.S. method of dealing with the threat could be assumed to correspond to the best interests of Japan.¹⁴

If the Security Treaty ever represented such identity of threats and interests, it no longer did in 1972. If United States security interests were global and all-encompassing, they were not in 1972. Despite changes in the perceived national interests of the parties and modifications of the international system, Japan and the United States have continued to place great emphasis on the Security Treaty. In the State of the World Message to Congress on February 9, 1972, President Nixon declared:

¹⁴This explanation tends to be absolute and perhaps not completely accurate, but is used to emphasize the issue. I shall not attempt to treat the historical evolution of the Security Treaty. It is, of course, an essential facet of Japanese national security, and I shall discuss and refer to the security relationship throughout this study. However, the history and development of the U.S.-Japanese security relationship has been covered in detail elsewhere. Refer to Weinstein, Postwar Defense Policy, for a detailed review in English; and Emmerson, Arms, part 2, for interesting aspects of early U.S.-Japanese negotiation. Also see "The U.S.-Japan Security Treaty," Boei Nenkan (Defense Yearbook) (Tokyo: Boei Nenkan Kanko Kai, 1972 ed.), pp. 101-113. The official Japanese view may be found in Defense of Japan, "The Development of Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements" (section 4-1). For opposition views of development refer to "DSP Views Toward the Government-LDP Decision for Automatic Extension of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty," Democratic Socialist Party Statement, (U.S. Embassy Translation) and "Indictment Against Automatic Extension of Security Treaty; Arms of 1970 Treaty and our Attitude," Shakai Shimpō (organ of the JSP), June 17, 1970 (U.S. Embassy Translation). A detailed, newspaper outlook on the treaty is provided by "Japan's Peace and Security: Part III: The Security Treaty," 31 parts, The Mainichi Daily News, November-December, 1968. See also Hughes, op. cit. especially Chapters II and IV, William J. Jorden, "Japan's Diplomacy Between East and West," Borton, et al., eds. Japan Between East and West (New York: Harper and Brother, 1957); and Fred Greene, U.S. Policy and the Security of Asia (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1968). What I shall attempt to do is focus on the changing complexion of the treaty due to the change in policies and capabilities in Asia.

We intend that Japan shall remain our most important Asian ally. We expect that the future will be an even greater degree of interdependence between us. We believe the vitality of our friendship and our cooperation in international matters is essential to the stable Asia we both require--and to the peaceful world we both seek.¹⁵

On January 29, 1972, in his annual policy speech to the Diet, Prime Minister Sato also reiterated the importance of the relationship:

For Japan, our relations with the United States are more important than those we have with any other country. Today, no matter to what extent international relations have become multipolarized, this fact has not changed in the slightest degree.¹⁶

There has been, however, a shift in the nature of the relationship. Even in the reaffirmations cited above, Prime Minister Sato noted the multipolarization of the international system and President Nixon did not talk about the defense of Japan but of common interests shared in Asia. Three months before, then Director-General Nishimura gave a major defense policy address, and did not specifically mention the Security Treaty. He mentioned the confidence provided by "Japan's security relationship with the U.S.," however, he then declared:

This does not mean, however, that Japan will forever, and in every field of national security, depend on the U.S. Nor will Japan take every U.S. protection for granted. We are doing and will try to do more by ourselves. Nevertheless the security relations with the U.S. are a basic

¹⁵President Richard M. Nixon, U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970's: The Emerging Structure of Peace, A Report to the Congress, February 9, 1972 (Washington, D.C., U.S. Government Printing Office), p. 58.

¹⁶Prime Minister Sato Eisaku, text of administrative speech delivered to National Diet, January 29, 1972, Japan Times, January 30, 1972, p. 12.

element for which we have not yet found any effective alternative.¹⁷

There were several interesting aspects to the statement. The Director General indicated that the relationship was changing, and that there was a difference between U.S. interests and Japanese interests. Perhaps most significantly, in terms of the threat to Japan, Mr. Nishimura acknowledged that the probability of U.S. action differs with the nature of the threat involved.

Japan will not take "every protection for granted." The Director General was rather explicitly acknowledging that there were situations in which the United States might not act, situations in which Japan previously may have expected the United States to act.

The Nixon Doctrine included a reaffirmation of the nuclear umbrella, but warned that local conflicts must be dealt with by the parties concerned. President Nixon said Japanese-American cooperation was essential to a stable Asia. Foreign Minister Aichi Kiichi put it another way in 1969; American forces were necessary "to keep the peace in the region."¹⁸ The United States will not become directly involved in local conflicts, but will participate in regional stabilization. A security relationship tempered by the Nixon Doctrine forces Japan to assess the limits of the U.S. commitment before it can determine the value of the relationship. What will be the nature of the stable Asia to which the President referred? May a regional subsystem be defined and how may it be made stable? What level and type of cooperation in this endeavor has been offered? Japan has disassociated itself from any

¹⁷Nishimura, op. cit., p. 10.

¹⁸Aichi Kiichi, "Japan's Legacy of Change," Foreign Affairs, October 1969, p. 31.

role in a global military balance. However, within the increasing multi-centrism in Asia, there exists the possibility that regional threats might arise which could demand new responses from the Japanese.

Raymond Aron asserted that the first characteristic of a system "is the configuration of the relation of forces."¹⁹ This, he said, involved several questions; "What are the limits of the system? What is the distribution of forces among the various actors? How are the actors situated on the map?"²⁰

The primary purpose of defining such a system is to determine possible threats to Japan, therefore, it is permissible to begin by designating it a political-military sub-system. The actors may be defined by their capability to project their influence on Japan by the use of force.²¹


Figure 1-2 is a world polar projection centered on Tokyo and it graphically presents the problem of distance for participants in an Asian political-military sub-system. The continental states of Southeast Asia may be eliminated, both by virtue of their distance and lack of seagoing navy. Australia is over 3000 miles away; its defense budget is only two-thirds of the Japanese defense budget, its GNP

¹⁹Aron, op. cit., p. 95.

²⁰Ibid., Professor Tsunoda Jun, October 21, 1972, Interview, was very helpful in clarifying my concepts regarding Japan's international milieu particularly on a regional basis.

²¹The reverse (Japanese threat) need not be considered for two reasons; the threat to Japan has been established as the major criterion and Japan's policy and force structure provide a low capability for Japanese force projection. Section V discusses air power capacity in detail. It should be noted that the issue of the U.S. role in conditioning Japanese perception of threat has been suspended in order to establish the system in which it will operate. I shall return to the U.S. role in the Japanese view of their system.

FIGURE 1-2. World Polar Projection Centered on Tokyo, Japan



one-sixth that of Japan.²² The Philippines is closer but having one-tenth of the Japanese defense budget and one-thirtieth of the Japanese GNP eliminate it as a threat.

Indonesia must be considered more carefully because of its position. It guards the Straits of Malacca, Japan's gateway to the Mideast. It also claims control of Sunda Strait and Lombok Strait, two deepwater straits between the Malacca Strait and Australia. Japan is dependent on trade and particularly dependent on the supply of oil from the Mideast.²³ Japan imported 99.4 percent of its crude oil in 1968 and 91 percent of that came from the Mideast.²⁴ Therefore, the Malacca Straits provide an ideal geographic checkpoint to apply pressure to Japan. It should be remembered that the point here is to assess the strategic possibility of sea-lane interdiction, not to assess the probability of Japanese reaction although proposals for sea-lane protection are outside of the mainstream of defense theory in Japan.²⁵

²²Approximate figures taken from International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 1971-1972 (London; International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1971) pp. 44-47.

²³Commander Sekino Hideo, I.J.N. (ret.), defense author and advisor to the Foreign Ministry stressed this vulnerability in discussions on December 2, 1971 and February 28, 1972. Also, see Auer, James E., "The Postwar Sea Forces of Maritime Japan, 1945-1971." (Ph.D. Thesis), July 1971, Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University pp. 276-300 for a detailed account of the Sekino Theory asserting the need, and possibility for protection of the sea lanes. Another thorough discussion of the problems of the maritime defense is Sekino Hideo, I.J.N. (ret.), "Japan and Her Maritime Defense," U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings, May 1971, pp. 98-121.

²⁴Sekino, op. cit., p. 115.

²⁵Mr. Nakasone Yasuhiro, when Director General, declared that Japan had "neither the capability nor the intention to go on the high seas" to protect its tankers, Proposals on Mutual Security Between Japan and the United States, text of speech delivered at the Washington Press Club, September 10, 1970. Professor Royama Michio of Sophia University told me that such theories "were pre-nuclear and archaic; they are not

The Indonesia archipelago is a geographic checkpoint, however, it is not an insurmountable obstacle. Japan operates twenty-five-knot supertankers which, by 1971, began to bypass Malacca; and shipping could go around Australia. In political terms, there appears little advantage for the present Indonesian government; Japanese economic reprisals could outweigh the advantage of attempting blackmail at Malacca. The only probable use of Malacca Straits as a geo-political checkpoint would occur when a state with probable benefit used that location to apply pressure in collusion or alliance with Indonesia.

With the Southern Asian nations eliminated, the regional subsystem narrows to Japan's five immediate neighbors and the United States. Figure 1-3 provides a rough summary of the size and ready force structure of these states. The United States is far from the center of the regional system; this special discrepancy will be discussed in more detail later. The Asian deployment of United States' military forces does make it capable of acting in the political-military sub-system. One obvious fact is revealed by Figure 1-3. There are four large, or potentially large, members, and there are three relatively small actors.

Although North and South Korea and Taiwan have the technical capacity to reach Japan with the weapons they possessed in 1971, such a venture seems highly unlikely.²⁶ Aside from political realities, they could

feasible technically, economically or politically," Interview, February 5, 1972. Mr. Kaihara Osamu, Secretary General of the National Defense Council and others were also very critical. Commander Sekino recognized the improbability that Japan would (could) extend such protection, he is therefore interested in much closer maritime coordination between Japan and the U.S. Seventh Fleet; Interview, December 2, 1971.

²⁶Taiwan has both the air and naval capacity to reach Okinawa (approx. 300 NM.) with F-100's, F-5's, Airborne Brigades, Destroyers and Landing Ships, North Korea could drop bombs on Honshu with IL-28's, Mig-17's, and MiG-21's (400 NM to Hiroshima); See Military Balance, 1971-1972, for information on orders of battle mentioned here.

Area ¹ (1000 Sq. Miles)	Population ¹ (1,000,000)	GNP ¹ (Billion \$)	Defense Budget (Billion \$)	Army ² (Manpower)	Navy ² (Tonnage)	Air Force ² (Operational Aircraft - #)
Japan	142.8	104.6	1.8	179,000	135,000	380
United States (not in Asia)	3,541.0	208.1	78.7	70,000	650,000 ⁴	1200 ³
8,647.3						
U.S.S.R. (partially in Asia)	245.7	490.0	39.7	465,000	700,000 ⁴	1500
China (P.R.C.)	3,690.6	760.0	8.5	2,500,000	260,000	2800
North Korea	46.5	14.0	.85	360,000	24,000	555
South Korea	38.0	32.7	.41	560,000	64,000	235
Taiwan	13.9	14.6	.60	390,000	145,000	385

¹ Figures all rounded to one decimal.

² Forces present in Asia.

³ Including U.S. Naval aircraft.

⁴ Subject to deployment fluctuations.

not carry out any rational act of violence without support from another state. All three states are former Japanese colonies and battlegrounds of the cold war. They provide a problem for Japan that might be characterized more accurately as areas of instability rather than autonomous threats. These instabilities are aggravated by the large force structures existing in the three states, and the uncertainty likely during a readjustment period among the major powers.²⁷

Taiwan was ceded to Japan in 1895 as a result of the Sino-Japanese War, and it reverted to China in conformity with the terms of surrender of World War II. It became the refuge of Chiang Kai-shek and the government of the Republic of China in 1949. Japan subsequently signed a separate peace treaty with the Nationalist government. Japan's previous occupation and the separate peace treaty have been a great irritant to the Chinese People's Government in Peking. Professor Fairbank compared the Communists to the Ch'ing Dynasty which conquered Peking in 1644, but "could not rest content" until Taiwan was taken in 1683.²⁸ Japan has limited options regarding Taiwan: to support Nationalist China, to support an independent Taiwan, to avoid the issue, or to support the Chinese People's Republic. Japanese internal pressures make it increasingly difficult to avoid a decision. There has been in Japan a strong emotional pull toward the Taiwanese Independence Movement,

²⁷Major General Takeda Akio, JASDF, Interview, February 21, 1972, a military theoretician on the staff of the National Defense College. I am in his debt for his comprehensive and novel ideas on the Asian balance of power and Japan's security problems. Specifically, he emphasized the instability of these two areas and the need for Japan to take a positive role in a solution. I am afraid, however, that he will not agree with my conclusions regarding the best solution from Japan's viewpoint.

²⁸John K. Fairbank, Edwin O. Reischauer, Albert M. Craig, East Asia: The Modern Transformation (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1965), pp. 882-883.

which bases itself in Tokyo. However, Taipei and Peking both would oppose that position and such a Japanese policy would only exacerbate the dilemma. The United States already has acquiesced to the one-China philosophy of the two contending governments. There are voices who argue that Taiwan is a vital Japanese interest and Peking must be opposed on the issue; they are, however, in a minority.²⁹ Japan's essential interest is balance and stability in the region. While it is valid to urge a peaceful solution of the imbroglio, Japan eventually will accept the probability that Peking will dominate Taiwan.

If Taiwan is an important issue to Japan, Korea is a critical one. The Korean peninsula lies between Japan, China and the Soviet Union. It has been the scene of three wars in the past eighty years. None of those wars were fought with the primary intent of conquest, but were results of attempts to change the balance between larger powers in the system. Japan has believed and publicly acknowledged that Korea is an important issue in Japanese national security. In 1969, Prime Minister Sato stated in Washington, D.C.: "if an armed attack against the Republic of Korea were to occur, the security of Japan would be seriously affected."³⁰ Mitsuya Kenkyu, the secret defense study planned by the Defense Agency in 1963, envisioned a hypothetical invasion of South Korea.³¹

Again, there have been limited options for Japanese policy. It has been natural for Japan to oppose forceful re-unification by North

²⁹ Joseph Z. Redau "Japan's Taiwan Dilemma," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, March 1972, pp. 49-53.

³⁰ Prime Minister Sato Eisaku, Speech to National Press Club, Washington, D.C., November 4, 1969, text, New York Times.

³¹ Japan Times, February 10, 11, 12, 1965.

Korea, for that would mean Korea's dominance by either the Soviet Union or China. A quick glance at the map reveals the difference in Japan's strategic posture. The entire Japanese megalopolis is within five hundred nautical miles of Korea's southern tip. Japan could support either peaceful reunification or the status quo. Peaceful reunification and neutralization are often considered ideal solutions to the problem. In an ideal world that solution would work; however, in a less than ideal world there remains a high probability that competition for influence in Korea would resume after reunification. Japan would have historical and geographical disadvantages in such competition. It would appear that this will continue to be a Pandora's Box better left unopened; although there remain instabilities possible in the Korean situation, no probable alternative has promised greater benefit to Japan.³²

If the smaller states in Asia may be judged incapable of seriously threatening Japan, it is possible to conclude that in the absence of the Soviet Union, China and the United States, Japan would have no security problem, would need no security treaty, and would require a minimal defense structure. Such a statement may appear inane, but it can be helpful in understanding the chimeric aspect of Japan's defense requirements: A non-nuclear nation with a defense-only force structure potentially facing the three largest nations in the world, all equipped with nuclear weapons.

³²General Takeda, Interview, February 21, 1972. The general believed that Korean reunification and neutralization could remove the common threat to all three nations (China, USSR, and Japan), and enable an Asian Security Treaty, including arms control and military deployment control, which would stabilize the Asian subsystem. The JSP proposes essentially the same solution when they advocate a 4-power security treaty which effectively would neutralize Korea and eliminate competition.

An important aspect of this assessment is that Japanese theorists and political leaders have perceived Japan as a full-fledged member of this subsystem. General Takeda, already cited, believed that Japan should advocate a four-pillared security arrangement, including the United States, Soviet Union, and China with Japan.³³ Professor Royama also predicted that the new balance in Asia will be a quadra-centric one; he believed that the four nations will deal with each other from equidistant positions.³⁴ Prime Minister Sato acknowledged that Japan must work for closer relations with its Communist neighbors in his major foreign policy address for 1972.³⁵ Director-General Nishimura was more explicit on October 11, 1971, in a major address on the "Philosophy of Self-Defense:"

Japan's belief is that it is both necessary and possible, first, for Japan, the U.S., the Soviet Union and China - whatever their differences might be - to cooperate and work together for ultimate peace and stability in the Asian-Pacific region.³⁶

Figures 2 and 3 reveal some obvious flaws in this vision of a quadra-centric balance in Asia. First, the nations are not equidistant in space. The United States is significantly displaced and, although it has an evident global interest, a specific interest and involvement

³³Interview, February 21, 1972.

³⁴Interview, February 5, 1972.

³⁵The Japan Times, text, January 30, 1972.

³⁶Nishimura, op. cit., p. 40.

in the regional balance must be demonstrated.³⁷

It is also evident that no military balance exists between the four powers. Disregard of this imbalance is what Professor Aron called "military indifference - taking armament potential for actual power, imagining that diplomatic notes have the same force of conviction whether they are supported by statistics of steel production or by fleets of battleships, aircraft carriers and planes."³⁸

Japan is not co-equal to the other three states in military power in 1972; even were it decided to achieve parity, Japan faces geographic difficulties. Continental states, with their great territorial expanse, are more able to absorb the destruction of war. This is especially important in an age when offensive technology dominates at both strategic and tactical levels of warfare. Japan also faces an imbalance of space. The respective concentrations of industrial capacity of the U.S., the U.S.S.R. and China are a greater distance from Japan than the Japanese megalopolis is from the national boundaries of those three countries.

On May 28, 1971, Mr. Nakasone Yasuhiro, the Director General of the Self-Defense Forces, also expressed a belief that the stability of Asia was dependent on the four nations discussed. He went on, however, to enunciate four principles which must guide Japanese diplomacy and one of

³⁷The future might prove the United States less of an Asian power than in 1940. The U.S. interest in Taiwan and South Korea will continue to decline, other than their effect on Japan, and the line of U.S. "free-use" bases now extends only to Guam. In 1940 the U.S. involvement in China stemmed partly from U.S. possession of the Philippines. At that time the U.S. was an Asian territorial power.

³⁸Aron, op. cit., p. 40.

those was "to have a reliable ally."³⁹ If Japan must have an ally - and strategic data supports such a theory - the only possible balance is tri-centric. As long as the U.S.-Japan security relationship continues to exist in some form, the actual balance now in the process of evolving is tri-centric. If that situation remains stable, the probable threats to Japan may be discussed in terms of three bilateral relationships: Japan-China, Japan-U.S.S.R., and Japan-U.S.⁴⁰ Possible multilateral combinations and the possibility of Japan playing a balancer role may be considered in terms of these relationships.

The French military theorist, Pierre Gallois, declared that Chinese nuclear capacity had forced Japan into one of three courses: absolute dependence on the U.S.; neutrality, dependence on China; or indigenous development of a nuclear weapons capacity. Such a pronouncement naturally gained significant public attention in Japan, and the Defense

³⁹ Mr. Nakasone Yasuhiro, Perspective of the Defense of Japan, text of speech delivered at the America-Japan Society, May 28, 1971 (Japan Defense Agency), p. 10. The four principles were: 1) to do nothing beyond our national strength, 2) to take no gambler's risks, 3) to have a reliable ally, 4) not to be isolated from world currents. Mr. Nakasone had expanded on this view in a discussion in Yomiuri, July 18, 19, 1970.

⁴⁰ Professor Royama Michio, "Again on the China Problem", Chuo Koron, November 1971, (U.S. Embassy Translation), discussed the Chinese problem and suggested that there will be a tripolar detente, but he saw it as a nuclear, global balance which operates above Japan's level of participation and actually makes the Japanese position more flexible. The tri-centric concept I suggest here is a regional system which directly involves Japanese policy, and in which Japan plays a part in the balance. The possibility of alliances against Japan will not be discussed in detail. Hopefully, the following discussion on the bilateral relationships will show that cooperation between two or more great powers against Japan is unlikely and even the use of a third state by one of the great powers would not be tolerated by the others.

Agency announced a "full-scale study of the China question."⁴¹ The results of that study have not been announced, but understanding of the Sino-Japanese power relationship lies deeper than Chinese nuclear capacity.

The relationship has been deeply involved in the common history the two nations share. The Japanese openly feel that their relationship with China has been a very special one. They believe that cultural, social and linguistic similarities give them a unique ability to understand and deal with China. Lieutenant General Okumiya Masatake, JASDF (ret.), is a military historian and has authored works in both English and Japanese. In discussing the China issue, General Okumiya declared that "Japan became an independent country when China joined the United Nations."⁴² Japanese feeling for the special relationship has been increased by their sense of guilt resulting from aggression in the 1930's and 1940's. As a result of the special relationship, Japan has felt little fear or hostility toward China.⁴³ There also has been a certain sensitivity in Japan to the Chinese relationship with other states. Perhaps this sensitivity results from the common Confucian background because the Japanese have seen themselves balanced against China. China's status as permanent member of the Security Council also has

⁴¹See Sankei, February 1, 1971 (U.S. Embassy Translation) for detailed quotes on the Gallois theory and JDA announcements concerning their forthcoming study of China. See also Tokyo Shimbun, February 1, 1971 and Nihon Keizai, January 10, 1971.

⁴²Interview, November 18, 1971, see the bibliography for some of General Okumiya's works, he also is the co-author of Midway The Battle that Doomed Japan. A former member of the IJN as well as the JASDF, General Okumiya was an advisor to the International Editorial Office of the PHD Institute for World Peace in Tokyo in 1971.

⁴³Weinstein, "Japan and the Continental Giants," Current History, April 1971, p. 199, made this point in his discussion of Sino-Japanese relations.

worried the status-conscious Japanese. Improvement of U.S.-Chinese relations has therefore been interpreted in Japan as a deterioration of U.S.-Japanese relations. While the timing and method of effecting a U.S.-Chinese rapprochement obviously could exacerbate Japanese concern, the basic sensitivity has existed regardless.⁴⁴

There have been areas of friction between China and Japan. One analysis, made in Japan during the Nixon visit to China, argued that the Chinese attitude toward Japanese militarism had shifted in 1969.⁴⁵ In the spring, Chinese and Soviet troops were clashing along the Amur River; President Nixon announced a new Asian policy in the summer; and then the U.S.-Japan Joint Communiqué concerning Taiwan and Korea instigated Chinese fears that Japan was replacing the U.S. "vacuum" in Asia.

Regardless of the timing of the shift in Chinese attitude, it has been clear that the resurgence of a military structure and the increase of Japanese political-military influence have been prime concerns of Chou En-lai. He has repeatedly warned of the dangers of Japanese militarism over the past three years; most recently the subject was broached in the U.S.-Chinese Joint Statement issued February 14, 1972.⁴⁶

⁴⁴The Nixon visit to China was a great shock to the Japanese and it perhaps is unwise to use it as an example, however during Nixon's visit I was approached many times by Japanese to discuss the subject and this basic assumption repeatedly manifest itself.

⁴⁵"Security Issue Plays Role in China-U.S. Talks," Yomiuri, February 21, 1972.

⁴⁶For a convenient and detailed statement of Chou's views see James Reston's interview, "Chou alarmed Over Japan's Growing 'Militarism' in Asia," The New York Times, August 10, 1971. For a detailed analysis of China's concern with Japan's nuclear capacity, see Alice Langley Hsieh, Communist China's Evolving Military Strategy and Doctrine (Arlington, Va.: Institute for Defense Analysis, June 1970), pp. 38-43.

Although there is little doubt that Chou's concern was real, it is doubtful that he believed 'militarism' was dominating Japanese life. The Chinese statements on Japanese militarism could be considered a form of preventative diplomacy.

The Chinese attitude on Japanese militarism has been essentially a defensive one, and assessments of Chinese strategy reinforce that viewpoint. The rough figures cited in Figure 1-3 show a great disparity between the force structures of the two states, but that picture does not fully describe the balance. The Chinese naval forces have been equipped and deployed in such a manner as to suggest coastal defense was the primary strategy.⁴⁷ The Air Force has had the technical capability to reach Japan, but with only a small percentage of its bombers and they have been outmoded.⁴⁸ Its MiG-17's and MiG-19's could reach Kyushu but would be operating at their maximum combat radius.⁴⁹ Recent reports suggested that the Chinese were placing more emphasis on the flexibility of their conventional force with the development of a Mach 2, multi-purpose aircraft.⁵⁰

⁴⁷ Military Balance, 1971-1972, p. 42. For more detail on the general "low-risk, cautions" military strategy employed by the Chinese see Hsieh, op. cit., pp. 1-5, 55-62.

⁴⁸ The Military Review, 1971-1972, reports the total Air Force in China at 2800 aircraft, approx. 200 of those being bombers. Air Actualities, the official review of the French Air Force, has recently reported the Chinese Air Force at 3,740 aircraft, including 440 bomber aircraft, (as reported in Yomiuri, January 28, 1972, and Mainichi Daily News, January 29, 1972).

⁴⁹ The MiG-19 is supersonic and the Chinese fleet totalled over 800 in 1971 with a production rate approaching 16 per month, Air Actualities, as reported in Mainichi Daily News, January 29, 1972.

⁵⁰ Air Actualities, as reported in Mainichi Daily News, January 29, 1972 and the Daily Yomiuri, January 28, 1972. The aircraft is reportedly called the F-9 and weighs ten tons with a maximum airspeed of Mach 2. The Chinese are reported to have 80 built and production underway at the rate of 10 aircraft per month.

The Japanese have been aware of the growing Chinese nuclear capacity which further imbalanced their military relationship with China. Japan has viewed the Chinese nuclear capability as the major source of any future Chinese threat potential.⁵¹ The official Japanese position on the issue reflected a broader nuclear attitude: at present, "China does not pose a substantial threat;" and if the threat grew, Japan must "rely on the security provided by the United States nuclear deterrent."⁵² Therefore, it has not been concerned with Chinese military capability and has not viewed it as a significant threat to Japanese security. There remains the possibility that continued Chinese rearmament, particularly attack capability, and a destabilized Asia could escalate Japanese estimates.

Although the Japanese have avoided any public designation of enemies, they have believed that the Soviet Union has presented their principal military threat during the post-war era and will continue to do so, at least in the 1970's.⁵³

The threat, although tied to Soviet global interests, has also been regional. The Soviet Union is Japan's closest neighbor. It occupies more Asian land than any pure Asian power, and its dependence on the Pacific has increased: for commerce, for food supply and for access to an environment in which it may project its influence in Asia and protect its security interests vis-a-vis China. It has become "inextricably

⁵¹ Nakasone, Proposals on Mutual Security, September 10, 1970, p. 24. Hsieh, op. cit., pp. 48-54, discussed China's nuclear mix and possible strategies.

⁵² Nakasone, Proposals on Mutual Security, p. 24.

⁵³ See Weinstein, Japan's Defense Policy, and "Japan and the Continental Giants," loc. cit., p. 197, for comment concerning Japanese perceptions. Also Emmerson, Arms, pp. 243-250, for a discussion of Soviet policies regarding security in Asia and the Japanese position.

involved" in Asia, as either a global or regional actor.⁵⁴

The Soviet Union is not only "inextricably involved" in Asia, it also has become unavoidably involved with Japan in both its regional and global role. Japan is a potential enemy to the Soviet Union. The Japanese islands limit Soviet access to the sea. If the Japanese take purely regional defense measures such as establishing control over their peripheral sea and air areas, the acts assume global proportions to the Soviet Union because they limit the Soviet fleet's access to the Pacific Ocean. Japan may find that any Pacific conflict involving the Soviet Union would be unavoidable because of this geographic relationship.

Siberian resources and Japanese technology are two elements which could lead to improved relations. Those relations have proven dynamic in recent years with the Soviet Union initiating the betterment and broadening of its relations with Japan. The Soviet Union did not normalize relations with Japan until 1956, and they have not signed a Peace Treaty concluding World War II. There have been frictions between the two states, primarily over the "Northern Territories," and the treatment of Japanese fishermen by Soviet authorities.⁵⁵ Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko visited Tokyo in January 1972, and in an apparent shift

⁵⁴George Thompson, "The New World of Asia," Foreign Affairs, October 1969, p. 137, discussed the Soviet involvement from the Indian Ocean to the Arctic and makes the point that the USSR is "inextricably involved."

⁵⁵Emmerson, Arms, pp. 227-243, contains a good account of USSR-Japan relations including the territorial problem, and Weinstein, "The Continental Giants," loc. cit., pp. 198-199, discussed the fishing issue. For a summary of Japanese viewpoints on the issue see Watanabe Takechi, "Territorial Issue Key to Peace Treaty," Mainichi Daily News, January 29, 1972, which includes Japanese views on other Japanese-Soviet problems. It also could be noted that there was a continuing dispute over the repatriation of Japanese POW's after World War II which has left some Japanese disenchantment with Soviet negotiations.

of Soviet attitude, agreed to open negotiations for a Peace Treaty including discussion of the Northern Territories.⁵⁶ Prime Minister Sato, addressing the Diet after Gromyko's visit, stressed "the strengthening of amicable and friendly relations between our two countries."⁵⁷

At first glance, the Soviet military power vis a vis Japan has appeared to be overwhelming. However, it is not without limitation. First, the force structure actually deployed to Asia has been only a small portion of the Soviet military. Figure 1-3 provides general data on the approximate size of forces actually stationed in Asia. Although Soviet forces obviously could be redeployed at any time, the distance between Leningrad and Vladivostok makes redeployment a major undertaking. It would appear probable that the Soviet Union will continue to be heavily committed in Europe during the 1970's and would withdraw forces there with great reluctance.

The Soviet Forces deployed in Asia have had varied missions. The Soviet Pacific Naval Fleet has been increased significantly over the past few years, however the submarine fleet and surface task groups have operated in a global strategic and political role. Director General Nakasone expressed such an opinion when asked about the Soviet Navy: "this global deployment of Soviet naval power is less a military threat than a political demonstration."⁵⁸ The Soviet force structure also must consider a regional mission in Asia which has outweighed any Japanese focus. The thirty-three divisions in Asia have been deployed along the Chinese frontier; that sensitive border has limited Soviet

⁵⁶Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko, press conference, January 28, 1972, Mainichi Daily News, January 29, 1972.

⁵⁷Japan Times, January 30, 1972.

⁵⁸Nakasone, Proposals on Mutual Security, p. 20.

options with regard to Japan.

Finally, in the event of hostilities with Japan or China, the Soviet Union would face a serious logistics problem, particularly if amphibious operations were planned. If seaborne supply was interdicted, the Trans-Siberian Railway is a limited vehicle, as it still is reduced to single track in some areas. Over 4000 rail miles connect Moscow and Vladivostok; the distance and supplies needed to support an amphibious invasion would pose a serious logistics problem.⁵⁹

Mr. Kaihara Osamu, Secretary-General of the National Defense Council (NDC), was correct when he argued that the only Japanese hope against the Soviet Union was delay; there was no real probability that Japan alone could resist attack.⁶⁰

The factors mentioned above do help to explain, however, the lack of Japanese concern and their optimism concerning the probability of attack, either direct or indirect.

The lowering tensions in Asia and the "era of negotiation" have popularized the belief that there does exist very little chance of attack. The Security Treaty and the entire concept of a U.S.-Japan security relationship has been questioned. Opponents argue that, with the lessening of U.S.-Soviet and U.S.-Chinese tensions, the treaty has lost its raison de'etre and should be abrogated or phased out.⁶¹

⁵⁹Mr. Taoka Shunji, Interview, December 1, 1971.

⁶⁰Interview, February 29, 1972, and see Kaihara Osamu "Boeiryoku to wa Nanika Gutaitekini Kangaeyo" (Let's Consider Defense Capability Realistically), Niju-Seiki (The 20th Century Magazine), January 1971.

⁶¹Shimizu Minoru, "Japan-U.S. Security Treaty: Improving Int'l Climate Brings Demands for Abrogation," The Japan Times, March 9, 1972, or see U.S. Embassy, Press Translations, June 15-30, 1970, for a series of opposition statements made on the tenth anniversary of the treaty. Mr. Masuhara Keikichi, former Director General of the Defense Agency, and member of the House of Councillors, National Diet, pointed out that

Professor Royama has argued that nuclear deterrence exists with or without a treaty or relationship; it existed because of a tri-centric nuclear balance between China, the Soviet Union and the United States. He proposed that Japan phase out the security arrangement, retaining deterrence value and gaining flexibility.⁶²

The security arrangement was established in a world dominated by the United States and the Soviet Union. If a transition to a more multi-centric international system is occurring, and evidence portraying that transition has been discussed, some of the common rationales given for the existence of the Security Treaty are no longer valid. The United States unconditionally guaranteed the defense of Japan, and terms such as the "spear and the shield" were applicable to the U.S. and Japanese defense responsibilities in Japan.⁶³ The Nixon Doctrine qualified the unconditional guarantee, and the U.S. force structure in Japan in 1972 was no longer the spear that it once was.⁶⁴ U.S. Forces were no longer in Japan for the defense of Japan.⁶⁵ Earlier U.S. posture which directly defended Japanese territory has fundamentally changed. Lieutenant General Caraway, a former high commissioner of the Ryukyus,

there was growing pressure within the Diet for treaty revision/abrogation, stemming from the relaxation of tensions, Interview, February 19, 1972.

⁶²Royama, Interview, February 5, 1972, see FN 43, this chapter, for discussion of Professor Royama's views.

⁶³Emmerson, Arms, p. 143, uses this term to describe the collective U.S. and Japanese defense responsibilities.

⁶⁴The last USAF F-4 squadron left Japan in July 1971. A Marine Air Wing is stationed at Iwakuni, Japan, and elements of the 7th Fleet provide strike capability.

⁶⁵U.S. Congress Senate, Subcommittee on United States Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad, Japan and Okinawa, 91st Congress, 2nd Session, Hearings (Washington: U.S. GPO, 1970), testimony by Under Secretary of State U. Alexis Johnson, January 26, 1970, pp. 1186, 1214.

was correct when he alleged that U.S. bases in Okinawa would be less useful to the United States after reversion.⁶⁶ He was correct in a bipolar world where the United States required unlimited use of its bases in order to carry out global defense commitments wherever and whatever conflict arose.

In a changing Asia the previous reasons for the security arrangement are suspect. It would not be correct, however, to assume that the emerging situation has not provided a new basis for a security arrangement.

Professor Wakaizumi Kei, a distinguished Japanese political analyst, has contended that a fundamental review of the Security Treaty will be mandatory by the mid-1970's. He concluded that there are three likely options available to Japan:

- 1) Renunciation of the Treaty and Japanese Nuclear Rearmament.
- 2) Revision of the Treaty to include U.S. nuclear protection in return for base rights, but with minimum contact.
- 3) Renegotiation of the Treaty leading to a closer security relationship on the bases of equality and mutual interest.⁶⁷

If only the general security relationship is considered, it would appear that the choices could be narrowed to two: either continue to operate in the context of a U.S.-Japanese security relationship or not.

If the security relationship is ended, the United States and Japan separate; but what happens to the United States? The American interest

⁶⁶Lt. General Paul W. Caraway, ret., comments in United States-Japanese Political Relations, Special Report Series #7 (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University, Center for Strategic Studies, May 1968), p. 25.

⁶⁷Wakaizumi Kei, "Japan Beyond 1970," Foreign Affairs, April 1969, pp. 515-516.

in participation is different in a multi-centric situation although the size of the states involved and ocean between make it likely that instability in Asia could eventually involve the United States. Therefore, as President Nixon said, stability in Asia is a U.S. interest. It would remain an interest even in the event the Japanese security relationship was terminated. However, the United States would discover that there existed no method to apply its force structure on a regional basis. Alliance with either of the other two powers would serve only to exacerbate a then bipolar region. The United States' contribution to Japan's political-military posture has become focused on the availability of its military forces and this contribution would not be applicable elsewhere in the subsystem. The United States would cease to participate effectively in the regional subsystem. Whatever the status of global nuclear deterrence, the regional, tri-centric balance would have failed.

Japan, after discarding the security relationship with the United States, would not be capable of maintaining a tri-centric regional balance. Two options would be open. As Professor Wakaizumi suggests, Japan could arm, including nuclear armaments, and attempt to play an autonomous role in the sub-system. Such a plan would be expensive and uncertain, facing all the strategic difficulties of an insular nation facing one, or possibly two, continental adversaries. The alternative would be to seek alliance with either, or submit to dependence on either. Either alternative is equally unattractive, for in view of the relationships described above, the Soviet Union or China would oppose Japan's alliance with its continental adversary.⁶⁸

⁶⁸This is not to suggest that the day the treaty ends, there would be either a war or a great shift of alignments. The process would be a slow one perhaps not noticeable at first, but instability in the system

It appears probable that a continuing U.S.-Japanese security relationship would be profitable, even in a regional, multi-centric context. Such an arrangement would provide Japan greater flexibility and system stability than any other choice. The 1970 decision to extend the Security Treaty indicated that Japan and the United States have elected that choice.

While the U.S. posture in Asia makes it Japan's ally rather than adversary, the U.S.-Japanese security relationship and the system within which it operates are vital ingredients to understanding the Japanese perception of threat, both direct and indirect. There are those in Japan who argue that the threat to Japan has increased despite the Treaty. Mr. Kaihara Osamu, Secretary-General of the National Defense Council, has repeatedly urged that more attention be paid to Soviet and Chinese policy statements as well as their physical capabilities in an effort to draw more attention to the possible threat to Japan.⁶⁹

Mr. Kaihara, however, has been in the minority. There has been an attitude in Japan that might be summed up: "We are at peace, not at war."⁷⁰ This belief that the probability of attack is extremely low was

would lead to incidents. These could manifest themselves as infringements on Japanese international rights, its shipping, air routes, fishing, etc.

⁶⁹Interviews, November 10, 1971, and February 29, 1972, See Kaihara Osamu, "Anzen Hosho no Tadashii Kangaekata" (The Correct Way to Consider National Security), Jiji, April 1969, for a comprehensive and thorough exposition of Mr. Kaihara's view in this area. This article includes discussion of the threats facing Japan, the viability of various alternatives such as neutrality pacts and security agreements, and criticism of some viewpoints in Japan. The article is particularly significant in view of Mr. Kaihara's substantial influence as Secretary General of the National Defense Council.

⁷⁰This was the comment of Mr. Aoki Hidco, Executive Director and Managing Editor of Kokujoho (Aireview), a major aviation magazine in Japan.

repeated to me by senior officials in the Defense Agency, by generals in the Air Self-Defense Force, by middle-grade officers teaching at the Air Staff College and by cadets at the Officer's Candidate School at Nara. Hedley Bull's assessment in Foreign Affairs was correct: "Japan does not now perceive any direct threat to her security."⁷¹ The first goal of the new Fourth Defense Build-up Plan formalized the position "(We are) building up gradually our autonomous defense setup, on the assumption that no threat is impending on Japan for the moment."⁷²

The threat of indirect attack has not received thorough analysis in Japan's assessment of its defense needs. Several factors have contributed to the depreciation of this danger: stability in Asia which may have always been the primary benefit of the United States presence and certainly is in the 1970's; Japanese policies toward the use of their military organization which prohibit its application to such situations; and a widespread belief in Japan that sea-lane protection, for example, is an anachronism of the pre-nuclear age and not technically possible in the future. Therefore, official policy has disregarded the threat of indirect attack, despite its strategic feasibility.

As has been discussed, the relationship of the Security Treaty to Japanese security has become more complex and its effect has tended to be disassociated from the direct defense of Japanese territory. The simple argument that Japan feels no threat because of the Security Treaty may, in the final analysis, be accurate, but it is also pointless in

⁷¹"The New Balance of Power in Asia and the Pacific," Foreign Affairs, July 1971, p. 676.

⁷²Japan Defense Agency, The New Defense Build-up Plan (JDA Draft), April 27, 1971, official translation, letter of transmittal. The Foreign Ministry generally concurs with this assessment.

terms of Japanese perceptions. The statement may not be qualified.

Japan has felt no threat, direct or indirect, to its national security.

Chapter 2

STRATEGIC THOUGHT IN JAPAN

Strategy, because it prescribes tactics against the use of force or postulates methods of dealing with threats of force, can assist in further clarifying the Japanese perception of threats to its national security. This chapter is not dedicated to the definition of an official Japanese strategy; it is, instead, a survey of the prevalent strategic discussions in Japan. There are those in Japan who either believe that a threat does exist, or believe there exists the probability of a future threat. The various views serve better to delineate the threat perceived in Japan, particularly with regard to its nature. A derivative of this survey is a portrayal of the defense intellectual community. Knowledge of the character of the community provides some insight into their impact on the policy-making process.

Clausewitz said that "war is an act of violence intended to compel our opponent to fulfill our will."¹ Strategy concerns itself with the methodology of such an act; "the theory of the use of combats for the object of war."² These military aspects of strategy are of primary concern in this discussion; however, war is an act in the strategic-diplomatic continuum. Clausewitz also called war "a continuation of political commerce."³ Therefore, strategic thought as discussed here is not limited solely to pure military application. Non-military strategies, particularly those designed to contend with possible threats of force, are significant

¹Carl Von Clausewitz, On War, ed. Anotol Rapoport (London, Penguin Books, 1968), Book 1, Chapter I, p. 101.

²Ibid., Book II, Chapter 1, p. 173.

³Ibid., Book I, Chapter 1, p. 119.

for Japan.

As might be suspected, the absence of perceived threats has a significant effect on strategic thought in Japan. Any definable community of defense intellectuals is very small.⁴ Defense research has not been a significant area of academic endeavor, whether in terms of accomplishment, prestige or funding. The lack of money also has discouraged the institutionalization of strategic thought.⁵

Those few institutions that do consider defense problems usually include military matters among varied social and economic aspects of national security. There has been, therefore, very little focus on strategy among those who do consider national security. The Nomura

⁴A specific number of "defense intellectuals" is difficult to determine if only because of the problem of definition. However, even including a broad range of subject from technical expert to political generalist, there are less than twenty well-known students of national security. This comment and the substance of the discussion of the defense community relies on interviews with Professor Momoi Makoto, December 3, 1971; Commander Sekino Hideo, December 2, 1971; Professor Kosaka Masataka, January 1, 1972; Professor Iwashima Hisao, February 4, 1972; M. Gen. Yamada Ryoichi, Chief Defense Section, Defense Division, Air Staff Office, December 13, 1971. Professors Momoi and Kosaka are among the most highly regarded "defense intellectuals" in Japan. Professor Iwashima is a young professor at the National Defense College who is emphasizing modern international communications (political and social aspects). Professor Iwashima pointed out that despite the pacifism in Japan, there is almost no peace research occurring.

⁵Institutions include the International Relations Institute at Sophia University and Kokusai Mondai Kenkyucho (Defense Problems Institute), which consider strategic matters at the policy level and include foreign policy emphasis. The Nomura Research Institute is economically oriented. The Historical Research Institute, KDK Institute and Tairiku Mondai Kenkyucho are all very small, limited budget operations. Within the Defense Agency, Boei Kenshusho, or the National Defense College, is the center of academically oriented study. Computer programmed operational analysis studies are programmed by the Air Staff Office and conducted by computer think tanks such as Mitsubishi Research Institute, IBM in Japan and the Computer Research Center.

Research Institute, for example, was headed by Mr. Saeki Kiichi, a respected name in defense analysis and former president of the National Defense College. However, the institute itself has been oriented toward economic matters and has not focused on strategy or even been limited to national security studies.⁶ Other institutions are quite small, such as the Historical Research Institute which was concerned with naval war history and has begun to pursue current strategic affairs. It is mainly a one-man operation with a director, one or two research associates and secretaries.⁷ Institutions such as the International Relations Institute at Sophia University focus on broad national policy studies and, moreover, disassociate themselves from the Defense Agency or any military oriented studies.⁸

The small size of the community concerned with defense and its diffusion among varied institutions and groups have combined with the lack of threat to eliminate any cohesion or focus among those who do discuss strategy. The "community" has consisted of individuals, reliant on diverse organizations not primarily concerned with strategy. Therefore, there has been a tendency toward academic isolation among these scholars and critics, and they often become concerned primarily with one aspect of strategy.

⁶Professor Momoi and Commander Sekino, Interviews.

⁷Cdr. Sekino is the Director of the Institute, Interview, December 2, 1971.

⁸This is true on the institutional level but not necessarily so at the individual level. Professor Royama Michio, Sophia University does, for example, accept invitations for conferences or lectures at the National Defense College as does Professor Kosaka Masataka of Kyoto University. Interviews Kosaka, January 1, 1972; Royama, February 4, 1972. These two highly regarded international affairs experts are among the few examples of academic integration of policy and strategy.

In order to put the various strategies available in perspective, Figure 2-1 outlines the possible strategic alternatives open to Japan. Japanese policy and posture in 1972 superficially indicates a strategy corresponding to category B, with a limited conventional capability for territorial defense. Weinstein would postulate that category B.2.a. best describes Japanese post-war strategy. Others have suggested that current, covert Japanese goals include implementation of one or more of the last three strategies listed in Figure 2-1.

There are as many opinions regarding the proper Japanese defense posture as there are categories in Figure 2-1. David K. Willis, for example, argued in 1970 that Japan must consider "some wider tasks of area defense, as well as self-defense."⁹ There was some indication that Japan might be moving in that direction in November 1969, when Prime Minister Sato expressed Japan's special interest in Korea and Taiwan. However, it seems more likely that Prime Minister Sato was speaking in terms of the consultative clause of the Security Treaty. While Japan might allow the United States to defend Korea using Japanese bases, it presently does not contemplate participation.

Some have speculated on the level of military forces necessary to participate in regional defense. Mr. Taoka Shunji recently drew up a plan relying on the resources which would be available to Japan were it to dedicate five per cent of its GNP to defense spending over the ensuing ten years.¹⁰ Such a policy would provide ten billion dollars

⁹David K. Willis, "Japan in Asia: Rabbit, Porcupine or Tiger?", Pacific Community, July 1970, Vol. 1, No. 4, p. 103. Mr. Willis' argument, however, seems implicitly based on the assumption that the alternative to limited external defense would be a more substantial rearmament.

¹⁰Manuscript of article written by Mr. Taoka who showed it to me and discussed his ideas on December 2, 1971. Mr. Taoka was not advocating such a development, rather discussing the efficient application of such resources.

Figure 2-1. Japanese Strategic Options.

- A. Unilateral Disarmament.
 - 1. Non-aligned. Rely on United Nations and non-aggression treaties.
 - 2. Aligned. Rely on United States (or other military power) for all aspects of physical defense.
- B. Limited Conventional Capability for Territorial Defense.
 - 1. Non-aligned.
 - a. Concentrate on maintaining internal security against an indirect aggression. Use geographical advantages and national unity (large reserves also) to fight guerrilla war against invader.
 - b. Concentrate on conventional forces.
 - 2. Aligned.
 - a. Concentrate on internal security. Rely on other state for external defense.
 - b. Coordinate forces and tactics to complement those available from ally. Either by mission or level of conflict.
- C. Unlimited Conventional Capacity for Territorial Defense.
 - 1. Non-aligned. Develop force structure capable of defeating any attack including large invasion. Rely on nuclear stalemate.
 - 2. Aligned. Same force structure, but rely on 'nuclear umbrella' of United States or other nuclear power.
- D. Conventional Capacity for Defense of Territorial and External Interests.
 - 1. Non-aligned. Could include C. 1. above plus several levels of capacity including:
 - a. Defense of South Korea and/or Taiwan, and
 - b. Protect sea lanes, and
 - 2. Aligned. Any of the strategies suggested in D. 1. could be undertaken in concert with another state. This could include only a limited Japanese defensive capability with reliance on an ally to implement the capacities listed above. Or the Japanese could emphasize manpower while an ally provided equipment.
- E. Nuclear Capacity for Territorial Defense.
 - 1. Non-aligned. Defensive nuclear capacity including anti-aircraft and anti-ship weapons, and a second-strike nuclear deterrence capability.
 - 2. Aligned. Nuclear armaments complementing ally, relying on nuclear deterrence of ally for support against all (or some) states. Concentration on tactical and/or defensive nuclear armaments. Nuclear sites in either or both countries.
- F. Nuclear Capacity for Defense of Territorial and External Interests.
 - 1. Non-aligned. Development of all aspects of nuclear weaponry. Mobile strike forces, tactical and strategic weapons included. Attainment of great power military status.
 - 2. Aligned. Development of F. 1. above in concert or alliance with other state(s). In this case, comprehensive mutuality of interests would be required among the allies.

per year, or one hundred billion available for a ten-year program of defense construction. The budget base would equal six times the 1970 budget and would enable naval and air power construction which not only could establish a credible defense posture, but allow the projection of Japanese military force within the region. The research and development portion of Mr. Taoka's budget was increased by a factor of 700, enabling the development of nuclear armaments.¹¹

That policy is technically possible today, but it is advocated by very few people. Few discuss the allocation of that amount of resources because such a policy option is assigned a very low probability. Therefore, the strategic application is of limited interest although the nuclear policy option does receive attention.

Three major areas or arguments receive primary strategic focus in Japan. The newly popular concept of "autonomous defense" has been discussed in terms of the degree of cooperation desirable with the United States. This has been the middle ground of strategic choice and it has normally been discussed assuming that the autonomous force structure would be similar in size to the current Defense Forces. This area has received the great majority of detailed strategic analysis.

Negotiated security has become another favorite topic and usually has included discussions of arms limitations, ratios of armament or disarmament. At the other pole, the nuclear weapon option has received increasing attention. The great disparity between the force levels envisioned by these three arguments can be partially explained by the

¹¹Using a 1970 base, Mr. Taoka programmed the following increases per year: GSDF - 600 billion yen (2.4 x 1970); MSDF - 1200 billion yen (8.6 x 1970); ASDF - 600 billion (4.8 x 1970); Research and Development - 700 billion yen (700 x 1970), including nuclear development, equals a total 3500 billion yen or 10 billion dollars (before revaluation).

lack of manifest threat which would focus strategy.

While most Japanese agree that the threat of international violence is very low, they differ in their view of the type of violence which could be employed. Commander Sekino has contended that Japan's great reliance on imports makes the sea lanes the most vulnerable target.¹² Mr. Ogawa of Koku Shimbun agreed with that concept, and argued that the first visible results of independent security policies would be a growing harassment of Japanese international rights.¹³ General Genda Minoru, former Chief of Staff, JASDF, and now a member of the House of Councillors, also argued that interdiction of Japan's supply lines was the "most important point in Japan's defense."¹⁴

Another theory has found wider acceptance; it has emphasized another form of indirect attack. M. Yasuda asserted that no "rational aggressor" would destroy "his war trophies" through a massive attack aimed at Japan's industrial potential.¹⁵ If the aggressor wished to impose his will on Japan he must resort to a small scale invasion or to an indirect approach. The choice:

Indirect approaches will do and can do better. No risk of inviting a third party intervention. ...gone in fact is the classic possibility of an outbreak of a contingency

¹²Interview, December 2, 1971, also see "Japan and Her Maritime Defense," pp. 100-105.

¹³Ogawa Raita, Interview, December 27, 1971.

¹⁴Genda Minoru "Boeicho ni Namiyon Nozumaku" (What I Expect of the Defense Agency), Koku Shimbun, July 21, 1971, p. 9.

¹⁵Mr. Yasuda, "No Drastic About-Face in Security Policy," The Daily Yomiuri, January 6, 1971 (part of 3-part series). M. Yasuda is reported to be a pseudonym for a prominent defense analyst in Japan.

with an armed open attack.¹⁶

Then Director General Nakasone reflected this attitude in interpellations before the Diet in 1970. He testified that he believed direct attack would be accompanied by indirect attack; "irregular political measures smacking of military intention or launch military actions with political factors."¹⁷ The Director General expressed the same belief on December 1, 1970 in a speech to the Foreign Correspondent's Club in Tokyo:

A nuclear or an all out conventional warfare is least likely to occur. But the contingencies we must most likely deal with will be (one) an indirect aggression or an externally supported city guerrilla operation and (two) a limited infiltration and its escalated form, a local open invasion.¹⁸

The diverse concepts of the nature of the threat tend to aggravate the fragmentation of strategic thought. A direct external threat has been largely disregarded and indirect aggression is very difficult to deal with in conventional strategic terms. The fragmentation and lack of pressure for focus in Japanese strategy have been reflected by the threats envisioned by the three branches of the Self-Defense Forces. The GSDF has supported the view that limited invasion of Hokkaido was most likely; the MSDF has believed the primary threat to Japan was the submarine menace; while the ASDF planners have contended a large

¹⁶M. Yasuda, "No Drastic About-Face in Security Policy," The Daily Yomiuri, January 6, 1971 (part of 3-part series).

¹⁷Japan, Japan National Diet, House of Councillors, Budget Committee, Interpellations Regarding Defense Matters, May 12, 1970, p. 13, (Japan Defense Agency).

¹⁸Nakasone, The Defense of Japan, p. 6.

scale air attack will precede any other use of force.¹⁹ The base of strategic thought is quicksand, and discussions range all the way from nuclear armament to disarmament.

The Nuclear Option

The decision, whether or not to attain a nuclear weapons capability, has been made. The government of Japan repeatedly has disclaimed any intention of attempting nuclear armament. Yet, it remains an open issue, discussed on the assumption that no decision has been made. Professor Wakaizumi argued in Foreign Affairs in 1969, that there was no small probability that "the road to nuclear armament might be selected" between 1975 and 1980.²⁰ He then declared that it is an unlikely choice, "at least within the 1970's."²¹ The choice Professor Wakaizumi, and many Japanese, refer to is not an "either-or" choice, but the positive one. There is an implicit assumption that if the decision is made, or when it will be made, it will be a positive one.²²

A positive decision to develop nuclear weapons contains many complications. The type of fission material to go in the weapon must be

¹⁹This was pointed out to me by Taoka Shunji during my first month in Japan and was not disputed by the many persons with whom I raised the issue. Nor was a substantive explanation of the difference offered. This problem will be raised again in the discussion in Section IV regarding the construction of policy and in Chapter 10 when command relationships are discussed. Perhaps the underlying reason for this disparity is that the uniformed services agree that the most likely threat is indirect.

²⁰Wakaizumi, "Japan Beyond 1970," loc. cit., p. 517.

²¹Ibid.

²²This is the general focus of Japanese informed discussion. Those opposing nuclear rearmament argue as though they were slowly being defeated. I am not suggesting that, therefore, nuclear rearmament is inevitable (far from it). It will very much remain an open issue in the foreseeable future.

chosen; the inventory may be offensively or defensively orientated; strategic weapons, tactical weapons, or both may be selected; the type of delivery system has to be considered; and the issue of unilateral versus bilateral or multilateral development must be considered.

Such a decision is shaped by many factors, including social, economic, technical, political and strategic elements. While the primary concern here is with the strategic variables, it should be noted that social opposition in Japan, the 'nuclear allergy,' has been considered a primary reason for political attitudes to date. There are indications that this viewpoint is slowly changing, or perhaps that the potential for change is increasing. In August 1969, 72% of the Japanese hoped that Japan would not have nuclear weapons, but only 36% believed that Japan would be non-nuclear in ten years. Two years later 73% of the people still believed nuclear weapons were undesirable, however, only 30% still believed that Japan would not possess such weapons.²³ In 1968, a young Liberal-Democratic candidate for the House of Councillors of the Diet advocated "re-thinking" of the Japanese nuclear policy and campaigned with a national flag sewn on his jacket.²⁴ He received more votes than all the Communist candidates combined, indicating some decline in the "nuclear allergy." While this gradual shift in attitude does not necessarily support political advocacy of nuclear rearmament, it has generated wider discussion of the various aspects of nuclear weaponry.

²³Results from Yomiuri, August 7, 1969, and Sankei, August 4, 1971. Yomiuri: 1) Do you hope Japan will have nuclear weapons? Hope - 16.1%, Do not hope - 71.8%, Do Not know - 12.1%; 2) Do you think Japan will possess nuclear weapons (If U.S. nuclear umbrella withdrawn)? Yes - 43%, No - 30%, do not know (or can not say) - 27%.

²⁴Wakaizumi, "Japan Beyond 1970," loc. cit., p. 511.

The Japanese nuclear policy to 1972 has consisted of three no's; make no, have no and allow no nuclear weapons in Japan. That policy has been based, in part, on the United States nuclear deterrence. In December 1970, then Director General Nakasone said, "we will not possess nuclear arms as long as the U.S. nuclear deterrent effectively functions."²⁵ One year later another Director General declared that "even if the nuclear umbrella of the United States were removed," Japan's nuclear attitude would not change.²⁶ Perhaps not, but the Japanese nuclear option is most often discussed in terms of the existence of a nuclear deterrent.

Some argue that nuclear deterrence is increasing despite the validity of the U.S. nuclear umbrella. Professor Royama was among those who argued that a nuclear balance or stalemate provided everyone with a nuclear umbrella.²⁷ Kishida Junnosuke, editor of Asahi Shimbun, wrote in 1968 that nuclear weapons were a deterrent and the "security of a nation in the nuclear age is not complete without nuclear weapons."²⁸ He argued that the reliability of U.S. nuclear deterrence was decreasing, in fact the increasing global power balance, the dispersal of nuclear technology, and the anti-ballistic missile had lowered the nuclear umbrella for any one country. However, Kishida postulated a four-level nuclear structure which included superpowers, other nuclear states,

²⁵Nakasone, Defense of Japan, p. 30. Prime Minister Sato has also noted the relationship between the non-nuclear policy and U.S. deterrence.

²⁶Nishimura, Philosophy on Self-Defense, p. 38.

²⁷Professor Royama, Interview, February 4, 1972; Mr. Nakasone also has expressed a similar view, see Defense in the Future, pp. 2-3.

²⁸Kishida Junnosuke, "Nippon no Kaku-Seisaku to Hikauku Sengen no i Mi," (Japanese Nuclear Policies and the Significance of the Non-Nuclear Weapons Declaration), Ushio Nippon No Shorai, (Ushio Magazine, special issue, the Future of Japan), Spring 1968, p. 42.



semi-nuclear states and underdeveloped states. Achievements of more complex nuclear capacities by the lower levels continue to force the superpowers to advance in order to maintain a "nuclear Pax Russo - Americana."²⁹ Because of the pressure from below, the superpower competition could result in a balance which applied to all the countries of the world. "Country-unit nuclear deterrence is based on treaty and a price must be payed. However, under global deterrence there is no price to be payed, so it is doubly unwise to pay for a deterrence which is decreasing."³⁰ Mr. Kishida's argument has been especially appealing to opponents of nuclear rearmament in a period of uncertainty over the validity of the U.S. commitment.

Others have questioned the credibility of the U.S. deterrent; the headline of an August 1971, article by M. Yasuda read "U.S. Nuclear Umbrella No Longer Credible."³¹ General Holloway, Commander of the Strategic Air Command, testified before Congress that he did not believe the President would launch the U.S. nuclear force in support of NATO. Mr. Yasuda concluded the U.S. would be even less likely to take a nuclear risk in Asia. General Genda added another perspective to the question as he argued that whatever the validity of nuclear deterrence, it is a global tool. Nuclear weapons might be employed on a regional basis, and there is no regional nuclear umbrella for Japan.³² General Genda

²⁹Kishida Junnosuke, "Nippon no Kaku-Seisaku to Hikauku Sengen no i Mi," (Japanese Nuclear Policies and the Significance of the Non-Nuclear Weapons Declaration), Ushio Nippon No Shorai, (Ushio Magazine, special issue, the Future of Japan), Spring, 1968, pp. 46-47.

³⁰Ibid., p. 49.

³¹In The Daily Yomiuri, August 19, 1971.

³²General Genda Minoru, ASDF ret., former Chief of Staff, now member of House of Councillors, National Diet, Interview, November 17, 1971.

called the three non-nuclear principles "the magic of not getting wet without umbrella."³³ General Takeda Akio made a similar assessment when he argued that a nuclear-conventional distinction was no longer valid for Japan. Japan, he felt, must consider defense in the future Asia in terms of all weapons; autonomous focus on limited war capability was no longer relevant.³⁴ These men would disagree with Mr. Kishida's theory on the basis that it is not applicable to the regional threats to Japan. Therefore, Japan must take positive steps to avoid the regional nuclear threat.

One obvious answer would be to obtain an autonomous deterrent capacity. It could be argued that the French deterrent in Europe is not a global, but a regional, deterrent. The Japanese, by obtaining a nuclear capacity, would in fact support the goals of the Nixon Doctrine and share in the deterrence of "theater nuclear war--by virtue of their own nuclear capabilities."³⁵ The growing nuclear capacity of China threatens further to erode the credibility of the U.S. deterrence, particularly if the Chinese continue to emphasize regional interests. Alice Hsieh concluded that the "Chinese are more sensitive to (nuclear) weapons systems developed in the region."³⁶ A Japanese nuclear capacity would "make the Chinese even more cautious," and the nuclear balance of power "might be further complicated to China's disadvantage;

³³Genda, "Boeicho ni Naniyon Nozumaku," loc. cit., p. 9.

³⁴Interview, February 21, 1972.

³⁵Statement of Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird before House Armed Services Committee, U.S. Congress, F4 1972-1976 Defense Program and 1972 Defense Budget, March 9, 1971, (Washington, U.D. GPO, 1971) p. 22. Laird was speaking of those nations which possess weapons and was not advocating Japanese nuclear arms.

³⁶Hsieh, op. cit., pp. 9-10.

a Japanese regional nuclear capacity...may well have the effect of limiting China's use of its emerging nuclear capacity."³⁷ This theory sees the Japanese autonomous nuclear deterrence operating in the framework of a continued U.S.-Japan security relationship.

Professor Wakaizumi illustrated the contrary assumption when he equated nuclear rearmament and renunciation of the Security Treaty.³⁸ An autonomous nuclear stance exacerbates many of Japan's geo-political, strategic weaknesses, and such a stance has been the target of vociferous criticism. If Japan's possible adversaries were China, the Soviet Union and the United States; the distance to major industrial centers would dictate inter-continental weapons and/or a submarine-based force. The continental expanse of the adversaries and dispersed industrial and strategic structures would force Japan to build a numerically large force as well as a sophisticated one, in order to be able to inflict a level of damage that could make the potential adversary susceptible and therefore deter it. These nations already are developing nuclear weapons, and all have some air defense; therefore, the Japanese nuclear deterrent force would require a missile delivery capacity. The limited dispersal possible in Japan would make a second-strike capability available only through substantial hardening measures or a submarine-based force. The concentrated industrial sector in Japan makes it an ideal nuclear target. Its insular geography limits the acquisition distance of land-based warning systems, and therefore, increases the

³⁷Hsieh, op. cit., pp. 9-10.

³⁸Wakaizumi, op. cit., p. 515. See Chapter 1, FN75, and associated discussion.

complexity of defending against missile-borne nuclear attack.³⁹

The issue is undecided, but it is evident that there are strategic liabilities to nuclear rearmament. The possibility that U.S. nuclear deterrence has failed, or is failing, has caused some to look for other solutions outside nuclear rearmament. One of those is negotiation.

Negotiated Security

The alternative to armament competition is disarmament or arms control, which is normally advocated in a multilateral context in the hope that it will provide some lower balance of forces.⁴⁰ The Japanese Socialist Party has advocated unilateral disarmament throughout the post-war era, however, they qualify their stand by declaring an intent to negotiate "separate or collective treaties of non-aggression with the United States, China, the Soviet Union and other countries in order to guarantee neutrality."⁴¹ This proposal is vague as to concept, and

³⁹General Takeda, Interview, February 21, 1972; Professor Momoi Makoto, Interview, December 3, 1972, the geographic limitations were pointed to by several uniformed officers with whom I discussed the issue. Also see Y. Suenaga, "Nixon Shocks, Muckracking Preempt Japan's Manuever," The Daily Yomiuri, January 28, 1972 (Suenaga purportedly a pseudonym for a prominent Japanese defense analyst), and Momoi Makoto, "Limit to Self-Defense Power and its Strategy," Mainichi, June 23, 1970. Before a pro-nuclear arms policy could be adopted, the technical and economic capacity of the state must be capable of supporting the venture. This will be discussed in Chapter 12.

This paragraph is a summation of the strategic arguments presented against nuclear armament. An official reflection of this strategic argument is evident in Nishimura, Philosophy on Self-Defense, p. 38.

⁴⁰Security obtained through bilateral or multilateral alliances is not the major focus of this subsection. The various factors applicable to security relationships of that nature were discussed in Chapter 1. The primary concern here is with security negotiated with the potential enemy in order to arrive at some contrived balance of power which modifies a pure power relationship.

⁴¹"SPJ's Policy on National Security," Japan Socialist Review, November 15, 1969, Socialist Party of Japan, p. 18.

totally imprecise with regard to the types of guarantees or the method of implementation envisioned although a nuclear-free area is mentioned.

General Takeda also has concluded that there is no viable alternative to negotiation, although he arrived at this conclusion somewhat differently and is more precise with his proposals.⁴² He contended that the U.S. deterrent has failed in the 1970's, and that Japan may no longer distinguish between nuclear and conventional threats. Japan's neighbors are nuclear powers, and Japan therefore has two options: either strengthen the treaty and increase armaments, both conventional and nuclear; or, take a non-military solution. The strategic difficulties of rearmament facing Japan mandate the non-military solution.

The first step would be the elimination of two great instabilities in Asia; Taiwan and Korea. Taiwan could be reunited with China, and the Koreas could be united and neutralized. Korea must be neutralized because it is a threat to all other neighbors if under the influence of any one. In conjunction with these steps, Japan would negotiate an Asian security pact with China, the Soviet Union and the United States. The treaty would include arms control provisions leading to regional disarmament. Finally, the nations mentioned would regulate the international sea and airspace in Asia, and military vehicles of any type would not be allowed thereon.

A similar proposal, although less inclusive, was advocated by Y. Suenaga in January 1972, in an eight-part article on U.S.-Japan relations in The Daily Yomiuri.⁴³ He denied the threat of nuclear attack because

⁴²The following discussion is based on an interview with General Takeda, February 21, 1972.

⁴³Suengaga, "Wanted: Disarm Conference to Freeze Navies in Pacific," January 28, 1972, and "Japan Wants a Voice in Pacific Naval Balance" January 31, 1972, loc. cit., the following discussion is based on these articles.

of 'war prize' destruction and went on to say that it was "useless and meaningless to worry about an all-out strategic nuclear war."⁴⁴

A nuclear stalemate may exist, but it does not eliminate the danger of local wars.

Limited conflicts are likely to take the form of naval engagements in this section of Northern Asia. The U.S. Seventh Fleet no longer dominates the western Pacific which heightens this possibility. This regional issue is a particularly sensitive one to Japan. Suenaga declared that Japanese strategists believe it is not a "nuclear umbrella but the Seventh Fleet and its carrier-based air strike power that actually deters potential aggression against Japan."⁴⁵ Balance must be maintained, but there remains an increasing probability of an "excessive naval rivalry;" such a rivalry could be avoided by freezing "part if not all, naval armaments at an agreed stable level."⁴⁶

The Japanese Socialist Party, General Takeda and Mr. Suenaga may have little in common, but their proposals do. That similarity is negotiation to achieve a contrived balance of power. Negotiation of arms control agreements are rarely successful unless the accord can prove mutually beneficial. Japan has little to offer in this regard other than its potential armament capacity. Even if an accord could be reached, two difficulties remain: preciseness and guarantee. In General Takeda's proposal one may multiply the difficulties of the current Strategic Arms Limitations Talks (SALT) by two factors: the

⁴⁴"Japan Wants a Voice," loc. cit.

⁴⁵Ibid.

⁴⁶"Wanted: Disarm Conference," loc. cit., Suenaga goes on to propose a tonnage balance of USSR - 6: U.S. - 5: China - 3: Japan - 2. He agreed the technological aspects and armament controls would cause some difficulty.

need to control all classes of weaponry, and the problem of regional application. As Suenaga admitted, the prospect of limiting all the technological details of naval armament is slim. Even the limitation of major surface vessels, which Suenaga eventually proposed, would be complicated by the complexity of weaponry and the press of technology.

Next comes the question of guarantee. How does a state determine that the agreement which it ratified is being adhered to? How fully may it rely on a state whose possible interests and potential threat generated the need for an agreement?⁴⁷ Perhaps the answer lies in the national interests of the parties. The treaty will be violated if it is in the national interest of the violator, which is not to say such a treaty is non-negotiable; it only illustrates the temporary and tenuous nature of such security.

Autonomous Defense Versus Treaty Defense

Perhaps the most immediate strategic argument in Japan in 1972 concerns the concept of Jishu Boei, or autonomous defense. This argument focuses on the center of the spectrum presented in Figure 2-1, and is particularly relevant because it concerns defense policy and defense procurement decisions being considered in the Fourth Defense Build-up Plan, 1972-1976.

There are some who believe that Japan already has the capability to defend itself against attack. Director-General Nakasone, speaking on May 28, 1971, declared that "Japan assumes full responsibility for

⁴⁷Mr. Kaihara, "Anzen Hoshō," loc. cit., pp. 5-7, criticized Japanese willingness to rely on such treaties, particularly in view of their 1941 Treaty of Neutrality with the Soviet Union.

defending her home islands with conventional weapons."⁴⁸ This was apparently not news to the United States, for sixteen months earlier, on January 26, 1970, Under Secretary U. Alexis Johnson testified that "Japan has the capability of defending, now defending, Japan proper against a major conventional attack."⁴⁹ Such views have been vehemently criticized by men such as Secretary-General Kaihara of the National Defense Council, who characterized such views as pure nonsense. The defense standards necessary for such a claim are presently unattained; proponents of such a belief "do not know the enemy or themselves."⁵⁰

Perhaps the claim of autonomous defense capability is explained in the JDA introduction to the Fourth Defense Build-up Plan: We gradually will build "our autonomous defense setup, on the assumption that no threat is impending on Japan for the moment."⁵¹ Professor Edwin Reischauer suggested that there was little difference between autonomous defense and treaty defense. He compared it to "going into the same room through a different door," and argued that the theory reflects and appeases growing Japanese self-confidence.⁵²

The question is not black and white, and one may see arguments for autonomous defense and reliance on the treaty within the same article.⁵³

⁴⁸Nakasone, Perspective of the Defense of Japan, p. 4.

⁴⁹Hearings, U.S. Commitments, p. 1167.

⁵⁰Kaihara, "Boei Ryoku", pp. 4-5. See Sections V and VI for an evaluation of Japanese air power. See James E. Auer, "The Postwar Sea Forces of Maritime Japan, 1945-1971," (Ph.D. Thesis), July 1971, Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, for a definitive analysis of Japanese naval strength.

⁵¹The New Defense Buildup, Letter of transmittal.

⁵²Professor Edwin O. Reischauer, Interview, March 29, 1971.

⁵³See, for example, Momoi Makoto, "Limit to Self-Defense Power," loc. cit.

Degree of cooperation is one distinction that may be made, but it is not very helpful in distinguishing between the two concepts. There has, in fact, been little operational cooperation between the two military forces during an era of great Japanese dependence. Mr. Aoki, editor of Koku Joho, made the point that more cooperation may be required with less reliance.⁵⁴

The argument may be stated in terms of area: where should the U.S. and Japan cooperate, and where should Japan have an autonomous capability? While Japan may participate in regional stability, cooperation to 1972 has manifested itself only passively. The area of active Japanese participation is limited to its territory in either an autonomous or cooperative policy. Within the Japanese territory, autonomy may be discussed in terms of the direction of Japanese strategy and avoid for the moment the controversy over capability. Although direction or intent of development provides no definitive comparison, intent may be expressed in terms of the desired method of cooperation; and here some strategic distinction may be made.

International cooperation may be required if, one, the national force is limited functionally, or, two, if its size is limited. Wars may be limited by the methods employed or by the level of combat, however certain tactics or functions of military force are necessary for any degree of autonomy. If a military force emphasizes one functional expertise to the exclusion of a balance of essential capabilities, generally it has opted for dependence. Emphasis on a smaller, balanced force provides a limited military independence.

⁵⁴Aoki Hideo, "Kyokuto Bei Kugun to Nippon no Boku" (Far East U.S. Air Force and Japanese Air Defense), Gunji Kenkyu, April 1971, pp. 125-126. Also see Chapter 10 for discussion of unified command framework.



This difference may be specifically illustrated in terms of air power in Japan. Official policy in Japan has continued to emphasize the air defense mission, with no plans for counter-attack capability.⁵⁵ That policy has depended on the spear and the shield concept, and has been basically a dependent posture. Wars are fought with both the sword and the shield. Any military action would require assistance and no operational plan may be written without contemplating the use of another state's forces.

Those advocating such a strategy are more concerned with the probability of threat today; they postulate that the country likely to attack, the Soviet Union, could not be defeated alone. The functional division of labor is more efficient, and concentrating on air defense while leaving attack to the U.S. requires a less complex command structure. Changes in this policy would require a significant change of concept within the force structure and a diversification of allocated resources.⁵⁶ In the Japanese case, political and social controversy also could be expected.⁵⁷

Those advocating a more balanced force are less concerned about threats today, but more concerned about the intent of the United States. The Nixon Doctrine has raised doubts about U.S. assistance in the event of low-level, conventional applications of force. Although the U.S. reaffirmed its intent to keep commitments and to continue to protect against nuclear powers, withdrawals and further policy statements have eroded Japanese confidence in the U.S. strategic posture in Asia. One

⁵⁵Major General Yamada Riyoichi, Chief Defense Section, JASDF, Interview, December 13, 1971.

⁵⁶Aoki, "Kyokuto Bei Kugun," loc. cit., p. 122.

⁵⁷Ibid.

Japanese strategic commentator translated the 1970 U.S. Defense White Paper as follows:

In Asia, that takes No. 2 spot to Europe in the U.S. global strategy, no U.S. ground forces will be committed, but economic and military aid will be, where needed, and air-naval support if absolutely required to protect U.S. national interest.⁵⁸

A balanced Japanese force would relate to this interpretation in two ways: it would require no U.S. assistance, or only military supplies in the event of low-level violence; dependence in the event of a large attack would be more likely to be determined in the U.S. interest.

Counterforce strategies, tactics and equipment would be required to implement such an autonomous policy. It is far from reality, and Professor Momoi Makoto placed such a concept in the "thinking stage;" two steps before planning and capability.⁵⁹ Advocates of such a posture have argued that steps should be taken to enhance functions such as reconnaissance and counter-attack in order to reach some degree of independence, "within the limits of our own capacity."⁶⁰ They believe that such a policy not only would give more autonomy to Japan, but would be more responsive to its security needs in view of the evolving U.S. posture.

⁵⁸M. Yasuda, "U.S. Defense Strategy and Japan," 3-part article, The Daily Yomiuri, April 1-3, 1971.

⁵⁹Professor Momoi, Interview, December 3, 1971.

⁶⁰Ibid., and see Momoi, "Limits to Self-Defense Power," loc. cit., Mr. Kaihara, although an outspoken advocate of continued cooperation with the U.S., is very critical of the real capability of the SDF. He recommends a policy of retrenchment to less sophisticated equipment and increased emphasis on logistics and passive defense. Within the strategic parameters established, that is advocacy of more autonomy.

There is no conclusion. Professor Momoi believed that "a fatal flaw in the Japanese defense posture is the lack of strategy."⁶¹ Lack of strategy means that no guiding principle can offset the other pressures existent in the construction of defense policy. A final assessment of Professor Momoi's statement awaits the conclusion of this study. It is possible, however, to agree that no single strategic theory dominates in Japan: diversity and contradictions are the rule.

⁶¹Momoi, Interview, December 3, 1971.

III.

INTERNAL VARIABLES: THE SOCIETY AND THE INSTITUTION

This section of the thesis examines those national and institutional variables which may limit and curtail the policy-maker although they may not commonly be recognized as strategic variables. Civil dissent could invalidate an otherwise viable military option, while national unity might permit a seemingly impossible task. Historical experiences at societal and institutional levels color later interpretations and decisions, and affect the policy and the force structure. These variables have the potential to limit the response to threat or to condition its evaluation.

Elements of national power have been identified and categorized by various students of international affairs. Aron consolidated all factors as three fundamental elements which are comprehensive and serve to illustrate the focus of this section of the study. Aron defined these three categories as the "milieu, or space occupied by the political units; resources, or the quantity and quality of implements and combatants;" and lastly, "the collective capacity for action."¹

The first element, milieu, might be called the theater of operations. The considerations discussed in the first section serve to define the milieu which delineates the existence of threat.

The second element emphasizes the need to consider the resources available as a base for national power. Resources may be considered at several levels of potentiality. The availability of resources at any level may be altered through policy measures such as stockpiling or diversion of resources to strategic manufacture. Natural resources may therefore be considered an aspect of policy objectives and compose a portion of the potential force structure. Together with the ready

¹Aron, op. cit., p. 54.

structure, it comprises the policy-maker's product. Both ready and potential resources relevant to airpower will be perused in sections V and VI.

The "collective capacity" of a state refers to its capacity to utilize its resources within its theaters of action. Collective capacity may be analyzed at several conceptual levels. Within the military organization, command and control at the flight, squadron, or wing level bear on the capability of the force structure to apply its resources. Military force efficiency is a derivative of its capability to coordinate and integrate its functions with other branches to carry out operations. The entire force structure relies on the governmental decision-making process. These also are finished products which the policy-maker and military planner might be expected to include among policy goals.

There are other, broader indices which the policy-maker must consider when evaluating national strength. Domestic consensus and the society's technical capacity are essential bases to force structure capability. The policy process must consider the external threat, but must base plans for a stable, optimum relationship on internal variables including the political system, the social structure and specific institutional factors applicable to the force structure.

In discussing a similar concept of "national style," Hoffmann concluded that "what is unique is each nation's experience."² Aron also noted that "none of these three terms....is exempt from history."³ This concept of capacity is both historical and dynamic. Experiences

²Op. cit., p. 91.

³Aron, op. cit., p. 54.

condition perceptions and responses, and while history is very important, it is also imperative that the domestic condition be viewed from a current perspective.

The Japanese Constitution, the political opposition and post-war pacifist sentiments in Japan have been widely considered to be sources and examples of the deep societal division over defense policy and indicative of strict societal limitations as regards the planner. Societal limitations are important to the defense planner, and they must be considered in any state's policy formulation process. This aspect of Japanese capacity is discussed in Chapter 3 where the dynamic aspects of these issues are emphasized in order to define more clearly their relevance to the 1972 Japanese policy-maker.

While social limitations tend to receive thorough analysis, another aspect of collective capacity is often neglected. Japanese military policies partially result from military history, and views of air power are conditioned by the unique history of Japanese military aviation. History is important in any case, but particularly significant in Japan where the current leadership were directly involved in the World War II defeat and the rebirth of military aviation. Chapters 4 and 5 shift the focus from the society to the institution. While Chapter 4 peruses the background of air power policy in Japan, Chapter 5 examines the evolution which reincorporated air power in the Japanese force structure. These institutional factors, internal to the military establishment, help explain the special prejudices which characterize the Japanese use of air power.



Chapter 3

THE CONSTITUTION, POLITICS AND THE SOCIAL MILIEU

This chapter examines the political controversy over defense in Japan and related constitutional arguments; it then investigates the society's opinion of the Self-Defense Forces (SDF). Both these domestic constraints are dynamic variables, and recent trends in Japan are emphasized. Commentators commonly assume that these variables have created stringent limitations on the options of military policy. Whatever the historical or theoretical validity of such assumptions, recent trends indicate that reappraisal is necessary.

The political controversy over defense in Japan, which may be broadly considered a dichotomy between the government and opposition parties, is seemingly an endless argument. Article IX of the Constitution has served as the legal basis of this continuing imbroglio. The assumption of an anti-military sentiment in Japan has been based on Japan's experience with nuclear warfare and its defeat in World War II. The resulting pacifism and related "nuclear allergy" presumably limit Japanese defense planners.

The policy-maker is constrained by these elements only to the extent that an otherwise viable alternative is prohibited. Therefore, these aspects of the national environment will be evaluated with particular emphasis on current values and their degree of relevance to options available in 1972. Although social opinions sometimes do not distinguish between the branches of the Defense Forces, their particular applicability to air power policy will be noted where relevant.

The Politics of Article IX

Japanese national security policy has been discussed most often in terms of constitutionality. The U.S. Security Treaty, the U.S. bases and the Self-Defense Forces are criticized for their alleged conflict with Article IX. The constitutional issue reemerges yearly as a tool for criticism of defense budgets. The significance of Article IX is well known, even to those who know little else about Japan or its national security policy.

When interpellated on the Constitution in 1950, the Prime Minister had cited aircraft as one of the types of weapons which would be offensive and illegal under the Constitution. Although the situation has changed greatly in the past twenty years, it remains relatively easy to impute offensive characteristics to aircraft.

Article IX of the Japanese Constitution has been exposed to a great deal of discussion, and the legal historical arguments will not be reviewed in detail.¹ However, the Air Self-Defense Force feels particularly exposed to the constitutional issue because of its weapons and the nature of some policy options theoretically open to it. For that reason, it is appropriate to review some aspects of the constitutional limitations existent in Japan.

A constitution is a dynamic instrument. It may be modified by interpretation; its limitations primarily have meaning in terms of current values and needs. A constitution is a document, a legal paper;

¹For background, see Miyasawa Toshiyoshi, Commentary on the Japanese-Constitution (Tokyo: Nihon Hyohom: Ltd., 1965), Professor Miyasawa has written extensively on the Japanese Constitution. An excellent English language source is Dan Fenno Henderson, ed., The Constitution of Japan, Its First Twenty Years, 1947-1967 (Seattle: Univ. of Washington Press, 1968). Also see Emmerson, Arms, pp. 50-53, 108-119, for views on Article IX and its effect on the SDF.

however, the full extent of its meaning is shaped by the actions and decisions taken in its name. Finally, a constitutional limit is significant with regard to policy only if it eliminates an otherwise viable alternative. It would be rather meaningless to say that Article IX of the Constitution prohibits a large strategic bomber force if that is not a viable Japanese policy option with or without Article IX.

The origin of Article IX remains uncertain; however, the Constitution is still considered the "MacArthur Constitution", and Article IX the "MacArthur Article". The written history did begin with General MacArthur when he included his views on the topic in a memo to General Whitney:

War as a sovereign right of the nation is abolished. Japan renounces it as an instrumentality of settling its disputes and even for preserving its own security. It relies upon the higher ideals which are now stirring the world for its defense and protection.

No Japanese Army, Navy or Air Force will ever be authorized and no rights of belligerency will ever be conferred upon any Japanese Force.³

A draft constitution was written by the Government Section of the Supreme Commander, Allied Powers (SCAP) after the initial Japanese version proved unacceptable; it was presented to the Japanese in the form of an ultimatum on February 13, 1946.⁴ The SCAP draft read as follows:

Article VII. War as a sovereign right of the nation is abolished. The threat or use of force is forever renounced as a means for settling disputes with any

³SCAP, Political Reorientation of Japan, Vol. I, p. 102.

⁴Emmerson, Arms, described the scene where General Whitney threatens Foreign Minister Yoshida with Publication of the Government Section draft in the absence of an acceptable Japanese alternative.

other nation.

No army, navy, air force or other war potential will ever be authorized and no rights of belligerency will ever be conferred upon the state.⁵

While there was some consolidation from MacArthur's memorandum, the origin of the article seems certain. The Japanese did not question the article and it was submitted to the Diet in that form. During the Diet discussions, the article was amended pursuant to a proposal by Mr. Ashida Hitoshi. The final, official text of Article IX showed some revision:

Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes.

In order to accomplish the aim of the preceeding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized.⁶

This amendment was not debated and Mr. Ashida waited five years before he explained the reasoning behind his actions. He believed the phrases he added had guaranteed that Japan had not forfeited the sovereign right of self-defense. By adding "in order to accomplish the aim of the preceeding paragraph," forces were only illegal if to be used contrary to paragraph 1. However, there appeared to be little public discussion of the matter at the time and only a few raised their

⁵Miyasawa Toshiyoshi, Commentary on the Japanese Constitution (Tokyo: Nihon Hyochom Company, Ltd, 1965), p. 57.

⁶From official translation provided by Legal Section, Air Staff Office, ASO, JASDF.

voices in disagreement.⁷ Edward Martin could write in 1948: "there seems to be agreement on the proposition that Japan should never be permitted to have an army, navy or air force."⁸

But the situation in Asia began to change rapidly and new interpretations of Article IX began to appear. The originator, General MacArthur, touched on the subject during a 1950 New Year Statement to the Japanese: "Japan retains the inalienable right of self-defense against unprovoked attack."⁹ The political leadership in Japan also went through a difficult period of reinterpretation. Prime Minister Yoshida argued that the National Police Reserve could not be called rearmament because it was only established to maintain internal security and therefore had no "war potential."¹⁰ The next step was the establishment of the National Safety Agency on August 1, 1952, and General Tatsumi Eichii suggested to Prime Minister Yoshida that these forces were concerned with military matters and Article IX should be revised. The Prime Minister became angry at this suggestion and said his old position was still valid. The Safety Forces were not charged with external defense, and they therefore had no war potential.

⁷U.S. Navy Far East Memorandum, dated July 15, 1947, cites one instance of Article IX criticism when the no-war clause was denounced by a Communist Party representative at a public rally. The JCP would amend the Constitution he said for Japan had the right to military forces and "to declare defensive wars."

⁸Edward M. Martin, The Allied Occupation of Japan (New York: American Institute of Pacific Relations, 1948), p. 39.

⁹The New York Times, January 1, 1950.

¹⁰Prime Minister Yoshida changed his position on the defense forces during the 1950-1954 period and I rely heavily on General Tatsumi's description of these changes and his arguments with the PM over the Constitution, Interview, February 22, 1972. General Tatsumi favored Constitutional revision. See Chapter 5 for a discussion of General Tatsumi's relationship with the Prime Minister. .

The Self-Defense Forces presented a different problem for it did have responsibility for external defense. There was an air defense force which was to fly jet interceptors, obviously not for internal security. Again General Tatsumi suggested that Article IX should be altered. The Prime Minister disagreed once more, however, he based his opposition on a different rationale. The Self-Defense Forces were war potential, but war potential in self-defense was permissible if not to be used for the settlement of international disputes.¹¹

This shift in attitude in 1954 corresponded to the realities of the Defense Forces and also a shift in public opinion. There was a significant amount of public support for rearmament during 1953, and the Progressive Party assumed the vanguard of the movement.¹² In February 1953, the Progressives adopted a resolution at their party convention which supported constitutional revision. The resolution specifically referred to Article IX, and the party's defense committee received approval of its rearmament plan. The Progressive position enjoyed a high point of popularity in 1953 and early 1954, but support for revision of Article IX began to erode rapidly during 1954. Twenty-five of forty daily newspapers supported revision in 1954; by 1956 five of thirty-four took the same position.¹⁴ In December 1954, the first Hatoyama Cabinet took Yoshida's earlier position: the Constitution allowed a "minimum degree"

¹¹Yoshida, Interview, February 22, 1972.

¹²Henderson, Constitution, pp. 52-62, including public opinion polls.

¹³"Progressive Party's Defense Special Committee Five-Year Defense Draft Program," May 1954, Ashida Mitoshi, Chairman, provided by U.S. Embassy.

¹⁴Henderson, Constitution, p. 63. .

of military forces to effect the right of self-defense.¹⁵ During November 1955, the two conservative parties formed a new coalition and their arguments emphasized the constitutionality of the Self-Defense Forces. In view of public opinion, the task became one of rationalizing rearmament and Article IX rather than altering the Constitution.¹⁶

The current position of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) is quite similar to that taken in 1955. The LDP infrastructure includes a "Constitutional Research Council" which has been primarily concerned with revisions of the Constitution.¹⁷ The council has researched proposed changes for five years, and has recently decided to recommend no change of Article IX. Instead they proposed that new articles be added proclaiming the legality "of the Self-Defense Forces, the need for self-reliant defense, and national security."¹⁸ The chairman of the council admitted that even those proposals had little hope of adoption by the LDP.¹⁹

Several factors make it likely that the LDP will continue to avoid the issue. Opponents of the SDF have repeatedly attempted to press the constitutional issue in the courts. The Japanese courts have steadfastly refused to rule specifically on the issue. Perhaps the most definitive opinion to date was delivered in the Sunakawa Case, one of the most famous on this issue:

¹⁵Royama Masamichi, "Problems in Self-Defense," The Annals of the American Academy, Japan Since Recovery of Independence, Vol. 308, 1956.

¹⁶Miyasawa Toshiyoshi, "The Constitution in Trouble," Japan Quarterly, July-September 1959, Volume VI, No. 3, pp. 293-294.

¹⁷Ikeda Hajime, "Constitution Change Believed Unlikely," The Japan Times, December 6, 1971, p. 3.

¹⁸Ibid.

¹⁹Ibid.

....this Article renounces the so-called war and prohibits the maintenance of the so-called war potential, but certainly there is nothing in it which would deny the right of self-defense inherent in our nation as a sovereign power. The pacifism advanced in our Constitution was never intended to mean defenselessness or non-resistance.²⁰

The legal opposition to the Self-Defense Forces has not subsided, and any case against the government which may raise the constitutional issue has received the support of opposition politicians and publicists. Many defense lawyers are retained and the case subsequently is appealed through all levels of the Japanese judicial system.²¹

The Air Self-Defense Force faced two similar cases in 1971.²² Both the Naganumo Case in Hokkaido and the Fujioka case in Hyakuri involved land acquisitions by the ASDF which have been contested, using the alleged illegality of the JASDF as the basis of their arguments. The JASDF expects that both cases eventually will be decided in its favor; lower level decisions have upheld the government position. However, the cases are a constant issue; the tactics of delay and appeal keep them in the courts almost continuously.²³ This, of course, has been the goal, and the primary reason opposition parties support the cases.

²⁰Supreme Court of Japan, Judgement Upon Case of the so-called "Sunakawa Case" (Tokyo: General Secretariat of the Supreme Court, 1960), pp. 2-8 (published in English translation), as quoted in Emmerson, Arms, p. 53.

²¹Emmerson, Arms, pp. 111-113, described the evolution of the "Eniwa Case," in which volunteer legal support was utilized.

²²This information was provided by Major Torino Masaru, JASDF, Legal Officer, Legal Branch, ASO, Interview, December 10, 1971. The cases are not actually contested by the JASDF because the government is always represented by the Justice Ministry. The legal branch of ASO does act as investigative office and technical advisor in cases involving the JASDF.

²³The case involving Hyakuri Air Base land began with a government purchase in 1957, Ibid.

The constant exposure keeps the issue in the public view.

Public opinion also acts to deter any revision of the Constitution. Despite the fact that the Constitution was imposed during the Occupation and is popularly referred to as the "MacArthur Constitution," public opinion polls oppose revision, particularly of Article IX. Only twenty percent of those polled in 1970 supported any change and less than seventy-five percent of that group favored changing Article IX.²⁴

Popular opinion is not a serious problem for the SDF, because the great majority, seventy-five per cent or more, support the existence of the Defense Forces.²⁵ The public generally has accepted the government position that the Constitution allows the SDF and this was borne out in a poll taken in February 1971. When asked the meaning of the Constitution, thirty-two percent replied that no military establishment was allowed; thirty-nine percent believed that the SDF was permissible. Twenty-nine percent were unsure of its meaning.²⁶ Similar surveys taken in 1967 and 1968 revealed nearly identical results.²⁷

²⁴Seron Chosa, Public Opinion Survey Pamphlet printed by Sorifu Koho Shitsu (Public Relations Division of the Prime Minister's Office), October 71, pp. 66-75, from 1970 national survey by Nippon Research Center. Also see Seron Chosa, February 72, pp. 20-21 for examples of Constitutional support.

²⁵Seisaku Geppo, April 1970, Central Survey Co. public opinion poll, September 69, the SDF had better exist; yes-75%; no-10%; don't know-15%, Mainichi, June 15, 1971, Mainichi Press Survey on Defense. Do you think SDF are necessary? Yes-71%; No-24%; Don't Know-5%. The Communist Party members were the only group opposed, by a 47-51 margin. Of the 24% opposing the SDF, only 7% based their opposition on the Constitution. Yomiuri, public opinion poll published August 7, 1969, generally supported these statistics and included a party preference breakdown showing, for example, 57.9% of JSP members prefer the SDF at current strength or stronger.

²⁶Seron Chosa, February 1972, pp. 20-21.

²⁷Ibid., February 67, no-31%, yes-42%, DK-27%; February 68, no-33%, yes-37%, DK-30%.

Furthermore, there have been some indications that opposition to the Defense Forces is not based on the Constitution. In the 1971 poll which was cited above, the respondents were asked: "Apart from the Constitution, should Japan have a military force for its self-defense?"²⁸ Those saying no totaled thirty-three percent; the yes vote was forty-six percent; and twenty-one percent did not know or had no opinion. Again, this ratio had remained constant over the preceeding four years.²⁹ The polls actually reflected a slightly higher opposition to the Self Defense Forces outside the constitutional reference.

If there are significant political reasons for avoiding constitutional revision, there remains the strategic issue. What defense options are prohibited by the Constitution and how important are such restrictions? The Vice Chief of Staff of the JASDF, Lieutenant General Shirakawa Motoharu, contended that the issue was "basic" to ASDF capabilities.³⁰ General Okumiya believed that Article IX is a "very great problem" facing Japan.³¹ These men and many others believe that there is a "basic philosophical difference" between the government and the opposition which would mean a different interpretation of Article IX and the disbandment of the Defense Forces if the latter came to power.³² They do not necessarily believe that the change would be made immediately.

²⁸Seron Chosa, February 1972, pp. 20-21.

²⁹Ibid.

³⁰Interview, December 10, 1971.

³¹General Okumiya Masatake, Interview, November 18, 1971.

³²This view also was expoused by Masuhara Keikichi, senior LDP member and member of the Diet, Interview, February 19, 1972; and Mr. Ogawa Raita, editor of Koku Shimbun, Interview, February 18, 1972. Also see Oi Atsushi, "Japan in a Democratic Context," The Christian Science Monitor, October 29, 1971.

Mr. Ogawa, for example believed an opposition government would depreciate combat and operationally ready procedures and move slowly towards demilitarization.

However, an opposite view exists which holds that the opposition parties would make very few if any changes in the SDF if they came to power.³³ The majority of all opposition party members questioned in 1971 declared they supported the Defense Force so there appears to be some political basis for the assumption although the opposition has used the Constitution continuously as a basis for attacking the SDF. From the formation of the National Police Reserve (NPR) in 1950 to the submission of the Fourth Defense Build-up Plan, the opposition parties have charged the government with violation of the Constitution. Most recently, they charged the government with "flagrant violation" of the constitutional principle of civilian control due to their handling of the new defense build-up.³⁴ Despite all the protestations and governmental "concessions," there has never been any significant alteration of the defense budget as a consequence of Diet deliberations.³⁵

The application of constitutional restrictions must be effected by the courts or through the political process. The reluctance of the

³³Mr. Kaihara Osamu, Interview, November 10, 1971. I am indebted to Mr. Kaihara for directing me into a closer investigation of the "SDF positions" of the various opposition parties.

³⁴This issue dominated all newspapers for the month of February 1972, while the opposition boycotted the Diet over the charges. For opposition charges see The Japan Times, February 8, 1972; February 11, 1972; and February 23-24, 1972.

³⁵The 1972 budget (for the first time) has been reduced slightly, but will not actually change the expenditures or direction of policy because of the bureaucratic procedures for procurement. "Nothing has changed" Mr. Kaihara declared, interview, February 29, 1972. For details on the political input to the policy-making process, see Chapter 7.

courts has been noted; the absence of budgetary modifications suggests that the Diet has not participated actively in the application of Article IX. The Diet, of course, is a tyrannical body in that the party with a majority may pass its programs whatever the opposition attitude, but that is not common in the Japanese Diet. The LDP has shown restraint and issues normally are discussed fully. There are, however, two basic factors which degrade the political impact on this issue. The Diet has very little expertise in military affairs, and the five political parties display an amazing consensus on the status of the Self-Defense Forces.

The Diet and the government are virtually void of personnel with previous military experience. General Genda Minoru and Admiral Hoshina Zenshiro now in the upper chamber of the Diet are conspicuous exceptions. There are men like Masuhara Keikichi, who have served as civilian administrators in the Defense Agency, but their early experiences were in the Internal Bureaus or police organizations. The most outspoken Diet member on military affairs in recent years has been Nakasone Yasuhiro, and he is a career politician.

The absence of personal experience is magnified by the lack of a standing defense committee. The establishment of such a committee has been supported by the LDP and the Democratic Socialist Party (DSP), but opposed by the other parties, particularly the Socialist Party.³⁶

The growing technological expertise required to interpret a defense budget exacerbates this problem.

³⁶The most recent effort for a defense committee stemmed from the February 1972 controversy over defense and was promptly attacked by the JSP, see: The Japan Times, February 17, 1972.

There is no pressure to remedy the lack of expertise. The lack of specifics has enhanced the use of constitutionality as an emotional, political tool by the opposition, and the absence of perceived threat leaves the government little leverage to force discussions into specifics. The LDP itself feels no threat and no need to obtain technical advice on its policies. Most leaders of the Defense Forces are certain that Prime Minister Sato would not recognize them in public. A striking example of this disregard occurred in 1969 when Prime Minister Sato went to the United States to confer on the return of Okinawa without any conferences with the Joint Staff Council, even though the Defense Forces would be charged with Okinawa's defense.³⁷

It is generally assumed that there are greatly divergent opinions on the constitutionality of the Self-Defense Forces. The Communists, the Socialists and the Komeito repeatedly assert that the current forces exist in violation of the Constitution. The LDP position is reflected by the Defense Forces as the party has been in power since Japan's independence: the Self-Defense Forces are legal; they may only be used for defense; and they may not be dispatched overseas. The Democratic Socialist Party supports the constitutionality of the SDF and opposes revision of Article IX. It supports "autonomous defense power in keeping with the Constitution."³⁸ However, it does believe that the present level of the SDF is sufficient and any further increase would be detrimental to Japan's security.

³⁷ Okumiya, Interview, November 18, 1971.

³⁸"Democratic Socialist Party Views toward the Government-LDP Decision for Automatic Extension of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty," DSP Document, (U.S. Embassy translation, June 22, 1970, pp. 21-22, also see Emmerson, Arms, p. 111.

The Komei Party has often called LDP defense policies unconstitutional, "these defense policies already have revised the Constitution for the worse."³⁹ It has also called for the return to the "peace Constitution - to realize peace without armaments."⁴⁰ Some ambivalence remains as suggested by a recent statement of the Party's secretary-general: "Our doubts about the constitutionality of the Self-Defense Forces are extremely strong."⁴¹ Moreover, Komeito proposals have been vague and contained a National Land Guard Force, the "Koku do Keke Tai."⁴² It has avoided discussing any specific organization, missions or armament for this force.

The Communists have been adamant about the current status of the SDF and their proposals for it:

The SDF law and the Defense Agency Establishment Law will be abolished, and the SDF, which are armed forces, violating the Constitution, subordinated to the U.S. and for the suppression of the people will be disbanded.⁴³

However, the Communists have not insisted that the Constitution is immutable; they have suggested that revisions might be necessary after Japan became "truly independent."⁴⁴ Despite their denunciation of the SDF, the Communists have agreed that:

³⁹Yomiuri, October 22, 1970.

⁴⁰Ibid.

⁴¹As quoted in Emmerson, Arms, pp. 110-111.

⁴²Kaihara, Interview, November 10, 1971.

⁴³"Japan Communist Party's Security Measures," Akahata (Red-Flag Organ of JCP), June 22, 1970 (U.S. Embassy Translation), pp. 13-14.

⁴⁴Emmerson, Arms, p. 110.

As a future problem, we have to consider that developments both within and without the country may produce a situation in which, in order to defend the independence and sovereignty of the country, some defense measures of a military nature may be required.⁴⁵

Therefore, they also have acknowledged the possible need for a defense force. Their essential objection would appear to be its orientation rather than its existence.

The Japan Socialist Party (JSP) has given the appearance of being most radically opposed to the Self-Defense Forces. It has denied that, once in power, it would alter the Constitution: "it is necessary to protect the constitutional system to the last."⁴⁶ The Self-Defense Forces are unconstitutional and would be dissolved when the Socialist Party came to power. The JSP has advocated a policy of unarmed neutrality to realize peace and protect the "precious treasure of the peaceful Constitution."⁴⁷ This "clear and resolute" statement becomes somewhat muddled, however, when JSP proposals for dissolving the SDF are examined in more detail.

The Defense Forces are to be converted into a National Police Corps, or "Koku Minki Satsutai."⁴⁸ They will be different, the JSP has asserted; the Police Corps will be relieved of "coping with direct

⁴⁵Akahata (Red Flag), June 11, 1968, as quoted in Emmerson, Arms, p. 110.

⁴⁶"Let Us Make Japan's Constitution of Non-Armament and Neutrality the Constitution of the World," Japan Socialist Review, January 1, 15, 1970, Nos. 194-195, p. 36; However, it should be noted that Socialist approved drafts of an altered Constitution have appeared and subsequently been played down by JSP leaders, Emmerson, Arms, p. 110.

⁴⁷Ibid., pp. 32-34.

⁴⁸Ibid., p. 32, Kaihara, Interview, November 10, 1971.

aggression" and will maintain "peace and order at home."⁴⁹ Even this distinction is later confused, for the Socialists have indicated that this police corps will "supplement" the prefectural police. Furthermore, its strength and equipment will be maintained in accordance with four factors:

- 1) The stability of the government, or the balance of forces between the government and the hostile forces (in and out of the Diet).
- 2) The degree of control over the Self-Defense Forces. (It is necessary to lead the Self-Defense Forces to understand the policy of our Party and cooperate with us by carrying out personnel transfers and replacing militarist education with correct education.)
- 3) The degree of realization of the foreign policy of peace and neutrality promoted by a socialist government. (A collective system or separate systems for guaranteeing peace, demilitarized zone in Asia and the Pacific, and a major belt of non-aligned neutral countries between the two major camps.).
- 4) Overwhelming public opinion (to dissolve the SDF).⁵⁰

These conditions of dissolution paint a totally different picture.

The last one suggests that very little will be done without "overwhelming" support; and current public opinion overwhelmingly supports the SDF.

The third factor makes the size and mission of the SDF, or police corps, dependent on the external situation, belying the previous assertion that it was only concerned with domestic order. The first two factors are the most ominous of all; they indicate that the 'new' defense forces would espouse the socialist viewpoint and be used to support the

⁴⁹"Let Us Make Japan's Constitution of Non-Armament and Neutrality the Constitution of the World," Japan Socialist Review, January 1, 15, 1970, Nos. 194-195, p. 36.

⁵⁰Ibid., pp. 32-33.

government viewpoint in the Diet and outside it.

A closer look at the various party policies regarding the Self-Defense Forces reveals that a great similarity in their views has developed. No party has actually intended to dissolve the Self-Defense Forces and remedy the 'violations of the Constitution.' The SDF have been criticized primarily because it is an area in which the government has been vulnerable. The opposition parties have vehemently opposed any revision of Article IX because they would be left without one of their most reliable points of criticism. While the Defense Force will continue to be called unconstitutional, it seems unlikely that the opposition will have the interest, the expertise or the true intent of altering probable policy alternatives.

The operational forces feel little restriction because of the Constitution. The defense planners within the Air Self-Defense Force discussed their difficulties and limitations in effecting budgetary and operational planning at length with the author. The subject of constitutional prohibitions was not mentioned. Budgetary and bureaucratic limitations were far more pressing.⁵¹ There has been good reason for the lack of concern with the constitutional problem as it has not been translated into specific policy limitations. When Director-General Arita authorized the planning for the Fourth Defense Build-up Plan, he gave no "constitutional" limits; in fact he only promulgated a very abstract guideline without specific limitations.⁵²

⁵¹Colonel Yamada Riyoichi (now Major General, JASDF), Chief, Defense Section, ASO; Colonel Hase Kiyoshi, Chief, Defense Branch, ASO; Colonel Katao Nobora, Chief, Annual Program Branch; Colonel Kume Toyahisa, Chief, Medium and Long Range Plans Branch, Interviews, December 13, 1971.

⁵²Mr. Yasuda Hiroshi, Defense Councillor, Japan Defense Agency, Interview, February 10, 1971.

In interviews held with operational personnel at air bases at several locations in Japan, the Constitution rarely was mentioned as a problem in Japan. In a roundtable discussion at the Air Staff College with several field-grade instructors, the Constitution was mentioned only briefly although the problem of public attitude and SDF morale was discussed at length.⁵³ While talking to cadets at the Air Officer Candidate School, the constitutional issue was raised. One cadet replied that it was not really an issue; the Constitution was ambiguous and should be changed, but that was merely a technical problem.⁵⁴ In sum, there is little evidence that the Constitution has constrained recent choices regarding policies or operations of the JASDF.

It is possible to argue that the above theory may be applicable within limited policy options, essentially the maintenance of the status quo or minimal growth; however, the constitutional limitation would prohibit a wider range of strategic alternatives. Therefore, an autonomous nuclear force or strategic deterrence capability are not possible policy options. Such an argument may be true, but it does not concern the major point addressed here. The current, viable policy options are constitutionally and politically possible. If there developed a drastic change in the international environment or the threat to Japan, it seems probable that a strategic deterrence force could be

⁵³I participated in this discussion on November 30, 1971, with five officers of the JASDF, Lt. Col. Ozaki Yasutada, Lt. Col. Fujii Tsutomu, Maj. Kenmizaki Masaru, Maj. Jominaga Shigefumi, and Maj. Itonaga Yoshiteru.

⁵⁴Visit to Nara Air Base, January 14, 1972. There were other opinions among the many people I talked to. Some felt that it was a limitation. JASDF could have only tactical and not strategic weapons for example. However, when only asked what are the major problems of JASDF, the Constitution was rarely volunteered by the younger officers and cadets.

built while still claiming the integrity of Article IX. The Chinese have built a nuclear missile force only for self-defense, repeatedly promising that it would never be used first. It is very difficult, if not impossible, to designate a weapon offensive or defensive. In 1972, Article IX is a useful Japanese tool for dealing with friend and foe, but less significant as a limitation on security policy options.

Pacifism in Japan

The Self-Defense Forces have been characterized as a foreign legion in their own country. One Air Self-Defense Force General was returning from a visit to the United States where he had been the official guest of the United States. The general was reported to have said that he could feel his social status falling more rapidly than the aircraft as it descended to Haneda International Airport.⁵⁵ The SDF was very unpopular in its early days. If pacifism was the stoning of the first young cadets at the Defense Academy, then there definitely was a strong strain of pacifism in the 1950's.⁵⁶

In discussing pacifism in Japan in 1972, it is helpful to consider the opposite phenomenon, militarism. Various sources inside and outside Japan have charged that militarism is reviving. One author recently suggested that Japanese public opinion could "compel" nuclear armament.⁵⁷ The primary goal is not comprehensively to examine militarism or pacifism, but to place the prevailing Japanese social attitude toward defense

⁵⁵Story related by Taoka, Interview, December 1, 1971.

⁵⁶Lieutenant Commander Baba Toshihaya, JMSDF, was a member of the first class of the Defense Academy and related incidents of rocks being thrown at him while in town with his uniform on.

⁵⁷Morton Halperin, "Reports Japan," The Atlantic, April 1970, Volume 225, No. 4., p. 14.

somewhere along a militarist-pacifist continuum. For this purpose, a definition contrasting the two extremes is applicable. Militarism could be defined as the assumption that military force and the use of violence is the most efficient method of effecting international relationship, and a national policy which implemented that assumption. Pacifism, on the contrary, would be the assumption that military force and violence are the most inefficient methodology of international affairs, and therefore, it advocates abandonment of their use.

Prime Minister Yoshida made a statement in the Diet, June 26, 1946, which represented early Japanese pacifism:

As to the clause of the draft constitution forsaking war, it does not recognize any armaments or the right to make war against any country. Therefore it means we have forsaken war, even the right of self-defense, to battle other countries. In wars of recent years, many have been fought in the name of self-defense, including the Manchurian Incident and the great Asian War. War using the right of self-defense appears to be righteous, but I believe that it is harmful to recognize such a right.⁵⁸

James Buck suggested in 1967 that a total change of the social structure occurred during the Occupation which permanently limited the options of the Self-Defense Forces.⁵⁹ There were many significant changes implemented during the Occupation; land reform, monetary reform, and democratization. Although these occupational reforms could be called a political revolution, there remain many unique Japanese characteristics which contribute to a basic Japanese conservatism. Jobs are still often for life, and organizations employ the college background and the family of their employee, not just the individual. The Confucian values relevant to a hierarchal society are still apparent in Japan. Professor

⁵⁸Quoted in Asahi Shimbun, January 1, 1972.

⁵⁹Buck, "The Japanese Self-Defense Forces," loc. cit., pp. 597-602.

Watanabe, after discussing societal change in post-war Japan, concluded that; "Japan still is a modernized clan, and consists of many vertical societies large and small."⁶⁰ While there have been many changes in Japanese society after World War II, it would not be correct to say that it has changed fundamentally. Nor was the early pacifism of the Occupation a permanent change. There has been some movement away from the previous strict interpretation and there is ample evidence that Japan is no longer willing to abandon the use of force in every circumstance. Twenty-five years after Prime Minister Yoshida's statement to the Diet, another statement made by Prime Minister Sato reflected a different national attitude:

I believe that our country should have as a basic principle the ideal to have freedom and peace, but also with the pride that we defend our own country and maintain adequate size self-defense forces. This also will contribute to the lessening of tension in Asia.⁶¹

The change in Japanese attitudes toward defense has not been a total reversal, and there remain significant limitations to the increase in support enjoyed by the Defense Forces. Some sections of Japanese society still oppose and ostracize the SDF. A recent public opinion poll showed only seventeen per cent of students supported neutrality with self-defense while forty percent supported unarmed neutrality.⁶²

⁶⁰Professor Watanabe Kazutaka, "Philosophy of Management in Japan," prepared for Headquarters, Fifth Air Force, Japan, April 1966, provided by Office of Air Force History, Fifth Air Force, Japan; p. 8.

⁶¹Quoted in Asahi Shimbun, January 1, 1972, from Diet speech October 20, 1971.

⁶²Of all occupational classifications this was the only group who showed such support, only 8% of housewives, for example, supported unarmed neutrality, "Public Opinion Poll Concerning the SDF," Seisaku Geppo, April 1970, p. 33.

The Japanese academic community also has generally opposed the Defense Forces. In 1968, the majority of major Japanese universities voted to exclude all Self-Defense Force personnel. This ban remains in effect today.⁶³

Outside the academic sector there appears to be less opposition to the SDF although some observers have felt that the entire Japanese social attitude is inimical to uniformed military pride.⁶⁴ General Okumiya has pointed out that Japan does not have an Army, Navy or Air Force but only Self-Defense Forces.⁶⁵ Conscription, military justice, national security measures and emergency mobilization procedures are some of the aspects of the normal military force structure which have not been developed in Japan.⁶⁶ There is no award system in the SDF, limiting the means by which heroic or meritorious service can be recognized.⁶⁷ An expression of the general lack of pride in the uniform is the

⁶³The civilian graduate program for JASDF was cancelled in the 1968 school year, Colonel Teramura Sumio, JASDF, Chief of Training Section, ASO, February 14, 1972. There are signs that this policy may be reversed in the future according to some, including Professor Ando Nisuke of Kyoto University, Interview, January 14, 1972. Mr. Kaihara points out that the most vehement opponents of current national security policies and the Defense Forces are the strongest proponents of Mao Tse-tung who said, "the central duty of the revolution - is the seizure of political power through armed forces and the solution of problems through war." In "Anzen Hosho no Tadashii Kangae Kata," loc. cit., pp. 2-4. There are, of course, many non-Maoist academics who oppose the SDF.

⁶⁴Ogawa, Interview, December 27, 1971; Okumiya, November 18, 1971.

⁶⁵Okumiya Masatake, "Japan's Self-Defense Forces," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, December 1965, p. 27.

⁶⁶See Auer, "Postwar Sea Forces," Chapter VII, for a detailed description of these differences. I am citing these differences as possible elements affecting the morale and attitude of SDF members. Operational deficiencies caused by these situations is a different matter and will be discussed in the course of Sections V and VI.

⁶⁷Ogawa, Interview, December 27, 1971.

reluctance of military personnel to wear their uniforms to and from work. This situation is changing, however, and one experienced United States Air Force officer remembered that a uniformed officer could not be found on the street in the mid-1960's while it is commonplace to see men in uniform in 1972.⁶⁸

While general social acceptance of the military may be improving, militarism in Japan has become an often discussed topic that obviously worries many Japanese. The majority of them do not believe that militarism has revived in Japan, but on the other hand, a majority also believe that it is a future danger.⁶⁹ When asked why there is a danger of militarism or why they believe that militarism has revived, the majority cited the LDP policies and the buildup of the Defense Forces.⁷⁰ Japan is sensitive to external opinions, and recent charges of militarism from the United States and China have heightened speculation in the press. One section of the special New Year's edition of Asahi Shimbun was dedicated to "Gunkoku shugi o Tsusekisuru," the study of the drift to militarism.⁷¹

⁶⁸Colonel Richard G. Leech, U.S.A.F., former Air Attache to Japan 1967-1970, January 27, 1972. It is more common to see men travelling to and from their base in uniform outside the Tokyo area. At Matsushima and Komatsu bases most personnel wore their uniforms to and from work, (in a much more hospitable atmosphere than Tokyo).

⁶⁹Seron Chosa, December 1971, pp. 45-47; "National Opinion Poll," Asahi Shimbun, January 3, 1972, (U.S. Embassy Translation); "National Poll", Mainichi, October 18, 1971 (U.S. Embassy Translation). Only 5% believe militarism has revived, an average of 25% believe that it "is reviving"; 40-45% see revival in the future; and 55-60% believe that there exists the "possibility that militarism may revive." Only 25-30% believe there is "no danger of militarism."

⁷⁰Ibid.

⁷¹Asahi Shimbun, January 1, 1972; also see Matsuda Michio, "Militarism in the Mind," Asahi Evening News, January 1, 1972, a long, polemic article on the revival of militarism.

The Defense Forces have done little to combat this trend of public opinion although there have been several reasons for their ineffectiveness in public relations. The principle of civil control has been translated to complete dominance and any public statements on policy by the uniformed officers have been frowned on if not totally prohibited.⁷² The SDF were unpopular and looked on as stepchildren of the Occupation at their inception and have been hesitant to make contact with the press and public. Many uniformed officers remain suspicious of the Japanese newspapers and feel that the newspapers have been dominated by Communist or leftist elements; they have viewed the press as opponents rather than friendly critics. Even friendly members of the press receive only limited support and feel that the SDF should attempt to create more positive relationships.⁷³ The JASDF only began recruiting over radio and television two years ago, and did not disseminate pamphlets for that purpose until 1965. The editor of Koku Shimbun pointed out that the Air Self-Defense Force was "so concerned over political sensitivity that they did not want to be discussed."⁷⁴ There has been greater effort expended in this area as the Defense Agency recently earmarked one million dollars for public relations, and the JASDF, for example, takes public figures on "invitational flights" at a cost of over \$1650.00 per jet ride.⁷⁵

⁷²The extent of civilian control will be discussed fully within the framework of the policy-making structure explained in Chapter 6.

⁷³Ogawa Raita, editor of Koku Shimbun (Wing) and strong supporter of the JASDF, expressed this view, Interview, December 27, 1971.

⁷⁴Ogawa, December 27, 1971.

⁷⁵"Flight on SDF Trainer Interceptor." Mainichi, January 17, 1972. The JASDF also has attempted to publicize emergency flights which deliver medicine or rescue stranded mountain climbers, etc.

Although there has appeared to be an amelioration of the social atmosphere in Japan, some anti-military sentiments clearly remain, and the Defense Forces remain very low on the public's list of national priorities. There has been great sensitivity in Japan to the "people's welfare" and disruption of the people's welfare may cause sensational results. The U.S. Navy "Blue Angels" flew to Asia in 1971 at the invitation of the Japanese government and were to give three performances at the Japan International Aerospace Show which began October 29, 1971. The show was the first of its kind in Japan; it was co-sponsored by Asahi Shimbun, the Society of Japanese Aircraft Constructors and the Japan Aeronautical Association; eight countries and one hundred forty-five companies were represented. Yet, the mayor of one small town complained of the noise and danger to the 'people's welfare' caused by the initial Blue Angel's demonstration and they were first asked to alter their performance and then were cancelled entirely.⁷⁶

In the same manner, kichi kogai, or the base nuisance has been a primary irritant in the U.S.-Japan security relationship. The damage the bases do to the people's welfare is a most sensitive issue.⁷⁷ Even the militarism issue is related; when Japanese were asked what influences militarism would cause, most replied in terms of personal austerity imposed, conscription imposed, or their personal freedoms deprived.⁷⁸ These concerns heavily outweighed the fear of war because of militarism.

⁷⁶I was present at the show and involved in the circumstances of the cancellation. The government has allocated almost \$33 million over the next five years to noise countermeasures, The Japan Times, February 24, 1972.

⁷⁷See Hughes, "Guardianship," pp. 99-107, for detailed description of the effects of "kichi kogai" in 1968.

⁷⁸Asahi Shimbun, January 3, 1972.

The people's welfare is a constant point of political attack by the opposition parties. It was put into common western terms by Defense Councillor Yasuda when he said the issue in Japan is "guns versus butter and the Japanese people prefer butter."⁷⁹

When Japanese anti-militarism is viewed in this fashion, it appears very similar to sentiments expressed in many other states. No unique social or cultural characteristics appear to mandate the attitude; it is one which has been evident in many societies before, including Japan, and will appear in many more.⁸⁰ It is a common human emotion, based on important rational objections to violence, particularly the organized violence of war. However, it has proven a rather unpredictable sentiment, and the sudden perception of an imminent threat to Japan could well alter the preference of butter before guns. Japanese national pride could play a role in such an opinion shift, and there are indications that the Japanese national spirit remains quite strong.

In 1905, Professor Nitobe Inazo wrote that "Bushido was and still is the animating spirit, the motor force of our country."⁸¹ Bushido was more than a code of chivalry in Japan, it has been the basis of moral education, the combination of different elements which formed the Japanese notions of right and wrong.⁸² Bushido dominated Japan for over seven hundred years, and as Professor Nitobe noted; "were (it) a mere physical force, the momentum it gained in the last seven

⁷⁹Interview, February 10, 1972.

⁸⁰Kennedy, Japan and Her Defence Forces, Chapter III, describes the social pressure for disarmament in Japan after World War I.

⁸¹Nitobe Inazo, Bushido, The Soul of Japan (rev. ed. Tokyo: Charles E. Tuttle Company, 1969), p. 171.

⁸²Ibid., pp. xi-xii.

hundred years could not be stopped so abruptly."⁸³ Japanese pacifism seems a rather transient phenomena when compared to the long history of Japanese bushido morality. The Emperor has remained a symbol of the Japanese state, and more Japanese still pay homage to those symbols representing Japan than to any religion of the East or West.⁸⁴ In Herman Kahn's words; "the Japanese people have almost always had a very clear conception of themselves as being special, as being Japanese and therefore unique."⁸⁵

If the Japanese spirit suffered in the defeat of World War II and the subsequent occupation, there have been indications that national spirit has begun to reassert itself. The growing self-confidence of Japan was evident at the 1964 Olympic Games hosted in Japan, the World Exposition held in 1970 at Osaka and the recent winter Olympic spectacle held in Sapporo. This self-confidence has begun to spread to the political arena where Japan is dealing with new boldness and strength.⁸⁶

⁸³Inazo, Bushido, The Soul of Japan, p. 170.

⁸⁴I was fortunate enough to visit Kyoto during the New Year Holiday, 1972, where I was graciously hosted by Professor Emeritus Taoka Ryoichi, Japanese Representative to the Permanent Court of Arbitration and Member of the Japan Academy and his son Taoka Shunji, Defense Affairs Reporter for Asahi Shimbun. During visits to the famous Shinto and Buddhist pilgrimages during the Japanese holiday period, I was impressed with the dominance of nationalism whatever the nature of the shrine. Japanese national feeling appeared to remain a "motor force" of Japan in 1972. The many Japanese I saw in Kyoto were not worshipping the state, they were celebrating the fact that they were Japanese.

⁸⁵Herman Kahn, The Emerging Japanese Superstate, Challenge and Response (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1970), p. 21.

⁸⁶The return of Okinawa has contributed to the Japanese attitude, and their new assertiveness may be seen in the Japanese claims to the Senkaku Is. and to the Northern Territories. See Crocker Snow, "Japan Now Seeks Return of Russian-held Islands," Boston Globe, May 20, 1972 for similar comments by a current observer.

The reawakening of pride may also encompass the military heritage of Japan. Legislation is under consideration to give national support to the Yasukuni Shrine in Tokyo. This shrine has been referred to as the tomb of the unknown soldier, but it is more than that; it is the major symbol of the Japanese martial spirit.⁸⁷ It is a shrine to all the past and future war dead of Japan and it is very closely related to the symbol of the Emperor. The government-supported legislation has indicated significant support for the reinstatement of the shrine. It is interesting to note that China considered the re-emergence of the Shrine so significant that they leveled a specific attack on it as the base for "Japanese reactionaries" to propagate "militarism."⁸⁸

This indication that Japan has regained some degree of respect for its military heritage have been accompanied by an increasing public awareness of defense issues. In August 1969 a Yomiuri poll on the Security Treaty revealed that 53 percent of those sampled had some concern about the "defense problem of Japan."⁸⁹ Only considering the male population interviewed the percentage was more impressive with 78 percent being concerned about Japan's security. Only 27.6 percent of those polled believed that there was no country who would force

⁸⁷William P. Woodard, "Yasukuni Shrine," The Japan Christian Quarterly, Spring 1971, pp. 74-75. Although Mr. Woodard opposes the concept of the shrine as a Christian, he concludes that the majority of Japanese support its reinstatement.

⁸⁸New China News Agency, December 26, 1971, as quoted in Japan Times, December 27, 1971.

⁸⁹Yomiuri, August 7, 1969 (U.S. Embassy translation).

unjust demands on Japan by the use of force.⁹⁰ Part of the reason for an increasing awareness of national security affairs is the change in Japanese public opinion toward the United States' defense commitment. In June 1969, 37 percent of those polled believed that the U.S. would come to Japan's defense versus 29 percent who said the U.S. would not defend Japan in an emergency; but in October 1971 only 30 percent believed the U.S. commitment and 38 percent disbelieved it.⁹¹ Polls also have indicated that the Japanese public increasingly sees the SDF as an instrument for the national defense. Only 24 percent of those interviewed in 1967 believed the SDF were needed primarily for external defense, but 50 percent thought so in 1970, more than a 100 percent increase.⁹² Only 10 percent of another poll believed further strengthening of the SDF was "desirable," but another 34 percent said it was "unavoidable" versus 40 percent who saw it as "not desirable."⁹³ These polls show the division of opinion in Japan on the defense issue. The opinion shifts also demonstrate a natural phenomena; as people perceive of the SDF as a function of the national defense, they will relate the necessary strength of the SDF to their

⁹⁰Yomiuri, August 7, 1969. 40% believed there were such countries and 32% were unsure.

⁹¹Yomiuri, October 19, 1971, (U.S. Embassy translation) and the 1971 data is reinforced by a poll reported in Seron Chosa, December 1971, pp. 64-71, in which 29.6% said U.S. will defend, 38.2 said no, and 37.7 hard to say.

⁹²Seisaku Geppo, April 1970; What are the duties of the SDF?

	1970	1967
Ensuring the Security of the Country-----	50%	24%
Maintenance of internal public security-----	22%	21%
Dispatch in case of disasters-----	13%	33%
Co-operation for public welfare-----	2%	6%
Don't know-----	13%	16%

⁹³Yomiuri, October 19, 1971.

perception of the threat. If the threat increases the majority may not see increased armaments as desirable, but they will see them as "unavoidable."

There also have been indications that the morale of the SDF has responded to the increased public awareness of defense matters. The Defense Agency promulgated a moral code for SDF personnel in June 1961 entitled "Mental Attitude of Self-Defense Personnel."⁹⁴ It was a temperate document, calling on each man to develop "his will to improve himself, his love of others, and his concern about the race and the fatherland."⁹⁵ Even this document was subject to criticism and some commentators recalled the "Imperial Rescript for Soldiers," and "Field Service Code" of the Imperial Army.⁹⁶

Despite criticism from certain quarters, morale has improved; public recruiting and the increased incidence of personnel wearing their uniforms outside the bases have been cited in support of this trend. On December 12, 1970, Director General Nakasone met the Emperor at the Imperial Palace to report "various matters under his competence."⁹⁷ It was the first time the chief of the Defense Agency reported to the Emperor and this was followed by another first when the Imperial Household officially invited the Chief of Staff of JASDF to the Shinjuku Palace. ASDF officers saw this as a significant increase in their

⁹⁴Official Translation provided by JDA.

⁹⁵Ibid., p. 2, note the fact that no call to love Japan or Japanese, only to be concerned, my emphasis.

⁹⁶Asahi, June 28, 1961.

⁹⁷Yomiuri, December 15, 1970 (U.S. Embassy translation).

prestige and national stature and were most proud of the event.⁹⁸

Another indication of the increased confidence of the SDF personnel was the recent criticism of their attitude by Senator Ueda Tetsu, a Socialist Diet Member: "they (SDF personnel) said the SDF was responsible for defense and they did not have to bow their heads to civilians. If this is the spiritual position of the Fourth Defense Build-up Plan, we are faced with a great problem."⁹⁹ Perhaps even more significant, the statement quoted by Senator Ueda did not raise any general public outcry.

Another important factor in the evolution of SDF attitude centers on the increased responsibility they sense. Japan is only now becoming an independent country according to General Okumiya, and in his words; "before you think of peace you must be able to defend yourself."¹⁰⁰ Director-General Nakasone stressed increased responsibility and the resultant pride during his first broadcast to the men of the Defense Forces.

The work of the SDF is the defense of the nation. You yourself have chosen to take on this task which someone must shoulder, for Japan, our country, to survive. You must take pride in this noble mission.¹⁰¹

⁹⁸Lieutenant Colonel Okazaki Yasutada, JASDF, Faculty (War History), Air Staff College, November 15, 1971. Colonel Okazaki mentioned this fact and its significance as he saw it in a group discussion, and all the officers present agreed they were proud when it happened.

⁹⁹"Tokubetsu za Dankai 4 Jibo no Kobu Keikai o Kuru" (Special Discussion: Review of the Aviation Portion of the 4th DBP), Koku Joho (Aireview), January 1972, p. 77.

¹⁰⁰General Okumiya, Interview, November 18, 1971.

¹⁰¹As quoted in Asagumo, June 11, 1970.

Again in a New Year's Statement, Director-General Nakasone stressed his belief that "autonomous defense" was a new reality which was increasing the mission of the SDF:

I ask all members of the Self-Defense Forces to have full awareness of these changes in the environment and to deepen their pride and sense of mission as SDF members.¹⁰²

Terms such as "deepen their pride" and "noble mission" were not used in reference to the Self-Defense Force of 1960, but were used in 1970. There are exceptions to this trend and one young air force officer recently commented that he thought of "unconstitutional" when he heard the word "Koku Jieitai." However, many SDF men feel less estrangement and more prestige than at any time in the history of the Self-Defense Forces.

Domestic Restraints - 1972

Political, constitutional and societal factors do limit the options of the decision-makers who formulate Japanese defense policy. These elements have played a significant role in restricting policy options over the past twenty years. There remain options which are not viable due to domestic considerations although options such as nuclear weapons or strategic capability also have been rejected on other grounds.

Any national policy is similarly constrained in type if not degree. The social pressures which Japanese policy-makers face in 1972 do not generally prohibit them from exercising otherwise rational policy directions. The general public trend in Japan has been toward greater acceptance of the need for defense and the Defense Forces.

¹⁰² As quoted in Asagumo, January 14, 1971.

The Constitution, as presently interpreted, provides rather flexible limits on defense armaments. The continuing political debate on national security has focused on moral and legal arguments. It has not investigated substantive defense policy alternatives; its influence on the policy-maker has been superficial. The defense issue has been used as a political tool and often the politicians who debate the topic have been uninformed and uninterested in substantive results.

There appear to be no international restrictions to Japanese rearmament in 1972 although massive rearmament would trigger a large protest, particularly in Asia.

Therefore, a new or different political consensus could revise the Constitution and accelerate rearmament. Is a new consensus evolving, or could a new consensus be reached? Japan is only twenty-six years away from the fury of atomic warfare and the humiliation of defeat. Deep anti-military emotions remain in the society; these emotions have been reinforced by the desire for more individual freedoms. The feelings have also been supported by the relatively high degree of security felt by the great majority of Japanese. Were Japan threatened, it is quite conceivable that the homogeneity, the spirit and the martial pride of Japan could reassert itself.

Nakasone Yasuhiro, perhaps the most prominent nationalist in Japan, but also an astute politician who is aware of Japanese public sentiment, recently expressed this emerging Japanese pride in rather forceful terms:

There is no other country which had developed its economy even to the extent of almost catching up with America, in a bare 25 years, from the very ashes, after its defeat in war. Furthermore, this nation is a homogeneous people, that is, the Yamato Race, who have grown up together for 2,000 years in an island nation, and speak only one language, the Japanese language. Their educational level is extremely high. In The Greater East Asia War, they manufactured Zero Fighters, and they manufactured (many other) outstanding

weapons. Since they are such a superior people, who have all those abilities, it is conceivable that foreigners will, at times, fleetingly think how fearful they would be if this nation was to start thinking about a military expansionist policy or how terrifying it would be if it was to have atomic bombs, especially when they look at this country's amazing reconstruction since the end of the War and its economic growth.¹⁰³

Social limits do exist and they will continue to exist. However, they stem from the current Japanese situation. If a need for accelerated rearmament were demonstrated to the Japanese people, it is unlikely that constitutional limitations or pacifist sentiments would prohibit any options which Japanese leaders wished to exercise.

¹⁰³"Dialogue Between Nakasone Yasuhiro and Ishibashi Masashi on Japanese Militarism," Yomiuri, May 4, 1970.

Chapter 4

A BITTER HISTORY

Two Air Forces

September 2, 1945, found Japan a defeated, crushed nation, ravaged by a long costly war and facing the humiliation of unconditional surrender. Japan had suffered tremendous damage; entire cities had been laid to waste although foreign troops had not set foot on the mainland. Japanese air power had been unable to stop the American bombers, and it bore responsibility for the extent of destruction. Every Japanese decision-maker, in uniform or out, is personally aware of the failure of Japan's air defense. The pre-war history of military aviation and the lessons learned by Japan remain a significant input to the decision-making process.

Most national military organizations at the turn of the century were characterized by a separate army and navy. Japan was no exception, and the leaders of the Meiji Restoration took care to establish a modern army and navy which followed those modern national force structures. Aircraft added a new tool to military actions and airspace a new medium in which warfare could be conducted. As this new era of warfare evolved during World War I, aviation was adopted by both armies and navies. Japan, in the normal pattern, had two air forces; and while this was not uncommon, the extent and scope of the disparity between them was unique.

The modernization of the Japanese military structure actually began before the Shogun was overthrown.¹ The first British Naval Mission to Japan arrived in 1867 and the first formal French military mission to the Imperial Japanese Army (IJA) arrived in 1872.² A previous, informal French mission had arrived before 1865. When the Meiji Emperor came to power, the competing influences of two distinct military systems were already present. Although the missions were officially recalled, other groups, often including the same personnel, soon replaced them and continued their respective training.

The Japanese have a long history illustrating their unique receptiveness to foreign instruction, and this situation was no exception. They mimicked their tutor's tactics, dress, and equipment. The Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) went so far as to celebrate Queen Victoria's birthday!³ This emulation included the adoption of their mentors' strategies; strategies which became deeply entrenched after the successful Sino-Japanese and Sino-Russian Wars. By 1905 British big navy strategy versus the continental theories of Army dominance had divided the two services; they were operating with conflicting goals

¹See Ernst L. Presseisen, Before Aggression: Europeans Prepare the Japanese Army (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1965), for an excellent and thorough discussion of the early European military missions to Japan and their results. While somewhat more emphasis is placed on the French and German missions to the Imperial Army, there is a thorough discussion of the tactics and strategies adopted by all the branches.

²Ibid., p. 10, also see Captain M. D. Kennedy, Some Aspects of Japan and Her Defence Forces, (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner and Co., Ltd., 1928), pp. 18-20, Appendix I.

³Taoka Shunji, Interview, December 1, 1971. This custom was stopped after World War I.

and competing for limited resources.⁴

Another factor which exacerbated the division was the independence of the two ministries. Under the Meiji Constitution they were firsts among equals in the Cabinet.⁵ No other branch of government was capable of imposing a joint or unified strategy on the two military services. Therefore, the two branches continued to develop autonomously, without full coordination, much less integration.

The division between the Army and Navy was well established by 1910 when the first heavier-than-air craft was piloted by a Japanese. Baron Shigeno Kiyotake of the Imperial Japanese Army had trained in France and during December 1910, Japanese Army pilots were establishing Japanese records for aviation in French- and German-built aircraft.⁶ The Navy Department sent two officers each to the United States and France in July 1912, and by 1916 a small domestic pilot training program had been established by the Imperial Navy.⁷ Military aviation received little emphasis before World War I, but the Japanese attitude visibly changed subsequent to the war.

⁴Mabuchi Ryoitsu, "Nihon Sangyo no Hyaku hen" (100 Years of Japanese Industry), Jiyu (Freedom), February 1969, p. 68.

⁵The Army and Navy Ministries later, based on Imperial Ordinances, called for active duty officers. Without Cabinet cooperation no active duty officer would replace one who resigned, forcing the Cabinet to collapse.

⁶Okumiya Masatake and Horikoshi Juo, Zero San: Nihon Kaigun Koku Sho Shi (Zero Fighter; A Brief History of the Japanese Naval Air Force), (Tokyo: Nihon Shappon Kyodo Kabushiki Kaisha (Japanese Publishing Corporation), 1954, Appendix II, p. 256.

⁷General Sanagi Sadamu, JASDF, (Ret.), former Chief of Staff of the JASDF, letter to the author, January 20, 1972, some of the detailed information provided by General Sanagi was obtained from Vice Admiral Kuwabara, Chairman, Nihon Kaigun Koku-shi Hensan Inkai (Japan's Naval Air History Comm.), Nihon Kaigun Koku-shi (Japan's Naval Air History) (Tokyo: Jiji Tsushin-sha (Jiji Press), 1969, 4 Volumes. General Sanagi participated in the work of compiling these volumes. Also, Admiral Kuwabara Torao, IJN (ret.), one of the first Naval Aviators in Japan, Interview, February 16, 1972.

They were not only impressed with the use of aviation in Europe; its value had been demonstrated in the seige of Tsingtao. German warships had taken shelter in the harbor at Tsingtao under the protection of shore batteries and immune from the Allied Fleet. A Japanese cruiser had three Forman seaplanes aboard which were instrumental in dislodging the Germans and securing the fall of Tsingtao.⁸

The increased emphasis on aviation after World War I was exemplified by the arrival of two separate military missions to assist Japanese development. In January 1919, a sixty-three man "Aeronautics Guidance Group" arrive from France.⁹ This mission was led by Colonel Faure, a French Army officer; it remained in Japan for more than a year establishing the Army aviation training program. In 1921, the French mission to the Imperial Army was followed by a British mission to the Imperial Navy. This "British Naval Aviation Mission," was headed by the "Master of Sempill"; Colonel Sempill's mission arrived in July 1921 with the final contingent leaving Japan more than two years later.¹⁰

The primary objective of these missions was to train pilots and maintenance personnel and to establish permanent training programs. However, they did teach operational lessons learned during the war,

⁸General Sanagi, Interview, November 11, 1971; Sanagi, letter January 20, 1972, Kennedy, op. cit., pp. 57-59.

⁹Okumiya, Zero San, p. 259; Kennedy, op. cit., pp. 116-117.

¹⁰Kennedy, op cit., p. 35, Sanagi, letter, January 20, 1972; Okumiya, Zero San, p. 261. Colonel Sempill was a retired officer as were all the other members of the mission at the British Government's insistence. Although the British payed little official attention to its progress they gave "no little advice and support" unofficially! Sanagi, letter, January 20, 1972.

therefore increasing the operational and organizational gulf between the Japanese Army and Navy.¹¹ French aviation emphasized short range air-to-air and air-to-ground missions performed semi-autonomously behind the continental battlefield. English Naval Aviation emphasized integrated strategies with aircraft only operating in conjunction with a naval operation. Japanese reliance on British naval aviation was established even before the Sempill Mission in 1919 when the Navy Department proclaimed the policy that the "adaption of foreign aircraft and equipment would primarily rely on British origin."¹² By the early 1920's the differing influences were obvious as the Imperial Japanese Army had a separate Commander, and Air Army Headquarters. No such autonomy developed within the Imperial Japanese Navy.¹³

The first manufacture of engines and airframes began in 1913 and 1914, but significant development of the aviation industry began in 1919-1920. There were limited resources to be applied to aviation and Army-Navy competition immediately spread to the aircraft manufacturers. The two services took different approaches to industry; the Army relied upon industry for design and development while the Navy established a research and design center at Yokosuka in 1913.¹⁴ The Navy subsequently maintained its own research, experimental and repair

¹¹In addition to 52 pilot and 130 maintenance graduates, the Sempill mission provided a gunnery and bombing course, 4 reconnaissance and 12 communication graduates. Sanagi, Letter, January 20, 1972.

¹²Ibid.

¹³Kennedy, op. cit., pp. 116-125; Sanagi, Interview, November 11, 1971, VADM Kuwabara, Interview, February 16, 1972. The Aviation Bureau was set up as an external organ of the War Ministry in 1920, Okumiya, Zero San. This organ was to become the nucleus of civil aviation in Japan.

¹⁴Sanagi, Letter; Okumiya, Zero San, p. 256.

facilities; and it utilized the manufacturers as mass producers while it provided guidance to the companies.¹⁵ An aircraft company, therefore, had difficulty manufacturing aircraft for both services, which resulted in a dual aircraft industry paralleling the military itself.

The extent of the difference was immense and difficult to describe, but the most basic concepts of operations and maintenance were involved. Naval aircraft specifications were in feet and inches from their Anglo-Saxon mentors, while army aircraft were built using the metric system. Therefore, the Nagoya plant of Mitsubishi, which was producing identical models, was forced to maintain two autonomous production lines and no parts were interchangeable; even the threads on the same bolt would be slightly different!¹⁶ An army pilot would discover that the throttles on a navy aircraft went the opposite way, therefore it was impossible to integrate basic training.¹⁷

There were efforts to integrate military aviation; in fact they began in 1920. Public opinion in Japan strongly supported disarmament measures in the early '20s, and some consolidation of the post-war military establishment did occur.¹⁸ At the same time, in October 1920, a "Committee on Army and Naval Aviation," composed of both army and navy officers, was organized to investigate various aviation

¹⁵ Mabuchi Ryoitsu, former aeronautical engineer of IJA, Interview, November 27, 1971; also Sanagi, letter; Sanagi, Interview; and later all the aircraft companies manufacturing naval aircraft were designated Naval Facilities.

¹⁶ Sanagi, Interview, November 11, 1971.

¹⁷ Kuwabara, Interview, and Sanagi, Interview. Admiral Kawabara recalled that the Navy throttles pulled back to open because it took both arms to pull these planes off the water and it was convenient to have the throttle pull the same way on take off.

¹⁸ Kennedy, op. cit., see "Chapter III, The Japanese Fighting Forces and Disarmament," pp. 104-125.

problems and to report to the Army and Navy Ministers within two years.¹⁹

The Committee did consider the organization of an independent air force and their final report to the secretaries read in part:

There are merits and demerits in both a unified air force system and separate air services under the army and the navy. Because it is too early to reach any final conclusion on the matter, it is recommended that the present status be continued.²⁰

At approximately the same time, an independent air force was proposed to the Minister of the Army by some army aviation personnel. This proposal did not mention naval air, and the Army General Staff was against an independent air force at the time.²¹ There were a series of unofficial and internal proposals for unification and/or independence within the Imperial Army, although the Army never officially proposed such steps to the Navy.²² The Navy General Staff consistently opposed any such step as they considered the air arm an integral part of naval strategy and tactics.

In May 1936, a Navy captain instructing at the Naval War College issued a joint statement with an instructor of the Army War College which criticized the dual structure. The statement proposed the organization of an independent air force, and it was submitted to both the Imperial Army and Navy. It was disregarded by the Navy and the instructor was transferred to another post.²³ The problem finally

¹⁹Sanagi, letter.

²⁰Ibid., taken from Japan's Naval Air History.

²¹Ibid.

²²Ibid.

²³Ibid.



received some official attention from the Naval Bureau of Aeronautics in 1939. The problems of separation, and the lack of a strategic air arm were discussed. As a result, an Army-Navy Committee was formed to deal with the dual air structure. It limited its immediate goals and hoped to coordinate training, material, maintenance specifications and operations in order to utilize better the limited resources available. The gulf between the two air forces made any coordination difficult, and integration was declared infeasible at the time. A few limited successes were reversed by the expanding war and the growing competition for resources.²⁴ From 1937, the competition for resources was exacerbated by the dual strategies of the Army and Navy. The naval anti-U.S. strategy and the Army anti-Soviet strategy split the industry "which was incapable of implementing the dual goals."²⁵ Again, no one was strong enough to win or force a compromise.

December 7, 1941, found the gulf between the two air arms as great as ever, and the pressures of war precluded any further efforts at integration. The successes early in the war stilled those concerned with aviation weaknesses, and the mobilization of the aircraft industries initially provided adequate equipment. However, by June 1944, aircraft shortages began to create serious problems for the Japanese. The decline was first caused by a transition to new models; then plants were destroyed by earthquakes in December 1944 and January 1945; finally, the B-29 raids had crippled production by June of 1945.²⁶ The equipment,

²⁴Sanagi, Interview; and Mr. Ogawa Raita, Executive Editor, Koku Shimbun, Interview, December 14, 1971.

²⁵Mabuchi, op. cit., p. 159.

²⁶Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, Final Report on Progress of Demobilization of the Japanese Armed Forces, 31 December 1946 (provided by the U.S. Naval History Division, Washington, D.C.), p. 78.

armament and oil shortages exacerbated the organizational difficulties which were coming to the fore.

Neither the Army nor Navy Air Force relished the idea of defensive operations. Both were primarily concerned with attack; however, the bombing of the homeland, which began seriously in June 1944, forced the reorganization of some air units in Japan.²⁷ The air defense of Japan was assigned to the Imperial Army Air Force. Heavy B-29 raids over Tokyo, Nagoya and Osaka began in November 1944, and Army aviation found it was woefully unprepared. The speed and altitude of the B-29's required an early launch and resulted in very limited endurance for the fighters. Their radars were undependable and diversionary tactics by the B-29's were very successful against the air defense system.²⁸ An alert system was established, however the B-29's began simultaneous small raids with one major attack and further confused the defenders; "this had a demoralizing affect on the air regiments which were under staffed and under equipped to combat such tactics continuously."²⁹ After February 1945, fighters from U.S. carriers joined the bombers and proved another insurmountable problem. The appearance of land-based fighters further crippled the Japanese air defense. By June 1945, the air force was not launched during daylight raids or against small

²⁷Imperial Japanese Government, Imperial Japanese Army, Homeland Air Defense Operations Record-Central Sector. This monograph was compiled from Japanese War Ministry and Japanese General Staff Record in accordance with SCAPIN No. 126. It was compiled by former officers working in the Demobilization Bureau and translated by G-2, Headquarters, Far East Command (Department of the Army, Office of the Chief of Military History, Washington, D.C.), p. 1.

²⁸Ibid., pp. 10-14.

²⁹Ibid., p. 15.

raids in an effort to conserve the few remaining elements.³⁰

Thus, two months later, when the final blows were delivered to Japan, no effective air resistance could be mounted against the nuclear attacks. In the words of Occupation authorities, the Japanese air forces, "though numerically substantial, were incapable of effective air combat resistance."³¹ There were many reasons for their failure; the lack of fuel and equipment has already been mentioned. In addition, all replacement pilot training had been disrupted by the constant attacks and there was a shortage of qualified pilots. Even with these limitations, there remained the fact that those resources available to Japan were not utilized in the most efficient manner. A unified command structure or additional emphasis on air defense would not have changed the course of the war. It might have lessened the devastation, and these air power lessons of World War II have continued to influence policy-makers in 1972. The lessons of air defense emphasis and unified command may seem simple, yet it is advisable to analyze these two factors more closely and to evaluate their lessons and the Japanese interpretation of these lessons.

It has been noted that the helplessness of the Japanese situation in 1945 was complicated by the joint command structure. There were some naval air units on the mainland tasked with the air defense mission, and the desperation of impending defeat did generate some effort toward integration of the remaining forces. At an Army-Navy top-level conference on March 3, 1945, the Army requested that the Army and Navy be consolidated. In order to reach agreement, "the Army will agree

³⁰Imperial Japanese Government, Imperial Japanese Army, Homeland Air Defense Operations Record-Central Sector, op. cit., p. 19, also SCAP, Demobilization, p. 66.

³¹SCAP, Final Demobilization, p. 66.

to let its Army aviation operate under Navy Command."³² This proposal did not materialize, however, and on July 13, 1945, the Army and Navy signed the "Agreement Between the Army and Navy Relative to Air Operations."³³

The agreement recognized that the anti-aircraft defenses "must be strengthened" and the enemy aircraft coming to attack the homeland must be destroyed.³⁴ The "main objective" was cited as the "combined operations of the Navy and the Army."³⁵ However, despite the military pressure and the hopelessness of the situation, unified command proved elusive:

The supreme commands of both air forces will during operations be situated in the same locality or in close proximity to each other and will endeavor to maintain close cooperation. In time of emergency the commanders of both forces will immediately cooperate with each other.³⁶

It does not matter that unified command would not have changed the course of the war. It was perceived as a vital factor but could not be implemented. Shortly after the surrender, General MacArthur called the victory "a triumph for the concept of the complete integration

³²Sanagi, letter.

³³Imperial Japanese Government, July 13, 1945, translated by G-2 Headquarters, Far East Command, provided by the U.S. Naval History Division, Washington, D.C.

³⁴Ibid.

³⁵Ibid.

³⁶Ibid., my emphasis.

of the three dimensions of war, ground, sea and air."³⁷ General MacArthur also quoted General Yamashita, the Imperial Army Commander in the Philippines; "diversity of Japanese Command resulted in complete lack of cooperation and coordination between the services."³⁸

The Commanding General of the Imperial Japanese Air General Army, General Kawabe Masakazu made an interesting assessment of the Japanese air defeat soon after the surrender:

We did not have any power to attack (by air); we could only defend the Home Islands. We expected that this (special attack--Kamikaze) defense would bring us to the point where we could win the war. It is not sound tactics to employ the AAF defensively to win the war. It was the force of circumstances which caused the decision.³⁹

Even in defeat, the role of air defense was depreciated by the commander, and his attitude illustrated the general military repudiation of defensive measures.

In the post-war years, there has been widespread criticism of that view, and the importance of air defense has been stressed repeatedly. Japanese observers have often compared the unsuccessful air defense of Japan in 1945 to the successful air defense of England in 1940. The "precedent of the Battle of Britain" is repeatedly used in discussions

³⁷ SCAP, Political Reorientation of Japan, September 1945 to September 1948, Report of Government Section (2 Volumes, Washington, D.C., U.S. Government Printing Office, 1949), Volume II, MacArthur Statement "Demobilization of Japanese Armed Forces," 16 October 1945.

³⁸ Ibid.

³⁹ SCAP, Final Demobilization, p. 65.

of air warfare involving the Japanese islands.⁴⁰ There are compelling similarities between the two situations. Both are insular nations and aerial bombardment was the first weapon brought to bear, for without its success further operations were impossible. British success prevented German invasion and was a significant turning point in the war. Japanese failure led to the destruction and collapse of Japan.

There are, however, some differences between the circumstances of Britain and Japan. The German goals were limited in the early stages of the Battle of Britain, and they concentrated on Channel convoys and southern ports.⁴¹ The second month of the air war saw the Germans switch their emphasis to the Royal Air Force, and it was not until the last stage that industrial centers were attacked. The final stage was sporadic, vengeful bombing, and it was not carried out primarily to achieve strategic objectives. The primary goals of the Germans began with the engagement and destruction of the Royal Air Force; not because of their defensive capabilities, but because no invasion was possible against the naval strike capability of the Bomber Command. The U.S. goals in the strategic bombing of Japan were different; cities and industrial centers were the primary targets and no specific effort was made to engage the enemy air force.

The air war over Britain in 1940 was an air to air battle primarily between fighters. The German bombers were rarely sent alone; when they were, the results were disastrous.⁴² The technological match

⁴⁰Kaihara Osamu, "We Should Know Ourselves," pp. 24-25. During my research in Japan, Japan's defense was often compared to the Battle of Britain by men in and out of uniform.

⁴¹Winston S. Churchill, Their Finest Hour (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, Co. 1949), pp. 319-340 contain a succinct description of the Battle of Britain.

⁴²Ibid., pp. 324-325.

was nearly equal. In Japan, the B-29's were superior aircraft. They flew much higher and faster and were unsupported by fighters. A great portion of the Japanese defensive problem was reaching the bombers, or interception; a problem the British did not face. The Battle of Britain was an air superiority battle, while the Battle of Japan was an air intercept battle with different goals, strategies and tactics.

Demobilization

The second phase in the history of Japanese military aviation is the history of its absence. Aviation of all types was banished at the outset of the Occupation, and the extent and the limitations of the gap are part of the heritage of military aviation in Japan.

The first official instruction to the Japanese ordered "all Japanese aircraft, civil, military and naval," grounded pending demobilization instructions.⁴³ The aircraft were to be disabled immediately and with few exceptions the propellers were taken off all aircraft. This step was completed by October 1, 1945.⁴⁴ After the termination of a temporary courier service, all Japanese aviation activities were terminated. The dismantling of Japanese aviation proceeded on five fronts; personnel, military aircraft, airfields and installations, aircraft industries, and commercial and civil aviation.

⁴³Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, Headquarters, General Order Number One (SCAPIN 1), September 3, 1945.

⁴⁴SCAP, Supplement #1, Progress of Demobilization of the Japanese Armed Forces Ground Air Navy, 15 February 1946, provided by the U.S. Naval History Division, Washington, D.C., enclosure 8; the few exceptions were some aircraft retained by the United States and 27 civil aircraft which the GOJ was allowed to operate as a courier service until October; see SCAPIN 23, Authorization to Operate Aircraft, September 13, 1945; SCAPIN 77, Retention of Aircraft; and SCAPIN 108, Courier Service Transferred to FEAF, October 9, 1945.

Discharge of personnel began immediately after the formal surrender. By December 1, 1945, there were fourteen men remaining in the Navy and they were discharged within fifteen days. The rate of discharge of the aviation personnel is depicted in Figure 4-1. These were the official reports of demobilization and discharge; the actual discharge of personnel preceeded the reports and was nearly complete by November 1, 1945.⁴⁵

Figure 4-1

Progress of Personnel Demobilization¹

Japanese Air Forces Strength - 15 Aug. 45		Demobilized By			
		1 Sept.	1 Oct.	1 Nov.	1 Dec.
Army	262,000	62,000	248,000	253,602	262,000
Navy	291,537	187,543	281,105	285,801	291,523
Totals	553,537	249,543	529,105	539,403	553,523

¹These numbers included only air force personnel based on home islands; those overseas were lumped with other units.

Source: See FN 44.

On August 15, 1945, Japanese aircraft strength was reported at 16,397 military aircraft of all types and 939 civilian aircraft.⁴⁶ Almost 3700 of the military aircraft were overseas at the time of the surrender; those aircraft remaining in Japan were demobilized. In the early days of the Occupation the aircraft were demolished with no intent to salvage materials, but that policy was revoked and a scrapping

⁴⁵SCAP, Final Report on Progress of Demobilization of the Japanese Armed Forces, December 31, 1946, provided by the U.S. Naval History Division, Washington, D.C., p. 65.

⁴⁶Ibid., pp. 68-69.

program was substituted. The results of the demobilization effort are portrayed in Figure 4-2.

Figure 4-2

Progress of Aircraft Demobilization¹
December 1, 1946

Total A/C	Total Disposed	Balance on Hand	Destroyed	Scrapped	Allied Operations	Research Intelligence
12,735	11,146	1,589	9,766	1,092	188	100

¹Those "on hand" were awaiting scrapping operations.

Source: See FN. 44.

The Occupation forces assumed control of 233 airfields in Japan and South Korea. Of those fields, 50 were required by the occupation airforces with 17 actually basing U.S. air units. Some fields beyond the 50 officially required were being utilized by the Occupation forces for billeting, offices and storage. All Japanese equipment at the air bases was destroyed and those fields not required by the Occupation forces were returned to the Japanese for conversion to farms and salt fields.⁴⁷

There were eight major aircraft companies still producing aircraft as the war ended. Occupation authorities halted all production of aircraft, aircraft parts and related equipment. Jigs, dies and other tools related to aircraft manufacturing were destroyed, although equipment which could be utilized in production not related to war potential was left intact. Some factories were converted to other

⁴⁷168 fields were returned in this manner (excluding seadromes returned). Japan was forbidden to use them as land fields for aircraft, SCAP, Final Report on Progress of Demobilization of the Japanese Armed Forces, December 31, 1946, provided by the U.S. Naval History Division, Washington, D.C., pp. 64, 70-77.

tasks such as the production of bicycles and automobiles.⁴⁸

All other areas of aviation were affected by SCAPIN 301, "Commercial and Civil Aviation," promulgated on November 18, 1945.⁴⁹ The five operative paragraphs of the instruction illustrated the totality of Occupation prohibitions:

1. You will abolish by 31 December 1945 all governmental and semi-governmental bodies concerned with commercial or other civil aviation in any of its aspects except those activities specifically authorized for operation under the direction of the Supreme Commander.
2. You will take necessary measures by 31 December 1945 to effect the dissolution of all companies, partnerships, or associations of any kind which have been engaged in any way with relation to commercial air transport or other civilian air operations, or in pilot or other training related to aircraft design, construction, maintenance or operation.
3. You will submit to this headquarters not later than 15 December 1945 a register of officers, principal operating officials, professional engineering and research personnel, pilots and instructors of the organizations affected by the above dissolution.
4. On and after 31 December 1945 you will not permit any governmental agency or individual, or any business concern, association, individual Japanese citizen or group of citizens, to purchase, own, possess, or operate any aircraft, aircraft assembly, engine, or research, experimental, maintenance or production facility related to aircraft or aeronautical science including working models.
5. You will not permit the teaching of, or research or experiments in aeronautical science, aerodynamics, or other subjects related to aircraft or balloons.⁵⁰

⁴⁸SCAP, Final Report on Progress of Demobilization of the Japanese Armed Forces, December 31, 1946, provided by the U.S. Naval History Division, Washington, D.C., p. 65.

⁴⁹Provided by the U.S. Naval History Division, Washington, D.C.

⁵⁰Ibid.

Despite the total embargo on all aspects of military and civil aviation, there were some thin strands of continuity, and efforts in that direction began almost immediately. In the words of the Shin Meiwa Industry Company:

During the World War II, our company suffered from enormous damages, but fortunately we could retain a great majority of (our) experienced aircraft engineers, skilled workmen and machineries. From the termination of the War, it has been our serious intention to get back to the original work as soon as possible.⁵¹

Although few positive steps could be taken in this regard, there were several attempts to retain the nucleus of aviation. The factories themselves retained their personnel, if only to produce bicycles, or in some cases pots and pans.⁵² They allowed the employees to live in the factories and to use the area for growing food. This protection was extended to some Army and Navy aviation personnel; they also were assisted by the companies in the immediate post-war era.⁵³

The civil aviation community also attempted to maintain some cohesion. All the civil airline pilots kept in touch by mail and local meetings. Occasionally local representatives went to Tokyo where they met and contacted Occupation authorities in an effort to lobby for a

⁵¹Introduction, Itami-plant, SMDI-6, Shin Meiwa Industry Co. Ltd., ex-Kawanishi Aircraft Company, introductory pamphlet, dated August 7, 1954.

⁵²Mr. Gene Kawakami, Aircraft Division, Shin Meiwa Industries, Interview, February 16, 1972; General Sanagi, Interview; Ogawa Raita, Interview, December 14, 1971; and Mr. Doba Hajime, Defense Analyst, Yomiuri Shimbun, Interview, March 2, 1972; Mabuchi, Interview, November 27, 1971.

⁵³Ogawa, Interview; Doba, Interview.

revival of aviation.⁵⁴ Through this unofficial group, civil pilots were informed early in 1951 that Japan Air Lines would resume operations in the future, and they began work as cabin crewmen in anticipation of their return to flight operations.⁵⁵

Even within the governmental machinery itself there existed one area where ex-military officers gathered. SCAPIN 137, October 14, 1945, approved the Japanese plan for demobilization which included two demobilization ministries for the army and navy.⁵⁶ They were later reduced to bureaus, but continued to contain a nucleus of ex-military officers and to be valuable points of contact for many others. Purge records and other demobilization registries required by the Occupation were an excellent source of information for rearmament planning. Thus, on March 17, 1951, the Second Demobilization Bureau Liquidation Division could present to SCAP a document concerning the "Situation of Former Japanese Servicemen and Investigation Data concerning Re-Organization of Air-Sea Force."⁵⁷ It included the number of pilots still qualified to render service and fly, by rank and specialty. Similar data on technicians by specialty was also presented, indicating the thoroughness of the records that had been maintained.⁵⁸

⁵⁴Captain Kimoto Eijii, Japan Air Lines, Director, Senior Flight Crew Council, Interview, December 7, 1971. Captain Kimoto has flown for Japan Air Lines since 1938 and was a part of this unofficial organization.

⁵⁵Ibid.

⁵⁶SCAP, Political Reorientation, Vol. II, 454; See Auer, "Post-War Sea Forces," pp. 139-143, for a detailed description of the evolution of this core of personnel.

⁵⁷Provided by LCDR J. E. Auer.

⁵⁸Ibid., enclosure (1) and (2).

Mabuchi Ryoitsu was describing the aviation industry after World War II when he said, "the leaves and the branches were destroyed but the trunk and the roots remained."⁵⁹ However, he could have been speaking for all aviation, military and civil. The community of personnel with the technical, intellectual and administrative skills necessary to the rebirth of military air power had emerged relatively intact from the demobilization.

As the Occupation drew to a close and a national defense establishment began to emerge in Japan, the total disestablishment of aviation connected bureaucracy left the Japanese great flexibility in constructing the new bureaucracy to deal with national defense. Japanese leaders had not forgotten, however, the unique "lessons" they had derived from the failure of air power in World War II, and these were to play a role in the future organization and employment of air power in Japan.

⁵⁹Mabuchi, "100 years," loc. cit., p. 168.

Chapter 5

THE BIRTH OF THE AIR SELF-DEFENSE FORCE

July 1, 1954 marked the point of departure for a new era in Japanese defense posture. The birth of the Air Self-Defense Force effected a shift in defense policy which directly recognized an autonomous responsibility in the external defense role.¹ However, July 1 not only marked the beginning of an era, but also the conclusion of another. The efforts made to establish a comprehensive defense structure, the resistance thereto and the history of the changes which eventually permitted an air force to emerge remain relevant to the nature of Japanese air power today.

A force structure is rationalized in terms of threat. That threat may be real or imagined, truly feared or utilized to cover other intentions; however, it is always the threat as perceived or explained by the decision-maker. In Japan, the rather peculiar situation arose in which a national force structure began to evolve in an occupied nation. Thus, there were two decision centers evaluating the threat and deciding the necessary response. Although veto power lay with the United States until the Occupation ended and with Japan afterwards, both parties played an active role in the evolution of the defense structure.

The changing U.S. perception of threat in Asia was the key factor which enabled the force structure to begin to evolve. There was little doubt of U.S. perceptions when General Kenney raised the American flag in Tokyo which had flown over Hickam Field on December 7, 1941. Japan

¹See Chapter 6 for discussion of the defense policy shift and the pressures behind it.

was the only threat to peace in Asia. Secretary of State Byrnes evinced the same conclusion when he proposed the "disarmament and demilitarization" peace treaty for Japan.²

As the deficiencies of the United Nations became apparent and the realities of the post-war era erased the euphoria of the San Francisco Conference, a new concept of threat in Asia began to emerge. The American-Soviet confrontation dominated the evolution of world politics in 1947, and the U.S. concern began to shift; protection from Japan changed to protection of Japan. The National Security Council recognized a threat to Japan in November 1948 and recommended that a 150,000 man national police force be established.³ By 1950, the United States was publicly citing the threat to Japan and the common interests held by the two nations as indicated in a famous speech by Secretary of State Dean Acheson:

(The United States must assume) the military defense of Japan so long as that is required, both in the interests of our security and in the interests of the security of the entire Pacific area and, in all honor, in the interest of Japanese security.⁴

Japan began to react to the changing situation in August 1947, when a joint U.S.-Japanese security policy was proposed in the Ashida

²Emmerson, Arms, pp. 59-74, thoroughly discussed the early efforts to formulate a Japanese peace treaty. The Byrnes' proposal was made in June 1946.

³Frederick S. Dunn, Peace-Making and the Settlement with Japan (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963), p. 72.

⁴U.S. Department of State, Bulletin, Volume XXII, No. 551, January 23, 1950, p. 116.

Memorandum.⁵ Japanese leaders at that time remained hopeful that the United Nations or other international solution could avoid the need for rearmament and the U.S. could provide security temporarily pending such a solution. A security treaty was widely expected in Japan by 1949, and various aspects were being discussed publicly.

The eruption of war in Korea dashed Japanese hopes for avoiding rearmament, and the escalation of the threat prompted more rapid armament planning by both the United States and Japan. Prime Minister Yoshida had opposed rearmament, however the Chinese-Soviet alliance, the war in Korea and the related reduction of American garrison forces forced reevaluation of the security problem.

The Prime Minister was unfamiliar with military affairs and turned to Lieutenant General Tatsumi Eichii for advice in the summer of 1950.⁶ Yoshida did not trust military men but had known General Tatsumi when they served together before the war at the embassy in London. The Prime Minister opposed rearmament for domestic, economic and social reasons, and also feared the anxieties rearmament would cause among Japan's Asian neighbors. Despite those factors, events in Asia and the increasing U.S. pressure to rearm led Yoshida to allow rearmament planning to continue with official blessing. He eventually would preside over

⁵Boei Nenkan, 1970, p. 188, referred to the Ashida Memorandum as the first indication of Japanese concern with defense (at the political level). See Weinstein, Defense Policy, pp. 20-36 and Emmerson, Arms, pp. 62-64 for discussions of early Japanese views on security.

⁶Interview with General Tatsumi, Ex-IJA, February 12, 1972. General Tatsumi became the Prime Minister's personal advisor on all military matters. He acted both as technical advisor and go-between throughout the establishment of the defense forces. This was corroborated by VADM Terai Yoshimori, Interview, February 16, 1972 and others. Also see Weinstein, Defense Policy, p. 59, FN 40 and Auer, op. cit., pp. 146-160 for further confirmation of Gen. Tatsumi's role.

the establishment of the Safety Agency and the Defense Agency.

It became increasingly apparent during the Occupation that some air protection was necessary. Unidentified aircraft, presumably Soviet, were first sighted in June 1947, and with increasing regularity thereafter.⁷ The Fifth Air Force (5AF) received a command letter in April 1948, which reemphasized its initial occupation mission to maintain "military air control over Japan."⁸ However, a new mission was added in May 1949 when a similar letter directed 5AF to "provide for air defense including air warning service for Japan proper."⁹

Japanese military planners were also well aware that air power would be a useful tool in their defense. The Demobilization Ministries established early in the Occupation were forced to consolidate as their role decreased and they eventually evolved into the Liquidation Division, Demobilization Bureau of the Welfare Ministry by 1951.¹⁰ Their initial records, compiled as the Imperial forces demobilized, had been maintained intact.

Beginning as early as 1946, the ex-officers who manned the demobilization bureaus had discussed informally the possibility of rearmament and the possible structure of a future force. They contacted American military personnel in 1949, and by 1950 they were utilizing the demobilization records to provide data on personnel available for

⁷U.S. Commander Naval Forces Far East, Summary, October 15, 1947, provided by U.S. Naval History Division, Washington, D.C.

⁸History of 5AF, 1 January 1948 -- 30 June 1949, p. 7.

⁹Ibid., p. 9. The 5AF, late in 1948, released an information booklet which indicated the USAF already assumed it was defending Japan.

¹⁰See Auer, "Post-war Sea Forces," for a detailed description of this evolution, pp. 139-143.

rearmament. When SCAP asked for data on rearmament on March 3, 1951, the Second Demobilization Bureau responded two weeks later with a 70 page document.¹¹

This plan and all subsequent ones assumed that Japan would have an indigenous air power capability. There were several private and semi-private rearmament plans drawn during the 1950-1953 period. Doba listed seventeen plans and all but two included air forces which ranged from 1000 to 7000 aircraft.¹² Those ex-military officers who began planning in the late 1940's also presumed that Japan would have a comprehensive force structure including air forces.¹³

The United States and Japan agreed that a threat existed. They also agreed that the source of threat was the Soviet Union.¹⁴ They

¹¹Second Demobilization Bureau, Liquidation Division, Repatriation Relief Agency, "Situation of Former Japanese Servicement and Investigation Data Concerning Re-Organization of Sea-Air Force," dated March 17, 1951, provided by LCDR James E. Auer.

¹²Doba Hajime, Nihon no Gunji Ryoku (Japan's Military Power) (Tokyo: Yomiuri Shimbun Sha, January 1, 1963).

¹³Two of the earliest planners in aviation were Lieutenant General Arinuma Genshiro, JASDF, ret., Interview, March 7, 1972, and Vice Admiral Terai Yoshimori, JMSDF, ret., Interview, February 16, 1972. Then Colonel Arinuma jointed the NPR in 1952, but had served with Colonel Hattori Takushiro's War Studies group from its inception in 1948 and dealt with aviation aspects of rearmament. He was later one of the original three men who began the official planning for JASDF. Then Commander Terai was the aviation specialist in Admiral Nomura Kichisaburo's group of rearmament planners who began work at approximately the same time. Both of these men believed there was never any doubt that aviation would be included in the Japanese force structure.

¹⁴This is perhaps an obvious truth considering the prevalent view that Communism was a monolithic entity, however, the Japanese and Americans agreed that the only direct military threat was from the Soviet armed forces. General Otto P. Weyland, Commander of FEAF at the time (letter to the author, April 30, 1972) and General Tatsumi agreed that the Soviet forces were the only threat considered.

agreed that air power would be necessary in the Japanese defense. However, they did not agree on the priority that air power should be accorded within the Japanese defense structure nor the organizational form which it should assume. Moreover, differences of opinion were not limited to Japan and the United States, but were apparent among different internal factions.

Controversy among the U.S. forces developed during joint planning to reorganize and reinforce the National Police Reserve and Maritime Safety Agency. The planning, which began in 1951, had been generated by U.S. Far East Command (FEC) proposals on National Police Reserve (NPR) reinforcement and a U.S. offer of patrol frigates and landing craft.¹⁵ It became apparent that the U.S. was not emphasizing air power development, and early in 1952, General Otto P. Weyland, Commander Far East Air Forces (FEAF), took action. He approached General Mark Clark, then Commander of the Far East Command, and suggested that it "was time for parallel discussions on the foundation of a 'new' Japanese air arm."¹⁶ General Clark replied that such plans were premature and should be delayed.

U.S. Air Force commanders in Japan were dissatisfied with this approach as they soon indicated. Japan's air defense was then assigned to the Japan Air Defense Force (JADF), commanded by Brigadier General Delmar T. Spivey. Upon learning that the U.S. Army felt political

¹⁵ Richard D. Burns, USAF Assistance to Japan's Air Force, 1955-1956, provided by Office of History, 5AF, USAF, Japan, pp. 3-8, discussed the Air Force reaction to Army plans. Auer, "Post-war Sea Forces," pp. 166-176, discussed the formation of the joint planning groups concerned with acceptance of the U.S. ships and their efforts. The Japanese committee which worked towards the establishment of the Coastal Safety Force was called the Y - Committee and was closely associated with Admiral Nomura's unofficial planning group.

¹⁶Letter to the author, April 30, 1972.

and economic restrictions would not permit an indigenous air force, he responded with a rather pointed question to his commander, FEAF:

Does FEAF have any information which would lead it to believe that it is the intention of our government, the Japan Logistical Command, or the Air Force to continue to furnish the Japanese indefinitely with air defense forces?¹⁷

If not, the General felt that some program to initiate an indigenous air arm should commence. General Spivey also went on to summarize his view of the priorities involved:

It seems to me that modern air weapons have relegated land forces to a third priority in any future defense of these islands. World War II provided the example needed to show the strategic vulnerability of Japan to air power. If we desire to have Japan as our partner in securing Western democracy in the Pacific, the necessary air power must be provided. The expenditure of all or major portions of Japan's defense effort on the lowest priority force cannot be justified.¹⁸

General Spivey went on to inform General Weyland that JADF had developed a comprehensive plan to provide air defense to Japan.

Part of the United States Air Force's (USAF) dissatisfaction with the FEC resulted from the fact that it was not a truly joint command.¹⁹ The Security Advisory Section, which was responsible for joint planning, consisted entirely of Army officers. The air advisor was an infantry

¹⁷Letter of May 28, 1952, quoted in Burns, USAF Assistance, p. 3.

¹⁸Ibid., pp. 3-4.

¹⁹General Weyland, letter to the Author, April 30, 1972. Also see R. P. Martin, "How Much Air Power for Japan?," Aviation Week, December 29, 1952, pp. 17-18, and "USAF Tightens Japanese Air Defenses," Aviation Week, February 16, 1953, pp. 13-16, for published versions of the split between the U.S. Army and Air Force and the attitude of General Clark's staff.

man. The army's concept of an air force emphasized the close air support role. This reflected General Clark's viewpoint as he had been an exponent of army-controlled tactical air. Thus, the Air Force felt their views were not being heard. It became apparent that their initial efforts in 1952 had little effect when a new FEC Staff Study was completed on June 12, 1952. It again recommended to Japan that ground forces receive major emphasis in its planning.²⁰

Meanwhile, the United States Navy had been discussing rearmament with the Japanese planners since early in 1951. Admiral Nomura's study group presented Admiral Arleigh Burke with a defense proposal on January 29, 1951, which had been drawn up for Admiral Nomura to present to Ambassador Dulles when he was in Japan.²¹ The plan envisioned a two department force structure with the majority of air power in the sea force. The Demobilization Bureau plan presented to the U.S. similarly envisioned a sea-air force. Admiral Burke and other naval officers felt that this was the most efficient and effective way to utilize air power, and in the summer of 1951, Admiral Burke proposed a two department force structure with tactical air assigned to the ground forces and other air missions under navy control.²² Then, in June 18, 1952, Secretary of the Navy Kimball forwarded a Naval War College study entitled "Japanese Organization for National Defense" to Admiral

²⁰Far East Command records, provided from Modern Military History, National Archives, 5/092/1952 by Department of the Army.

²¹Admiral Burke, record memorandum, January 29, 1951, Burke papers, U.S. Naval History Division, Washington, D.C.

²²Admiral Burke, Interview, August 10, 1971.

Nomura's group.²³ The study suggested a two-department force and urged that sea and air power be integrated.

During the year and one-half between Nomura's proposal to Dulles and the Kimball suggestion, Admiral Nomura's group had worked closely with the Y-Committee. Admiral Yamamoto Yoshio, who had been associated with Admiral Nomura, was selected to head the Y-Committee. Yamamoto, like General Tatsumi, had served in London while Yoshida was there. Therefore, when Tatsumi began to meet with Yoshida in 1950, he took Admiral Yamamoto along on some occasions to provide advice on naval affairs.²⁴

They found that Yoshida particularly opposed an air force because he felt it utilized "offensive weapons," and he foresaw serious economic and technical difficulties in establishing an air force. General Tatsumi strongly believed that an air force was essential to Japan's defense. He felt the British success in the Battle of Britain was an important lesson for Japan. All three men had been in London before the war, and the two military officers reminded Yoshida of the British experience as proof that an aircraft could be defensive and was crucial to an island's defense. The Prime Minister agreed and the planners continued preparing for a comprehensive force structure.

The "lessons of the war" were evident to many civilian officials and military officers as they related to the stature of the new air

²³The reply to this proposal was entitled "Former Japanese Navy Men's View on 'Japanese Organization for National Defense'," dated August 1, 1952. The letter sprang from talks between Nomura and Kimball, see Nomura Kichisaburo, *An Inside Story of the Establishment of the Defense Forces*, February, 1960, Anzen Hoshō Kenkyū Kai, *Kaiyokoku Nihon no Shoyai* (The Future of Japan as a Maritime Nation) (Tokyo: Hara Shoba, 1970), Chapter 3.

²⁴General Tatsumi, Interview, February 22, 1972.

force. Most who participated in planning during that era felt there was never any doubt about the independence of an air force.²⁵ Admiral Yamamoto and General Tatsumi were aware of Yoshida's feelings and believed that the force would have to be independent. When Admiral Terai brought up the subject of an air-sea force at the Y-Committee proceedings, he was told by Yamamoto that the issue was already decided and that air power was to be independent.²⁶

Therefore, by the time Secretary Kimball proposed an air-sea force, the view of Admiral Nomura's group had changed drastically. The reasons which caused the ex-navy officers to acquiesce in an independent force were admirably expressed in their reply to Secretary Kimball. From a military point of view, they agreed that "a separate air force is unnecessary and undesirable for a small defense establishment such as Japan is going to build."²⁷ They agreed that Japan must meet an invading force out over the sea to defend the homeland effectively; therefore, air defense would be most effective in a sea-air organization.

They felt that these military issues were secondary to the political problem. They pointed out that most Japanese "consider that Japan's primary defense against external aggression has to be sought in the air."²⁸ Even though American strategists might try to convince Japan that sea and air defenses could be undertaken by the U.S. forces, the people still would believe that air defense should be the most important

²⁵The consensus of all whom I interviewed with the exception of those few involved early in 1951 such as Admiral Burke and Admiral Terai.

²⁶Admiral Terai, Interview, February 16, 1972; General Tatsumi, Interview, February 22, 1972.

²⁷"Japanese Navy Men's View," p. 8.

²⁸Ibid., p. 9.

task of the Japanese forces.

Therefore, there must be an air defense service, and if it was not independent, the navy officers feared it would fall under army control. They pointed out the psychology of overhead protection being related to the army, the historical relationship of air defense and army, and the early dominance of the NPR. These factors led them to conclude that if Japan did not have an independent air arm, "the responsibility for the homeland anti-air defense will surely be incorporated in the Army."²⁹

They noted the large imbalance between the National Police Reserve and Coastal Security Force (CSF) where there was an 8 to 1 budget ratio, and concluded that the addition of air power to the army could make them so dominant as to be dangerous. Not only would they easily dominate the defense structure, but later perhaps again the government itself.³⁰

Thus, most Japanese concerned with military planning had concluded early in 1952 that Japan would be served best by an independent air force structure. Soon after General Weyland was rebuffed by General Clark, he was approached by Admiral Nomura's group. Besides Nomura, the group which approached him initially included Admiral Hoshina Zenshiro of the IJN, Major General Harada of the IJA Air Force, and several leaders from the business community. They informed Weyland that they were concerned over the lack of development in Japanese air power and solicited his counsel.³¹

²⁹"Japanese Navy Men's View," p. 10.

³⁰Ibid., p. 11.

³¹General Weyland, letter to the author, April 30, 1972. The first contact between General Weyland and Admiral Nomura was early in the summer, approximately the time, Nomura had replied to Secretary Kimball.

General Weyland was happy to assist the group and began a program of very private briefings which were presented by his operations and intelligence staffs in FEAF.³² They were briefed on the threat from the Soviet Union and China, including approximate force levels, capabilities and radii of action of potentially hostile air forces. The group became convinced, or already were, that the "most immediate and greatest threat to Japanese security lay in hostile air power and that the best defense lay first in a viable air power structure."³³

By this time, late in 1952, the Japanese group began consideration of the organization of an air power structure. They tentatively agreed that the structure would be most effective as an autonomous organization not attached to either the ground or sea force. The group which received the FEAF briefings began advocating their position within government and industrial sectors.

The Japanese government privately announced in February 1952, that it was planning a unified defense organization and queried the U.S. on the feasibility of an air advisory group.³⁴ Japan preferred that air advisors be provided through existing groups to minimize the possible political effects if the planning became public. The U.S. Army also urged this procedure, but the USAF refused to supply advisors under those conditions. The Air Force was aware that the U. S. Navy

³²An account of one of the briefings by General Banfill, Chief of Intelligence, FEAF, was carried by Asahi, September 19, 1952, and again by Aviation Week, December 29, 1952, p. 17. Asahi reported that there were 14 Japanese present at the briefings. U.S. Army Headquarters (or FEC) were not aware of the briefings.

³³General Weyland, letter to author, April 30, 1972. The caveat, "or already were," is also General Weyland's observation.

³⁴SCAP, record memorandum, March 1, 1952, Records of FEC, National Archives 5/092/1952, authorized by Department of the Army.

and Army were providing advice directly through their own organizations, and would not place air force advisors under army control.³⁵ This was the last U.S. Army effort to control the advice provided by the FEAF, and by June 1953, the FEC acceded to the USAF position that they offer all assistance directly. Thus, both Japanese and U.S. military planners had agreed to the concept of an independent air force by the summer of 1953.

The Japanese characteristically began long-range studies for the new air force at the same time they approached General Weyland. Admiral Nomura's study group formulated a plan for a 33 squadron, independent air force in the spring of 1952. The plan was unofficially submitted to the government, apparently through the Y-Committee.³⁶ Whatever the first contact between the private rearmament planners and government officials concerning air power, it soon became an on-going series of informal consultations. Admiral Yamamoto was close to Mr. Yamada Makoto, Chief of the Safety Bureau and later head of the Air Preparatory Office. General Tatsumi consulted with Mr. Masuhara Keikichi who headed the National Police Reserve until August 1952 and then represented Japan in the first official liaison with the U.S. on air force planning.³⁷

³⁵Martin, "USAF Tightens Japanese Air Defenses," loc. cit., p. 16, also reported that JADF had submitted at least two plans to begin integration of Japanese into the air defense network and the FEC had turned down both proposals.

³⁶The Y-Committee was charged with the specific responsibility of planning the Coastal Security Force to operate ships offered by the U.S. However, by 1952 concurrent planning was going forward on the concept of a unified defense force and the possibility of an air arm. Admiral Terai, General Tatsumi and Mr. Ogawa all believed that the informal plans first were first transmitted through the Y-Committee though none were positive of the method. Doba, Japan's Military Power, refers to 3 plans as Y-Committee plans, meaning Admiral Nomura's group.

³⁷Mr. Kaihara, Interview, November 10, 1971, also see Burns, USAF Assistance, p. 10.

Some of the men engaged in official planning were members of groups which had conducted private rearmament studies as in the case of General Arinuma.

The official planning for a unified defense structure, which began early in 1952, continued within the National Safety Agency (NSA) after it was formed. The Seido Chosa Iinkai, or Systems Research Council, was located in the Safety Bureau of the Agency.³⁸ Comprised of uniformed and civilian officers, it studied the long-range aspects of rearmament and internal Japanese capabilities. It also performed an intelligence function, studying the armaments of other countries.³⁹ The committee produced two series of rearmament plans, the first beginning in March 1953. Their second draft, in June 1953, coincided with the evolving consensus that the proposed Japanese air power structure would be autonomous. The size of air force envisioned in the second and subsequent plans was similar to the earlier unofficial plan from Admiral Nomura, and proposed approximately 1500 aircraft.⁴⁰

Some critical aspects of the new air force remained to be settled, particularly the method by which the air force would be attached to the unified organization, and the new air force's scope or number of air power missions which would be placed under its control. No real progress could be made on these detailed issues until a political decision to

³⁸ Boei Nenkan, 1970, p. 189, and Masuhara, Nihon no Boei, p. 47, discuss the formation of the Committee. General Arinuma confirmed that it continued the studies which had preceeded the formation of NSA. One newspaper, Mainichi, September 7, 1952 reported that a rearmament committee had been formed including Tatsumi and Yamamoto. They were still advising Yoshida, but not within an official committee although they did unofficially advise and guide the committee.

³⁹ Despite the fact the NSA had no responsibility for external defense!

⁴⁰ Masuhara, Nihon no Boei, p. 48.

alter defense policy goals and establish a complete defense structure was reached. That decision was signified by the Shigemitsu-Yoshida Communique which altered defense policy and cleared the way for establishment of the Air Self-Defense Force.⁴¹

General Weyland proposed that a Japanese air force should be independent and co-equal to the other two branches when he first discussed the air power problem with Admiral Nomura's group. He believed that a structure similar to the U.S. Department of Defense would be appropriate with one exception. He urged "that all military aviation be concentrated in a single service."⁴² The primary arguments for this view were economic; logistics and training could be concentrated, and operational effectiveness would be retained by assigning joint service responsibilities to the air force.

General Weyland exchanged views with the Headquarters, USAF in Washington, and in July 1953, he organized an office within FEAJ which was known as the "Air Advisory Group, Japan."⁴³ Its mission was to "formulate general policy and procedures necessary to guide initial planning for the Japanese Air Self-Defense Force."⁴⁴ This office provided working-level contact with the men who would formulate JASDF guidelines.

No special office for air force planning had been established at that time by the Japanese, but two months later, in September, two uniformed officers and one civilian were ordered to the Systems Research

⁴¹ See Chapter 6 for discussion of this policy evolution. The communique was dated September 27, 1953.

⁴² Letter to author, April 30, 1972.

⁴³ Burns, USAF Assistance, p. 11.

⁴⁴ Ibid.

Council in anticipation of the forthcoming political decision. Colonel Arinuma Genshiro was a former IJA air officer, Colonel Ito Motoe was a former IJN aviator, and Mr. Takahashi Giichi was a civilian from the internal bureau whose specialty was law.⁴⁵ The three-man operation began as Bu Shitsu, or simply a separate office in the Systems Research Council. They immediately contacted their USAF counterparts and joint discussions and planning began at once. The initial Japanese committee expanded to eleven members late in November as the pace of planning increased.

A plenary meeting of USAF and NSA officials was held on October 7 to discuss various planning guidelines. General Weyland represented the USAF and Mr. Masuhara Keikichi headed the Japanese group. Views were exchanged on various aspects of air force organization and, while both groups were primarily interested in a strong air arm, some differences emerged.⁴⁶

⁴⁵ LGEN Arinuma, Interview, March 7, 1972; also see JDA, Koku Jieitai So Setsushi (The History of the Foundation of the JASDF), pp. 20-21. The committee officially consisted of three members, but another officer, Colonel Yahagi Juro, was already working with the committee. The Committee was formally established on October 5, 1953.

⁴⁶ This discussion of the origin of joint planning and the concepts which were exchanged and debated is based primarily on interviews with Mr. Masuhara Keikichi, senior Japanese representative, February 19, 1972; General Hayashi Keizo, Chief of 1st office (Ground Staff), December 9, 1971; Mr. Kaihara Osamu, Chief of Safety Section and active in the negotiations, November 10, 1971 and February 29, 1972; Colonel Arinuma Genshiro, original member of air force planning group, March 7, 1972; General Otto P. Weyland, Commander, FEAF, April 30, 1972 (by letter); Colonel E. B. LeBailly, working head of Air Advisory Group, December 9, 1971 (by letter). Ranks and titles noted are those held at the time of planning. Additionally, two letters provided by Japanese sources amplify U.S. views; (1) from Gen. O. P. Weyland to DG Kimura Tokutara, dated October 8, 1953, and (2) from General J. E. Hull, Commander FEC, to Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru dated December 1, 1953.

The Japanese civilian officials, including Mr. Masuhara, Mr. Kaihara and Mr. Yamado Makoto, wanted all aviation in one branch and so were in accord with USAF views on that point. However, they disagreed on the best method of integrating the new air force. The Japanese officials were advocates of a strong centralized command. They had tried to establish a unified command when the NSA was formed and still considered this preferable.

They proposed, therefore, that the new air force be attached directly to a joint commander who then would have dual authority, commanding the air force directly and also controlling the entire defense force.⁴⁷ They felt that this would indicate the primacy of the air defense mission and make it first among equals. It also would be a step towards the unified command they envisioned.

The Japanese did not agree on the issue as the uniformed officers generally were inclined to side with the U.S. planners. The pressure for a unified command had been generated in part by the experiences of World War II, however, some previous advocates of that course were having doubts after one year with the Safety Agency. For example, General Hayashi supported the arguments for a unified command structure in 1952, but when the argument arose again, he felt that NSA experiences had demonstrated the need for separate operating staffs.⁴⁸

The U.S. representatives had strong opinions on both subjects; General Weyland wrote to Director General Kimura immediately following

⁴⁷ Masuhara, Interview, February 19, 1972. Mr. Masuhara was the primary advocate of this particular idea. He stressed that he agreed completely with USAF officials who wanted primary emphasis on air power and only differed on the best way to achieve that goal.

⁴⁸ Interview, December 9, 1971.

the first plenary meeting and stressed the importance of an independent and co-equal third force. The Japanese were relying heavily on U.S. aid in developing the new air force and General Weyland alluded to that assistance:

An air force organization separate from and co-equal with the National Land Safety Force and Coastal Safety Force is felt to be best suited for receiving advice, assistance and training from the Far East Air Forces.⁴⁹

Mr. Masuhara felt that the Prime Minister initially agreed with him, but the pressures for a force structure similar to the U.S. continued, and on December 1, the Commander of the Far East Command wrote directly to the Prime Minister and offered his views on the impending establishment of an air component. He noted that "the organization of the defense establishment is a prerogative of Japan as a sovereign nation," and declared that he did "not intend to encroach upon this sovereignty in any manner."⁵⁰ However, he did feel that:

The unity of purpose of the United States and Japan concerning Japan's defense posture recommends the creation of an organizational structure in the Japanese air arm sufficiently similar to that of the United States air arm to permit close alliance and common methodology and application.⁵¹

Furthermore, the similarity between the U.S. forces and Safety Forces:

...has facilitated the exchange of materiel, services, and ideas between analogous components having primary responsibilities in equipment procurement, in the operation of weapons and weapon systems, and in personnel training. In the interests of economy and effectiveness, I feel it would be desirable also to follow this pattern in the

⁴⁹Letter dated October 8, 1953.

⁵⁰Letter dated December 1, 1953.

⁵¹Ibid.

organization of a separate and co-equal Japanese Air Safety Force.⁵²

The support for "separate and co-equal" had become overwhelming. Perhaps, as General Tatsumi believed, there was never any doubt that the air force would be an independent and equal branch, but U.S. influence did play a role.⁵³

If there were few doubts about the eventual air force status, there remained significant controversy over the scope of its operations. General Weyland and his staff held the same view which the General initially had expressed to the Nomura group, and he reiterated it in his letter to the Director-General:

It is felt that all air elements of the Japanese security forces should be concentrated under an independent and co-equal Third Staff. Under such an organization, your available air strength should be able to provide the greatest security within a limited budget through flexible utilization to meet all Japanese air requirements. Such a centralized organization should realize great savings in pilot and technical training, logistics support and personnel requirements. Furthermore, if funds allocated in the national budget for aviation are diversified, there will be no single concentration of air power adequate to cope with the threat which faces Japan. It is further felt, upon study of Japan's economic conditions, even with assistance from the United States, that the creation and maintenance of three separate and distinct air arms is economically infeasible.⁵⁴

The Japanese planners, particularly the civilians, agreed and the predominant opinion appeared to favor the inclusion of all military aviation in one branch. The only dissent came from the ground and maritime branches which included aviation branches in being by the

⁵²Letter dated December 1, 1953.

⁵³Interview, February 22, 1972.

⁵⁴Letter, October 8, 1972, my emphasis.

summer of 1953. The ground forces started a pilot school at Hammamatsu in October 1952, and early in 1953 an office of naval aviation was established in the second staff of the NSA.⁵⁵ The fact that air branches already existed in the other two services appeared to be their strongest argument and there were indications that all air power would be centralized as planning progressed in November.⁵⁶

General Hull's letter to the Prime Minister also touched on this subject, and here it played a decisive role:

In view of specific requirements of parent-service integration and coordination, it is my belief that liaison and naval aviation should be integral parts of the Japanese National Safety Force and the Japanese Coastal Safety Force, respectively.⁵⁷

One source suggested that the letter was prompted or even drafted in part by General Weyland.⁵⁸ He obviously did not write that section and the reason for General Hull's inclusion of the remark is uncertain. Kaihara felt that the U.S. Navy had some role in instigating the letter.⁵⁹ General Hull's own belief in the need for integrated air support could have been the cause.

Issues such as joint training and the exact divisions of aviation resources between the branches continued for years, but the tide had turned and the Japanese gave up the idea of integrating all aviation

⁵⁵ Admiral Samejima Hiroshi, JMSDF, Interview, December 7, 1971.

⁵⁶ Admiral Terai, Interview, February 16, 1972, felt the lack of U.S. Navy support had made the issue critical; Mr. Kaihara felt that those supporting integration of all forces were in control.

⁵⁷ Dated December 1, 1953.

⁵⁸ Burns, USAF Assistance, p. 11.

⁵⁹ Interview, February 29, 1972.

into one service.⁶⁰

On January 12, 1954, the Koku Jumbi Shitsu, or Air Preparatory Office, was founded in the National Safety Agency. A total of 47 personnel were gathered under the leadership of Mr. Yamada Makoto to plan the Air Self-Defense Force.⁶¹ This committee completed a tremendous amount of work in a very short time. Working very closely with the FEAF, on a daily basis in most cases, the details of logistics, training, administration and operations were established. The committee helped to write the new defense law and was guided by it as they ironed out the organizational details prior to July.⁶²

They were also guided by the preliminary joint planning which had occurred over the previous year. The general size of the force structure had been decided; the scope of its operations had been delimited; and the nature of the organization and its method of integration had been determined.

⁶⁰Interview, February 29, 1972, the training problem continued until 1968, but it was generally an evolution towards greater separation. A joint training order was not issued immediately upon reorganization in July, but in August JASDF's responsibility for training was affirmed. The U.S. Navy reacted strongly at this time and withheld trainers which they had agreed to supply until an independent MSDF training program was established. By March 1958, the joint program began to disintegrate and all phases of pilot training were separate by 1968. General Okumiya Masatake, Interview, November 18, 1971, was Commander of the 2nd Flying School when the MSDF began their own program. Admiral Samejima also provided background on this evolution.

⁶¹JDA, History of Foundation of JASDF, p. 20.

⁶²Major General Ogawa Hideto, Interview, March 4, 1972. Then Major Ogawa was one of 4 supply planners and recalled the rush of planning and large workload. Each man had an area of responsibility which he alone was responsible for. He planned with a USAF counterpart and was individually responsible for coordination with fellow planners in areas of possible conflict or overlap.

The United States, particularly through its military representatives, had played a most significant role in the formation of basic concepts. The U.S. representatives actively negotiated and offered positive guidance at each step in the development of the force structure.

Yet, the U.S. negotiators had not dealt with a blank tablet. The Japanese came to plan an air force with many ideas of their own origin. While in many cases they accepted U.S. proposals, the impetus for establishment of the air force and the emphasis it received came from the Japanese. U.S. influence played a significant role in organization, but basic precepts of air force size and role were of Japanese origin.

IV.

THE FORMULATION OF DEFENSE POLICY

The first three sections of this study set the stage on which the Japanese decision-makers concerned with defense policy work. A singular aspect of the foregoing parameters was the lack of constraint imposed on the policy-maker. As a result, the external and internal variables which have been discussed provide little circumstantial evidence; they provide scant knowledge of the substance of Japanese defense policy. The absence of circumstantial imperatives emphasizes the policy-making process, and also allows a less integrated policy. The lack of cohesion is magnified by the nature of Japanese decision-making which gives added significance to factional viewpoints within the policy formulation structure.

Broad aspects of Japanese defense policy will be noted in this section although those aspects which relate to air power will be emphasized. In particular, those defense policy interest groups which are primarily concerned with air power applications will be isolated and evaluated. Thus, the defense policy application to air power and the air force structure input to defense policy will be considered.

Japanese defense policy has been treated in monolithic terms during the 1950's and 1960's. The finished product, or the government's official policy statements have received overriding consideration. The policy formulation process and the disparate views of the groups which participate have not been considered. In the Japanese case, the lack of defense imperatives and the absence of definitive policy make the viewpoints of relevant interest groups essential to understanding the substance and direction of policy.

The various interest groups relevant to policy formulation are identified in Chapter 6 and their policy viewpoints analyzed. These policies are the initial ingredients of government policy. These

factional viewpoints would constitute the government policy were any one group's views comprehensive and their influence dominant.

Chapter 7 involves a detailed analysis of the decision-making process. It will illustrate the relative access to this process enjoyed by various interest groups and will indicate their relative influence on final policy. Such an analysis also will provide insight to the degree of policy integration which actually occurs and to the number of decisions that are resolved at the apex of the structure.

Therefore, this section provides an initial synthesis of Japanese defense policy. Subsequent sections of the study which analyze the force structure will serve to test the presumptions concerning policy included herein.

Chapter 6

POLICIES AND STRATEGIES

At the outset of any discussion of Japanese defense policy, it is necessary to examine the question of the existence of that policy. When asked the major weakness of the Air Self-Defense Force in 1971, General Genda Minoru slammed his fist on the table and said "no policy, no strategy."¹ On the other hand, the Socialist Party believes a grand strategy does exist which reflects "the desire of the Japanese government to dominate Asia again."²

The majority of informed opinion in Japan agreed with General Genda's assessment as Japan prepared to implement another defense build-up plan. The Secretary General of the National Defense Council, Kaihara Osamu, said "we have no policy."³ Professor Momoi Makoto of the National Defense College linked Japanese defense problems to "the absence of any guiding principle."⁴ The Chief of Staff of the JASDF, General Ishikawa Kanshi, concluded that ASDF policy had been limited to imitation of U.S. air defense policy.⁵ The minority opinion, aside from socialist polemics, theorized that Japan consistently maintained a policy of total reliance on the United States for external defense

¹ Interview, November 17, 1971.

² Japan Socialist Review, November 15, 1969.

³ Interview, November 10, 1971.

⁴ Interview, December 3, 1971.

⁵ Interview, October 12, 1971. This view was reinforced by many sources and relates to the discussion found in Section I concerning the various theories of defense policy. For another viewpoint emphasizing the lack of defense policy see Auer, "Postwar Sea Forces," pp. 300-311.

in the post-war era.⁶ Professor Royama Michio agreed that defense policy is a reflection of Japanese foreign policy. However, he concluded that Japan has had no systematic foreign policy in the past twenty-five years and therefore no defense policy. It only had contended with the status quo, hence "no direction or cogency to the defense program."⁷

Whether policy or non-policy, Japan's defense is a question that cannot be separated from the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty and the broader picture of Japan-U.S. relations. The basic framework of Japanese and U.S. security relations has been discussed in Chapter 1. However, the core of the U.S. commitment to Japan may be reduced to the operative portion of Article V of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty:

Each party recognizes that an armed attack against either Party in the territories under the administration of Japan would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional provisions and processes.⁸

History demonstrates that crises sometimes create new interpretations of commitments; interpretation could enable the United States 'legally' to do nothing while acting in accordance with its constitutional processes. Nor does the commitment's existence necessarily explain Japanese interpretations and reservations. Their interpretation of the commitment balanced against their view of the threat is in essence a definition of the parameters of Japanese autonomous defense policy. Therefore, Japan's attitude towards their autonomous defense structure is one

⁶Weinstein, Postwar Defense Policy; see discussion in Section I.

⁷Interview, February 5, 1972.

⁸Signed January 19, 1960.

method of clarifying their interpretation of the treaty.

If they intended to rely totally on the U.S. commitment, the Japanese force structure should reflect a preoccupation with internal security. If Japan believes the U.S. commitment is suspect in one area, for example low-level local attack, the force structure should emphasize a capacity to deal with such threats. If Japan is planning towards eventual military dominance in Asia, allocations of resources would reflect their intent to project influence militarily. Therefore, this analysis will focus on the internal aspects of defense policy, not in disregard of the Security Treaty, but because the domestic structure also may be used to define the security relationship.

Policy is designed to deal with present or future situations. The absence of any manifest threat to Japan enables emphasis on the future dimensions of policy. The absence of threat also reduces the demand for defense policy and again raises the question of its existence. With the caveats noted and within the limitations cited, this question may be addressed further.

Policy represents a decision, and the nature of Japanese decision-making bears on the definition of defense policy. The establishment of a defense policy is an innovative decision rather than an implemental one; and the Japanese methodology for reaching such a decision has some unique aspects. Japanese decision-making is often referred to as a "consensus" method, however this is an over-simplification which results in a distortion of the actual process. Herman Kahn described the system as "diffuse, group-centered decision-making."⁹

⁹Kahn, Japanese Superstate, p. 40-41. I have relied on Kahn, pp. 40-51, Richard Halloran, Japan: Images and Realities (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1969), pp. 90-100, and discussions in Japan as background for this view of Japanese decision-making.

This term gives a better image of the Japanese process where all interest groups have access to present their views on any decision. As the final decision is reached every effort is made to accommodate the special viewpoints of each interested party. The process is further complicated by the giri and on systems of duty and obligation existent in the Japanese culture. The on-going nature of policy-making enables giri and on to play a significant role in the evolution of policy.

Two prevalent bureaucratic manifestations of this process are the systems of ringi and matomari. Ringi is a process whereby junior members of a bureaucracy or private corporation reach a consensus on a particular issue at their level. They draft a position paper on the issue which must be approved by the director of the particular section or bureau. The paper then is circulated through that department and other interested departments for discussion, comments and opinions. The initial document may be recirculated several times with many changes made before a consensus is reached. It will repeat this process at appropriate levels until it reaches the apex of the organization for a final decision. As Kahn noted, the leadership then is under serious pressure to take action from the consensus established below them.¹⁰

Matomari is a related process where the initiative comes from the leadership rather than the lower echelon. The leader of a decision-making group states a problem on which all other members are asked to comment. Each member indicates his position although he "only exposes a slight portion of his thinking;" he does not commit himself totally and refrains from harsh criticism of others' views.¹¹ The discussion

¹⁰Kahn, op. cit., p. 44.

¹¹Halloran, Images, p. 92, also see Auer, "Postwar Sea Forces," p. 310, for discussion of this process.

proceeds with various parties partially indicating their viewpoints and all trying to establish the others' positions. If and when agreement is reached, it will be stated by the senior member. If no agreement is reached, no decision is forced on the group, and they adjourn to consider the problem further. Informal meetings or mediation may be used in the interim to assist in reaching some accord.¹² By the next meeting, the agreement normally will have been reached, but only in the event the parties concur. "All else is subordinate to this point."¹³

It is possible to argue that the processes described only differ slightly from American or other western systems of bureaucratic decision-making. In the American bureaucracy, decisions are promulgated from the apex of the decision-making process. The leadership has the authority to issue such a decision with or without the consensus of the bureaucracy. However, if the bureaucracy is dissatisfied with the decision, it in fact may be altered by minor implementing actions which are taken contrary to the goals initially established. In both the American and Japanese situation one might say that the lower bureaucratic levels influence and alter decisions, yet, there is a significant difference: in the American bureaucracy, the organization only operates with established goals, even if those goals are not fully implemented. In Japan, the organization may continue to operate without any relevant goals. In the United States, implementation contrary to a top level decision is possible where the leadership is unaware or unconcerned over

¹²In the February 1972, dispute between the political parties over the defense issue, the time-honored custom of senior member mediation was evident as the Speaker of the House of Representatives, Funada Naka, mediated between the LDP and the opposition.

¹³Halloran, Images, p. 93.

such alterations. On the other hand, bureaucratic implementation without any top-level decision would be an unacceptable risk, for the bureaucracy would be unsure of the parameters of the impending decision. In Japan, the decision has been discussed thoroughly; even if no decision is reached, the parameters are understood and various sectors of the bureaucracy may continue making implemental decisions reflecting their own policy outlook. Their knowledge of the issues and the various points of disagreement prevents them from directly violating or foreclosing others' views. Thus, the absence of a decision is neither conspicuous nor critical, as it is in the American process. Unless a situation emerges which mandates a final decision, it is quite possible that such a decision will be delayed; different interest groups will dominate aspects of the issue which they may implement.

This discussion has centered on the bureaucratic decision-making process; however, the elements do have relevance outside the bureaucracy in the broader concept of decision-making or policy formulation. Japanese policy implementation does not rely on a goal-oriented environment. Implementation may occur in certain aspects of defense capacity, for example, without any final consensus as to policy goals. The complexity of this process makes it difficult to identify the originator of any one aspect of policy or to isolate the dominant influence in policy formulation. A final policy decision may be diffusely authored with different goals representing the special interests of groups who participated in the decision. Each party has an effective veto on the establishment of a new policy by withholding its consent, and in the interim, policy may be determined by effective control of the various aspects of the problem.

This discussion of Japanese decision-making has particular application to defense policy for several reasons. The absence of imperatives in the Japanese security problem have been cited. As a result, there has been little pressure for a final decision. The absence of a final decision does not mean that no accord has been reached, but that some areas of disagreement among the various participants do remain. Nor does the absence of a final decision mean there is no policy. Instead, the policy may be an interim amalgam of the various viewpoints of the relevant interest groups. It is not possible to assume that the parameters of such a policy were decided or even completely acquiesced to by the senior member of the group, the political leadership in this case.

The top-echelon leadership of the Japanese Government may be considered the 'senior member' of the decision-making group on defense policy, however, there are others who have an interest in and access to the process. It is important to identify these groups and to delineate their policies, because those individual policies may constitute a portion of Japanese defense policy through their ability to implement a particular aspect. Interest groups may be non-governmental; although defense policy represents a government decision, outside groups have interests and can be considered possible participants. It should be noted that a group may participate without a comprehensive policy covering all aspects of the issue, or if a comprehensive policy is proposed, certain sectors may be emphasized.

The formulation of Japanese air power policy involves a decision-making process which has been underway for over twenty-five years. Heads of the government have participated, as have the Defense Agency

and the Air Self-Defense Force.¹⁴ The Finance Ministry, the Foreign Ministry, The Ministry of International Trade and Industry and the Economic Planning Agency have been represented on the National Defense Council and have access to national security planning. Non-governmental sources have also played a role, and in a parliamentary system the political party is one important input. Although the party and the political leadership are closely related, differences in institutional goals enable some distinction in the emphasis of their policy objectives. The aircraft industry has been miniscule as compared to the Japanese industrial complex, however it has maintained a voice in the formulation of policy. These groups have distinctive policy viewpoints which may be isolated and defined.

Other potential groups have failed to make a significant impact within the policy process through the first twenty years of post-war defense planning. The opposition parties face the dilemma of ideology, and lack of substantive alternatives which limit even their external affect on policy formulation. They have not developed shadow cabinets or established Diet committees with which they could gain access to the defense policy process and express their own viewpoints. Therefore, the opposition parties have made little substantive input to defense policy considerations.

The various public media have also been a potential source of policy initiatives. In addition to the individual expertise of commentators, particularly within the great national newspapers, the

¹⁴The JDA and the ASDF represent a civilian and uniformed continuum of the military bureaucracy which began with pre-JDA participants. The GSDF and MSDF also have viewpoints as to air power planning which will be considered when the uniformed viewpoint is discussed in detail.

media provide convenient means for articulation of private and public opinion representing the views of special interest groups and general public sentiment. Although newspapers have not ignored defense completely, they generally have not assumed any constructive role as a defense policy interest group. Newspaper reports and editorials have emphasized the constitutional, political and social issues, and avoided the substance of defense policy alternatives. Some contend that the newspapers are leftist and opposition-oriented; others portray them as members of the establishment.¹⁵ Such an argument is interesting but irrelevant to the issue. Whatever the press's general posture, it has not played a significant role in constructing defense policy alternatives.

The defense intellectual community could be another source of innovative ideas on defense policy, one commonly used by governments to examine possible alternatives and suggest new approaches to national security. As noted in detail in Chapter 2, the defense intellectual community in post-war Japan has remained small, diffuse and unorganized. It has limited access to the decision-making process. Possibly because of the general alienation of academia to military topics, the government does not appear to be generally receptive to academic opinion. Outside of the National Defense College and other small institutions noted, there have been few strategic discussions of national defense. The intellectual input has been essentially limited to personal relationships. The influence of a particular analyst may be significant because of his

¹⁵Several military leaders, both retired and on active duty, have expressed suspicion of the motives and orientation of the major newspapers, while Richard Halloran, Images, Chapter 7, contended the newspapers are another element in the establishment and play a prominent role in building consensus.

contact with a Director General of the JDA or with a Prime Minister; however the results of this participation are rather limited and no clear intellectual position can be ascertained.

The Space and Technology Agency, although not a permanent member of the National Defense Council (NDC), regularly sends a representative to attend its meetings. The close relationship of technology, space and military power suggests that the agency would play an important role in defense policy. It does not primarily through its own choice. Mr. Ichinose Teruo, Space Development Councillor for the Science and Technology Agency, assured the author that "space research in Japan is unique that the military is completely excluded."¹⁶ Because of this, the Agency must compete for resources in all cases. Beyond opposition to defense allocations they have not proposed policy alternatives due to the lack of intercourse between the two agencies.

Political Leadership

Japan's parliamentary government has been ruled by the Liberal-Democratic Party or its predecessors since independence. With the exception of one six-month period in 1947, every post-war Prime Minister has come from the conservative parties who have dominated Japanese politics. The party organization of the Liberal-Democratic Party has been geared to have a direct influence on the government through a secretariat, a policy board, and a research council. Research council committees correspond to the government ministries. While the defense policy viewpoints of the LDP and the government leadership are obviously quite similar, it is appropriate to distinguish between them. The LDP

¹⁶ Interview, February 25, 1972.

is an interest group with secular, power-oriented goals, but the government leaders operate at the apex of the policy structure; they are the "senior members" of the group. The security of Japan is a primary Cabinet concern; the LDP, although not unconcerned, has naturally emphasized the continued success of the party.

Japanese leaders began to discuss the security problem in 1947 when the possibility of a Peace Treaty arose. The discussions within the Japanese government led to the "Ashida Memorandum" which was informally presented to the United States in September 1946.¹⁷ At that time, the government wished to rely completely on the United States for external defense, "to have Japan's security guaranteed by the United States."¹⁸ The planned domestic structure would concentrate on internal riots or disorders.

The Ashida Memorandum reflected the 1947 viewpoint of the Japanese leaders, and the Occupation authorities deemed it inappropriate at the time and refused to discuss the subject formally. By 1950, the United States opposed such a Japanese policy because it wished Japan to contribute to its own defense, external as well as internal. The rearmament pressures existent during the Peace Treaty negotiations were generated primarily by special envoy John Foster Dulles.¹⁹ His position, uncompromising at first, was modified during the negotiations.

¹⁷ See Weinstein, Postwar Defense, pp. 12-40, for details on the evolution leading to this early position.

¹⁸ Ibid., p. 25.

¹⁹ Baron E. J. Lewis Van Aduard, Japan From Surrender to Peace (New York: Praeger, 1954), pp. 157-200; Nishimura Kumao, "Situation at the Time of the Japanese-American Security Treaty" in Nihon No Anzen Hoshō (Japan's National Security) (Tokyo: Kajima Kenkyūjo, 1964); and Weinstein, Postwar Defense Policy, pp. 58-63, all illustrate examples of the Dulles position on rearmament.



Prime Minister Yoshida responded to the request for "gradual rearmament" by outlining "a project, long under consideration, for increasing both our land and sea forces and placing them under the control of an embryo Ministry of Defense."²⁰

Yoshida's first commitment to Dulles regarding Japanese intention to rearm came in January 1951.²¹ The commitment was formalized in the preamble to the first Security Treaty: "that Japan will itself increasingly assume responsibility for its own defense against direct and indirect aggression."²² It was a tenuous obligation at best because it could be found only in the preamble, and there expressed in terms of the United States "expectation" that Japan would assume external responsibilities. Although some concessions had been granted, there is little evidence of a change in Japanese policy toward implementing rearmament. In 1952, Prime Minister Yoshida again denied any intention to rearm: "we will not rearm. To rearm we must ask the consent of the people and revise the Constitution."²³ The National Safety Agency was established in August 1952, and its missions were limited to dealing with indirect aggression: to take action "in cases of special need to maintain peace and order in our country and to protect human lives and property."²⁴

²⁰Yoshida Shigeru, The Yoshida Memoirs, The Story of Japan in Crisis, trans. Yoshida Kenichi (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1962).

²¹Ibid., also see testimony of Okazaki Katsuo before the Commission on the Constitution, in Kempo Shosakai, Kempo Chosakai Dai 3 Jinkai Dai - 30 - kai Sokai Gijiroku, Tokyo, 1959, p. 8.

²²U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, September 8, 1951.

²³Quoted in "Kokai Rongi no Naka no Jieitai" (The Self-Defense Forces in Diet Discussions), Keizai Orai, June 1967, p. 119.

²⁴Japan Defense Agency, The Defense of Japan, October 1970, p. 34, quoted from Safety Agency Law.

Internal and external pressures for a policy change increased, and a significant policy shift did occur on September 27, 1953. A joint communique released by Prime Minister Yoshida and Progressive Party President Shigemitsu declared a new direction:

In consideration of the present international situation and the spirit of national independence which is arising within our country, we will clarify the policy of increasing our self-defense strength and formulate a long-range defense plan commensurate with national abilities and in keeping with the gradual decrease of United States Forces stationed in Japan. Together with this measure as a first step, we will amend the Safety Agency Law in order to reorganize the National Safety Forces into the Self-Defense Forces and to add the mission of defense of our country against direct aggression to the former's mission.²⁵

This statement was the final indication of a policy shift which had been favored by domestic interest groups as well as the United States, and it enabled the Japanese defense structure to continue to expand.

Japanese-U.S. talks on mutual security and mutual security assistance were scheduled to begin in October and presented the immediate imperative that a new Japanese consensus be reached.²⁶ However, the policy had been advocated within Japan by both uniformed and civilian interest groups, and a series of studies and plans already proposed by the Safety Agency illustrated the growing Japanese consensus.²⁷ The

²⁵ Japan Defense Agency, The Defense of Japan, October 1970, p. 35, quoted from Safety Agency Law, a series of meetings led to this significant policy shift which are discussed in Boei Nenkan, (The Annual Report on the Defense Agency) 1970 edition, (Tokyo: Boei Nenkan Kanko Kai, 1970), p. 188. The text of the quote was compiled from the different translations. My emphasis.

²⁶ The Ikeda-Robertson talks were held in Washington during October 1953.

²⁷ These will be discussed in more detail in discussions of JDA and JASDF policy development, *supra*.

establishment of the Self-Defense Forces, on July 1, 1954, represented the first concrete steps taken to implement the new policy: "the primary mission of the Self-Defense Forces shall be to defend the nation against direct and indirect aggression."²⁸ This was particularly relevant to air power, the primary orientation of which was toward external threats.

The National Defense Council (NDC), established on June 3, 1956, has represented the apex of substantive defense policy formulation. Cabinet and Diet "decisions," which effect NDC "recommendations," rarely make any changes. The NDC is officially the "supreme advisory body of the Cabinet on national defense problems;" its membership consists of the Prime Minister and five other Cabinet members.²⁹ The paucity of high level consensus on defense policy is illustrated by the fact that in the first ten years of its existence the National Defense Council made only eleven recommendations to the Cabinet.³⁰

Of those, the most significant was the "Basic Policies for National Defense," decided by the Cabinet on May 20, 1957. This document reiterated the purpose of national defense "to prevent direct and indirect aggression;" it then went on to set forth four national policies:

1. To support the activities of the U.S., and to promote international cooperation, thus contributing to the realization of world peace.
2. To stabilize the livelihood of the nation and to enhance the spirit of patriotism, thereby establishing a foundation essential for the nation's security.

²⁸ JDA, Self-Defense Forces Law, Law No. 165 of June 9, 1954, Article 3, (official translation).

²⁹ National Defense Council of Japan, Secretariat, National Defense Council, October 1967, p. 1.

³⁰ Ibid., p. 3.

3. To develop efficient defense capacities progressively, taking into account the national strength and the actual conditions of the country, as well as keeping within the limits necessary for self-defense.

4. To meet foreign aggression in accordance with the Japan-USA security arrangements until the U.N. has become capable of discharging its function of arresting such aggression more effectively.³¹

This major policy consensus also was precipitated by the necessity of events. Prime Minister Kishi hoped to negotiate a major reduction in the U.S. force structure in Japan during an impending trip to the United States. The policy was established as the basis for negotiation and later internal support before he left Japan. These four principles remain the basis of the Japanese government attitude towards defense policy fifteen years later. Neither interest group pressures nor a changing international environment has forced a new consensus.

The United Nations has been very popular in Japan; and the first basic goal reflected Japanese public opinion. The Japanese government has remained fully aware of the limitations of the U.N. in security affairs. There are, in fact, limitations to the support Japan might provide the United Nations in this area. The Japanese have repeatedly declared that they would not dispatch troops in any role, even at the request of the U.N.³²

Early in the occupation, the Japanese government took the position that indirect aggression or civil violence represented the major threat to Japan's security. The second policy reflected that perception and spelled out the primary method of dealing with this threat.

³¹National Defense Council of Japan, Secretariat, National Defense Council, October 1967, Appendix 3.

³²Defense of Japan, October 1970, pp. 39-40, also Nishimura, Philosophy of Self-Defense, October 11, 1971, p. 34.

Domestic spending to promote the people's welfare continued to receive first priority in the government budget in 1972. The direct relationship between a higher living standard and national security was made before May 1957; Prime Minister Yoshida had resisted pressure to rearm more rapidly in 1950 because of this economic philosophy. The principle remained equally important in 1972. When recent shifts in the international economic situation resulted in a decrease of the economic growth rate, the defense program was reduced because it must be "adapted to the reality of (the) current and immediate future domestic situation."³³

The third principle included a reaffirmation of the second, for the commitment to gradual development of defense capacity was conditioned by the phrase "within the bounds of national capabilities." However, this was an important step for Japan and represented the new consensus that the Self-Defense Forces would continue to expand within economic parameters. The principle recognized the formula for the continued reduction of U.S. garrison costs and conditional U.S. troop withdrawals which had been agreed to the previous year by Secretary of State Dulles and Foreign Minister Shigemitsu.³⁴ The principle remained valid for the Fourth Defense Build-up Plan (DBP) which reaffirmed Japan's intention of "building up gradually our autonomous defense set-up."³⁵

The third policy was a precondition to the validity of the fourth. The Security Treaty was to be the primary tool "to cope with aggression." Japan did not say total reliance; in fact, Foreign Minister Shigemitsu

³³Nishimura, Philosophy on Self-Defense, October 11, 1971, p. 24.

³⁴See Hughes, "Guardianship to Partnership," pp. 56-70, for details of the U.S.-Japanese security negotiations which were conducted during this period.

³⁵JDA Draft, Fourth Defense Build-Up Plan, April 27, 1971. Letter of transmittal.

had agreed two years before that Japan gradually should assume "primary responsibility for the defense of its homeland."³⁶ However, such a commitment did not reflect Japan's available military potential. Increasing military capability and reliance on an ally were not contradictory policies.

The imbalance of capacity and policy was apparent in air power policies which were illustrated by United States and Japanese attitudes. The two nations first exchanged notes on the subject in January 1953. Japan began by noting constant violations of its airspace and acknowledging that it did not "possess at present any means effectively to repel such violations."³⁷ Japan requested that the United States "take effective and appropriate measures to repel them for the protection of the common interest of Japan and the United States of America."³⁸ The United States acquiesced to the request and instructed the military to take necessary measures "with all practicable assistance from the Japanese Government."³⁹ The exchange of notes was reaffirmed by a "U.S. Note on the Air Defense of Japan" after the 1960 Security Treaty.⁴⁰ The balance of actual U.S. and Japanese air forces present in Japan has changed dramatically since 1953, or even 1960. The policy, as expressed in the agreements has not changed. The permanence of these policies reflects the government's extreme caution in this area, and the difficulty of obtaining any consensus within the policy formulation structure.

³⁶"Dulles-Shigemitsu Communique," New York Times, September 1, 1955, p. 4.

³⁷Murphy-Okazaki Exchange of Notes on Air Defense, January 13 and 16, 1953, provided by Commander, U.S. Forces Japan.

³⁸Ibid.

³⁹Ibid.

⁴⁰Provided by the Commander U.S. Forces Japan.

The government statement made at the time of Security Treaty extension in 1970 reflected this caution when it in part replied to the initiative of Director General Nakasone who was campaigning for a revision of the Basic Principles:

The very enthusiasm about autonomous defense is a basic condition for maintaining national security, but it will be difficult to preserve security independently. Therefore efforts will be made to consolidate self-defense power in conformity with national power and the domestic situation and to maintain the peace and security of the Far East, including our country, by the Security Treaty structure.⁴¹

The National Defense Council specifically reaffirmed the Basic Principles when it approved the Fourth Defense Build-up Program outline: "the program will be carried out in accordance with the nation's basic defense policy approved by the Cabinet May 20, 1957."⁴²

Japanese defense policy, as enunciated at the apex of government, has displayed two singular characteristics. It has addressed military capacity in most broad and general terms. Any number of different, even contradictory actions could be explained in terms of the vague principles outlined above. Secondly, it has been unresponsive; new policies have not emerged despite significant, even radical changes, of the internal and external situation. The Japanese decision-making process would suggest, however, that new trends or initiatives in policy would not occur at the top level, but at lower levels or within the different interest groups participating in policy formulation.

Although there has been no distinct division between the policy positions of the various groups, it is possible to categorize them

⁴¹As quoted in Nihon Keizai, August 16, 1970 (U.S. Embassy translation).

⁴²As quoted in The Japan Times, February 8, 1972.

generally as either status quo or revisionist in orientation. The Liberal Democratic Party, The Finance Ministry, The Foreign Minister and The Economic Planning Agency (EPA) have tended to resist changes to current security policy, albeit for different reasons. On the other hand, the Defense Agency, The Air Self-Defense Force and the aircraft industry have favored modification of the current policy, again for different goals.

The Liberal-Democratic Party

It is difficult to distinguish LDP policy attitudes from government attitudes for the obvious reason that in many cases the same men dominate each sector. In the Japanese parliamentary system the LDP is the top-echelon of government, and their basic conservative philosophy has been magnified by other factors. The LDP can be characterized as a coalition of factions representing, in part, varying degrees of conservatism, and the factions themselves are vertical groups bound by their loyalty to a personal leader. The coalition within the faction is maintained in order to gain power; often the leader is a present or future candidate for Prime Minister. The basis of the inter-factional coalition is primarily related to the acquisition of power as opposed to overriding ideological principles. The leader of the party is more of a balancer than a leader, and the maintenance of the balance discourages innovation which is uncharacteristic of Japanese leadership anyway.

The executive structure of the party entails another element of diversity. The Policy Affairs Research Council (PARC) is the major advisory body to the Executive Council of the party; it indirectly advises the National Defense Council. The operating structure of the

Policy Affairs Research Council consists of divisions and committees which correspond to the ministries of government. The party policy normally reflects the consensus of these committees as well as a consensus of the factions; it consequently resembles the vagueness of governmental policy.

The LDP directly participates in the defense policy process; when Nakasone proposed a revision of the basic defense policies, he met with top LDP leaders at the party headquarters before making his proposals to the National Defense Council.⁴³ The attitudes of the LDP leaders often corresponded to their primary interests: the Security Research Council Chairman expressed support for the general idea of autonomous defense while the Foreign Affairs Research Council Chairman asked "that a cautious attitude be taken in revising the basic policy."⁴⁴

As opposed to broader government objectives, the party is concerned with its own unity, strength and continued power; consequently, it favors the least possible controversy with which revisionist parties could make political gains. It naturally views the security issue in that framework and is hesitant to take any initiatives which could disrupt factional unity or raise issues that might be utilized by the opposition. On balance with this, the party relies on industry, particularly for financial support; it also has an interest in insuring that industrial viewpoints are presented to the government.

Although the LDP is a distinguishable interest group, its policy position on defense is general and vague. The scope of its interests extends to all aspects of governmental affairs, and to achieve consensus

⁴³Nihon Keizai, July 24, 1970 (U.S. Embassy translation).

⁴⁴Ibid.

within the LDP is as difficult, if not more so, then within the bureaucracy. Furthermore, its primary concern with the balance of power in domestic politics accentuates its conservatism.

The Finance Ministry, The Ministry of International Trade and Industry and the Economic Planning Agency

Japanese defense spending has had very low priority in the allocation of government resources. This has effectively implemented the second basic principle of defense: to promote the national welfare. The Japanese white paper on defense expounded the principle:

Furthermore, in order to insure the security of the nation fully, it is necessary to take political, economic and social measures for the establishment of an internal foundation, such as the promotion and increase of economic power, promotion of social welfare and the improvement of education.⁴⁵

The Finance Ministry and the Economic Planning Agency (EPA) serve as the bureaucratic means by which the policy is implemented; they deal in the allocation of government resources, and therefore, are concerned with the amount and priority of defense spending.

Defense budgets have often been compared in terms of a percentage of GNP. In Japan, the percentage dropped from 1.73 in 1954 to .79 in 1970.⁴⁶ It not only has become a most common method of describing the budget, but an almost absolute guideline for defense spending. The defense planner must begin with a monetary sum fixed by this percentage. The current defense build-up plan has been delayed, in part, because of opposition from the EPA based on this guideline.⁴⁷ The tentative

⁴⁵Defense of Japan, October 1970, p. 29.

⁴⁶Ibid., p. 97.

⁴⁷Kaihara, Interview, February 29, 1972.

approval given the plan in February 1972 included no financial data. The EPA opposed promulgation of such data because international monetary realignments altered the EPA's economic growth forecasts. A lower annual growth meant the defense plan would involve spending in excess of the programmed percentage of GNP. Such a possibility violated policy. Not only was the JDA forced to revise their plan, but were not allowed to present a modified proposal until the EPA revised their five-year economic forecast.⁴⁸

The delay of the defense build-up was forecast over a year before when the plan was first proposed by the JDA. The Finance Ministry publicly noted that the projected 18 percent yearly growth of defense spending might outgrow the economy and the national budget. Such increases would mean "heavy sacrifices from 'civil' spending in the field of social welfare and others, and such a state of affairs would not be tolerated."⁴⁹ The Finance Ministry is a most powerful, semi-autonomous bureaucracy within the Japanese government, and some believe that it "makes" foreign policy and defense policy because of its extensive influence. It has played the role of watchdog and master of the Japanese budget over the past twenty years and imposed limits on defense allocations with near total authority.

The principle of national welfare priority not only assigns a low priority to defense spending, it additionally relates that spending to the "promotion and increase of economic power."⁵⁰ The government's

⁴⁸Kaihara, Interview, February 29, 1972. This is the second time that a DBP was delayed by the Finance Ministry and/or EPA. In 1960, the 2nd DBP was delayed one year by the Finance Ministry, Nihon no Boei, p. 53.

⁴⁹JPE Aviation Report, November 2, 1970, p. 6.

⁵⁰Defense of Japan, p. 29.

financial bureaucracies limit defense spending; they also concern themselves with the distribution of the military budget. The Finance Ministry, along with the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI), has actively supported the principle that defense monies be spent in a manner beneficial to related industries.

Support of defense industries has been a consistent Japanese principle, one which began with very early defense planning. An Aircraft and Ordinance Section was established in the Ministry of International Trade and Industry in August 1952, and an Aircraft Production Council, also in MITI, began operations one month later.⁵¹ Their goals were to improve production and engineering techniques in Japanese defense industry and to coordinate its development. They were charged with implementation of the controls authorized in the Aviation Law and Aircraft Industry Promotion Law passed by the Diet in 1952.⁵² An Aircraft Manufacturing Industry Law, passed June 3, 1954, gave more control to MITI. It continued to act as an industrial policeman and industrial spokesman in 1972, and it remained deeply involved in the promotion of defense industries.

The powerful bureaucracies concerned with financial allocations and industrial interests give added emphasis to the defense principle of social welfare priority. A natural bureaucratic tendency to control future competition aggravates the imbalance of influence. Primacy of social welfare has been translated to a limit on military expenditures

⁵¹ L. M. Garret, U.S.A.F. Industrial Planning with the Japanese Air Self-Defense Force, 96 pages, undated (1958), prepared under authority of the Office of Information Services, Headquarters, Fifth Air Force Japan, provided by the Office of Air Force History, Fifth Air Force, Japan, p. 2.

⁵² Aviation Law, Law No. 231 passed July 15, 1952, and Aviation Promotion Law, Law No. 237, passed July 16, 1952.

which has been divorced from strategic needs. The principle has also been used to justify allocation of resources in order to stimulate defense industries. Stimulation of industry is not an unusual goal of defense policy; however, the concept that industrial promotion might be more important than operational capability has reflected an uncommon situation. Those priorities indicate the special interests and influence of the government bureaucracies outside the defense structure.⁵³

The Foreign Ministry

The Foreign Ministry naturally has focused on the Japan-U.S. security arrangements. They have been well aware of the Nixon Doctrine and concerned with the stability and dependability of the United States commitment. They hesitate to support the principle of autonomous defense, even within the security treaty framework, for fear it will tend to deemphasize the alliance.⁵⁴

The Foreign Ministry has recognized the need for U.S. military capability in maintaining regional stability, and they do not want an expanded SDF participating in this role. They agree that the direct military threat to Japan is very remote, and resist the autonomous defense theory because of the destabilizing effect it could have on the U.S. security commitment. The section of the recent Defense White

⁵³ A recent example of this occurred in September 1971, when the JASDF was forced to choose the T-2, home-built advanced jet trainer over the F-5 which could have been imported at a much lower price per aircraft. The number of aircraft requested by JASDF then was not approved because the total bill was too high. They now will receive less aircraft than necessary to implement their training program because of the primacy of the domestic production principle. See Chapter 9 for details of the allocation process.

⁵⁴ This discussion of the Foreign Ministry position is largely based on a briefing which I received from Foreign Ministry officials in February 1972.

Paper which dealt with the Security Treaty was finalized after consultation with the Foreign Ministry and it expressed their caution:

At any rate, in the case of the initiation of an armed attack against our country, Japan and the United States must both act to meet it most effectively. Therefore, it is necessary for the two countries always to be in close communication with each other, to endeavor to communicate ideas, and to maintain close relations.⁵⁵

The rapprochement of the nuclear powers, the Nixon Doctrine, and domestic instability in Japan reflect the need to reexamine the basic concepts of defense in Japan. Yet, the Foreign Ministry has not concerned itself with the details of the SDF's capability and would prefer to move slowly toward increased autonomy and increased reliance on the Self-Defense Forces.

Autonomous Defense

Jishu boei, autonomous defense, received a great deal of attention during discussions of the Fourth Defensive Build-up Plan (DBP). Those favoring a new defense policy often used jishu boei as their keynote. The Japan Defense Agency, the Air Self-Defense Force and the Japanese aircraft industry were among the defense policy interest groups identified with autonomous defense.

Although each of these supported jishu boei, the meaning of the term varied with each group. Their disparate views on the scope of autonomous defense reflect in the different policies they have advocated. Although the arguments for a more independent defense stature have become prominent in the 1970's, closer analysis reveals that recent arguments often reflect long-held positions.

⁵⁵Defense of Japan, p. 45.

The Japan Defense Agency

Director-General Nakasone assumed leadership of the Defense Agency in January 1970. During the ensuing year and one-half, he drew unprecedented attention to the defense forces and the jishu boei theory. However, this was not the first time the civilian defense bureaucracy was associated with efforts to alter existing policy.

Seido Chosa Iinkai, the Systems Research Committee discussed earlier, was formed within the Safety Bureau as the Safety Agency was established.⁵⁶ The Committee, primarily constituted for long-range defense studies, included civilian and uniformed personnel. Sub-committees studied economics, organization, equipment and other facets of national security. The Systems Research Committee represented the first civilian participation in the military planning process. Earlier plans by the private groups headed by men like Admiral Nomura and Colonel Hattori were dominated by the ex-uniformed viewpoint. The new committee was established within the civilian sector of the Safety Agency and represented a new concept of civilian participation. In March 1953, the committee promulgated the "first draft" of the government's defense planning. More than sixteen drafts in two separate series were prepared before the First Defense Build-up Plan was approved on June 14, 1957.⁵⁷

The first draft was called the "Report on Studies of Systems and Organizations"; while the proposed quantity of equipment reflected uniformed influence, the basic premise of the plan revealed advocacy of a new policy:

⁵⁶See Chapter 5.

⁵⁷Nihon No Boei, pp. 47-52.

(a) The objective of national defense is to maintain domestic security, and to prevent the intentions of aggression by foreign powers during peacetime, and in the event of aggression, to repel such aggression and to maintain supply lanes on the seas, and to preserve the independence and peace of our nation.

(b) Under the present conditions of two opposing groups of nations, to take part in the collective security of the free nations rather than to attempt such efforts single-handed.

(c) Under the existing domestic situation, national defense must allow due consideration for the domestic economy, security and morale of the people.

(d) Dispatching of forces overseas will not be considered. Action will be limited to territorial and maritime defense.⁵⁸

The first paragraph reveals the assumption that Japan would assume responsibilities for external defense. That premise was not agreed to within the political hierarchy for seven months, until the Yoshida-Shigemitsu Communique in October. The Diet did not approve it until June 1954. The committee also worked on the basis that primary importance would be "attached to air power;" again, more than one year before the Diet approved the formation of an air force.⁵⁹

The initiatives were supported by the civilian leadership, but a significant portion of the impetus came from the uniform influences in and out of the Safety Agency. After the establishment of the JDA and the formulation of the Basic Policies for Defense, the civilian leadership provided few initiatives during the SDF's development.

Civilians had not participated in military affairs before the war. National security planning and military appropriations were rarely questioned in the National Diet. The new defense civilians were

⁵⁸ Nihon No Boei, p. 48.

⁵⁹ Ibid.

recruited primarily from the former Home Ministry, especially the Police Bureau. They were unfamiliar with national security policies and military strategies. Technical discussions regarding development directions also went beyond their expertise.⁶⁰

There are indications that the JDA has begun to develop some autonomy and a higher level of civilian expertise. After 1964, it has shared in the allotment of university graduates within government. These young bureaucrats are JDA officials; they are permanent and their primary loyalty lies with their agency. As the JDA develops internal cohesion and autonomy, it will be more likely to develop independent views reflecting its primary interests and responsibilities. A more autonomous posture was indicated during the JDA's participation in the debate over the Fourth DBP which has been called the "Nakasone Plan". Although his style of presentation publicized it, the plan was being formulated within the Defense Agency before Nakasone came to office.

Prime Minister Sato called for more "autonomous defense" in a November 1969 speech when he declared Japan should rely on the U.S. for only the nuclear deterrent.⁶¹ After the elections in January 1970, Nakasone began to emphasize the need to reduce Japan's reliance on the U.S. commitment. In his first meeting with the U.S. Ambassador in Tokyo, Nakasone urged joint usage of the remaining U.S. bases and continued withdrawal.⁶²

⁶⁰JDA's lack of autonomy contributes to their lack of initiative, see discussion in Chapter 7.

⁶¹New York Times, November 3, 1969, p. 8.

⁶²New York Times, February 14, 1970, p. 9.

Nakasone revealed his intent to alter the Basic Defense Policy during an unofficial session of the National Defense Council held July 22, 1970.⁶³ It was one month after the automatic extension of the Security Treaty and the Nakasone proposals were based in part on the new treaty status which allowed abrogation by either party on one year's notice. Also, a new defense policy could help legitimize the Fourth DBP which was to begin two years later.

The Nakasone Proposal was keynoted by "autonomous defense;" he specifically proposed that the four principles of 1957 be replaced by "five principles of autonomous defense:"

1. To adhere to the Constitution and be thorough in national defense.
2. To unite with diplomacy and try to harmonize with various other national policies.
3. To perfect the civilian control system.
4. To maintain firmly the three non-nuclear principles.
5. To supplement the insufficient self-defense power with the security treaty setup.⁶⁴

The Director-General was appealing for a greater emphasis on Japan's defense capabilities and less reliance on the U.S. Security Treaty. The 1957 policy proposed meeting external threats with the U.S. commitment supplemented by the Defense Forces, while Nakasone proposed supplementing the SDF with the Security Treaty. Nakasone did not advocate abolishing the security relationship; on the contrary, he called it a basic principle for safeguarding peace in the Pacific and

⁶³The Japan Times, July 20, 1970, p. 1.

⁶⁴For various amplifications of the new principles see Nihon Keizai, November 2, 1970; Japan Times, July 25, 1970; Nakasone, Perspective of the Defense of Japan, pp. 4-6.

criticized those who believed a war should be fought by the SDF alone.⁶⁵

Jishu boei has been severely criticized by Kaihara Osamu, Secretary-General of the National Defense Council. Kaihara, a long-time official of the Defense Agency, has represented an important segment of opinion within the defense bureaucracy. He has related autonomous defense to the efforts to dismantle the U.S. base structure, and condemned the idealism of "autonomous defense" policy.⁶⁶ He argued that "it is no more than an expression of determination and hope. It is not backed up with reasonable analysis that intended results shall be acquired. It is a model of one who does not know either the enemy or himself."⁶⁷ Kaihara, with all his criticism, shared some basic assumptions with the former Director-General. Both men believe that the U.S. security relationship has been essential to Japanese defense and that the SDF has not been capable of defending Japan. Both men argue that Japanese defensive capacity must be improved. Both may be called revisionist in terms of the policies which have characterized Japan's attitude toward security.

However, at that point the two views diverge. The Nakasone theory was implemented in the draft of the Fourth DBP which emphasized the "renewal and modernization" of front-line armaments.⁶⁸ The Air Self-Defense

⁶⁵ Nakasone, Perspective of the Defense of Japan, p. 2; and Sankei, April 22, 1970.

⁶⁶ Interview, November 10, 1971; Kaihara Osamu, "The Defense of Japan and U.S. Military Bases," 1970 (undated), text of speech provided by Mr. Kaihara; Kaihara Osamu, "The Important Points in Improving Defense Capabilities," May 1971, outline of speech provided by Mr. Kaihara.

⁶⁷ Kaihara, "Boei Ryoku to wa Namika Gutaitekini Kangaeyo" (Let's Consider the Defense Capability Realistically), Niji Seiki, January 1971, pp. 4-5.

⁶⁸ The New DBP, April 27, 1971, p. 5.

Force was scheduled to acquire new fighter aircraft, reconnaissance aircraft, fighter-support aircraft, and transport aircraft.⁶⁹

Kaihara decried the emphasis on aircraft and other major weapons system components. He believed that it was important to distinguish between an aircraft and a complete weapons system. A weapons system is only complete when trained men, with experience, supporting facilities and ammunition complement the aircraft. Kaihara argued that this has not been done, and he concluded that autonomous defense was a sham. The policies being followed damage the security relationship but do not provide autonomous defense at any level.⁷⁰

The disagreement reflected in the Kaihara and Nakasone viewpoints is a significant one; it begins with a different perception of threat and divergent concepts of the military role in policy responses. Although both propose changes in basic defense policy, Kaihara's goals are more limited. His proposal adapted policy to the existing situation and aimed for quite limited autonomy. Mr. Nakasone displayed little concern for current posture; his policies imply a greater long-range autonomy and a larger military role.

In addition to the internal differences of opinion, external opposition dimmed any chance for adoption of the JDA's proposals. After Nakasone raised the issue in July 1970, the proposals were referred to a vice-ministerial level committee by the National Defense Council.⁷¹

⁶⁹The New DBP, April 27, 1971, pp. 6-7, F-4J fighter, RF-4E reconnaissance, FST-2 fighter support, and C-1 transport.

⁷⁰Kaihara, "We Have to Know Them as Well as Ourselves." Kokubo, April-August 1971, pp. 69-73. The assertions made by Mr. Kaihara will be examined in detail when the implementation of policy is discussed in Sections V and VI.

⁷¹Japan Times, July 25, 1970.

This "Defense Affairs Administrative Liaison Council," representing the JDA, Foreign Ministry and Cabinet, negotiated for three months without success, and Nakasone attempted to break the deadlock by calling for a Cabinet-level conference early in November.⁷² Although this was not successful and no new principles have replaced the old, Nakasone declared that "the process of deliberation is more important than a conclusion," and the process of deliberation has continued.⁷³

The Japanese Air Self-Defense Force

The uniformed military viewpoint on defense policy has been muted in the post-war era for obvious reasons; however, it has existed for a considerable period of time. As has been noted, former Imperial Army and Navy personnel began considering Japanese defense needs in 1946, long before rearmament seemed a possibility.⁷⁴ The ex-military involved in defense planning requested by the Occupation authorities in 1951 saw their goal as "rearmament for the self-defense and survival of our country."⁷⁵ They went on to say that "the new force to be created must be autonomous and independent."⁷⁶ The first advocates of autonomous defense were arguing their position in March 1951, nineteen years before Director-General Nakasone advocated the posture.

⁷²Nihon Keizai, November 2, 1970.

⁷³Yomiuri, October 3, 1970.

⁷⁴See Chapter 4.

⁷⁵Second Demobilization Bureau Liquidation Division, "Situation of Former Japanese Servicemen and Investigation Data Concerning Reorganization of Air-Sea Force," March 17, 1951, Enclosure 5, p. 2.

⁷⁶Ibid., p. 4.

Autonomous defense meant nondependence on other states to the 1951 planners, and following military planners have continued to operate with that philosophy. The military officers who planned the embryo air force in 1953 worked under the assumption that the JASDF would one day be independent. They planned with the expectation that the Air Self-Defense Force would have both offensive and defensive capacity.⁷⁷ The plans written by the Air Preparatory Office included light bombers as late as the Seventh Draft which eventually was used as the basic blueprint for the formation of the JASDF. The bombers were not deleted until the First Defense Build-up Plan was adopted in 1957.⁷⁸

The military officers have not been able to implement their beliefs, but they remain fully aware that a strategic defensive posture is necessary to autonomous defensive capacity. Some counter-attack capacity was a goal in 1953 and it remains an objective in 1972. General Genda argued that current ASDF capability and an autonomous defense requirement was comparable to "asking a baseball team to play nine innings without taking a turn at bat."⁷⁹ Air Self-Defense Force officers have been taught that it is incorrect "only to regard defense in total defensive power."⁸⁰

⁷⁷This view was corroborated by General Arinuma Genshiro JASDF, ret., early member of the Air Preparatory Office, Interview, March 7, 1972, Lieutenant General Eugene B. LeBailly, USAF, letter to author, December 9, 1971 and General Otto P. Weyland, USAF, letter to author, April 30, 1972.

⁷⁸Arinuma, Interview, March 7, 1972.

⁷⁹Interview, November 17, 1971.

⁸⁰General Principles of Air Power, p. 160.

The Air Self-Defense Force has assumed that it was the front line of defense for Japan:

It is unthinkable that ground battle could occur before the air and sea battle, and it is unthinkable that landing operations could occur before partial, local air superiority could be established.⁸¹

Furthermore, they have recognized the need to maintain air superiority over the peripheral sea in support of the JMSDF; it is imperative "in order to carry on sea operations."⁸² The military leaders also have been aware that the JASDF was incapable of exercising such a defensive strategy:

The present air defense strategy of Japan is based upon the JASDF which takes charge of defense, and the U.S. Forces which take almost full responsibility for offense.⁸³

Nor have they been satisfied with such a situation:

It may be more correct to say from this that Japan does not have an air defense strategy. If the level of the U.S. Air Force presence is decreased, Japan's defensive power may only be maintained through our shouldering a greater responsibility.⁸⁴

Aware that its force was inadequate for independent defense and constantly advocating that goal, the JASDF has emphasized development since its inception. General Sanagi, Vice Chief of Staff, then Chief of Staff, for the first five years of JASDF's existence, remembered

⁸¹General Principles of Air Power, p. 30.

⁸²Ibid.

⁸³Ibid., p. 160, also reflected in opinions of General Ishikawa, Chief of Staff, Interview, March 7, 1972; and Lt. General Takahashi, Commander of Air Defense Command, Interview, December 6, 1971.

⁸⁴General Principles, p. 160.

that pilot training, technical training and development were most important while operational capacity was only a secondary consideration.⁸⁵ General Ura, another former Chief of Staff of JASDF, led the survey team charged with selecting the semi-automatic radar system. The radar network was and is the basis of the Japanese air-defense network; however, General Ura recalled that the most important criterion in the selection was economy, and the requirement "to maintain development space."⁸⁶

The JASDF has emphasized development to the exclusion of other goals which may have conflicted. Air defense or interception has been the primary functional emphasis in the first twenty years of the Air Self-Defense Force; yet from 1963 to 1965, Japan refused an American offer to sell two squadrons of F-102 all-weather interceptors. The aircraft were offered as the U.S. transferred air defense responsibility to Japan, and would have been part of a package including aircraft and all support equipment. Shipping all the equipment back to the United States was an expensive undertaking and Japan, therefore, was offered the package at a very low price.⁸⁷ However, the air force leadership finally supported the government's decision to decline the offer because it endangered the completion of the defense build-up program then underway.⁸⁸

⁸⁵ Interview, November 11, 1971.

⁸⁶ Interview, December 23, 1971.

⁸⁷ Interview, Mr. Katsuyuki K. Kakudo, MDAO, U.S. Embassy Japan, February 15, 1972.

⁸⁸ More specifically the follow or purchase of F-104's, Kaihara, Interview, February 29, 1972. Aoki Hideo, "Japan's Aerospace Defense," loc. cit., p. 119, argues that the ASDF gave up trying to get F102's. In any case, they did not want to risk the development program.

The defense of an island is facilitated by denying the attacker control of the sea surrounding the island, thereby enhancing the value of a natural defensive barrier. The JDA draft defense plan referred to this obvious truth about the defense of Japan:

If any direct aggression on a limited scale should happen, it will be countered primarily by our own defense power, to secure air superiority and the control of the sea over the areas around Japan to the extent necessary to limit damages and repel such aggression in its very initial stage.⁸⁹

The MSDF cannot operate effectively in the peripheral sea without air cover. The JASDF has acknowledged the validity of such a policy and the needs of the maritime force, yet naval support has not been emphasized. The JASDF's equipment selection, operational research and tactical training reflect its preoccupation with the interceptor mission.⁹⁰ Even the interceptor tactics have been focused on the defense of the air bases; air defense of GSDF facilities, MSDF ports, and industrial concentrations have been deemphasized. The ASDF has defined its primary responsibility as the defense of its air bases, regardless of the fact that air base protection does not provide air superiority over the shores of Japan, let alone the peripheral sea.⁹¹ In strategic terms, the value of air superiority lies in the fact that the airspace may be utilized as an additional medium of warfare by the side obtaining superiority. The JASDF has deemphasized the balanced

⁸⁹"The New DBP," p. 3.

⁹⁰These aspects of ASDF operations are discussed in detail in Section V.

⁹¹Several senior officers of JASDF told the author that they considered air base defense primary.

air force which could utilize air superiority if it were achieved.

There can be little doubt that the lack of perceived threat has contributed to the military's lack of concern with current combat capacity. It also would appear that uniformed objectives have not been limited to the small, semi-autonomous force envisioned by Kaihara. When asked why the JASDF had concentrated on air defense to the exclusion of a balanced force, a senior JASDF Commander replied, "Nito o oumono ito mo eizu," or "chase two rabbits, catch neither." This old Japanese proverb suggested that air force leaders were aware that development proceeds most efficiently if available resources are concentrated. Historical, political and social factors made air defense a logical choice. It also should be noted that air defense required maximum technological development; in terms of weapons system technology it would be much easier to expand from the air defense mission rather than to it.

When the ninth Chief of Staff, General Ueda Yasuhiro, assumed office in July 1971, he was asked what goals he envisioned for the JASDF. He replied that he wished to "make this one of the greatest air forces in the world."⁹² Autonomous defense has been a long-held, long-range goal which envisioned independent defense. The uniformed leadership has had no secret rearmament plan; General Ueda also declared that education and social amelioration of personnel must precede the implementation of any projects.⁹³ However, JASDF leaders have looked beyond a small, balanced, limited-autonomy force toward a more absolute interpretation of jishu boei.

⁹²Quoted in "Interview with General Ueda Yasuhiro," Wing Shimbun, July 14, 1971.

⁹³Ibid.

The Aircraft Industry

John Emmerson concluded that "no military-industrial complex worthy of the name exists now, while defense production is 0.4 percent of the industrial production."⁹⁴ Such a conclusion, if taken to mean no industrial influence on defense policy, would seem to require two separate deductions: that the industry has neither the size nor cohesiveness to generate influence, and/or it has no access to the policy formulation process. Access to defense policy-making will be discussed in the following chapter; however, Emmerson's statement was more directly related to the industry's capacity to generate influence on defense policy. The industry's size and cohesiveness are related to this capacity to formulate any substantive defense policy, and the aircraft industry may be examined from that viewpoint. Its relation to the entire defense industry also bears on the nature and effect of its voice.⁹⁵

Military purchases accounted for 60 percent of the total sales of the Japanese aircraft industry in 1969; but that was 60 percent of a relatively small component of Japanese industry. The aircraft industry accounted for 0.7 percent of Japan's machinery production and 0.4 percent of total industrial output.⁹⁶ In addition, the Japanese aircraft industry is comprised of divisions of much larger industrial enterprises. There are no independent aircraft companies in Japan. Compared to

⁹⁴ Arms, p. 149.

⁹⁵ Chapter 11 describes the capacity of Japan's aircraft industry as it relates to potential air power. The emphasis here is on policy goals of the aircraft industry.

⁹⁶ "Society of Japanese Aircraft Constructors report to Ministry of International Trade and Industry," as reported in JPE Aviation Report, May 3, 1971, pp. 6-8.

their parent industries, aircraft divisions are minute; on an industry-wide average, they accounted for less than 5 percent of the corporate sales or production totals of their parent companies.⁹⁷ This general description gives the impression that the aircraft industry is small, dependent on the military, and fragmented. Despite these appearances, and there is a degree of truth in each assertion, other elements greatly enhance the influence of the industry.

The aircraft divisions of the large conglomerates are relatively more important to their individual companies than size alone would indicate. Economically, the government contracts are cash contracts and provide ready surpluses of capital within the division which may be transferred elsewhere giving the company more flexibility.⁹⁸ Military technology has been important to all Japanese industry, and technological "spin-off" benefits from advanced aircraft designs have played a prominent role in broader industrial development.⁹⁹ One good example of this is widely known in Japan. The brakes on the trains running on the New Tokaido Line, the famous "Bullet Trains," were designed from technology learned during license production of the F-104. These benefits provide the aircraft divisions with a greater

⁹⁷ "Society of Japanese Aircraft Constructors report to Ministry of International Trade and Industry," as reported in JPE Aviation Report, May 3, 1971, p. 5; also provided by Mr. Arimori Mitsuo, Executive Director of the Society of Japanese Aircraft Constructors, Interview, February 23, 1972. The ensuing discussion relies heavily on the information and analysis proffered by Mr. Arimori.

⁹⁸ Mr. Shimomura Makoto, Manager, Business Section, Aircraft Division, Shin Meiwa Industry Company, LTD, Interview, February 16, 1972; Arimori, Interview, February 23, 1972.

⁹⁹ Shimomura, February 16, 1972; Arimori, February 23, 1972; for an excellent review of this subject with particular reference to early benefits to Japan, see Daniel L. Spencer, Military Transfer of Technology; International Economic Transfers via Military By-Products and Initiative, Based on Cases From Japan and Other Countries (United States Air Force; AFROSR, March 1967).

degree of autonomy than figures alone would indicate, and the size of the parent companies becomes a positive rather than negative aspect of their influence.

Industrial cohesion has been enhanced by a large number of aircraft-related organizations. They include the Japan Aeronautical Association, the Aircraft Engineer's Association, the Flying Association, the Rocket Industry Association, and the Space Activities Promotion Council of Keidanren, among others.¹⁰⁰ Two of the most important organizations are the Society of Japanese Aircraft Constructors (SJAC) and the Defense Production Committee of Keidanren (DPC). The two play different roles; together they unify the industry and coordinate its activities with the entire defense industry.

The SJAC is the primary association of the manufacturers, and it was formed in 1952 by former aviation companies in anticipation of resumption of aircraft production.¹⁰¹ When the member companies wish to contact the government, they normally operate through this society. It has conducted conferences at which government representatives sometimes participate. The government often uses the society to distribute information to the companies. The former is the major purchaser, and there is no free competition among the manufacturers. Each aircraft division maintains special relations with certain U.S. companies, and the selection of an aircraft may decide the primary manufacturer. The Society also plays a role in this process.

¹⁰⁰ See Directory of the Aerospace Industry in Japan, Society of Japanese Aircraft Constructors, September 1, 1971, pp. 93-95 and Endo Kimsaku, ed. Wing International edition, Japanese Aerospace Directory 1971-1972 (Tokyo: Koku Shimbun Sha (The Aviation Press Company), April 1, 1971), pp. 64-66, for a complete list of the various industrial organizations connected to the aircraft industry.

¹⁰¹ Arimori, Interview, February 23, 1972.

Although defense contracts are issued by the Central Procurement Office (CPO) of the Defense Agency, MITI is dominant in the selection of companies. The SJAC and the Defense Production Committee both participate within the Aircraft Industry Council of MITI.¹⁰² MITI decides the allocation of contracts according to three principles. First, the facilities must be kept busy and no contract should exceed productive capacities. Secondly, the company must be capable of maintaining the technical standards required. Lastly, MITI considers the economic situation of the company.¹⁰³ When a contract is issued, the government assigns a prime contractor; however, it also specifies percentages of the contract to be assigned to other companies in order to insure a balanced industry. In all these decisions SJAC acts as a channel of information between government and industry.

Keidanren is the Federation of Economic Organizations. The association includes all major industrial organizations and represents the broad outlook of the leaders of the various industries in Japan. It takes an overview of general Japanese industrial welfare, and, as such, has played a significant role in the post-war era. The Defense Production Committee of Keidanren was formed on August 12, 1952, and is composed of those industries related to defense production. Its concern is to "best utilize the industrial capacity of Japan and to protect the defense production capability."¹⁰⁴ The DPC maintains a

¹⁰² Arimori, Interview, February 23, 1972.

¹⁰³ Ibid., MITI may consider economic health of entire company rather than aircraft division.

¹⁰⁴ General Sanagi Sadamu, Interview, November 11, 1971 (General Sanagi is an advisor to the DPC; also Mr. Mabuchi Ryoitsu, Research Associate, Defense Production Counsellor's Room, Keidanren, Interview, November 27, 1971, and Arimori, February 23, 1972, were instrumental in explaining the nature of the DPC.

rather unusual status among the various committees within Keidanren; it includes a Secretary-General and permanent staff with several full-time advisors. Research and recommendations are submitted by this staff and considered by sub-committees which meet less frequently on an as-called basis. The Aviation Sub-Committee consists of aviation division presidents and is identical to SJAC membership. The Chairman of the SJAC is a Director of the Defense Production Committee.

Thus, these two organizations, the DPC and the SJAC, serve to focus aircraft industry goals and to coordinate and integrate those goals within defense industry goals. This process of unification acts to magnify and clarify the views of the aircraft industry regarding Japanese defense policy. The broad view of Keidanren has not reflected a pure profit motive and therefore has translated the individual industry goals into a policy more closely corresponding to national interests.

Fukui Haruhiro recently wrote that, since 1952, the DPC of Keidanren had acted "as a semi-official link between the government and business circles."¹⁰⁵ In fact, cooperation began the year before when Keidanren formed an Economic Cooperation Forum in February 1951 which was a forerunner of the DPC.

The DPC produced a "Keidanren Plan of Rearmament" in February 1953 which indicated early big business support for a degree of autonomous defense.¹⁰⁶ It proposed a large, three service military establishment including 2,200 fighter aircraft and 900 medium bombers. The total

¹⁰⁵Fukui Haruhiro, Party in Power: The Japanese Liberal Democrats and Policy-Making (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1970), p. 211.

¹⁰⁶Doba Hajime, Nihon no Gunji Ryoku (Japan's Military Power), (Tokyo: Yomiuri Shimbun Sha, January 1, 1963), also see Fukui, Party in Power, pp. 211-212.

cost was to exceed the yen equivalent of 4.3 billion dollars over six years, although it proposed that eighty percent of the cost be borne by the U.S.¹⁰⁷

The Defense Production Committee was primarily interested in the industrial side of defense capacity, and after the political decision to adopt the external defense mission, the DPC concentrated on defense industry proposals. In March 1954, it presented the government with a proposal entitled "Opinions and Suggestions as to Improvement of the Defense Industry."¹⁰⁸ The five major points could be summarized as follows:

1. Government gradually should increase self-defense power and support the improvement of the defense industry.
2. Modern defense production cannot be made on a year by year basis, and the government must develop defense through the use of long-range programs. Measures must be taken to improve information and resources in liason with the U.S.
3. Two areas of demand must be considered for future defense production: a) Production of equipments for the SDF, and b) export of weapons to the free countries of the Far East and Southeast Asia.
4. The production of modern weapons with the newest technology will improve industry in general. Japan should actively pursue technological training and off-shore procurement.
5. In order to nurture industry, the government should assist through research and development, tax advantages, loans, rental of government property and long-term purchasing.¹⁰⁹

¹⁰⁷ Doba, Nihon no Gunji Ryoku, p. 211.

¹⁰⁸ Nippon No Anzen Hoshō, (The Security of Japan), (Tokyo: Asagumo Shimbun Sha, 1971), pp. 93-94.

¹⁰⁹ Ibid., pp. 94-95.

The suggestions forwarded in this report were in many cases adopted by the Government. The formula to increase defense power was adopted in 1957; and long range programs in the form of defense build-up plans also have been used since 1957. Advanced technology has been obtained through licensing and cooperation with the United States.

Within four months of the DPC report, a Japanese government proposal, entitled "Tentative Plan for Reconstruction of Defense Industries," was forwarded to the U.S. military commander in Japan by Prime Minister Yoshida. The Yoshida letter stressed Japan's inability to build up full scale defenses, and said that during the initial period of build-up Japan would have to rely on financial assistance and offshore procurement orders from the United States.¹¹⁰ The Prime Minister continued:

I am anxious to see the reconstruction of our defense industries speedily carried out with a view not only to perfecting our national defense structure but also to enable Japan to meet the defense needs of other free nations of Asia. By mobilizing our latent industrial power in this manner we shall be able to contribute substantially to the organization of free Asia's defense and at the same time improve our national economy suffering badly from dollar shortage.

For that purpose it is essential that the industries are provided with proper equipment and technologies and that they are assured adequate and steady orders for their products.¹¹¹

Many of the DPC's suggestions were embodied in the letter. Yoshida's comments regarding the desirability of weapon exports directly reflect the DPC's proposal. The goal, not yet achieved, has remained an

¹¹⁰Letter, Prime Minister Yoshida to General John E. Hull, dated 21 July 1954.

¹¹¹Ibid.

eventuality hoped for by the aircraft industry.¹¹² The United States already had agreed on the mutual advantage of improving Japanese defense industry capacity, and in August 1954, a joint committee was formed to negotiate U.S. assistance in support of defense industry rehabilitation. The United States has continued to play a significant role in Japan's defense industry development. Grant aid was discontinued in 1963, but participatory programs such as the semi-automatic radar identification system continued. In addition, the great majority of Japanese military aircraft have been produced through licensing agreements with the United States.

As already noted, the "Nixon Doctrine" and automatic extension of the Security Treaty caused many reverberations throughout Japan in thinking about defense policy; industry was no exception. Leaders in related industries realized the large potential budgets in the Fourth DBP and began to campaign for autonomous defense. On May 23, 1969, the President of Keidanren reported that defense industries must be strengthened and that "autonomous defense power" was mandatory for Japan.¹¹³ Five days later, the Japanese armament industry called for a defense budget equal to 4 percent of GNP and publicly advocated arms exports.¹¹⁴ The defense industry also began to push for changes in the

¹¹² Arimori, Interview; Shimamura, Interview. The current "official" Japanese policy on weapon export, is decided on a case by case basis by MITI based on 3 points: 1) no export to Communist states, 2) no export if prohibited by U.N., 3) no export, if states at war or danger of conflict. The last point is the catch-all phrase and the one which manufacturers urge be interpreted less severely. Sato has taken the phrase to permit the export of "weapons for self-defense." The push for export has received impetus from the Nixon Doctrine.

¹¹³ Ishizawa, "The Gradual Increase of Defense Power," loc. cit., p. 33.

¹¹⁴ Ibid., p. 34.

procurement system. The five-year plans provided stability, but they also constrained expansion in an era of much more flexibility. Therefore, a rolling system of defense plans was proposed, each five-year plan to be revised on an annual or biennial basis.¹¹⁵ Finally, in conjunction with the above proposals, interested industries undertook a major effort to emphasize domestic production.

In June 1969, officials of the JDA met with the Defense Production Committee whose members "emphasized the importance of domestic production for autonomous defense."¹¹⁶ The meetings continued, and on August 12, 1970, the DPC presented a plan entitled "Our Viewpoints as to the Problems of Improvement of the Next Defense Build-up Plan." In addition to the areas already discussed, it recommended the establishment of a National Defense Committee including members from the private sector to advise the Director-General. These efforts for regular access to the JDA were realized in October when monthly meetings between the JDA and the DPC were instituted.¹¹⁷

Director-General Nakasone attempted to increase competition among defense industries during the first months of his tenure. After the announcement of this policy in April, the defense industry instituted a campaign against it. By November 16, 1970, Nakasone had accepted an invitation to discuss the matter with Keidanren and other industrial representatives who explained "that the consolidation of the industrial

¹¹⁵"Defense Planning and Industry," The Oriental Economist, June 1969, pp. 8, 12.

¹¹⁶Ishizawa, "The Gradual Increase of Defense Power," loc. cit., pp. 34-35.

¹¹⁷Ibid.



basis through joint development and joint production" was the first consideration.¹¹⁸ The subject of competition has been dropped.

The Society of Japanese Aircraft Constructors has echoed the defense industry's demands. In the SJAC 1970 Annual Report, the editors admitted that the SDF had not been "primarily instituted to foster growth of the industry:"

However, there is no denying that the nation's self-defense power is never independent of the capabilities of its military equipment industry. It is also true that air defense will fail to perform satisfactorily without sufficient production and maintenance support. In other words, the industry is one of the more important links in the chain of national defense capabilities.¹¹⁹

The SJAC also advocated a rolling defense budget, and particularly emphasized domestic production of aircraft. The aviation industry has depended heavily on imports of technology, and is anxious to become more independent. It has hoped to have the government participate financially in research and development, but would like to carry out research within the industry. The exportation of aircraft and related systems have been strongly advocated by the SJAC.¹²⁰

The aircraft industry has not limited itself to direct advocacy of weapons systems, but additionally made strategic recommendations. Its spokesmen have advocated a strategic defensive posture in preparation for limited war with primary emphasis on the maintenance of air and sea superiority around the periphery of Japan. They do not propose independent defense, however, and instead advocate a certain time period

¹¹⁸ Mainichi, November 17, (U.S. Embassy Translation).

¹¹⁹ As quoted in JPE Aviation Report, August 10, 1970, p. 4.

¹²⁰ Arimori, Interview, February 23, 1972. .

of resistance "in order to prevent occupation until the U.S. forces have time to arrive."¹²¹ While they advocate semi-autonomous defense, they propose "a unique Japanese aircraft industry as before World War II."¹²²

The third group to advocate jishu boei falls somewhere between the other two. The Defense Agency has advocated autonomous defense only within the context of U.S. cooperation, while the Air Self-Defense Force has favored a potential capability for independent defense. The aircraft industry has stressed independent production capacity, but foreseen an operational reliance on the United States.

Whatever the policy positions of the interest groups which have been discussed, no one of them alone makes policy. The political leadership, which theoretically could make policy, has relied on a policy statement promulgated on May 20, 1957. Even then the statement was vague, giving few guidelines to indicate the type of defense structure necessary to implement the policy. Therefore, the defense policy currently applicable has depended, in part, on the relative influence of the interest groups which have been discussed.

¹²¹Nippon no Anzen Hosho, pp. 171-174.

¹²²Ibid., p. 152.

Chapter 7

THE DECISION-MAKING PROCESS

The previous chapter emphasized the nature of Japanese decision-making and the divergent viewpoints of the various groups who participate in defense policy formulation. Both of these aspects of Japanese defense policy have magnified the importance of the decision-making process. The delineation of this process will serve to clarify the relative influence of the various groups and identify areas of policy which individual groups dominate.

The supreme body in the Japanese parliamentary system is the National Diet, however it has issued no guidelines for the formulation of defense policy. Prime Ministers do not issue such guidelines, nor has the National Defense Council originated defense policy. Its decisions, for example the approval of defense build-up plans, indicate acquiescence to policies which originated within the bureaucracy. Even the "Basic Policies for National Defense": were ex post facto policies, recognizing a consensus achieved within the bureaucracy. This lack of direction also applies to the Defense Agency where, for example, Director-General Arita gave only abstract guidelines and basic ideas to the three services when he directed them to begin work on the Fourth Defense Build-up Plan.¹

The uniformed military begin the defense policy planning process without guidance. The defense budgets and defense build-up plans which they originate are defense policy in Japan. In the absence of current

¹Mr. Yasuda Hiroshi, Defense Councilor, JDA, Interview, February 10, 1972.

policy statements, these plans have been the primary indications of defense policy directions. The lack of guidance is not unusual nor critical as it conforms to the traditional bureaucratic decision-making system. One senior JASDF officer noted that the Japanese bureaucratic "principle of non-responsibility" may be added to the constraints which insure that new policies will be acceptable, wherever initiated. To take controversial initiatives, and therefore responsibility, often means ejection from the system. Like most bureaucracies, the Japanese bureaucracy breeds conformity.

Defense planning begins in the uniformed military branches and proceeds through the civilian leadership of the JDA who submit recommendations to the National Defense Council.

Such a simplified description is not incorrect but misleading; it provides little insight into a complex process. Planning does begin with the individual services. The Defense Section of the Defense Division of the Air Staff Office (ASO) initiates a planning cycle five to six years before implementation of a defense plan. This is the responsibility of the Medium and Long-Range Plans Branch within the Defense Section.²

Two parallel series of defense studies originate concurrently. One group of studies is conducted under the authorization of the Joint Staff Council (JSC). This includes a ten-year Joint Long-Range Strategic Study (JLRSS), which begins seven years before scheduled implementation; a five-year Joint Staff Operational Plan (JSOP) completed concurrently

²The following discussion relies heavily on Major General Yamada Ryoichi, Chief of Defense Section, Colonel Hase Kiyoshi, Chief Defense Branch, Colonel Katao Noburo, Chief Annual Program Branch, and Colonel Kume Toyahisa, Chief Medium and Long-Range Plans Branch who helped to explain the process described. The chiefs of the sections and branches are normally Colonels.

with the JLRSS; and a one-year Joint Staff Counter Study (JSCS) programmed annually just before scheduled implementation of the defense budget. The fact which all these plans have in common is that they will never be implemented. They are not approved by the Director-General and are not formulated with financial restrictions in mind.³

The Air Staff Office is primarily concerned with a similar series of plans which are authorized by the Director-General and eventually lead to budgetary planning. A ten-year Air Force Operational Plan (AFOP) is programmed five years before implementation. It is revised every five years under a sliding concept of policy formulation. These plans provide conceptual requirements, and specific hardware needs are not included. Four years before implementation of a DBP a Five-Year Fiscal Study and Financial Planning (FYFS+FP) begins, and this evolution continues until the five-year period of the Defense Build-up Plan. Actual budget planning is conducted concurrently over the final two years before implementation.

Fifteen months before implementation of the budget, the Defense Section draws up a program proposal. After some coordination with the internal bureaus of the JDA, a Program Guidance letter is promulgated by the Director General. The budget is then formulated by the Defense Division of the Air Staff Office and nine months before implementation it is submitted to the civilian leadership within JDA. The policy initiatives would appear to remain with the military at this point. However, two factors already limit uniformed autonomy. The Joint Staff Council plays little or no role in this planning avenue. Virtually no inter-service coordination exists because of the JSC's weakness, and

³Even these long-range studies do not contemplate offensive weapons, per se.




the civilian leadership takes charge of balancing the three separate budget proposals.

Figure 7-1 portrays the official JDA organization, however, it is somewhat misleading in regard to the planning process. The chart suggests that ASO planning would be reviewed by the civilian bureaucracy after it was formulated and submitted. This has not been the case; the internal bureaus have participated in the earliest stages of planning.⁴ Additional influences, some external to the JDA, are also brought to bear during the initial stages of planning. Figure 7-2 illustrates this process whereby the civilian bureaucracy within the JDA and external ministries participate in planning through working level coordination. The chart simplifies internal JDA relations and emphasizes the set of functional relationships which involve air power. The planning branches within the Defense Section confer with young Finance Bureau, Equipment Bureau and Defense Bureau officials through all stages of program formulation, long before any proposal is officially forwarded.

The external contacts depicted between MITI-Equipment Bureau and Finance Ministry-Finance Bureau are effected by the personnel policies existent in the JDA. For example, within the Finance Bureau, the Bureau Chief, Division Chief, Assistant Division Chief and two of the functional offices are normally filled by Finance Ministry personnel. Those persons serve in the JDA for approximately three years, and then return to their home ministry. Their primary loyalties lie with the Finance Ministry. The resultant Bureau-Ministry relationship permits


⁴Hata, Interview, November 22, 1971; General Yanada, Interview, December 13, 1971; General Okumiya, ret., Interview, November 18, 1971. General Utsunomiya Michio, JASDF, Commandant Air Staff College, Interview, November 30, 1971, was a former Chief of the Defense Division and he emphasized the existence of continuous coordination with the Defense Bureau and Finance Bureau. He also noted that the JSC staff has almost no influence.





Source: Japan Defense Agency, White Paper, October 1970.

FIGURE 7-1. Japan Defense Agency Organization



Source: Based on interviews cited in FN 1, 2, 4.

FIGURE 7-2. Japan Defense Agency: Planning Communication Channels

the Finance Ministry to affect directly the early stages of defense planning. Therefore, the apparent advantage of initiative held by the ASO planners has not been significant. No cohesive plans may be formulated before external modifications are introduced. Nor has the advantage of initiative pertained to the JDA. Only the Defense Bureau reflects the JDA viewpoint. The Equipment and Finance Bureaus tend to reflect the views of the ministries which supply their officials.

Moreover, the Equipment Bureau-MITI relationship permits the introduction of another external influence. The aircraft industry, primarily represented by the SJAC and the DPC of Keidanren, has had great influence within the Heavy Industry Bureau and the Aircraft and Ordnance Division² of MITI. The Aircraft Industry Council, an advisory body to MITI, incorporates private sector membership, with both the DPC and SJAC represented.⁵ Although the aircraft industry influence is twice removed from the immediate planning process, the companies "are kept informed" of progress before any plan is announced by the Director-General.⁶

After leaving the hands of the uniformed officer, the budgetary proposal or five-year defense plan is submitted to the Director-General, or in reality the Internal Bureaus. Defense plans are submitted to the Defense Bureau where the three service programs are integrated in coordination with the Finance Bureau.⁷ Conferences are held with the Finance Ministry at this time, and though unofficial, are important and

⁵Arimori, Interview, February 23, 1972.

⁶Shimomura, Interview, February 16, 1972.

⁷Yasuda, Interview, February 10, 1972. Also Hata, Interview, November 22, 1972 reported that tempers sometimes run so high between Defense Bureau and Finance Bureau representatives that Secretariat officials act as go-betweens.

represent direct external participation.⁸ The Sangi kan Kaigi, or Counselor's Conference, then considers the proposal. It consists of twelve men, including defense counselors and bureau chiefs. The Administrative Vice-Minister chairs the council.

The decisions of the council are unanimous so the unit veto of the Equipment Bureau, Finance Bureau, or Counselor for Foreign Affairs may prevent unanimity. Again, external influences are projected into JDA deliberations. While the influence of the Foreign Ministry, Finance Ministry and MITI increase as a planning cycle progresses, the influence of the uniformed services rapidly decline. The Chiefs of Staffs are "guest members" or technical advisors to the Counselor's Council. Thus, at this early stage in the planning process, they are no longer co-equal participants.

Important programs are forwarded from the Counselor's Council to the Chogi, or Staff Council, which is the supreme decision-making organ within the JDA. It normally meets only four or five times a year and includes the Director-General, Parliamentary Vice-Minister, Counsellor's Council and Director of the DFAA. The Chairmen of the Joint Staff Council, the Chiefs of Staff and the Chiefs of auxillary organs also participate in these meetings as technical advisors.

The uniformed role diminishes as the civilian sector conducts these conferences although the Chief of Staff of the JASDF does have regular access to the Director-General. However, the Chief of Staff is not a "voting member" of the Counselor's Council and Staff Council. One member of the civilian bureaucracy in the JDA admonished the author "please remember this is peace time," after being asked about the status

⁸Yasuda, Interview, February 10, 1972.

of the uniformed chiefs. Defense Councillor Yasuda put it another way: "political decisions are more important and the uniformed chief must feel the sentiments of the Director-General." The Chief of Staff has no accepted avenue of disagreement; to do so publicly would be fruitless. The Director-General would be called to the Diet to explain and the Chief of Staff would have succeeded only in embarrassing his superior. Such action constitutes violation of "the principle of non-responsibility;" normally the Chief of Staff would be expected to resign.⁹

At the same time, external influences continue to increase. Not only do the interested ministries have continued access to policy formulation through their affiliated bureaus, the ministries begin informal direct negotiation before any proposal, whether budgetary or planning, leaves the Defense Agency. Portions of the Defense Agency white paper referring to the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty were written in the Foreign Ministry. Defense Plans and Budgets are negotiated with the Finance Ministry before as well as after the Director-General announces them. Equipment purchases must be negotiated directly with MITI, often by MITI bureaucrats who may be found in the Equipment Bureau and the Central Procurement Office.

The aircraft industry's influence increases, with direct contacts supplementing their previous influence in MITI. From its inception the DPC has maintained regular contact with officials of the JDA, and in October 1970 monthly meetings were institutionalized in order "to

⁹In the past, Chiefs of Staff have taken responsibility in controversies not of their own making, playing the scapegoat for defense arguments. Recent controversies over the Fourth DBP and Okinawa reversion indicate they may no longer be willing to do so.

promote the defense industry and domestic production, and research and development."¹⁰ The Society of Japanese Aircraft Constructors participated in the Fourth Build-up Plan to the extent that it made broad recommendations emphasizing the need for home production emphasis and a dependable production level for the five-year period. These recommendations were made directly to the Director-General.¹¹

The Director-General forwards proposals to the National Defense Council; however, they do not go directly to the ministerial level of that body. All proposals are normally considered by the secretariat. The role of the secretariat is to analyze the forwarded defense proposals and "record the positions of the various ministries and evaluate the plan's pluses and minuses."¹² The secretariat is composed of the Secretary-General and nine counselors, three of whom serve exclusively for the National Defense Council. The other six counselors serve concurrently and their positions illustrate the influences of the various interest groups:

1. Chief, Security Section, North American Bureau, Foreign Ministry.
2. Budget Examiner-Defense, Finance Bureau, Finance Ministry.
3. Chief, 1st Section, Defense Bureau, Defense Agency.
4. Senior Planning Bureau, Economic Planning Agency.
5. Chief, Aircraft and Weapons Section, Heavy Industry Bureau, MITI.

¹⁰Ishizawa, "Gradual Increase of Defense Power", *loc. cit.*, pp. 34-35; the regular monthly meetings are normally held with Equipment Bureau leaders, General Sanagi, Interview, November 11, 1971.

¹¹Arimori, Interview, February 23, 1972.

¹²Secretary-General Kaihara, Interview, February 25, 1972.

6. Chief, General Affairs Section, Minister's Secretariat,
Science and Technology Agency.¹³

At this point the uniformed influence, even in an advisory capacity, is effectively eliminated although the law provides that the Chairman of the Joint Staff Council may be called to the NDC to state his views.

Industry also has had access to the National Defense Council. Both the DPC of Keidanren and the SJAC unofficially contact the National Defense Council. The Defense Production Committee has formulated comprehensive written proposals before any major decision such as the adoption of a five-year plan. It has not recommended specific aircraft types, however, it has commented on certain industrial skills which should be utilized or capabilities desired at the end of a five-year plan. The companies operate primarily through individual contacts; however, they regularly deal with the Aircraft and Weapons Section of MITI, whose Chief is a concurrent Counselor of the NDC Secretariat.¹⁴

The Secretariat forwards its analysis to the Council, although recommendations are usually considered by an Assistant Council comprised of the Secretary-General and nine Vice-Ministers appointed by the Cabinet. The National Defense Council is the supreme advisory body on defense policies. It is chaired by the Prime Minister and is regularly attended by seven to eight Cabinet members. It sits at the apex of the governmental process just described, however its deliberations are affected by another, parallel process.

Before the National Defense Council acts on policy decisions, it receives recommendations from the LDP. In order to generate these

¹³"National Defense Council," p. 8.

¹⁴Shimomura, Interview, February 16, 1972.

recommendations, the LDP has established a process to consider defense policy which in some ways corresponds to the government evolution. The Policy Affairs Research Council (PARC) is the major policy-making organ within the LDP, and defense recommendations are considered by that body. Initial deliberations begin in the National Defense Division and the Security Committee, or Anzen Hoshō Inkai. These two party organs are important to the Defense Agency for they, especially the Security Committee, are the defense bureaucracy's primary points of contact with the political party. The JDA would be further isolated from the decision-making process without this outlet for its views. Security Committee and National Defense Division proposals are considered by the Policy Affairs Research Council, and as Figure 7-3 illustrates, other interest groups come to bear at that point.

Two factors suggest that the political side of policy formulation is more advantageous to the JDA than the official process. There is first a structural advantage; the Security Committee is equal in stature to the other policy committees and it operates independently. Related to its autonomy is a natural sympathy towards the subject it studies and a good deal more freedom of expression than exists within the bureaucracy. It is, therefore, an excellent place at least to air strategic views.

Balanced against these aspects which tend to give strategic views larger influence in the LDP are the basic political orientation of the party structure and the lack of expertise within the LDP. Those who have had a measure of interest and experience in military affairs agreed that there are large segments of the LDP who do not understand

the problems or needs of the Self-Defense Forces.¹⁵ The party's basic concern is to remain in power, and criticism of the Security Treaty and of the Defense Forces is a most popular opposition tactic. Initiatives in that area understandably receive a rather skeptical review in the party process. This disparity between the outlook of the Security Committee and that of other interested Committees was illustrated during the LDP review of the Nakasone initiatives in 1970.¹⁶

The views of other interested committees are brought to bear during the discussions of the PARC. Therefore, before a policy decision is brought to the attention of the leadership in the Executive Council and Leaders Meeting sessions, the weight of the other interested bureaucracies normally has established a consensus similar to the one achieved through the official government process.

The aircraft industry also makes its weight felt in party discussions. Respected and powerful organizations such as Keidanren and the SJAC obviously have access to the political party. In addition, the companies themselves make contacts with individual politicians or with factions within the LDP.¹⁷ Political competition takes money, and financial support is one area in which the aircraft companies can provide needed assistance and in return receive consideration of their views.

¹⁵ Mr. Masuhara, Interview, February 19, 1972; General Genda, Interview, November 17, 1971.

¹⁶ Nihon Keizai, July 24, 1970 (U.S. Embassy translation), The Chairman of the Security Committee expressed his support and the Chairmen of the Policy Research and Finance Committees expressed their "caution." The LDP did not recommend the Nakasone principles be accepted.

¹⁷ Mabuchi, Interview, November 27; Shimomura, Interview, February 16, 1972.

The political leadership rarely alters or even seriously questions the recommendations which they receive at the ministerial level of the National Defense Council. The membership of the Council represents the same interest groups which dominate the entire policy-making process. The Director-General, the Finance Minister and the Foreign Minister are representative of the process which developed the consensus below. The MITI minister, although not a member, is among those regularly present. The one group without representation is of course the uniformed military.

Therefore, there is little likelihood of the NDC altering the consensus so laboriously achieved. In addition, the Prime Ministers who have led Japan in the post-war era have not been known for their understanding of military affairs. General Tatsumi, Prime Minister Yoshida's personal military advisor, was called on because Yoshida did not understand the strategic and technical aspects of military alternatives being discussed as the Occupation ended. More than twenty years later, Prime Minister Sato stirred a storm of criticism in the Diet through inadvertent comments on the ensuing defense build-up plan. The slip of the tongue occurred because the Prime Minister did not understand the relationship between the Fourth Defense Build-up Plan and the 1972 Defense Budget.¹⁸

Although political intervention rarely occurs in the process, politicians have the capacity to intervene and disrupt the consensus. The selection of Japan's first fighter aircraft illustrated this

¹⁸Taoka, Interview, February 10, 1972; Kaihara, Interview, February 25, 1972. He had been briefed that very few major 4th DBP projects were funded in the FY 1972 Budget. His answer in the Diet was that the 1972 Budget "has absolutely no relation" to the 4th DBP. The comment was ridiculous; 1972 was the first year of the proposed 4th DBP.

phenomena as well as other characteristics of the policy-making process. The ASDF began operations under the tutelage of the U.S.A.F. and the primary concerns in its first three years of existence were education and development. Even limited operational responsibilities were not accepted before 1958.

The JASDF faced its first major decision in the selection of a fighter aircraft to follow the F-86. This was not only an equipment decision, it was a significant policy decision. There were perhaps five different fighter aircraft discussed in 1957 when the JASDF began active consideration of the new weapons system. As a result of the first evaluation trip in August 1957, the choice narrowed to either the F-104J built by Lockheed or the Grumman 98J, or F-11-1F as it was later designated.¹⁹ The F-11 had greater mission flexibility with better instrumentation, ordnance loading and endurance. The F-104 was strictly an interceptor with limited range, but far superior climb and time to target performance. It was a higher performance aircraft with regard to speed and altitude capabilities. Choice of the F-11 would have been tantamount to opting for a limited, balanced concept of development; choice of the F-104 reflected emphasis on technological development and concentration on the air defense mission.

In initial discussions, the JASDF leaned toward the F-104, and throughout the selection process there remained a great deal of support for the F-104 within the ASDF. However, the first Japanese investigative mission to the United States met with a great deal of smugness at

¹⁹Garret, USAF Industrial Planning with the JASDF, p. 89.

Lockheed: "what did you come here for when it has already been decided."²⁰ During the trip, some officials in the Pentagon recommended the F-11 although U.S. Air Force officers in Japan had supported the F-104. This was the first major JASDF decision in which the U.S. did not take part. The U.S. Air Force remained neutral throughout, and in February 1959, the Chief of Staff (COS) of the USAF told General Sanagi, then the JASDF's Chief of Staff, that he would support any choice the ASDF made.²¹

The selection had been discussed within the Defense Agency for over one year, and upon General Sanagi's return from his trip to the United States, he made a final decision for the F-11 and obtained the support of the Defense Agency. Tentative proposals favoring the F-11 had been made during 1958, and they received no significant opposition from the bureaucracy or political circles.²² When the F-11 choice was forwarded to the National Defense Council, a "tentative" selection was made, probably meaning it was approved by the secretariat.²³ Doba also believed that

²⁰Description of Lockheed attitude towards the JASDF mission headed by General Nakamura, from July-September 1957. "Fx ome Gute" (Over the FX), Koku Joho (Air Review), January 1958, p. 39. It was during this mission that the choices were narrowed to the F-104 and F-11.

²¹General Sanagi, Interview, November 11, 1971; General Ura Shigeru, UASDF, ret., accompanied General Sanagi and felt that the U.S. recommended the F-11, and this fact influenced General Sanagi, Interview, December 23, 1971. However, an Aviation Week article published March 9, 1959, supported General Sanagi's contention that the U.S. had a "hands-off policy," "Politics Bogs Japan's Choice of New Self-Defense Force Fighter," p. 303.

²²Mr. Doba Hajime, defense correspondent, Yomiuri Shimbun, Interview, March 2, 1971; General Sanagi, Interview, November 11, 1971; Mr. Ogawa Raita, December 14, 1971; "Japanese Fighter Hits New Snag," Aviation Week, June 22, 1959, p. 82.

²³Aviation Week, June 22, 1959 reported that the NDC made a tentative choice, General Sanagi indicated that approval did not go beyond JDA, although it was approved by the Director-General after several top-level sessions of the Staff Council.

Prime Minister Kishi agreed to the F-11, although not in a formal NDC decision.²⁴

At this point the entire process was disrupted and eventually reversed, primarily by the opposition of Mr. Tanaka Shoji, member of the Diet and Chairman of the Audit Committee. There was no official explanation for his intervention because budget requirements were not being considered by the Diet at that point. He publicly attacked the F-11 in the Audit Committee, and privately called on and attempted to influence other LDP members, even calling them traitors if they supported the F-11.²⁵

The attack bore results rather quickly; by June the decision was delayed and the Defense Agency announced that a new evaluation team was being sent. On July 18, 1959, General Sanagi resigned as Chief of Staff and was replaced by General Genda Minoru who left Japan within three weeks as the head of the new evaluation team.²⁶ The evaluation group returned on October 26, and on November 6, only eleven days later, the National Defense Council chose the F-104J.

General Genda strongly defended his choice, noting that no one had flown the aircraft before he went to the United States and arguing that

²⁴Mr. Doba reported that the Grumman representative actually sent a telegram to Grumman reporting the sale, and Grumman sent "donations" to the LDP. Interview, March 2, 1971.

²⁵Doba, Interview, March 2, 1971. The substance of Tanaka's argument was that the F-104 was a production aircraft while the F-11 was only a design. This was not correct although some instrumentation on the F-11 had not been tested and it had not been selected by the USAF. The U.S. Navy was purchasing the F-11.

²⁶Ogawa Raita, "Brief History of Koku Jietai," pp. 4-6. General Genda left Japan on August 8.

the flight performance of the F-104 "was beyond comparison."²⁷ General Ura, the F-104 project officer and a later Chief of Staff, unequivocally supported General Genda.²⁸ The point here is not to question the views of either General Sanagi or General Genda, because different strategic viewpoints did exist within the JASDF and still do. However, as Mr. Doba noted, the decision was effectively made before General Genda left Japan. The evaluation trip had been interpreted as a formality preceeding reversal even before it left. The disruption, the new inspection trip and the rapid decision reached after its return suggest that such an interpretation is correct. No one needed to order General Genda to make a new decision, not only was he primarily concerned with interception capability, he was well aware of the events leading to his appointment.

One final question is what motivated Mr. Tanaka, who led the fight for reversal. Many refused to speculate, but Mr. Tanaka was later indicted on several charges of blackmail, bribery and fraud. Although none of these charges were related to the F-104 selection, there was some room for speculation that personal greed could have been a motive.²⁹ Regardless, there were other indications that great financial pressure was exerted to reverse the decision. The Japanese were aware that a fierce sales battle had begun in Japan among the competing American companies. A similar aircraft selection was being made in Germany, and on the assumption that one selection could influence the other, there was a good deal at stake. The U.S. forces had been cutback and offshore

²⁷ Interview, November 17, 1971.

²⁸ Interview, December 23, 1971.

²⁹ General Sanagi, for example, declined to comment on Tanaka's motivation. Others, however, directly charged that he had been bribed by Lockheed and their representative, the Marubeni trading house.

procurement reduced; therefore, the competition for defense contracts also had increased substantially within Japanese industry.

Lockheed was dealing through the powerful Marubeni Trading Company, while Grumman initially worked independently. Lockheed had signed an agreement with Kawasaki for licensing, and this complicated matters because Mitsubishi was considered the most likely choice for the fighter production.³⁰ Prime Minister Kishi's faction also had close relations with the Mitsubishi zaibatsu, possibly influencing his initial opposition to the F-104. However, Lockheed then wrote the Prime Minister indicating their willingness to break the contract with Kawasaki and sign with Mitsubishi; Kishi later discontinued his support of the F-11 selection.³¹ The F-104 was cheaper, which meant Finance Ministry support, and selection of Mitsubishi guaranteed the balance desired by Keidanren and MITI.

This incident demonstrated that the bureaucratic consensus may be disrupted, but only by intervention at the highest level. If substantive choices do become a political issue, they may be swayed through political pressure. The controversy also illustrated the high-level access to the decision-making process which is enjoyed by industry. Finally, the helplessness of the ASDF and the JDA in a major controversy was readily apparent. Although some uniformed factions supported the F-104, and regardless of the relative merits of the two aircraft, the F-11 choice was reached after long deliberations. When it was abruptly reversed, the Defense Agency was silently acquiescent.

The incident also indicated that civilian control, although its motives might be questioned, worked effectively in the controversy.

³⁰Garret, U.S.A.F. Industrial Planning with the JASDF, p. 89. Mitsubishi refused to sub-contract under Kawasaki.

³¹Doba, Interview, March 2, 1971.

However, the silence of the JDA in this controversy and others sporadically draws criticism that civilian control is ineffectual. Secretary-General Kaihara contended that civilian control has not been endangered, but argued that it has not been as strict as it may seem and that the uniformed branches receive what they want the majority of the time.³² On the contrary, military leaders have felt that civilian control was so strict that ASDF plans have been altered against its wishes without being given the opportunity to air the JASDF's complaints.³³ A portion of Kaihara's statement is correct, in that many minor decisions made by the JASDF go unquestioned. Outside of defense plans or major budget requests, uniformed planning and decisions have received little attention. Within its own sphere, including training, education, tactics and minor allocations of resources related thereto, the JASDF has been rather autonomous; outside that sphere it has had "no voice."

The civilian side of the defense bureaucracy also has little voice in major decisions. Part of the reason for their absence "of voice" lies in the fact that external influences begin at the branch level where ASDF planning begins. One good example of this phenomena was the selection of the second FX. The F-4 Phantom was officially selected on November 1, 1968, but the controversy over its selection occurred much earlier. The second FX was selected through a computer program. This process was devised in order to avoid the "difficulties and miscalculations" which occurred in the first F-X selection.³⁴ The computer selection format only shifted the controversy to the formulation of the program which would be fed to the computer.

³²Interview, November 10, 1971.

³³General Ishikawa, Interview, February 17, 1972.

³⁴General Ura, Interview, December 23, 1971.

The Defense Division of the ASO began work on the program in 1966, and early in 1967 the Finance Bureau and Defense Bureau were participating at the branch level.³⁵ The computer program to decide the second F-X awaited approval later in 1967; Kaihara, then representing the Defense Bureau, refused to see the plan which had been drawn up in the Operational Research Branch of the Defense Division of the ASO. The Finance Bureau agreed with the proposed process which would select the most technologically advanced aircraft with the highest performance characteristics. This reflected the technological impetus desired by industrial groups while providing a nucleus of the world's most advanced fighter aircraft for the JASDF. The external ministries and the JASDF were in accord. Mr. Kaihara, reflecting his previously described viewpoint, emphasized limited autonomy and wished to have the program rewritten to choose a cheaper, more flexible aircraft. Such a choice would enable the JASDF to spend more money on ammunition, training, fuel reserves and dispersal capability, thereby attaining a limited but realistic autonomy. In the words of Hata, "political pressures were applied," and Kaihara resigned in the summer of 1967.³⁶ The plan was submitted immediately after his departure and the following March the choice for the second FX was narrowed to three aircraft. None were comparable to the type favored by Kaihara, who openly advocated the Northrop F-5.

³⁵Mr. Kaihara, then Defense Section, Defense Bureau; Interviews, February 25, 1972; Mr. Hata Ikukiko, then young official in Finance Bureau, Air Office, who was working on this project, Interview, November 22, 1971; the majority of this episode relies on these two men who were the principals, although some aspects were filled in by JASDF officer.

³⁶Hata, Interview, November 22, 1972. Kaihara agreed that selection of the F-4 over the F-5 was part of the reason he "was fired" (his expression) from the Defense Agency.

Perhaps the most important aspect of this short controversy was that the uniformed leaders were scarcely aware of it. The men in the Defense Division were aware that the computer plan had been delayed "somewhere above the ASDF," but they were unaware of the nature of the delay. Senior officers in the JASDF assured the author that there had been no controversy, and denied any conflict over the selection of the F-4. One Japanese writer suggested that the selection of the F-4 meant that military choices were dominating defense planning and showed a weakening of civilian control.³⁷ Nothing could be further from fact. The brief controversy over the F-4 selection represented a conflict of goals between two civilian groups; one the Defense Agency, the other a conglomeration of industrial and bureaucratic interests.³⁸ The fact that the JASDF viewpoint corresponded to these interests showed a similarity of goals in the particular case, but indicated no growth of military influence.³⁹

The principle of civilian control remains strong in Japan; in fact, the layers and varied pursuits of the interest groups which dominate the uniformed viewpoint demonstrate a unique submergence of strategic interests. The civilian leadership's lack of understanding of military

³⁷ Ogura Yoshinori, "Nippon Ryoku ga Shimpan Sareta Toki, Jieitai wa do Ugokuka?," (How is the Japanese Defense Force Going to React When Japanese Territorial Air is Violated?), Ushio, Volume 113, June 1969, pp. 114-115.

³⁸ Keidanren opposed the Kaihara viewpoint, Mabuchi, Interview, November 27, 1971.

³⁹ The Base Air Defense Ground Environment (BADGE) system selection is another example of general agreement between the interest groups. Although the ASDF first recommended a different system, they finally settled on Hughes because it provided the most "development space", General Ura, December 23, 1971 was the project officer. It was the cheapest insuring Finance Ministry support, and it meant Nippon Electric, which needed work, would build it; hence MITI support.

needs and the weakness of the immediate civilian superiors within the JDA are perhaps the greatest irritants to uniformed officers. Outside of its control over the uniformed services, the civilian bureaucracy of the JDA has been very weak. Thus, when the Air Staff Office accepts a choice forced on it by the Internal Bureau, it may then find the JDA unable to obtain the compromised requirements.

This situation developed recently when the JASDF submitted plans for improvement of the advanced trainer aircraft inventory. Money had been allotted for the T-38, or F-5, in 1969, but had to be utilized to complete the purchase of F-4 aircraft which were costing more than expected. As the next budget was negotiated, the ASO reiterated its requirement for 80 advanced trainers. The air force preferred the F-5 because it was much cheaper, but the Internal Bureau then announced a decision to continue development of the home-built XT-2. This delayed any purchase decision one year as the XT-2 was far from production. Tremendous pressure had been applied by industry through MITI, and money was contracted to continue XT-2 development.⁴⁰ The JASDF received assurance from the Defense Agency that money would be allotted if XT-2 aircraft were chosen, and there would be no reduction in the inventory requested. Then in September 1971, the mass production decision was made. The XT-2 aircraft was selected, and the number of aircraft was reduced.⁴¹ The XT-2 cost twice as much as the F-5, and Finance Ministry spending limits were applied, forcing the JASDF below its minimum stated requirements. The goals of social welfare and industrial capacity clearly superseded

⁴⁰U.S. Embassy Official. Negotiations with the U.S. for the F-5 have continued although there now appears little chance the aircraft will ever be purchased.

⁴¹The initial JDA request was reduced. The JASDF then faced further reductions in negotiations with the Finance Ministry.

the goal of operational capability.

One final aspect of the Japanese defense policy process emphasizes its importance. While it can be altered by pressure from above as in the F-104 selection, it cannot be bypassed by individual interest groups. The political controversy which arose in February 1972 was triggered by Prime Minister Sato's inopportune remark. As has been noted, that reflected Sato's unfamiliarity with defense matters, but the confusion had been caused by an attempt to bypass the policy-making process.

Director-General Nakasone was easily the most spectacular head of the Defense Agency and he began what may have been the most spectacular attempt to bypass the process. The Fourth Defense Build-up Plan was by any standard a major defense decision, and particularly so in view of United States' policies and the growing Soviet presence in Asia. In September 1970, some 18 months before the NDC would pass on the measure, Nakasone announced the total financial expenditure which JDA proposed.⁴² The other ministries had not been consulted; the EPA had not been asked about projected national income; and there apparently had been few, if any, political consultations within the LDP. The speech announcing the plan was delivered in Washington, D.C., adding insult to injury for many bureaucrats. Then in April 1971, the entire JDA draft plan was released, one year before its scheduled implementation. The JDA "invited any kind of constructive criticisms on this draft plan from various segments of our nation."⁴³

⁴²Nakasone, Proposals, September 10, 1970, p. 8. Approximately 16 billion dollars over 5 years.

⁴³"The New DBP," letter of transmittal.

It became apparent that some acute criticisms awaited the Fourth DBP although Mr. Nakasone departed via a cabinet reshuffle on July 1, 1971. By August, some opined that the plan should be delayed one year. The Finance Ministry publicly announced that the plan was impossible.⁴⁴ The Secretariat of the National Defense Council, headed by Mr. Kaihara, was openly critical of the capabilities promised in the plan and the development directions programmed.⁴⁵ The international financial readjustments which occurred in late 1971 contributed to the impasse as the EPA announced that no plan was possible until a revised forecast of economic growth could determine the maximum defense budget based on percentage of GNP.⁴⁶ The rapid succession of four Director-Generals during the last half of 1971 exacerbated the situation as did the heightened political tension during the Okinawa reversion discussions in the Diet.

The political leadership was willing to delay consideration of the plan because of the political tension, and the JDA was willing to avoid the pressures from the Finance Ministry and the difficult questions from the Secretariat. As late as January 1972, speculation continued that the plan would be delayed; one observer reported that the NDC had not even discussed the JDA proposals.

The JDA had not submitted their proposals to the NDC in hopes of bypassing the secretariat and the necessary bureaucratic consensus which seemed an unlikely prospect. The Defense Agency was not without support,

⁴⁴JPE Aviation Report, August 2, 1971, p. 1., in an article captioned "Policy: 4th DBP---Big Delay Ahead?"

⁴⁵Ibid., also Kaihara, Interviews, February 25 and 29, 1972.

⁴⁶Ogawa, Interview, February 18, 1972; Yasuda, Interview, February 10, 1972.

for Keidanren and the industry favored the build-up plan; they had exerted their influence on the LDP and the Sato faction in an effort to avoid any dead period which could be caused by delays in implementation. As a result, the Finance Minister testified to the Diet on February 4 that the 1972 budget represented a one-year extension of the Third DBP, and the Prime Minister testified on the same day that the Fourth DBP would begin on schedule although the budget was not related.⁴⁷ The resultant impasse forced the NDC into an emergency session and on 7 February the Fourth DBP was approved, but only in outline form without financial or equipment details. The Council could not reach agreement on details and the effort to bypass the defense policy process collapsed. The effort, begun in the JDA, supported by industry, and acquiesced to by the political leadership, only demonstrated bureaucratic strength.

The defense plan would not be approved until the economic forecast appeared in September. In the meantime, it would return to the Defense Agency for reformulation and resubmission.⁴⁸ After twenty days of deadlock, the LDP agreed to revise the budget and the Diet resumed deliberations. The defense budget revision was the first ever in post-war Japan and some heralded it as a new political involvement in the defense policy process.⁴⁹ This was not the case; less than one-half of one percent of the budget was cut, and slightly over ten percent of the amount was "frozen" until after the Fourth DBP was approved. The Japanese government does not complete negotiations on contracts authorized in the 1972 budget until the last month of the fiscal year, therefore the

⁴⁷Japan Times, February 5, 1972; Mainichi, February 5, 1972.

⁴⁸Kaihara, Interview, February 25, 1972.

⁴⁹Japan Times, February 26, 1972.

"frozen funds" will not cause any actual changes in defense spending.

Contracts to be let on the funds which were cut will be negotiated normally. If the funds cannot be reinstated in a supplementary budget, they will be included in the following year's budget and disbursed immediately. The time difference to the company is less than one month, and the companies may obtain low-cost loans to remedy any deficit.⁵⁰ The bureaucracy had agreed to the defense budget, and appearances of change were a mirage.

This section must end without a conclusion, for the policies and processes which have been postulated may be better integrated after examining the result of the various policy positions which is the defense structure. Before going on to that structure, the importance of the policy process bears repeating. Concepts such as military-industrial complex, or military-industrial-political complex have not been particularly relevant as they contribute little to understanding defense policy formulation. No interest group can be completely disregarded because all groups have some chance to participate. The aircraft industry has become powerful; the political input may be significant if aroused; and the uniformed viewpoint dominates in some areas, if only by forfeit. However, the process by which Japan formulates defense policy is of primary importance. This bureaucratically-dominated defense policy process enables and regulates the access and influence of interest groups.

⁵⁰ Kaihara, Interview, February 29, 1972. With interest charged to the government, no doubt.

V.

THE READY FORCE STRUCTURE

As long as survival remains a primary national goal, and as long as the use of force remains a viable tool of international intercourse, national security policies will include plans to deal with the use or threat of force. No modern nation has renounced the use of force in the unique manner which Japan has; in 1972, no developed nation was spending as small a portion of its resources on the engines of force. Yet, even the Japanese have maintained the Self-Defense Forces and recognized the possibility that force may be used against them.

If national security policy exists in part to defuse, deter and, if necessary, defeat that possible use of force, and if national defense policy may be defined as that portion of national security policy which is concerned with the military aspects of contending with the use of force, then the national defense structure is one of the means which would implement the policy. The air force structure represents the tools with which air power would be used to implement national defense policy. However, the diverse, multi-authored policies so far delineated do not constitute a whole, and examination of various force structure aspects may further identify the dominant interest groups, and as a result, provide insight into dominant policy goals.

Emmerson, after discussing the effectiveness of the Self-Defense Forces for three pages, concluded that: "the words 'effective' and 'adequate' are meaningless unless one can answer the questions; 'effective for what?' and 'adequate for what?'"¹ Such a conclusion would be accurate if one's goal was to determine a specific power relationship, or to forecast the results of a particular confrontation. It is not correct as broadly stated, for effectiveness, adequacy and relevance to assigned

¹Arms, pp. 143-147.

or probable missions may be determined. For example, the air defense mission requires a series of operational steps to be successful. Weapons system performance may be judged against those requirements. A system's strengths and weaknesses may illustrate areas of policy which receive emphasis or are treated superficially.

Air power goals have been stated in the Self-Defense Force Law, in international agreements, in defense policy statements, and by the JASDF itself. Those goals have created requirements which may be assessed through evaluation of the force structure. Such an evaluation must probe more deeply than current operational readiness; policy also addresses problems which may occur in the future. Part of any current policy will include future modifications of the force structure to better achieve new goals. The training procedures discussed in Chapter 8 and the budgetary allocations discussed in Chapter 9 are oriented toward the future force structure.

However, another part of the policy-maker's task is to maximize the use of forces presently available; therefore, current command procedures and operational capacity discussed in Chapter 10 indicate the reality of current policy as well as the goals of past policy.

The limitations in operational capacity described here illustrate the options selected by policy makers, past and present, and do not criticize the capabilities of the JASDF's leaders, operators or technicians. The growth of Japan's air power potential has been nearly as spectacular as its economic recovery. Twenty years ago no aircraft industry and no air force existed in Japan; in 1972, it has designed, developed, produced and flown a supersonic fighter. The specific capabilities discussed only demonstrate the foreseeable results of policy decisions, and therefore assist in policy delineation.

Chapter 8

UTILIZATION

Personnel

In a ceremony at Matsushima Air Base on July 6, 1954, Lieutenant General Uemura Kentaro formally hoisted the flag of the new Air Self-Defense Force. The first Chief of Staff then led a cadre of 275 men; in 1972 General Ishikawa Kanshi led 40,242 men, a "community of technicians" training for the increasingly complex business of waging aerial warfare.¹

The Air Self-Defense Force has viewed itself as a uniquely modern organization, unhampered by prejudices of the past. There was no separate air force organization in Imperial Japan, and the defeat and occupation interrupted any bureaucratic continuity from the air arms of the old Imperial forces. Moreover, aviators from both branches realized the inadequacies and failures of the previous organization and were willing, even anxious, to try a new approach.

Despite those factors, there were also pressures for continuity. The primary goal of the early Air Self-Defense Force was growth, whether in manpower, equipment, facilities, or technological proficiency. A first step towards this goal was to begin with the most qualified people, and for this the planners turned to ex-Army and ex-Navy personnel. General Uemura Kentaro, who held a civilian post within the National Safety Agency, had been nominated to be the Chief of Staff (COS) of the new Air Self-Defense Force. Although Uemura had been involved in the post-war organization, he was a civilian bureaucrat before the war and

¹The quote is from a description of JASDF that was made by LGEN Shirkawa Motoharu, VCOS of the JASDF, Interview, December 10, 1971.

knew little about aviation matters. General Akiyama Monjiro, ex-Imperial Army, and General Sanagi Sadamu, ex-Imperial Navy, were called to the Safety Agency early in June, just before the establishment of the ASDF.² They were told that General Sanagi had been selected to be the Vice Chief of Staff (VCOS), and that between them, they would be responsible for selecting personnel for the new air force.³

Much of the organizational planning was complete, and the NSA had prepared a list of preferred candidates. Although the two leaders worked with the list, they were not limited by it and their choice was final.⁴ The purge had been rescinded completely and their greater freedom of choice resulted in a particularly high level of expertise among these early selections. Figures compiled by the Demobilization Bureau in 1951 indicated there were over 3000 naval air officers still able to reenter military service.⁵ There was a larger number of former IJA officers available, leaving Akiyama and Sanagi great flexibility in their

²Sanagi, Interview, November 11, 1971; General Hayashi Keizo, first Chairman of the JSC, Interview, December 9, 1971; and LGEN Arinuma Genshiro; Interview, March 7, 1972.

³There were several qualifications for the VCOS; in addition to having an aviation background, he would need to speak english, be a few years under the maximum age (58) permitted in the JASDF, and have the broadest experience possible from the old forces because he was going to be General Uemura's technical expert.

⁴General Sanagi, Interview, November 11, 1971. One of the interesting aspects of this was the exclusion of General Genda from the list. P. M. Yoshida had not liked Genda during his service with him in Britain during the war and he had been excluded. General Sanagi insisted that Genda be included, and it was only through Sanagi's efforts that Genda joined the ASDF which he later led after replacing Sanagi as COS in 1959.

⁵"Situation of Former Japanese Servicemen," Enclosure 1, p. 5.

selection.⁶

One constraining factor was the requirement that the key positions and senior ranks be balanced between ex-Army and ex-Navy officers. Although there had been a lengthy period between the old organizations and the new, the two factions did compete for influence as the planning was completed and they were carefully balanced at the senior levels. There were four major organizational divisions beneath the COS and VCOS; civilians, ex-IJN and ex-IJA were all represented:

Chief of Staff	LGEM Uemura Kentaro	Civilian
VCOS	LGEM Sanagi Sadamu	IJN
Chief of Operations Division	MGEN Akiyama Monjiro	IJA
Chief of Comptroller Division	MGEN Kanaya Eihiro	IJA
Chief of Personnel Division	MGEN Matsumae Misao	IJA
Chief of Materiel Division	MGEN Genda Minoru	IJN ⁸

Equal selections were made through the grade of Lieutenant Colonel, however below that the Army dominated as indicated in Figure 8-1.

Factions and competition between them have been very much a part of Japanese society. They did and have continued to exist to some degree within the JASDF. They have not appeared to be harmfully divisive in recent decisions, nor did they then. General Hayashi, Chairman of the JSC, remembered no difficulties because of factional disputes; in fact, he did not remember being aware of any factions.⁹ General Ura, a

⁶Sanagi, Interview, November 11, 1971; especially in the junior ranks, the IJN had suffered tremendous loss of life in the island campaign and more young IJA pilots were in Manchuria or the homeland. In addition, the IJA staff school had continued throughout the war giving their younger officers an experience advantage.

⁷Ibid.

⁸Ibid., names listed in Burns, USAF Assistance to Japan's Air Force, p. 29.

⁹Interview, December 23, 1971.

FIGURE 8-1. Air Self-Defense Force Officers
By Source (October 1955)

	General	Colonel	Lt. Col.	Major	Captain	1st. Lt.	2nd Lt.	Total
Imperial Japanese Army Academy (A)	4	20	44	180	234	118	1	601
Imperial Japanese Navy Academy (B)	4	19	49	36	60	39	0	202
Total Military School (A + B)	8	39	93	216	294	152	1	803
IJA and IJN Reserve Officers (C)	1	7	29	91	228	108	25	489
Previous Military Career (A+B+C)	9	46	122	307	522	260	26	1292
Other Sources	1	5	7	14	28	197	221	473
Total (D)	10	51	129	321	550	457	247	1765
A+B/D - %	80	76	72	67	53	33	0.5	45
A+B+C/D - %	90	90	95	96	95	57	11	73

Source: Provided by General Sanagi Sadamu

charter member of the JASDF and later COS, felt the varied backgrounds were a great help to the JASDF. The ex-IJA officers were skilled in logistics, planning, administration, and maintenance. In turn the former Navy officers were superior in training techniques, engineering and development. The net result of the balance was a more solid base from which to begin.¹⁰ Some felt, however, that later army dominance was part of the reason for over-emphasis of air defense.

Beyond the IJA-IJN relationship, Figure 8-1 also illustrates the overall dominance of ex-military officers. The one general officer without any Imperial military background was General Uemura; since he was relieved by General Sanagi, all JASDF general officers have had pre-war military experience. In late November 1954, a U.S. survey showed that 71.1 percent of the key JASDF officers had served more than ten years in the Imperial forces, and 32.6 percent graduated from a field-grade staff officers school of some kind.¹¹ Not only did 100 percent of air force generals still have wartime experience in 1970, but 310 of 338 Colonels were also from pre-war military backgrounds.¹² Although the total number of ex-Imperial officers has declined steadily, their dominance of virtually all leadership positions has continued. Inevitably their influence will decline, and by 1982, 1945 academy graduates will have reached retirement at age 58.

Figure 8-2 depicts the major officer sources over the past twenty years. The total number of yearly inputs began to fall in 1961 when the ASDF reached a total strength of more than 38,000 personnel. Of the

¹⁰Interview, December 23, 1971.

¹¹U.S. MAAG records, January 13, 1955.

¹²Information provided by the JDA.

FIGURE 8-2. JASDF Officer Inputs by Source

1954-1970

SOURCE	YEAR																	
	1954	1955	1956	1957	1958	1959	1960	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969	1970	TOTAL
Defense Academy				46	60	121	114	126	105	112	99	117	112	116	100	99	90	1417
Universities	37	154	418	315	270	109	83	58	53	86	33	30	33	24	37	39	38	1817
Engineering							5	5	4	4	8	10	13	11	13	12	9	90
Enlisted	68	89	81	70	55	120	104	143	98	82	78	80	55	79	79	85	85	1484
																		240
High School/Pilot Cadet					62	128	134	134	85	35	84	27	47	31	29	37	37	833
Warrant Officers	17	25	27	30	30	51	101	56	49	53	50		100	50	50	120	120	809
Imperial Forces	540	435	302	306	214		22	11	2									1872
Medical Officers	12	14	14	13	19	16	12	16	8	5	3	8	3	0	4	3	5	141
High-School-Enlisted-Cadet	187	231	209	375	355	221	115	71	89	84	77	75	54	Discontinued	2143			
TOTAL	577	873	1079	997	1038	748	729	681	586	530	397	454	343	407	314	311	384	10,606

Source: Japan Defense Agency. (The graph lists major sources but is not complete; there are varied other sources which tabled less than 1000 other inputs to the JASDF Officer Corps.)

300 to 400 officer candidates accepted yearly, approximately 30 percent normally are graduates of the Defense Academy. These career oriented officers numbered 20 percent of the officer corps in 1972. The first graduates of the Defense Academy were promoted to Lieutenant Colonel in 1972; in 1982, as the last Imperial Academy graduates retire the eldest Defense Academy officers will have twenty-five years of service, and some will have become general officers themselves.

There appears to be almost inevitable competition between Academy and university graduates. They have been the major elite inputs to the JASDF; the warrant officer, enlisted promotion and high school programs have been secondary in advanced promotion potential. Personnel administrators and other senior officers denied any differentiation between the two groups of officers, as did many of the young officers themselves. There were, however, some more outspoken officers who felt that the Defense Academy graduates were first among equals in assignments and promotion. There was little basis to make comparisons in 1972 as the most senior Defense Academy graduates have had fifteen years of service and remained in field grade ranks where promotion differentials had not become significant. However, they constituted a large core of elite, career-oriented officers, and it would seem probable that they will dominate JASDF leadership by the latter half of the 1980's.

These officers have been and will be dedicated career officers. After their graduation from the Defense Academy, they have no obligation to enter military service. They may resign at any time during their careers. Competition for the Academy has remained high, as Figure 8-3 indicates, although the top graduates of high schools normally compete for prestigious universities rather than the Defense Academy. One senior officer recalled that the old Imperial Academy graduates were always at



FIGURE 8-3

Defense Academy Input and Output

	Applicants	Accepted	Entered	Graduates	With- drawals	Commissioned* (JASDF)	
1960	6872	722	511	464	52	402 (117)	1964
1961	5734	802	537	497	42	455 (112)	1965
1962	5334	794	534	498	28	470 (116)	1966
1963	6047	879	540	495	33	462 (100)	1967
1964	5611	945	525	465	68	397 (99)	1968
1965	6053	903	520	465	60	405 (90)	1969
1966	7087	841	541	491	68		1970
1967	7394	833	512	463			1971
1968	6456	822	495				
1969	5358	827	578				
1970	4831	822	519				
1971	4121	861	555				

* Commissioned one year later.

Source: Japan Defense Agency

the very top of their high schools, and were respected in their subsequent dealings with the civilian bureaucracy. However, any fear that the standards of graduates have suffered because of the lesser prestige of the military are unfounded. They have proven to be extremely competent, highly professional and articulate military officers.¹³

Up to 1972, the JASDF had not faced a serious problem in attracting young officer candidates through the Defense Academy or from the universities. In fact, the ASDF has been able to meet its manning levels throughout its rank structure as illustrated in Figure 8-4. Colonel Mita Yujiro, Chief of the Personnel Section, was responsible for the JASDF recruitment program during 1971, and he felt that general recruitment was not a critical problem then nor would it be in the future if authorized manning levels remained constant.¹⁴ Figure 8-5 supports this conclusion in that JASDF loss rates have been stabilized after 1966 when the manning quotas were stabilized. If the loss rate can be stabilized at less than 5000 men per year, the magnitude of the recruiter's task will remain manageable.

However, there are also indications that recruitment could become more difficult in the future. As the Japanese economy continues to grow, the job market continues to expand. In 1965, there were 8 workers for every 5 jobs offered, but in 1970 there were only 3 workers for every 5 jobs offered.¹⁵ The problem for recruitment was even more critical;

¹³This statement is a conclusion of my own relations with the Defense Academy graduates and it coincides with the opinion of every foreign and Japanese observer with whom I raised the issue.

¹⁴Interview, December 13, 1971. During the first two quarters of FY 1971 (April-September 1971) the JASDF had 2.5 applicants for each recruiting quota, Boeicho Koho, December 24, 1971, p. 14.

¹⁵EPA, Economic Survey of Japan, 1970-1971, p. 104.

Japanese Air Self Defense Force Manning Levels:
December 1971

	OFFICER	WARRANT* OFFICER	NON COMMISSIONED OFFICER	AIRMEN	TOTAL
Authorized Strength	7510	300	17,095	16,752	41,657
Actual	7179	224	16,871	16,570	40,844
Shortage	331	76	224	182	813
Percentage of Authorized Levels	95.6	74.7	98.7	98.9	98.0

* Brand new program.

Source: Boei cho Koho, Volume 541, December 24, 1971. Verified Correct by JDA.

FIGURE 8-5

JASDF Personnel Loss Rates 1959-1970

CATEGORY	YEAR												
	1959	1960	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969	1970	
January 1 Strength (A)	4311	4718	5142	5749	6053	6309	6611	6669	6906	7052	7136	7136	
Mandatory Separation (B)	0	11	6	22	24	31	68	84	87	113	160	192	
Voluntary Separation (C)	88	118	173	191	194	122	121	93	54	101	150	131	
B + C = D	88	129	179	213	218	153	189	177	141	214	310	323	
D/A %	2.0	2.7	3.5	3.7	3.6	2.4	2.9	2.7	2.0	3.0	4.3	4.5	
January 1 Strength (A)	21,631	25,710	26,585	29,250	30,828	30,877	31,303	32,273	31,971	32,567	32,812	33,170	
Mandatory Separation (B)	0	14	13	22	0	0	0	0	0	23	24	41	
Voluntary Separation (C)	218	2914	4330	4189	3692	4919	3776	3477	4430	4882	4873	4641	
B + C = D	218	2928	4343	4211	3692	4919	3776	3477	4430	4905	4897	4682	
D/A %	1.0	11.4	16.3	14.4	12.0	15.9	12.1	10.8	13.9	15.1	14.9	14.1	

Source: JDA Statistics.

below 19 years of age there were 5 job offers for every young high school graduate.¹⁶

This labor shortage has been aggravated by a shrinking population growth rate. In 1965, there were 4,050,000 in the 15-19 age group; in 1970 that number will decrease to 2,950,000; it was forecast to reach 2,220,000 by 1975.¹⁷ That age group then will remain stable until 1985. One Japanese institute has forecast that the Japanese population will increase only 320,000 in the next fifty-five years.¹⁸

There have been some indications the JASDF has begun to feel increasing competition for young men. The major source of enlisted recruits remains the high school, but an increasing percentage must be recruited from middle schools. In 1967, 78.6 percent of JASDF recruits came from high schools and 20.7 percent from middle schools. Two years later the same sources provided 70.8 percent and 28.1 percent, respectively.¹⁹ The shift to a lower education source has not affected the IQ level of the recruits; it increased slightly from 1967 to 1972.²⁰

Recruiting statistics have not been especially discouraging, but the JASDF does rely on skilled technicians; the recruits which it obtains, in both enlisted and officer categories, must be able to learn and perform increasingly complex, technical tasks. The JASDF faces more or less unlimited competition for those recruits because there is no conscription

¹⁶EPA, Economic Survey of Japan, 1970-1971, p. 104.

¹⁷Ibid.

¹⁸Population Problem Research Institute, Welfare Ministry.

¹⁹JDA Statistics. The Japanese school system resembles the U.S. due to occupation reforms: 6 years (primary) - 3 years (middle) - 3 years (high school) - 4 years (college). The first 9 years are compulsory.

²⁰JDA statistics.

in Japan. In view of public opinion in 1972, conscription will be impossible in the foreseeable future; therefore, competition for graduates almost inevitably will increase.

Some new techniques have been employed by the JASDF in recent recruiting efforts. Public advertising has been used for the past five years, including newspapers, radio and television. Local recruiting offices, which are jointly maintained by the three branches, have been reinforced also, permitting more thorough local liason. The ASDF has expanded its public relations effort. For example, it has invited young people to the air bases and, where possible, has offered them a chance to fly.

The substantial inducements offered to a young person who is contemplating joining the Air Self-Defense Force focus on three different areas; benefits, nature of the life, and education.

Military pay in Japan has increased tremendously as Figure 8-6 indicates. The 1972 salary of an Airman Second Class with one year of service was nearly double that payed in 1954 to a Master Sergeant with twenty years service. A 1st Lieutenant with four years of service made more in 1972 than General Sanagi did when he assumed the post of Vice Chief of Staff less than eighteen years before. As spectacular as the percentage increases in pay have been, they do not compare to the change in per capita income index over the same time period. Japanese average per capita income was 74,734 yen per year in 1954; it had risen to 561,734 yen per year by 1970, an increase of more than 750 percent.²¹ Average starting salaries for junior high school graduates shot upward during the same time frame, from less than 4,000 yen per month to over

²¹EPA, Economic Survey, p. 153.

FIGURE 8-6

History of Japanese Military Pay - Selected Examples¹

YEAR	RANK	AIRMAN 2ND CLASS (1 year service)	STAFF SEARGENT (10 years service)	MASTER SEARGENT (22 years service)	1ST LT. (4 years service)	LT. COLONEL (16 years service)	LT. GENERAL (24 years service)
1954		6,000	10,800	19,200	19,665	34,800	58,200
1959		7,600	15,500	20,700	23,300	42,200	74,600
1962		9,500	15,500	21,900	25,200	45,300	78,000
1964		13,800	21,800	28,200	33,100	56,100	124,700
1967		17,800	27,700	34,800	41,000	67,100	137,000
1969		20,000	30,700	38,300	45,000	72,900	146,656
1970		28,200	41,200	49,600	57,300	89,200	186,000
1972		33,200	47,500	56,700	65,000	99,300	203,000
% Increase		553	475	295	331	286	348

¹All salaries (in yen) presented on monthly basis. Normal advancement assumed. Multiply by approximately 16.7 to include bonuses in yearly salary.

Source: Compiled from JDA records.

25,000 yen per month.²² These salaries were comparable to the starting salary of the JASDF, and salary increases come quickly in private companies. The JASDF's salary increases have been large, but they only have kept pace, if that, with the remainder of the society.

In addition, there is more to the normal Japanese benefit system than the salary. Housing, allowances, retirement pensions, and medical care are often included in the salary offered a Japanese worker. The JDA has not fared well in intra-government housing allotments, and the fringe benefits offered by the military have not been competitive with private industry. Professional prestige, often an offsetting benefit for military service, has not been a positive value in Japan.

The young man who might enter the JASDF is also interested in advancement. Promotion is a problem in any military service; the leaders of the air force have been concerned about promotional patterns and have attempted to improve them, however the picture has become a rather dismal one. In 1960, it took an average of ten years to become a Master Sergeant; in 1970, it took twenty years.²³ Comparable slowdowns have occurred in all the non-commissioned officer grades. Officer's promotions have also been slow although not critical. The first graduates of the Defense Academy may be promoted to Lieutenant Colonel in 1972 or 1973, after 15 to 16 years of service. That promotion rate has compared favorably to U.S. military promotion rates.

Tangible benefits have not been a particularly convincing rationale for entering the JASDF, and therefore, part of the recruitment effort has been dedicated to revealing intangible benefits. There are two

²²EPA, Economic Survey, p. 106.

²³JDA statistics.

diverse elements of military life which may be emphasized; either the patriotism, discipline and spartan atmosphere of the military; or the fascination, uniqueness, pleasure and comradeship of military life. Recent recruitment efforts have emphasized the latter, pointing out the chance to travel, the good working conditions, and the companionship of the collective life.²⁴

While patriotism and discipline have not been stressed in the recruitment campaign, they are taught after entry into the JASDF. Japan has no system of military law and the few cases which become legal rather than administrative problems must be prosecuted by the Ministry of Justice and conducted within the civil judicial system. Chapter IX of the SDF Law is entitled "Penal Provisions," and Articles 118 to 122 provide for punishments up to seven years' confinement for violation of their provisions. Article 122 forbids sabotage, absence without leave, disobedience of a direct order, and neglect of duty among its provisions. The article has made the JDA unique among Japanese government organizations as no other has a similar law.²⁵

Very few cases reach this stage and the great majority of military discipline is exercised through Article 46, Disciplinary Punishment:

In the event any self-defense personnel fall into any of the following categories, disciplinary punishments of dismissal, demotion, suspension, forfeiture of pay or reprimand shall be taken against such self-defense personnel.

- a. In the event of violation of duty obligations, or negligence of duty.

²⁴Colonel Mita, Interview, December 13, 1971.

²⁵Mr. Kosuge Hironaka, Chief, Legal Branch, ASO and Major Torino Masaru, Legal Branch, ASO, Interview, December 13, 1971. Professor Tagami of Hitotsubashi University has maintained that Article 122, because of its exclusive nature, proves that the SDF is a military and is unconstitutional because Article 75 of the Constitution states there shall be "no special tribunal."

- b. In the event of conduct unbecoming a member of the Self-Defense Forces.
- c. In the event of violating this law or any order based on this law.²⁶

Punishment under this system ranges to dismissal without pay and allowances, and as the generality of Article 46 suggests, almost any misbehavior may be included within its scope.²⁷ Punishment given under Article 46 may be dealt without the offender's agreement; his only recourse is to appeal to the "Fair Board." The "Fair Board" was established within the Defense Agency pursuant to Article 49 of the Self-Defense Law and is composed of civilian personnel within the internal bureaus.²⁸

If discipline is an indication of morale, the ASDF has had excellent morale for it has suffered minimal discipline problems. With 600 men in the Maintenance and Supply Group at Komatsu Air Base, an average of only six cases a year were serious enough to enter in the unit discipline log.²⁹ Figures from other units revealed a comparable one per cent annual discipline incidence rate. This is an astounding record if compared with a comparable American unit.³⁰ Those interested in a life of discipline would be well suited to the organization.

Beyond reimbursement for their services and the intangible benefits of military life, the JASDF has placed great emphasis on education.³¹

²⁶Self-Defense Forces Law, No. 165 of June 9, 1954 as amended.

²⁷Kosuge and Torino, Interview, December 13, 1971.

²⁸Torino, March 2, 1971. Defense Councillor Yasuda chaired the "Fair Board" in 1971, which indicated the seniority of its membership.

²⁹Major Kuroki Masaru, JASDF, Chief of Staff, Maintenance and Supply Squadron, Komatsu Air Base, January 13, 1972.

³⁰Based on several years as a personnel and legal officer in Naval Air Squadrons!

³¹Colonel Mita, Interview, December 13, 1971.

Recruiters emphasize the skills which are taught in the Technical Schools, and point out their wide and lucrative application in Japanese industry. Recruiting has been based on the concept of a limited career, encouraging those to join who are not considering lifetime employment, but wish to use the ASDF as a stepping stone to improve their position in life. The Air Self-Defense Force has concluded that five years is a break-even figure; if the man gives five years of service after he has been trained he will have been a positive asset.

The lure of education has been a popular device among military recruiters in any situation where they must rely on volunteer forces. It has received a great deal of emphasis recently in the United States. However, the educational aspects of military service recently have received top-level attention in Japan; some suggestions have gone beyond the old concept that the military was limited to teaching new skills.

On June 30, 1970, the Japan Defense Consultation Group recommended to the JDA that:

The SDF should be characterized as an educational organization as well as a military force. SDF members should receive a certificate of education for their schooling and training which should be recognized in the society. With the adoption of this system, young people of school age could be recruited into the SDF, avoiding recruiting competition with private companies.³²

Director General Nakasone already had proposed a similar idea to the Security Investigation Council of the Liberal-Democratic Party in March:

I wish to propose that the Self-Defense Forces be utilized as a seat of national education, with required educational facilities being provided within the units, so that SDF

³²Japan Defense Agency Consultation Group, Report on the Defense Agency and Self-Defense Forces, June 30, 1970, Mr. Hosokawa Ryugen, Chairman, p. 1.

men who are graduates from junior high schools may be officially recognized as having acquired the qualifications of senior high school graduates upon termination of their years of service and that they may be similarly treated by the general public as regular graduates from senior high schools. I further suggest that arrangements be made for SDF men who are graduates from regular senior high schools to be treated as regular university graduates after completing their service with the Self-Defense Forces.³³

Only thirty percent of JASDF's recruits currently come from the junior high school or middle school, and Nakasone proposed that the Defense Forces should obtain all recruits there, with a few exceptions.³⁴

Such a concept could have wide application in Japan, particularly if the size of the Self-Defense Forces remained static. The JASDF, for example, could retain a small body of highly qualified technician-instructors, but produce many more qualified technicians annually. These men would have a working knowledge of current ASDF technology, and would be useful in the event of rapid expansion of the force structure.

The JASDF almost certainly will face increasing recruitment problems in the future although they have faced none that are critical. The proposals to institutionalize and legitimize military education may greatly alleviate future problems. Such a solution also would broaden the societal base capable of mobilization in a sort of unofficial reserve.

The JASDF has employed one other method of dealing with private sector competition. Pilot retention has been a universal problem for military services because of the high salaries which pilots may command from airlines. The rapid expansion of Japan Air Lines in the early

³³Yasuhiro Nakasone, Japan's Defense in The Future, speech to the LDP Security Investigative Council, March 19, 1970, p. 5.

³⁴Ibid.

1960's caused a serious problem for the JASDF, and in 1962, the JDA, the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Communication and the airlines negotiated an agreement to control pilot loss.³⁵ The airline companies agreed to hire only 31 pilots each year from the military. The JASDF agreed to release experienced pilots in their mid-30's who applied and wished to fly for the airlines. The ASDF also has accepted 70 civilian students in its pilot training program each year, provided them with basic flight training and released them to the airlines. They had trained 540 pilots for the airlines through 1971.³⁶ Although the airline pilots only receive abbreviated training, they have a noticeable impact on the Training Command where they constitute 10 percent of the student load.

Training

There were four major commands in the Air Self-Defense Force in 1972: one operational command, one supply command, and two training commands. That balance was symbolic of the emphasis which training has received. Most military organizations concentrate on training in peacetime, and from its inception, the ASDF has considered training a primary objective.

Training may consist of group training or individual training. Although both go on and may not be completely separated, individual training tends to be emphasized over team training, particularly

³⁵General Shirakawa, Interview, December 10, 1971; Mr. Kimoto Eiji, Japan Air Lines, Interviews, December 7, 1971, January 25, 1972. Some companies did not fall into line immediately, but two years ago all problems were solved.

³⁶Colonel Morokuma Misao, JASDF, Chief Training Office, Flight Training Command, Interview, January 10, 1972.

in formal training situations. Crew training is often conducted less formally in the form of on-the-job training (OJT) within operational units. Individual training has been managed by the Training Section of the ASO. Curricular details are not programmed there, but major subject matters, course objectives and approximate course lengths are set forth within the Training Section.³⁷

All education external to the ASDF has been controlled within this office. Opportunities for education outside JASDF have been available to officer and enlisted personnel and they fall into five major categories:³⁸

1. Intra-Defense Agency.
 - a. GSDF, 80 officers and enlisted per year to various technical schools.
 - b. MSDF, 22 officers and enlisted per year to various schools.
 - c. Joint Staff College, 10 officers, normally Lieutenant Colonels, per year to a ten month course.
 - d. National Defense College, 5 officers, Colonels, per year to one year course.
 - e. Defense Academy, 32 officers per year for two year graduate study on natural science subjects. This program, equivalent to Master's level study, has been instituted to replace post-graduate study at civilian universities which has been denied to JDA personnel. (see 3 below).
2. Intra-Government.
 - a. National Police Agency, 3 officers and 12 enlisted per year in National Police Academy and other subdivisions to study advanced police skills.
 - b. Transportation Ministry, 1 officer per year to Weather Academy and 2 officers per year to an Air Traffic Control School.

³⁷Colonel Teramura Sumio, JASDF, Chief of Training Sections, ASO, Interview, February 14, 1972.

³⁸The following description of educational opportunities is based primarily on data provided by Colonel Teramura, Ibid. The list is not inclusive, but representative, although it does contain most major programs.

- c. Space and Technology Agency, 1 officer per year, to study aerospace psychology and medicine at Aerospace Laboratory.
3. Civilian Institutions. Until the 1968 school year, approximately 10 officers per year were sent to private universities for 2-year Master's programs and 3-year Doctor's programs in technical subjects. This program was terminated by the universities under pressures from radical groups.
 - a. Tokyo Education College, 1 officer per year to physical education program.
 - b. Tokyo Industrial College, 150 officers and 30 enlisted per year to 4 week course on labor management for those who have reached mandatory requirement.
 - c. Language Training, Chinese, 2 officers per year; Korean, 2 officers per year; German, 3 officers per year; French, 3 officers per year.
 - d. Dental Technicians, 4 enlisted per year.
 - e. Computer Programming, 8 officers per year to 3-month course.
 4. Industry.
 - a. Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, 1 technical officer for one year electronics study.
 - b. Ishikawajima - Harima Heavy Industries, 1 technical officer per year for studying jet engine technology.
 - c. Nippon Electric Company, 1 technical officer per year for electronics study.
 - d. Nippon Aviatronics Company, 1 technical officer per year for electronics study.
 - e. Japan Radio-Electronics Association, 70 enlisted per year for electronic transmitting license.
 5. Overseas training.
 - a. Private Institutions: 2 officers per year are sent to U.S. universities for technical post-graduate training in fields such as aerospace weapons and electrical engineering.
 - b. Foreign Military Staff Colleges, 1 officer per year to the Command and Staff course at the Air University in Maxwell, Alabama. 1 officer per year to a European staff college, either in England or W. Germany.
 - c. 1 officer per year for systems management training in U.S.
 - d. 2 officers per year for intelligence training in the U.S.
 - e. 30 officers and enlisted per year for NIKE training and upgrading in the U.S.

All education provided by the JASDF carries no extra-service obligation.

However, career orientation is an important part of the selection rationale and the retention rate on those selected for these programs has been over 95 percent.³⁹ No post-graduate education or similar training is offered in political, economic or other social sciences.⁴⁰

The three primary categories of training within the ASDF are pilot training, technical training and professional training.

The technical training and flying training programs were planned in close cooperation with the U.S. Air Force even before the establishment of the ASDF. Early in October 1953, General Weyland requested that the U.S. Air Training Command (ATC) "provide training specialists to aid the Air Advisory Group and the Japanese Air Planning Group (Seido Chosa Iinkai) in developing a training program involving all the aspects of flying and technical training necessary to conduct of the ASDF."⁴¹ There was some delay in dispatching an ATC team due to political sensitivity, but on December 18, 1953, General Weyland wired the Chief of Staff that the political climate had improved; "present circumstances indicate the possibility of 1 April 1954 as the date for placing technical and primary flying training schools into operation."⁴² He requested that the ATC team be formed and dispatched as soon as possible, and on January 18, 1954, the team, composed of three Lieutenant Colonels and one civilian, left

³⁹Colonel Sumio, Interview, February 14, 1972.

⁴⁰The absence of such training perhaps contributes to the JASDF's lack of communication and therefore influence within the bureaucracy.

⁴¹From Burns, USAF Assistance to Japan's Air Force, p. 12.

⁴²Quoted in Ibid., p. 13.

the United States for Japan.⁴³

When they arrived in late January, the April establishment date still appeared feasible in light of the mutual security negotiations underway, the lead-time estimated for USAF personnel and the logistic adjustments required to support the new force. The situation appeared urgent and the four-man team began work immediately. They immediately began planning with the U.S. Air Advisory Group and the Japanese Air Planning Staff.

Within the ensuing thirty days, the plan for training was written in its entirety.⁴⁴ It delineated the requirements for establishing the Japanese program. The final program was based upon the concept that personnel with wartime experience would be trained first, and it contained seven principal elements:

1. Refresher Flying Training, is designed to take the World War II Japanese pilot, provide him with refresher pilot training (and then diverted to some advanced training program).
2. OJT Technical Training, which is very similar in general terms to the flying program, only applicable to the technical skills, will take the Japanese craftsman and or tradesman, give him appropriate OJT and/or refresher training in his skill, (and he will then be fitted into JASDF).
3. Conversion Flying Training, will take the refreshed WWII pilot and train for either fighter pipeline or transport pipeline training.
4. Instructor Training, applies both to the flying and technical area. This is to be done largely within the

⁴³ From Burns, USAF Assistance to Japan's Air Force, p. 12. Team members were LCOL Robert D. Curtis, LCOL Wayne R. Pipher, LCOL Jesse A. Irwin and Mr. Chester L. Buecker. Colonel Irwin returned later as the commander of a squadron charged with implementing the Mutual Defense Assistance Program (MDAP) applicable to the JASDF.

⁴⁴ General Arinuma emphasized the importance of this group, citing the special influence of Col. Irwin, Interview, March 7, 1972. This is borne out by the U.S. assessment in Burns, op. cit., pp. 14-18.

(United States). (In either area these individuals would return to become the instructors in the new Japanese program).

5. United States Pipeline Training. Certain specialist skills which due to lead time considerations or abnormal training costs, (will be scheduled) in the formal ATC training system.

6. Formal training in Japan with USAF assistance, is limited to areas of sheet metal repairmen, machinists, supply and other general categories of training in which FEAF is conducting training.

7. Formal JASDF Training Schools, four in number: a technical school, primary pilot school, basic pilot school and a crew training school. (Schools to be manned and staffed by JASDF) and will receive advice, guidance, assistance and supervision as feasible and necessary (from U.S.).⁴⁵

The planning groups had completed the program by March 1, 1954, and it had been accepted "in principle" by all the interested parties. It only awaited Diet "legalization" to be put into operation.

Preparation for operations did not await Diet approval and on March 10, 1954, just after the program had won approval, the Director of the Advisory Group instructed USAF units to begin preparations to commence flying training.⁴⁶ Matsushima Air Base had been selected for conversion training; early in April, USAF men and supplies were arriving there to support the training. By May, they were prepared to receive students, and the first class arrived on 21 June, just nine days before the JASDF was established.⁴⁷

⁴⁵"Plan For Flying and Technical Training in Support of the Activation of the Japanese Air Force," quoted in, Burns, op. cit., pp. 17-18.

⁴⁶Burns, op. cit., p. 20.

⁴⁷Ibid., p. 25.

The Japanese actually began pilot training long before these events occurred. A flying school was established under the auspices of the National Safety Agency on October 15, 1952. It began training with U.S. army instructors and provided training for both army and navy (Coastal Safety Force) personnel. Although not official policy, the students there were all ex-Imperial pilots and they felt that the "larger objective of the school was to prepare to form an Air Force."⁴⁸

In 1954 the Hammamatsu Flying School became the Refresher Training Base for the JASDF. Two-thirds of the pilots trained there became JASDF pilots and constituted the initial inputs to conversion training. The Hammamatsu school was the only entirely Japanese-operated training function during the JASDF's first eighteen months. It rapidly became the nucleus of the training command.

Major General Kawaminimi was the initial Commandant of the First Flying School. He had directed flying at Hammamatsu from its beginning in 1952, and he remained there until relieved by General Arinuma in 1955. General Kawaminimi was instrumental in the formation of JASDF training and deserves the title of "the father of Japanese pilot training."⁴⁹

Major General Kawaminimi met then Captain Hartenberger when the U.S. liaison officer arrived in Hammamatsu in September 1954; his earliest remarks illustrate his attitude and suggest the importance of the USAF

⁴⁸Major General Muraoka Hideo, JGSDF, Chief of Aviation Section, Ground Staff Office, Interview, December 20, 1971, General Muraoka was one of the first ex-Army pilots at Hammamatsu; also see Koku Joho (Air Review), March 1953, p. 75, for story of early development.

⁴⁹Colonel Edmund K. Hartenberger, MDAO, U.S. Embassy, Interview, February 15, 1972. Col. Hartenberger was one of first Americans diverted to Matsushima and then became the first USAF liaison officer with the 1st FTS. General Ishikawa served under General Kawaminimi and supports this assessment of his role, Interview, February 17, 1972, as did others who worked with Kawaminimi. Also see Burns, op.cit., pp. 7-8, 62.

influence:

I want you to know that we are babies; we know nothing of aviation; we lost the war and we have lost touch. We must pretend and believe that we know nothing. I would like all the U.S.A.F. regulations and we will translate and promulgate them. After the Americans leave, we then will have time to adapt them to our own uses.⁵⁰

General Kawaminimi did not limit his effort to emulate the USAF in training procedures. Regulations governing all aspects of operations were translated in the same manner.⁵¹

Direct U.S. influence in pilot training began to phase down early in 1955. The Japanese were hesitant to assume total control of training as rapidly as the USAF had planned, but the phasedown was continued with minimal delays. By mid-1956, all training was transferred with the exception of the F-86 program. It was to become an advisory program six months later, in January 1957.⁵² In conjunction with the phasedown, the aircraft used in training were turned over to Japan, beginning with 91 aircraft in January 1955.⁵³

Although direct U.S. influence in training ended, guidance and advice continued; the United States has maintained a limited advisory role into the 1970's. The magnitude of the U.S. effort from 1954 to 1956

⁵⁰Hartenberger, Interview, February 15, 1972. This paraphrase of General Kawaminimi's remarks was Col. Hartenberger's best recollection of his statement.

⁵¹Hartenberger, February 15, 1972; General Sanagi, March 4, 1972; Lt. Colonel John Holman recalled similar wholesale translation when he served as one of the first jet instructor pilots at Tsuiki from October 1954-May 1956; Interview, February 24, 1972. Lt. Col. Holman and his student, now Chief of Staff General Ishikawa, were the pilots of the first postwar jet flight in a T-33 aircraft.

⁵²Burns, op. cit., pp. 60-80.

⁵³Hdqtr. MAAG Report, 10 June 1955.

left an indelible mark. There remain great similarities in training displays, briefing systems, and other operational procedures.⁵⁴

The Flying Training Command (FTC) includes four wings directly concerned with pilot training and an Aviation Cadet Training Group which gives initial instruction to high school graduates selected for the aviation cadet program.⁵⁵ Flight training has been conducted in phases as illustrated in Figure 8-7. (see next page) Although the pipeline structure itself is not unique, several factors are significant. The majority of pilots enter the fighter pipeline and it dominates pilot training resources. Only the fighter pilots receive all their training through the FTC. The training is long and difficult. The two years in flight phase is significantly longer than comparable U.S. Navy or Air Force training. Although the JASDF has hoped to shorten the program when training aircraft are updated, they do not intend to alter its formidability. The difficulty of entering and completing the flight training program is indicated in Figure 8-8.

FIGURE 8-8. Pilot Elimination Rate, JASDF

	Pilots	
	Total Remaining %	Failure Rate %
Aptitude Test	70	30
Phase 1 (Solo)	66.5	5
Phase 2 (Transition)	53	18
Basic Fighter	48	10
Advanced Fighter	47	2


Source: Colonel Morokuma, Interview, January 10, 1972

⁵⁴My own observations were supported by other working level observers, including Major Claude C. Blanch, U.S.A.F., Air Advisor, Defense Objectives Branch, COMUSJAPAN, Interview, November 16, 1971. Major Blanch worked continuously with the JASDF; he was the sole survivor of the Air Advisory Group.

⁵⁵This is a very popular program with over 1500 graduates annually competing for the quota of 110.

FIGURE 8-7

Japanese Air Self-Defense Force Pilot Training Pipeline¹



¹Academics as well as flying are included at each stage of training. The times and flight hours listed are approximate.

Sources: Colonel Morokume, Interview, January 10, 1972; JDA Statistics.

The aptitude test is given at the beginning of the English course to all qualified candidates from the Officer Candidate School and the Aviation Cadet Course. It is a strenuous, four-week examination, as the results suggest. Despite this, only 67 percent of those passing the aptitude test become pilots.

The nature of the program suggests that the quality of the product has been much more important than quantity. This has been borne out by the further training required of F-104 pilots. They must graduate, go to an F-86 wing for a minimum 18 months and have 500 hours of experience before they can apply for transition to the JASDF's front line fighter. The Flying Training Command could expand its output with few additional resources; it has 2,722 personnel assigned and 170 instructors for only 352 students.⁵⁶

The result has been a limited number of pilots, although their relative experience level is very high. At the end of 1971, the JASDF reported 1,212 pilots with the following levels of pilot experience: 152 pilots with less than 1000 hours, 360 pilots with 1000 to 2000 hours and 700 pilots with more than 2000 hours of flying.⁵⁷ The JASDF apparently has planned to maintain this small, experienced core of pilots because the JDA recently testified that the JASDF planned only a 200-pilot increase by 1977.⁵⁸

⁵⁶Colonel Morokuma, Interview, January 10, 1972.

⁵⁷JDA Statistics; also Boeicho Koho, December 24, 1971, p. 12. The GSDF has 106 fixed wing and 607 helo pilots; the MSDF has 635 fixed wing and 289 helo pilots. The Japanese total 2,846 military pilots.

⁵⁸As reported in Kokujoho (Aireview), November 1971, p. 142. Estimates for all three branches came to 3100 pilots, less than 300 more than they are currently reporting. Mr. Kaihara criticized this approach to pilot training arguing that more resources should be applied, and more pilots should be graduated.

The Technical Training Command (TTC) also has emphasized quality; it, too, derived many of its operations from the USAF. If possible, technical training had more intensive U.S. influence than pilot training. The technical aspects of modern aviation were one of the areas of great advance in the postwar era, and consequently it was an area where the Japanese had lagged most. However, one very important characteristic of Japan helped to offset this liability. At the beginning of the war Japan had become a more mature industrial power; even in the post-war era, occupation reforms stressed education, then economic revival. The literacy levels had remained high, and by 1955 Japan was producing over 65 million kilowatt-hours of electricity, over 20,000 cars and 100 times as much steel as in 1947.⁵⁹ The average Japanese was quite capable of learning the technologies required without the problems which might be expected in a less developed society.

This factor proved important quite early in the technical program, because over 300 Japanese were sent to the United States for technical instruction to form the basis of their own training program. Their grades were average and above; in the first 18 months of the program only one failure was reported.⁶⁰ Similar reports were made by the U.S. units in Japan which were including Japanese students in their training. The high technical aptitude of the society has continued to facilitate the training problem. The First Technical School at Hamamatsu trains in aircraft maintenance techniques, taking students from a 12-week basic training course and placing them in schools on electrical repair, engine maintenance and hydraulic systems. The failure rate is less than

⁵⁹EPA, Economic Survey, p. 159.

⁶⁰Burns, op. cit., p. 103-104.

0.5 percent.⁶¹ Even more remarkable was the ease with which the technical schools converted to prepare for the F-4 Phantom, one of the most modern aircraft weapon systems. The Technical Training Command was required to support that transition; it began teaching all required technical skills indigenously after only 43 instructors trained in the United States.⁶²

In addition to the technical training directly provided by USAF units in Japan and the United States, the USAF planned, supplied, and directed the establishment of the technical training center.⁶³ The JASDF was not aware of program requirements and USAF personnel wrote those, using USAF requirements as guidelines. Over 25 hard core courses were established, including weather, photography, communications, supply, radar operation, and varied aircraft system maintenance courses.⁶⁴

One particular example of USAF influence and Japanese capacity occurred in the training program established for the Aircraft Control and Warning (AC&W) system. It began some six months before the ASDF was formed, and it relied on an On the Job Training (OJT) and a cellular team concept which permitted informal training within operational U.S. radar sites. In August 1954, the ASDF formed a "shadow" AC&W administrative network permitting rapid training and experience without joint command difficulties.⁶⁵ The program proved a great success; 1300 people were trained in the first year of the program and by 1955, Japanese

⁶¹Major Matsuo, JASDF, Instructor (F-4 maintenance) First Technical School, TTC, January 11, 1972.

⁶²Ibid., confirmed by MDAO, U.S. Embassy.

⁶³See Burns, op. cit., pp. 106-115, for a detailed description of the USAF involvement in establishing JASDF technical schools.

⁶⁴Ibid., p. 115.

⁶⁵Ibid., pp. 116-118.

operators were participating in USAF exercises.⁶⁶ Operational AC&W sites were being manned and operated by the JASDF in 1957, "with but little supervision from USAF personnel."⁶⁷

Air technical training has proceeded apace, and more than 125,000 personnel had received schooling through 1971.⁶⁸ The Technical Training Command was training at the rate of 8,500 personnel per year in more than 200 courses during 1971. The command structure centered around the five technical schools listed in Figure 8-9. More than 90 percent of the enlisted men entering the JASDF receive some training from the TTC before their first operational assignment.

Both enlisted and officer training has been based on a dual cycle concept. Upon entering the service, the training which a man receives enables him to carry out basic skills and gives him the background to benefit from OJT. If he stays beyond the expected five years of service and demonstrates career motivation, he will return to the TTC to the advanced courses emphasizing special technical skills and managerial development.


The 8500 men trained each year is greater than the 5000 men lost each year. That suggests that the Technical Training Command has not only maintained the level of its "community of technicians," but has increased it. In addition, the training provides another social benefit. The JASDF has regularly discharged more qualified personnel than they have received, thereby benefitting the economic community and bettering

⁶⁶See Burns, op. cit., p. 124. The Japanese were reported to have "performed very well."

⁶⁷Maurer Maurer, Brief History of 41st Air Division 1952-1960, May 1960, (USAF Historical Division), p. 9.

⁶⁸JASDF, Technical Training Command, Command Briefing, paper, undated, provided by LGEN Goto Kiyotoshi, Commander, TTC, January 11, 1972.

Technical Training Command, Japan Air Self-Defense Force



Source: Technical Training Command, courtesy of Commander, LGEN Goto Kiyotoshi.

social standards.

Military organizations not only require technical skills; organization and command are also essential to operational capability. As the JASDF began its short history, leadership was the last of a myriad of problems. The academies of the IJN and IJA were among the most highly regarded educational institutions in Japan, and both the Navy and Army maintained respected staff schools. The officers from those professional backgrounds provided the JASDF with a core of experienced leadership in the early, formative years.

Organizational and staffing procedures evolve with the evolution of weaponry and tactics; moreover, new, untrained officers were soon entering the ASDF. The development of effective leadership through professional education had to be an on-going process. Some have felt that this area has been neglected with a resultant loss of pride, discipline and dedication necessary in the professional officer. Ogawa Raita criticized the lack of officer's meeting places and the absence of esprit de corps and comraderie among young officers.⁶⁹ He attributed this problem to lack of officer education, a lack of a consistent philosophy of management, and disassociation of older from younger officers.

If military bearing among its personnel, cleanliness of its bases, professional knowledge of its officers, readiness rates of its aircraft and the lack of disciplinary problems are indicative of successful leadership, then it has prevailed, for in each of these areas the JASDF has excelled. There are, however, other areas of operational preparedness which lend credence to Ogawa's assessment.

⁶⁹"Koku Jieitai no Mondai ten" (Problems of ASDF), Wing Shimbun, January 12, 1972, also Ogawa, Interview, March 3, 1972.

In any case, the final assessment of the leadership and professional competence of a military organization must await an operational test. It is, however, possible to review the extent and content of professional education. Figure 8-10 outlines the officer training system, demonstrating the grades at which an officer may hope for education and the types of schools available.


The officer candidate programs have been the common ground of professional training. The most important of these is the Officer Candidate School at Nara. All officer sources receive their orientation to the ASDF there. Even the Aviation Cadets who come to Nara primarily for English training are exposed to other selected subjects. Figure 8-11 illustrates the balance between the subjects which are taught to the various officer sources.

The military discipline field includes war history, national defense requirements, the mission of the JASDF and the meaning of patriotism. It only receives 5 to 9 percent of the candidate's time; it seems clear that 'spiritual training' does not receive undue emphasis. Military academics are emphasized which include introductions to command and staff concepts, air defense operations and weaponry courses. International law and economics are taught in the general academics section; English is also included in this section. The miscellaneous training consists of outside lectures, field trips and military ceremonies. These curricula are very comprehensive and intensive as compared with similar courses in the United States.

The next chance the officer has to add to his military training is the Squadron Officer Course which is given three times each year at the Air Staff College. The major subject areas of that course are command and leadership studies and operations. The operations portion of the

FIGURE 8-10

Outline of Officer Training System



Source: JASDF, Air Staff College, Command Briefing, provided by LGEN Utsunomiya Michio, Commandant.

FIGURE 8-11

Representative Curricula at Officer Candidate Courses

SUBJECT	STUDENTS	DEFENSE ACADEMY	UNIVERSITY	TECHNICAL CADETS	SELECTED NCO	AVIATION NCO's
Military Discipline		70 (5) ¹	100 (5)	100 (9)	90 (5)	50 (6)
Rules and Regulations		80 (6)	100 (5)	90 (8)	90 (5)	55 (6)
Military Academics		210 (16)	450 (24)	300 (27)	435 (23)	190 (22)
General Academics		60 (5)	130 (7)	90 (8)	230 (12)	190 (22)
Military Training		160 (16)	350 (19)	170 (16)	160 (14)	40 (4)
Physical Training		200 (24)	450 (24)	200 (22)	420 (22)	150 (17)
Others		320 (28)	316 (16)	150 (14)	367 (19)	205 (23)
Total		1,100 hours 25 weeks	1,892 hours 43 weeks	1,100 hours 25 weeks	1,892 hours 43 weeks	880 20 weeks

¹Primary figures show total hours per subject, figures in () show percentage of total hours.

Source: JASDF, Officer Candidate School, Command Briefing, provided by LGEN Iwasaki Toru, Commandant.

course includes air defense operations, intelligence, logistics and research and development. The yearly input to this course nearly equals the number of officers who entered the JASDF annually during the period 1965 to 1970, therefore, the great majority of officers have the opportunity to attend the course.

After the Squadron Officer's Course, middle field grade officers next compete to go to the Command and Staff Course. Here the competition becomes very rigorous, with an average 700 officers per year competing for 33 to 38 appointments.⁷⁰ Social sciences and national and international politics are included in this curriculum. Strategy and tactics are emphasized with particular attention focused on national defense policy, war theory, logistics and other operational elements.⁷¹

The senior Air War Course is given to only ten students per year, either Colonels or Lieutenant Colonels. The social sciences and politics receive more emphasis and the students spend a large percentage of their time on individual research projects. The Air Weapons Course is taught at the Staff College, and combines aspects of both the technical and professional fields. It introduces political affairs and operations, but concentrates on system engineering and technical administration. Primarily for technical officers, it provides the "knowledge and skills required as senior commanders or senior staff officers to be engaged in research and development and administration of technology."⁷²

⁷⁰ Teramura, Interview, February 14, 1972.

⁷¹ LGEN Utsunomiya Michio, JASDF, Commandant, ASC, Interview, November 30, 1971, provided the great majority of the information on the various courses of the Air Staff College.

⁷² JASDF, ASD, Command Briefing, provided by LGEN Utsunomiya.

Two other courses outside the Air Staff College framework provide additional professional education. The Joint Services Staff College is quite similar to the Command and Staff Course, although with a somewhat different orientation.

The National Defense College program is open to officers of Colonel rank. It is the equivalent of a graduate school of professional military studies. Five officers per year attend the ten-month course which covers the broadest aspects of defense policy and military strategy.

The professional training available to JASDF officers is comprehensive and yet available to a significant percentage of the officer corps. It complements the pilot training and technical training programs, providing virtually every officer with a combination of functional and professional education.

The personnel of the JASDF are highly trained and competent professionals. They represent the primary emphasis accorded education, and are capable of providing the nucleus of a significantly larger force.

Chapter 9

THE ALLOCATION OF RESOURCES

The verb to allocate may signify the assignment of a specified amount of resources for a certain purpose, or it may suggest a system by which a set amount is distributed among various groups. Both aspects of allocation bear on the defense spending problem. There are questions of priorities: what priority does defense have on government funds; what priority does air power have on defense funds; what priority does air defense have on air power funds? There are the related questions of assignment: What amounts of money have been assigned to air power, and what size of force do they and could they support? On what basis are monies distributed within certain programs? Do cost-effective analyses support the selections of weaponry? Answers to these questions should serve to explain the rationale behind Japanese defense spending and help identify the groups and the policy objectives dominating the allocation process.

In 1972, the air force structure included 14 fighter squadrons, 4 NIKE missile groups, 1 reconnaissance squadron and the equivalent of two squadrons each in the Transport Wing and Air Rescue Group.¹ This roughly equalled 23 squadrons which is one method of evaluating and air force size. Size can be discussed in terms of several different units; for example, aircraft, squadrons, or wings.

¹The Air Transport Wing has two locations and two aircraft types, roughly distinguishable as squadrons. The Air Rescue Group has 8 squadrons which are in reality detachments. They are discussed in squadron units in order to obtain a common unit air force-wide. The training aircraft are generally not considered in this discussion because air power goals normally have excluded training squadrons.

Squadrons are the lowest unit divisions which combine mobility and a sustained operational capacity. Comparison of aircraft totals can be hazardous because raw numbers tell little of actual operational ability or mission diversity of the force structure. A fighter aircraft assigned to a training squadron does not have fighter capability without the logistics, intelligence services and command network which a fighter squadron provides.

Because of these factors, historical comparisons with original force goals have more significance when both numbers of aircraft and squadron units are used for comparison. The rapid development of individual aircraft weapons system's capacity and the introduction of surface-to-air missile groups make squadron unit comparisons more meaningful.

There were great disparities between the many private plans which were proposed for Japan in the early 1950's. Some plans did not include aircraft and one included 7000 aircraft. Nearly all of the original private groups assumed that Japan's air force would have an attack capability which partially explained the large number of aircraft the plans entailed. The first semi-official Japanese proposal which the Demobilization Bureau gave to SCAP in 1951 included 2400 aircraft and approximately 60 squadrons.² Admiral Nomura's group passed a 33 squadron plan to the government in 1952, but the first plan formulated by the NSA's Systems Research Council included 6744 aircraft, rivaling the highest figures proposed.³ The Progressive Party proposed an air force of 52 squadrons and 2340 aircraft.⁴ This plan also included offensive

²For details of this plan's origin, see Chapter 5.

³See Chapter 5 for details of the relationship between the private planners and government planners. Masuhara, Nihon no Boei, p. 48.

⁴Annex 3, p. 12.

fighters, fighter-bombers and patrol aircraft.

The second and subsequent drafts from the Systems Research Council approximated the 1500 aircraft and the 33 squadrons which had been proposed by the Nomura group. These figures became the point of departure for subsequent planners.⁵ Organizational plans were formulated during early 1954, using the 33-squadron structure. The joint U.S.-Japanese planning for a training program was based on a 36-squadron structure, including medium-bomber and fighter-bomber squadrons.⁶ By June 1954, the 33-squadron figure had been agreed to within the fledgling ASDF and constituted the final ASDF proposal on force level. Light bombers were still included and remained part of the JASDF proposals until 1957.⁷

In 1957, there was a significant readjustment of the proposed force structure and it occurred for two distinct reasons:

The first DBP was promulgated in 1957, and each service's plans were subject to the hard realities of economic limitations. Political sensitivity was a factor in the ASDF plans as it became apparent that bomber aircraft would not be a suitable weapon in the light of constitutional interpretations. Elimination of the bomber squadrons naturally cut the size of the force. It was difficult for air force planners then to argue that they needed more of the remaining types of aircraft in their proposed inventory;

⁵General Sanagi, November 11, 1971; Mr. Ogawa, February 15, 1972; General Ogawa, JASDF; March 4, 1972, General Arinuma, March 7, 1972; all mentioned the 33 squadron figure when discussing the 1953-1954 planning process and proposed force level goals.

⁶Burns, op. cit., pp. 15-16.

⁷General Arinuma, March 7, 1972; Mr. Ogawa, February 18, 1972, Interview.

The ASDF also had internal problems with the 33 squadron structure. 1954 to 1957 had been a period of rapid expansion, and in early 1957 the aircraft accident rate took a sharp turn upward. Accidents were detrimental to operational capabilities and also exacerbated hostile public opinion. Because of these two factors, the JASDF readjusted their force level proposals in 1957 and projected a 23-squadron goal.⁸

The 23-squadron structure has remained the basis of the JASDF's planning in the 1970's. They have approached that goal, and the Fourth DBP proposals indicated their satisfaction. No increases in aircraft fighter squadrons were planned, nor were changes programmed in reconnaissance or transport units. Only NIKE missiles were scheduled to increase, from 4 to 7 units. Therefore, the total operational complement will continue to approximate the 23-squadron guidelines.

The JASDF has experienced relatively little trouble in obtaining their force-level goals, particularly in view of the low priority which defense in general has been accorded. Annual defense budgets are compared to GNP and overall government spending in Figure 9-1. The figures bear out the low priority of military spending as the JDA has received an increasingly smaller share of a continuously increasing government budget. The deemphasis of military claims on the budget has corresponded to the national policy on defense which dictates the priority of social welfare and the growth of defense only within national capacities. The low level of military spending has not necessarily constituted a disregard of national security. In the absence of external threats of force such a policy could enhance national security.

⁸General Ishikawa Kanshi, COS, Interview, February 17, 1972. General Ishikawa was one of the planners at that time. Mr. Ogawa, Interview, February 18, 1972, similarly described the 1957 transition.

FIGURE 9-1

Gross National Product, Government Budget
and Defense Budget, 1951-1971

	DEFENSE BUDGET (A) \$ million	GOVERNMENT BUDGET (B) \$ million	GNP (C) \$ million	A/B %	A/C %
1951	351	2,204	15,226	15.95	2.31
1952	507	2,590	17,702	19.58	2.87
1953	348	2,853	20,906	12.21	1.67
1954	375	2,777	21,735	13.51	1.73
1955	374	2,814	24,623	13.31	1.52
1956	396	3,026	27,641	13.11	1.44
1957	398	3,290	31,246	12.12	1.28
1958	412	3,703	32,736	11.14	1.26
1959	432	4,200	37,802	10.29	1.14
1960	444	4,903	45,019	9.07	0.99
1961	509	5,853	55,146	8.71	0.92
1962	593	7,119	60,165	8.34	0.99
1963	687	8,491	71,044	8.10	0.97
1964	780	9,229	82,029	8.41	0.95
1965	848	10,401	90,695	8.16	0.94
1966	958	12,436	105,883	7.71	0.91
1967	1,075	14,453	124,352	7.44	0.86
1968	1,171	16,436	146,611	7.13	0.80
1969	1,374	18,721	173,750	7.14	0.79
1970	1,581	22,082	201,222	7.16	0.79
1971	1,864	26,151	245,510	7.13	0.76

Source: JDA Statistics

360 Y/1\$

In absolute terms the defense budget has grown significantly. Professor Ishizawa has noted that Japan's defense spending percentages would be much different had Japanese economic growth equalled that of Western Europe in the past two decades.⁹ If Japan had maintained an average 4 percent growth rate from base year 1952, while defense spending increased at the actual rate, the defense budget would have equalled 2.5% of GNP in 1961 and 4.5% of GNP in 1968. Japan would face a military burden equal to the NATO countries of Western Europe.

The ASDF's relative success in obtaining allocations within those parameters may be explained in part by the high priority which air defense has held among the Japanese defense missions. The Systems Research Council based their rearmament planning on the presumption that primary emphasis would be placed on air power.¹⁰ When the JASDF was established Director-General Kimura announced that air power would be developed as the primary line of defense for Japan.

The United States was surprised by the emphasis the Japanese placed on air power allocations. Although all parties had agreed in principle to an air force, the force goals assigned the air force and the amounts of money deemed necessary by the Japanese raised some controversy among American officials in 1953.¹¹ U.S. military officials opposed the Japanese air power force-level goals as late as October 1953 because they felt the cost would be prohibitive to Japan. Characteristically, the U.S. was anxious to see the concept implemented while Japan was confident that an air force would be established eventually, and wished

⁹Ishizawa, op. cit., p. 41.

¹⁰Masuhara, Nihon no Boei, p. 48, Boei Nenkan, 1970, p. 189.

¹¹See discussion in Chapter 5.

to discuss long-range force directions.

In the late 1950's, the JASDF budget shot upward as the first build-up program was implemented. The air force received 56.2 million dollars in 1956 which was 14 percent of the defense budget. 27 percent of the budget, 118 million dollars, was allotted to the air arm in 1960.¹² As Figure 9-2 illustrates, the air force share of the budget continued to increase until 1964 when the majority of the F-104's had been purchased. The budget share has decreased since that time, partly as a result of a lull after the F-104 contracts were authorized, and partly because of increased emphasis on MSDF shipbuilding programs.

The JASDF has continued to fare very well in intra-JDA resources allotment. It received 23 percent of the defense budget in 1971 while only responsible for 16 percent of defense personnel. By comparison, the USAF received 28 percent of the defense budget with 30 percent of the personnel.¹³ In addition, the U.S. Air Force was responsible for several operational roles including a significant portion of the U.S. strategic forces while the JASDF maintained one major operational command.

This type of comparison between a military superpower and a non-nuclear force must be made with caution and deductions reached with care. The relatively large percentage of money allotted to the JASDF with its low personnel totals and limited operational role does, however, suggest different functional priorities of defense spending. Some differences do appear when the Japanese defense budget is compared to that of the United States. Figure 9-3 illustrates the relatively low priority which

¹²Asagumo, November 11, 1971.

¹³Figures compiled from Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird, Statement Before the Senate Armed Services Committee, FY 1973 Defense Budget and FY 1973-1977 Program, February 15, 1972 (Washington, D.C., U.S. Government Printing Office), Tables 1 and 4, pp. 189-197.

FIGURE 9-2

Individual Service Budgets, 1961-1971

(360Y - \$1)

	Budgets - \$ million			% of JDA Budget		
	GSDF	MSDF	ASDF	GSDF	MSDF	ASDF
1961	204	119	145	41	24	29
1962	231	134	183	39	23	31
1963	266	147	216	39	21	32
1964	301	161	246	39	21	31
1965	355	189	221	42	22	26
1966	417	216	237	43	22	25
1967	462	236	264	43	22	25
1968	522	270	273	45	23	23
1969	588	318	313	44	24	23
1970	701	387	349	44	25	22
1971	812	451	435	44	24	23

Source: Compiled from JDA; Boei Nenkan; Asagumo, November 11, 1971

Note: Percentages do not add to 100 because a small percentage of the JDA budget is allotted to the internal bureaus and other independent organs in the Agency.

FIGURE 9-3

Functional Comparison of JDA-DOD Budget Expenditures
1971-1972 Fiscal Period

(percentage of total budget)

JAPAN DEFENSE AGENCY	FUNCTIONAL CLASSIFICATION	DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
49	Personnel Expenditures	44
20	Operations Expenditures (Admin. & Maintenance)	23
27	Procurement	22
2.5	Facilities Construction	1
1.5	Research and Development	10

Source: Laird, FY 1973 Defense Budget and JDA, JFY 1971 Budget.

Japan has assigned research and development and the high priority assigned procurement.¹⁴ The differences between personnel expenditures and operational expenditures are not significant because many costs are interchangeable and could be categorized in either area. Other U.S. estimates suggest that some operational expenses could be considered personnel related. At any rate, Japanese and American operating expenditures are quite similar when personnel costs are included.

The JDA procurement emphasis is particularly significant in view of their lower use rate on petroleum, oil and lubricants (POL) and other expendable materials. Major equipment procurement totalled 353 million dollars in 1971, which was 62 percent of all procurement and 16 percent of the entire budget.¹⁵

The emphasis on procurement has been magnified in the Air Self-Defense Force where only 35 percent of the 1971 budget was utilized for personnel costs, while equipment purchases accounted for 24 percent. Major purchases accounted for 85 percent of the procurement effected by the Air Materiel Command; all general supply and minor item purchases were obtained with the remainder.¹⁶ Figure 9-4 portrays the development of the air force budget over the past six years and demonstrates the growing emphasis on equipment procurement. This will continue to rise; more than 191 billion yen already had been committed to future purchases by the 1971 and previous budgets.¹⁷ Some recent published reports have

¹⁴See Chapter 12 for a detailed discussion of the Research and Development effort.

¹⁵All dollar amounts discussed in the 1971 budget will be based on Y308--\$1 which is the new monetary exchange rate.

¹⁶Lieutenant General Sato Noriro, JASDF, Commander Air Materiel Command, February 28, 1972, Interview.

¹⁷JASDF, Outline of JFY 1971 Budget.

FIGURE 9-4

Japanese Air Self-Defense Force Budgets
by Functional Categories 1966-1971

(100 million yen)

CATEGORY	YEAR					
	1966	1967	1968	1969	1970	1971
Personnel Expenditures	262	294	332	385	452	543
Maintenance and Administration	337	389	433	430	441	465
Equipment Procurement	178	187	134	224	248	421
Aircraft	103	101	55	73	124	212
Surface-to-Air Missiles	1	13	40	115	73	104
Radar	54	46	15	12	20	18
Maintenance Equipment	5	11	8	6	13	65
Ground Equipment	15	16	16	18	18	22
General Support	15	15	17	22	22	26
Education and Training	33	33	34	29	29	47
Facility Construction	29	30	32	34	48	59
Total (May not add due to rounding)	853	949	982	1125	1152	1562

Source: JDA Statistics.

Note: 100 million yen = .3247 million dollars

indicated that approximately 50 percent of the entire funding requested for the Fourth DBP, 2.7 trillion yen, will be utilized for major equipment purchase.¹⁸

Major items already dominate JASDF procurement with over one-half the monetary amounts dedicated to aircraft, SAM or radar equipment. Major purchases programmed in the Fourth DBP have continued this trend.

The emphasis on major components has resulted in shortages in other functional areas and other procurement categories. Two categories, supply and facilities construction, have suffered considerably because of the minimum financial support they receive.

The JASDF spent 8.45 million dollars on aircraft ammunition in the Third DBP. That was an incredible .0433 percent of the monies expended.¹⁹ Expenditures for fuel and other war reserve materiel have been similarly short, and the result is an extremely small war reserve supply. That portion of the budget has continued to decrease, exacerbating a critical problem.²⁰ The supply problem can be illustrated in the training command where each student flies only ten 'hot' missions in the basic fighter pipeline.²¹ Guns only are fired, giving the young pilots no experience in missile firing which is the primary air-to-air weapon. The same situation has prevailed in the operational squadrons where a pilot may

¹⁸Toyo Deizai, September 19, 1970 (U.S. Embassy Translation), also see Nippon no Anzen Hosho, p. 101, and Ishizawa, "The Gradual Increase of Defense Power," pp. 54-55.

¹⁹JASDF, Outline of JFY 1971 Budget.

²⁰General Sato, Interview, February 28, 1972.

²¹Colonel Nakamura Satoshi, JASDF, Vice Commander, First Training Wing, Hammamatsu Air Base, Interview, January 10, 1972. Hot missions mean live ordinance is expended.

go for more than a year without a hot mission.²²

Some observers have noted that the lack of resources dedicated to training, the limited areas in which pilots may train, and the shortage of modern training aircraft could cause an acute shortage of pilots in the ensuing five years.²³ Air Force officials believe they can avoid a pilot shortage if they receive the aircraft and other resources they have requested; however, a shortage remains a real possibility. There were plans to train more than 2 pilots for each F-4 with 27 front-seat qualified and 18 back-seat qualified in each 18 airplane squadron.²⁴ With the recent training delays because of a serious aircraft accident and the current budgetary limitations, it seems improbable that the goal will be reached as planned.

Aircraft cannot operate without fuel and the JASDF has maintained a rather limited backlog. It has attempted to maintain a 2.5 month supply at the air bases and one month of emergency supply centrally located near Kure. The total 3.5 month estimate is predicated on normal usage.²⁵ In the event of actual mobilization, consumption in all likelihood would increase and current reserves would not last the predicted time periods. Air force planners have been aware of the possible

²²Interviews with air force pilots.

²³Kaihara, Interview, November 10, 1971; JPE Aviation Report, September 13, 1971. The limited areas for training are a result of the mid-air crash between a JASDF F-36 and an ANA 727 airliner. The XT-2 selection for JASDF's new advanced trainer will result in shortages which will be discussed in detail, *supra*.

²⁴Lieutenant General Uemura Eichi, JASDF, Commander, Flight Training Command, Interview, January 10, 1972.

²⁵Kaihara, "We Have to Know Them," pp. 70-72, also Interview, November 10, 1971. Koku Shimbun reported on July 21, 1971 that JASDF had no fuel reserves and would be forced to cut flight hours if additional money was not funded. 4 billion yen/year or 2.5% of the budget was being spent on fuel.

fuel problems and while military reserves are limited, extensive commercial reserves exist which are sometimes located on joint-use bases. These supplies, if available in an emergency, would extend the fuel reserves significantly.²⁶

A more critical war reserve shortage has existed in ammunition reserves. A recent Commander of the Air Defense Command suggested he would be quite happy if his command was still operational when the fuel reserves ran short. In 1971, the four primary weapons in the inventory were general purpose bombs, 50 calibre ammunition for the F-86's, 20 MM ammunition for the F-104's, and heat-seeking missiles for both aircraft. Conventional bombs were in short supply and outdated, most of them being of Korean War vintage. The 50-calibre shells were in abundance, and were virtually useless outside a limited air-to-ground close support mission. 20MM shells are the back-up weapon for the F-104; there was such a critical shortage of these that practice firing has been restricted.²⁷

An even more serious shortage exists in the supply of surface-to-air and air-to-air missiles. These have been the primary weapons for Japanese air defense. Five NIKE sites were scheduled to be operational after the transfer of the Okinawa site. With the battalions scheduled to be operating by 1971 at full strength, the force totalled approximately

²⁶Aoki, Interview, October 20, 1971. Mr. Aoki was a JASDF planner before resigning to become editor of Koku joho. Mr. Aoki also recalled that studies were conducted which envisioned the possible emergency use of gasoline in the J-79 engines. They would last about a week before corrosion and high exhaust gas temperatures took their toll. Chapter 10 discusses the extent and effectiveness of mobilization procedures.

²⁷In a related area, the JASDF has been slow to allot money to buy targets. The result has been subsonic practice or reliance on U.S. aircraft to provide services.

130 launchers.²⁸ At the same time less than three hundred NIKE missiles were maintained in war reserve, only about two firings per launcher.²⁹

The heat-seeking air-to-air missiles have been the backbone of JASDF kill probability in the air intercept mission. If only the F-104 fleet is considered, a combat launch of 125 aircraft would require a minimum 250 missiles.³⁰ It has been estimated that the missiles would last less than a week if the F-104's were only launched once a day.³¹ Therefore, multiple launches and ideal loading easily could expend the entire AAM inventory in one day. A Japanese general officer who commanded the Air Materiel Command acknowledged that "we have only a few days material."³²

It appears unlikely that the situation will improve as missile unit costs continue to increase. The new Sparrow III radar-homing missile is programmed to be the primary weapon for the F-4J, and its cost under license-production is approximately 30 million yen per copy.³³ One hundred of them would exceed the total amount spent on ammunition in the past five years. The 1000 needed would require 1.8% of the JASDF's share of the Fourth DBP, far more than will be spent with 1972's priorities.

²⁸JDA Statistics. There are actually less launchers due to legal delays in acquiring launch sites.

²⁹Of the 358 NIKE's programmed in the 3rd DBP, 208 were to be delivered by April 1972, JPE Aviation Report, April 19, 1971.

³⁰125 Aircraft is roughly 2/3 of the fleet. An ideal load would be 4 AAM per aircraft because with only two the aircraft has a one pass capability without the capacity for self-defense on the way home.

³¹Kaihara, "We Have to Know Them," loc. cit., pp. 71-77.

³²Mr. Kaihara suggested that the JASDF would last about one hour, Ibid., p. 72.

³³JPE Aviation Report, February 1, 1971.

Another area of allocation is the construction of air bases, or the expansion and improvement of those in existence. The JASDF spent 232,000 million yen on facilities construction in the Third DBP, approximately 4 percent of the budget. Yet, the passive defenses of the Japanese air bases were very weak in 1972, as the strongest JASDF supporters admit.³⁴ Dispersal is a natural problem in an island nation, however, even available dispersal areas have not been utilized fully. There were 20 civil airfields in Japan in 1972 which were capable of handling jet airliner traffic, and 29 others which handle local traffic.³⁵ The Air Self-Defense Force maintained some twenty fields, only eleven longer than 6000 feet. Of those eleven, fighter aircraft were based on nine, while the front-line F104's were based at only 4 airfields.

The probability of increased joint-use or other peacetime operational use of civil airfields would appear to be rather remote. They already have been overcrowded; Japan has needed to expand the capacity of many of its minor airports. No program of emergency dispersal has been promulgated although this would be a conceivable alternative. However, it would require more than just paper plans; support equipment, ammunition, and command and communication facilities would have to be provided prior to activation of emergency dispersal plans. Nor are U.S. airbases viable dispersal alternatives; other than Iwakuni and Yokota, Japanese forces already have occupied the major U.S. air bases.

Building new bases is an expensive undertaking. The JASDF has estimated it would cost 8 billion yen to construct an F-4J air wing

³⁴Aoki, Interview, October 20, 1971. Mr. Aoki, among informed viewpoints, has been the strongest defender of ASDF capabilities.

³⁵Masatake Okumiya, Sora Wa Kiken ga Ippai (The Sky is Full of Danger) (Tokyo; Mainichi Shimbun Sha, 1970), p. 96.

installation in 1972 without considering land purchase and leveling costs.³⁶ That was more than has been spent by the ASDF on all their construction projects in any one year and would amount to 35 percent of all monies spent on construction in the Third DBP.

Another construction alternative is hardening, and from the viewpoint of funding, it is the more attractive choice. The air bases have had almost no preparation in this area. They have no aircraft revetments, no separation in the parking areas, no reinforced hangars, no protection for fuel dumps and extremely limited command post facilities. The F-104 bases, for example, have had all aircraft stored in close proximity, either on the line or in an open hangar. One accurate attack would have a high probability of destroying many aircraft, as would one saboteur's blast. Yet, almost no resources had been allocated in this area through the Third DBP.³⁷

The purchase of front-line major equipment has and will continue to occupy the major portion of the JASDF's procurement resources. The Fourth DBP Draft has signalled that the C-46 transports will be replaced by C-1's, the F-86 will be replaced by F-4J and F-4E aircraft; the training fleet will be modernized by T-2's; 2 additional NIKE units will be formed; and new, mobile 3-D radar units will be put into use.³⁸ No mention was made of updating supply procedures or increasing war reserves, nor were additional facilities planned or emergency dispersal procedures funded.

³⁶ Estimates provided by General Yamada, Chief Defense Section, ASO.

³⁷ Mr. Ogawa, Interviews, January 21, 1972, and Mr. Kaihara Interview, November 10, 1971, both criticize JASDF strongly on this point. Mr. Ogawa said that the bases were like "Samurai dolls at the Boy's Day Festival," decorative but not useful.

³⁸ The New Defense Build-up Plan, pp. 6-7.

Major equipment selections do signify policy directions if only because they limit or direct the capabilities of the force structure. There do appear to be principles which have guided the major Air Self-Defense Force procurement programs. The first and perhaps most important rule regards the method of purchase. From the inception of the Defense Agency's contract purchases, they have been effected through licensing agreements, primarily with U.S. manufacturers. The weapons system, or portions of it, are then manufactured in Japan. The resultant per unit price to the government is higher, while the immediate beneficiaries of the policy are economic interests who enjoy the extra business plus spin-off benefits from the advanced technologies. The government bases its policy on the view that a healthy aircraft industry is part of the foundation of national defense, and therefore must be supported and encouraged.

This purchasing method results in less total purchasing power. It is a tradeoff of current defense capacity for a larger, more flexible potential capacity. Japan has demonstrated that it will sacrifice a great deal in order to purchase via license. The F-5 day fighter was first offered to Japan at \$1.3 million per aircraft direct purchase, while their licensing estimates were \$1.7 million per aircraft.³⁹ The F-4 was offered at \$3.5 million while the initial Japanese estimate for manufacturing through license was \$5.1 million. That price now has increased to over \$6 million per aircraft.⁴⁰ Some company executives, who deal with the Japanese regularly, estimate that licensing costs twice as much as direct purchase after manufacturer's and trading company's

³⁹ U.S. Embassy Official.

⁴⁰ JPE Aviation Report, February 1, 1971, p. 3.

profits are included.

The recent controversy over the selection of a new training aircraft (TX) for the ASDF illustrated a new aspect of this industrial emphasis. The foremost early candidate for the TX was the T-38 or F-5B, which was built by Northrop Aircraft Company.⁴¹ Then in early 1967, the concept of home production became an issue when Director-General Matsumo Raizo proposed that the TX be designed and built in Japan.⁴²

Although the JASDF resisted the program because of costs and time delays, the first funds for development were allotted in 1967. At that time, the JASDF still planned an interim purchase of advanced trainers because the TX was not expected to be mass produced before 1974. Then in 1970, XT-2 progress generated pressure to delay any other trainer purchase and buy all T-2's. The JASDF made provisional estimates on purchase costs of 80-90 T-2's and 120 models of a fighter-support version in late 1970, and found that costs would total \$2.8 million per aircraft, nearly double earlier estimates.⁴³ In March 1971, financial difficulties with the Rolls-Royce engines multiplied the cost-overrun problem; by the end of the year, the price had skyrocketed to over \$4.5 million per aircraft.⁴⁴

⁴¹Weinstein, "Japanese Air Self-Defense Force - Restrained, But Powerful," Air Force and Space Digest, December 1967, p. 63, mentions the T-38, but the F-5B, an advanced version of the same basic design, had flown in 1964. The aircraft was referred to as the "2-seat F-5" in response to questions regarding the matter in Japan. The exact model produced probably would have been an adaption of the F-5B.

⁴²Weinstein, "Restrained," loc. cit., p. 63.

⁴³JPE Aviation Report, March 1971, p. 2.

⁴⁴Asahi, March 17, 1971. This was confirmed by JASDF officials.

Despite the problems, plans for production of the T-2 continued although JASDF requested cost estimates on the F-5 in April 1971.⁴⁵ The discussions continued into September 1971 with the uniformed officials insisting that 60-80 training aircraft were necessary to support the pilot training program which in turn would have to support transition to the F-4 aircraft. They proposed a split purchase of F-5's and T-2's. At that point the F-5B under license production would have cost less than one-half the domestically produced T-2.⁴⁶ The aircraft were quite similar, both weigh approximately 20,000 pounds with service ceilings over 50,000 feet. The T-2 was slightly faster, Mach 1.6 as opposed to Mach 1.4, while their range was similar.⁴⁷

The issue was still in doubt in September and the resistance to the Fourth DBP contributed to the pressure to purchase the F-5 as it became apparent that the forthcoming budgets would be cut. As late as September 13, the respected JPE Aviation Report forecast that the "buy Japanese policy" would be reversed.⁴⁸ However, the forces supporting "home production" dominated and on September 25, Director-General Nishimura reported to the Diet that the "buy Japanese" weapons procurement policy would not be altered.⁴⁹ He additionally reported that the scale of the defense plan would be reduced. For the JASDF, the decision meant

⁴⁵JPE Aviation Report, April 26, 1971, p. 1.

⁴⁶Exact estimates vary with source. One senior JASDF General declared that the T-2 was costing three times the F-5. With the changes in the exchange rate this is quite possible with the F-5B costing Y500 million to Y1500 million for the T-2.

⁴⁷John W. R. Taylor, editor, Jane's All the World's Aircraft, 1971-1972 (London, Jane's Yearbooks, 1971), pp. 142, 370-371. Additional XT-2 statistics provided by Ogawa, Interview, January 21, 1972.

⁴⁸September 13, 1971, p. 3.

⁴⁹Ibid., October 4, 1971, p. 2.

their F-5 request had been denied; their "minimum requirement" had been slashed rather than delay purchase of the T-2.

The Defense Agency eventually proposed 36 T-2 aircraft to the Finance Ministry late in 1971. Wing reported that it "was made known to budget officials that the Japanese defense industry had already been ready for the production of the Japanese-designed T-2's."⁵⁰ The Finance Ministry finally agreed to the purchase of 20 T-2's.⁵¹ Inevitable further cuts appeared to leave the JASDF with less than one-half their original program requirements.

The Japanese aircraft industry benefitted from this decision. Design capabilities will be tested against mass production and operational use in addition to the obvious economic benefits. The overall autonomous capability of the industry will be enhanced. The decision-makers displayed their willingness to sacrifice operational capability for potential capacity.

Another guideline for major equipment decisions, although less obvious, reflected Japanese preoccupation with technological advance through procurement policies. The policy has been reflected in the selection of the highest performance, most technologically advanced weapons system units. If this choice were made in terms of an unlimited budget, it also would mean the choice of the highest operational capability vis a vis a particular mission. With a limited budget, the end result may be different. The highest performance weapons system unit may not provide the highest capability if the number of weapon units does not comprise an effective system, or if another portion of the system has

⁵⁰Wing International, January 18, 1972, p. 2.

⁵¹Ibid., p. 5.

suffered because of the unit selection.

When the F-104 was selected in 1959, it was at the forefront of operational aviation technology. Again in 1968, the selection of the F-4E(J) meant that Japan had opted for the most advanced aircraft weapons system. The final selection was made between similar models based on a computer program written by the JASDF. A more basic decision had been reached earlier when the program to select the fighter was chosen.⁵² Mr. Kaihara, then in the JDA, had opposed the F-4, or more accurately the program which would select the aircraft.

His choice of the Northrop F-5 fighter was more than a preference for a different model of aircraft. Figure 9-5 compares the two aircraft and demonstrates the tremendous differences between them. The F-4 was a significantly more flexible weapons system; an extremely high performance interceptor, it also could carry more bombs than a World War II Flying Fortress. The F-5 was also versatile and could be used in ground support, a tactical fighter or interceptor roles. However, its performance in the interceptor mission was limited and would not have represented any unit performance increase over the F-104.

Although there were major differences between the two aircrafts' performance, there was also a startling comparison in the unit cost differential. Mr. Kaihara's proposal can be compared more effectively in terms of the total F-4 program allocations through 1972. Japan had funded a total of 169,386 million yen for the F-4 procurement plan, paying for the licensed production of 102 F-4's. At an assumed cost of 650 million yen per aircraft, Japan could license produce approximately

⁵²See Chapter 7 for a description of the bureaucratic controversy surrounding the choice.

FIGURE 9-5

A Comparison Between the Performance
Characteristics of the F-4E(J) and the F-5E

F-4E(J)		F-5E ¹
54,600 lb.	Weight	24,364 lb.
35,000 lb.	Thrust	10,000 lb.
Mach 2 (+)	Maximum Speed	Mach 1.6
40,000'/sec (+)	Maximum Rate of Climb	35,200'/sec
71,000'	Combat Ceiling	50,000' (+)
16,000 lb.	Military Payload ² (Maximum Weight)	7,000 lb.
4 Sparrow III 4 Sidewinder	Air-to-Air Armament	2 to 6 Sidewinder 2 20mm guns
781 NM	Combat Radius (intercept profile and armament)	250 NM ³
AN-APQ 20 Fire Control System	Radar Equipment	Small Solid-State range/bearing radar
\$6.2 million	Cost ⁴	\$2.1 million

Source: Taylor, Jane's All the World's Aircraft; Captain R. J. Harlow, USN, "Comments on Air Defense in Japan-1971," loc. cit.

¹The F-5E was utilized in this comparison because it is the F-5 model which was designed for sales outside the United States. When the ASDF was considering the FX selection it seems probable that Northrop would have had similar drawing board proposals for development of the basic airframe.

²Ranges at these payloads would be very limited, approximately 250 NM for the F-4 and 100-150 NM for the F-5 with a hi-lo-hi profile.

³Approximate.

⁴The cost used for the F-4 was based on a 1971 JDA estimate and cost for the F-5 was based on Northrop selling price (\$1.6 million), multiplied by a factor of 1.35, similar to calculation of previous JDA estimates of F-5 licensing costs.

260 F-5's or directly purchase 340 F-5's.⁵³ More realistically, the purchase of 150 to 180 aircraft would leave additional resources for other areas of allocation which have been neglected.

The F-5 also would alleviate other weaknesses already mentioned. It is a much lighter aircraft and is designed to operate from shorter, more varied airfields. The F-5 would lower the cost of an emergency dispersal program and reduce the vulnerability of the JASDF in this area. Because more aircraft could be purchased, there would be greater mission flexibility. For example, aircraft could be diverted to counter-attack missions without degrading the continuity of the air defense posture.

The lower vulnerability and greater flexibility of such a program could not be achieved without cost. The air defense mission perhaps would suffer to some degree, at least in the interception capability of individual aircraft.⁵⁴ There would be less flexibility in aircraft industry potential.

The industrial benefits from the more advanced aircraft, and concentration on procurement were obvious. The reasons for air force support of the F-4 were less clear. Mr. Kaihara contended that the uniformed officers simply choose the "best and biggest" aircraft.⁵⁵

⁵³Those comparisons are reached using the figures quoted in Figure 9-5 and budget allocations announced in JDA, Outline of Cabinet Approved JFY 1971 Budget. The current exchange standard of 308 Yen/1\$ is used,

⁵⁴The JASDF air defense capability will be discussed in detail in Chapter 10. Mr. Kaihara pointed out that with the limited scope of the radar network in Japan, the F-4 performance cannot be utilized effectively. The F-5 intercept point would be within 20NM of the F-4. While he was correct to 50,000 feet, there would remain lesser kill probability because of the less sophisticated F-5 weaponry. Interview, February 29, 1972.

⁵⁵Interview, February 29, 1972.

That may explain some of the air force officer's attitudes, however many officers have seriously considered strategic options available to the JASDF within its limited budget. The F-4 selection may sacrifice a limited operational flexibility, but it has preserved a wider range of potential options. An expanded fleet of F-4 aircraft could provide a much broader counter-attack capability and could be integrated into a wider air defense system which might utilize its extended intercept capacity. These options do not necessarily contribute to any current operational capability; they do enhance the ability to expand to other roles.⁵⁶

There are other allocation procedures which suggest that the JASDF has been more interested in a wider range of options than a comprehensive local war capacity. Budget cuts normally have been made horizontally. No program has been completely eliminated, but only reduced, which indicates that the JASDF has been reluctant to close any option. The procedures also expose the problem which has faced the defense planner. Within the budget limitations which exist, the planner may either strike a balance between major equipments, training and logistical support; or he may emphasize only one of these aspects of operational readiness. Mr. Ogawa Raita concluded that readiness has been neglected in the past due to emphasis on major equipment and the Fourth DBP has indicated the same attitude will prevail through 1976.⁵⁷ He contended that unless the other aspects of operational readiness receive more balanced

⁵⁶Harlow, "Comments on Air Defense," p. 7, adds another reason for the F-4 which is not related to latent capabilities. The F-4 enhances the U.S. reentry capability because the aircraft is compatible with U.S. front-line fighters meaning some rudimentary support equipment would be in place.

⁵⁷"Koku Jeitai No Mondai Ten" (Problems of the ASDF), Koku Shimbun, January 12, 1972. (editorial).

treatment, no capability will exist and manpower and money should not be wasted on pseudo-readiness procedures such as standing alert. The uniformed planners might reply that the ASDF budget has been so small that a balanced application of resources would provide a minute force irrelevant to Japan's needs.

Training and support functions have received little priority in the allocation of resources. Training, although very important to the JASDF, has received little funding support, particularly if training requirements contravened other goals as in the T-2 selection. Logistical support has been neglected and the resulting war reserve seriously detracts from any effective operational stature.

Not only has the development of major weapons systems units dominated resource allocations, the methods of choosing those units also has emphasized the potential side of the force structure and its industrial support. The Fourth DBP has indicated that the characteristics of policy suggested by resource allocations to date will remain firm in the ensuing five years.

OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY

The nature and extent of the resources available to the Air Self-Defense Force have been examined in the preceeding two chapters. The allocation and application of personnel and budgetary assets help to define the principles which guide the JASDF. The force structure which results is primarily dedicated to the application of air power within the national defense structure.

The capacity of that air power force structure in the execution of various missions may further clarify the defense policy principles being applied in Japan. An assessment of the measures taken to provide a ready force structure, and the priority assigned various missions within the structure define the capability of the Air Self-Defense Force. The emphasis of certain capabilities or the disregard of others serves to reinforce or disprove the Japanese defense policy objectives which have been postulated.

It is necessary to add that such a deduction is true only if the decision-makers are aware of the actual capability of the defense force. There are indications that political leaders are not fully aware of real defense capacities, however, both the civilian and military bureaucracies are familiar with any weaknesses.

The criticism of informed commentators such as Ogawa Raita of Koku Shimbun and Aoki Hideo of Koku Joho is widely read. Secretary-General Kaihara's critical attitude towards the JASDF's capability is well known, and he, of course, has direct access to the National Defense Council. Therefore, one must assume that the relevant decision-makers

have been aware of air force capabilities and those capabilities reflect their policy priorities, not their ignorance.

There are five distinct missions which may be utilized to categorize the major theoretical air power contributions to the use of military power. They include reconnaissance/intelligence, mobility/supply, air-to-ground attack, air-to-naval attack, and air-to-air attack missions. Each of these operational areas will be perused in detail, however one aspect of operations which bears on any military mission must be examined first. Command is that essential process by which collective force is directed.

Command Network

Aron includes the "collective capacity for action" among his three fundamental elements of power.¹ At the time military force is applied, that collective capacity will be expressed in terms of leadership. The uncertainty involved in assessing leadership is a significant factor in the general uncertainty of war. Any definitive attempt to define Japanese leadership necessarily would include some discussion of the Japanese character including psychological and sociological evaluations. Such a discussion is outside the scope of this study.

However, one aspect of command may be assessed before it is implemented. Any governmental system establishes some relationship between itself, the state which it represents and the national military force. From that arrangement to the communication channels between operating units, there are levels, methods and procedures of command which are the framework in which command will be exercised. The nature

¹Aron, Peace and War, p. 54.

of that command network will directly affect the operational capacity of the force structure.

The first unusual aspect of the Japanese command network is at its apex. The Emperor is the symbol of Japan, not only because Article 1 of the Constitution declared it, but because he symbolizes the great national unity and pride which is Japan. It is rather unusual that the Emperor, the symbol of Japan, has had no relationship to the Japanese Defense Forces.

Moreover, the Defense Forces have had a unique relationship with the executive power, which is vested in the Cabinet. Boeicho is an agency rather than a ministry, Boei-sho. Because of its status, Boeicho is one step removed from the executive and faces an extra layer of civilian control or command. Figure 10-1 illustrates the effect of agency status in the Japanese parliamentary system.


The Prime Minister occupies two distinct levels of command; one as head of the Cabinet, and one as head of the Prime Minister's Office. Article 7 of the Self-Defense Forces Law refers to the Prime Minister as the "supreme commander and supervisor of the Self-Defense Forces," because he represents the Cabinet.² Article 8 declares that the "Director General shall, subject to the authority of the Prime Minister, direct the functions of the Self-Defense Forces."³ Here the Prime Minister derives his authority from his executive role as director of Sorifu, the Prime Minister's Office.

²Official Translation. These and other discussions of the legal aspects of JDA posture rely heavily on interviews with Mr. Kosuge Hironaka, Civilian, JASDF, Chief of Legal Branch, ASO, December 13, 1971, and particularly on Major Torino Masaru, JASDF, Legal Branch, ASO, December 13, 1971, February 14, 1972, March 6, 1972.

³Ibid.

FIGURE 10-1

JASDF Chain of Command



Chapter II of the Self-Defense Forces Law deals with the roles of the Prime Minister, Director-General and Chief of Staff in the command network. Article 7 gives "command and supervisory" powers to the Prime Minister and Article 8 gives powers of "command and supervision" to the Director-General.⁴ However, Article 9 does not authorize the Chief of Staff to command the JASDF; he is only directed to "supervise the functions and personnel, assist the Director-General, and execute the (Director-General's) orders."⁵ The Chief of Staff's role in the command process has a vague legal basis, questioning the legal existence of a uniformed leader. The situation is unique because Article 8 instructs the Director-General to operate through the appropriate Chief of Staff.

What is the actual situation? Mr. Masuhara Keikichi, former Director General, declared that "I only commanded one man in the Air Self-Defense Force."⁶ General Ishikawa Kanshi, Chief of Staff, JASDF, agreed: "I personally believe that I command my Air Self-Defense Force."⁷ On the other hand, General Ishikawa acknowledged that the Chief of Staff has no legal authority to command his units, and that the situation was vague at best.⁸

Within the JASDF, the command network is rather straight forward. The commanding officers of the major commands operate subject to the command and the supervision of the Director-General, as would be expected. The commands do not overlap and problems of concurrent

⁴Self-Defense Forces Law, official translation.

⁵Ibid., Article 9, paragraphs 1, 2, and 3.

⁶Interview, February 19, 1972.

⁷Interview, February 17, 1972.

⁸Ibid.

commanders or internal conflicts over operational control have been insignificant. There is, in fact, only one operational command, the Air Defense Command (ADC). The Reconnaissance Group is within the ADC, and the Transport Wing and Air Rescue Group, though independent, are not considered major commands.

Another important aspect of higher echelon command is joint, or inter-service command, although not all agree to its relevance in Japan. There are some who argue that any conventional use of force against Japan would be preceded by air attack.⁹ If the air attacks were repulsed, there would be little likelihood that the armed attack would continue. It therefore is unnecessary to emphasize joint commands to defend against integrated attacks.

A policy of this nature is particularly risky in warfare. Whatever the policy's theoretical value, it is, in colloquial terms, putting all one's eggs in one basket. Moreover, the theory is materially suspect in the Japanese case. Military force against Japan would be undertaken to accomplish political goals. It is doubtful that conventional warfare tacticians would rely on general indiscriminate bombing. Not only would such tactics require considerable time to achieve success; they also would be more likely to elicit external intervention. If the military goal is an integrated attack to take territory, then a phased attack to achieve air superiority first would be necessary only if air superiority were critical to the attack's success. Air superiority is critical if the defender can take advantage of his control of the air to repel attacks on the ground or sea. To do that, the defender must be capable of coordinating

⁹Perhaps the major proponent of this theory out of uniform is Aoki Hideo, editor of Koku Joho (Aireview), Interview, October 20, 1971. See numerous articles listed in bibliography for more detailed exposition of his views.

air power operations with relevant naval or ground forces. There are exceptions, but it would appear, therefore, that joint commands are theoretically important to the Japanese defense posture.

Joint command requirements are much more than theoretical needs as one analyst noted:

As far as the 4th DBP is concerned, the army will continue to be denied a specialized tactical air arm which would be built around fixed-wing battle-field support aircraft of its own. In other words, it will continue to depend on the Air Self-Defense Force for such needs; the air force will continue to be committed for full-fledged aerial support for not only the army but also the navy, at least in the 4th DBP.¹⁰

The need for better cooperation has been recognized in the ASDF; an Air Ground Operations School has been in operation for approximately three years. Its two-month course is given twice each year to pilots, ground control intercept (GCI) controllers and GSDF officers.¹¹ Map reading, aircraft armaments and forward air control tactics are among the subjects taught.

Although this course represents a step towards joint operations, the opportunities for practice have remained very slim. The F-86 wing based at Matsushima has been dedicated to the fighter support mission, yet on the average it has operated with the MSDF less than 6 times per year. Among young pilots based there for two years, one had one sortie against a ship, another had none. Even communications between the MSDF and ASDF are limited. General Okumiya pointed out that an ASDF reconnaissance aircraft with pictures of a convoy would land at an ASDF base where no

¹⁰JPE Aviation Report, December 7, 1970, p. 2.

¹¹The school is located at Matsushima Air Base. MSDF sends one instructor but no students. Interviews with Major Matsui, and Lieutenants Iwasaki Katsuhiko and Tanaka Iwaki at Matsushima, January 18-19, 1972.

one could analyze the pictures. There were no joint operations centers in 1971 and the pictures would have to be physically transported to a naval headquarters before the information could be utilized.¹²

The lack of coordination has resulted in some unfortunate incidents, one of which has hampered joint operations even further. On March 9 and 10, 1971, ASDF F-86 fighters were scheduled to practice attacking a Japanese destroyer in the Sea of Japan. They arrived on March 10 and carried out their attacks, only to discover that mistakes of navigation and identification had led them to attack a Soviet ship.¹³ The Defense Agency did not report the incident immediately and when the issue was raised in the Diet, it caused a sensation in the Japanese press. The Defense Agency already had apologized to the Soviet Union over the incident; however, the furor in the Diet resulted in further restrictions on joint exercises.

Large-scale operations between the services have been the target of Diet criticism after the Mitsuya Kenkyu controversy in 1965. The continuing criticism has reduced joint efforts to communications exercises although joint plans continue to be written. The lack of cooperation between the services and the difficulties experienced in joint exercises suggest that the joint command structure is inadequate.

Primary responsibility for joint training, joint operation and joint planning lies with the Joint Staff Council (JSC). It has been specifically charged with assisting the Director-General in the following tasks:

- (1) Preparation of Joint Defense Plans and coordination of defense plans prepared by the staff offices;

¹²Okumiya, Interview, November 18, 1971.

¹³General Takahashi, Interview, December 6, 1971; Mainichi, April 21, 1971, The Japan Times, April 23, 1971.

(2) Formulation of policies for Joint-Training Plans and coordination of policies for training plans prepared by the staff offices;

(3) Basic policy, and unification and coordination, of command orders to the Self-Defense Forces at the time of operation;

(4) Operational command and orders issued by the Director-General to special units which are composed of units of any two or more of the ground, the Maritime and the Air Self-Defense Forces...¹⁴

The final task was assigned pursuant to Article 22 of the Self-Defense Forces Law which provided that defense operations undertaken by the SDF which involve more than one service may be commanded by the Chairman of the Joint Staff Council.

Yet, the Joint Staff Council is extremely weak. The Chairman has very limited authority and each chief of staff possesses veto powers on matters under his cognizance. Efforts have been made to strengthen the JSC. The Council already has begun work on the Fifth DBP, hoping to take the initiative in that area. Officers assigned to the JSC have been encouraged to "take their uniforms off" and work there to develop a broader concept of military operations.¹⁵ Despite those steps, many senior officers suspect that the JSC will continue to be weak.

Part of the Council's problem has been its manning procedures. It has had no power of selection, but has relied completely on the individual staff offices. Balance between the branches has been stressed, and the men assigned to the Council have been aware that they would return to their parent service where, in all likelihood, their performance would be judged on the benefits which accrued to the parent

¹⁴Defense Agency Establishment Law, June 9, 1954 as amended, official translation, Article 26.

¹⁵General Ito, Interview, December 9, 1971.

service.

Additionally, the civilian leadership has been aware that a strengthened JSC might usurp some powers previously held within the internal bureaus, and they have opposed strengthening the organization. The problem is illustrated in the process of budgetary formulation where the JSC has been almost completely excluded while the services deal individually with the civilian bureaus.

Even within the uniformed services, some oppose a strengthened joint command. The GSDF would like their own tactical aviation to provide for ground support; the MSDF would like to have aircraft for air defense and surface attack. They have felt that these air power functions would be most effective under their own command and have hesitated to support the development of joint commands which might decrease the probability that their own air forces would continue to develop.

The GSDF's HAWK air defense missiles are one example of the situation. They have been considered part of the air defense system of Japan. The Air Defense Command (ADC) is an ASDF command, but the HAWK missiles have been under GSDF control. The units have not been under the ADC's command, and have been attached only through a communication line with a "liaison officer" in ADC headquarters. The GSDF has advocated the use of HAWK as a field air defense weapon, and wish to move them to forward areas in the event of operations. Therefore, the short-range point defense portion of the ADC system has not been under the command of the ADC and doubts exist about its availability in the event of an emergency.¹⁶

¹⁶General Takahashi, Interview, December 6, 1971. Another example of the difficulty in effecting joint commands or any structural shifts is the Search and Air Rescue services in Japan. Four separate and often redundant SAR organizations exist: army, navy, air force and civilian. Despite the logic of integration in this area, all attempts have been repulsed and the organizations will remain independent through the 4th DBP.

This situation has arisen because a joint command network has not been developed. Plans may have been written to effect such commands if the situation required, but a secret plan is no substitute for an established network where various operational units have knowledge and experience in operations under such a system. The absence of any such system would be a serious handicap in the event joint operations became necessary.

Possible military actions in Asia would be affected by overlapping defense treaties and similar security arrangements, and an additional complexity of command must be considered. Unified commands, or international command networks, are established to facilitate operations involving two or more national forces.

The problem of Japanese security has most often been discussed in terms of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty. Military operations taken pursuant to that treaty probably would require operational coordination which raises the problem of unified U.S.-Japan command provisions. The need for such provisions became apparent in the early stages of the JASDF's development, and the U.S. Fifth Air Force proposed a detailed plan for integration of JASDF-USAF operations in 1957.¹⁷ Efforts for the closer integration of operations continued in the 1960's, but with little success.¹⁸

The Murphy-Okazaki Notes of January 13 and 16, 1953, have remained in effect as an addendum to the Security Treaty and they reiterated the U.S. commitment in terms of Japan's air defense. They did not, however, provide for any methods or procedures whereby such a commitment could be

¹⁷ Fifth Air Force History, July to December 1957, provided by Office of Air Force History, Fifth Air Force, Japan, p. 422.

¹⁸ General Ura, Interview, December 23, 1971.

implemented. The only agreement of this nature was signed on September 2, 1959, by Lieutenant General Robert W. Burns, USAF, and Lieutenant General Matsumae Misoo, JASDF. The Burns-Matsumae document was entitled the "Agreement for Conduct of Air Defense of Japan."¹⁹

This agreement was "designed to facilitate operations of these two national air forces as one cohesive air defense system." All levels of command were directed to "coordinate" with his national opposite and communication networks were shared, but each retained the right to take unilateral action and coordinate later. In reality, it was an agreement not to agree:

United States and Japan National policy, at this time, dictates that command of military forces of either country should only be exercised through national command channels; therefore 5AF and JADC shall retain their respective national chain of command.²⁰

There has never been any unified command network; neither procedures nor command relationships have been resolved.

The Japanese public has been extremely sensitive to any joint command arrangement for fear that it would spell U.S. military domination and result in the use of Japanese forces against the government's wishes. In 1953, the Mutual Security Agreement (MSA) negotiations were delayed until the U.S. government gave public assurance that military aid would not require Japan to use its forces "except in self-defense."²¹

¹⁹Text provided by William R. Barret, USAF, Planning Division, Fifth Air Force, Japan, interview, February 2, 1972.

²⁰Ibid., the Burns-Matsumae agreement remains in effect today.

²¹New York Times, June 27, 1953, p. 2., also see New York Times January 16, 1953, and March 15, 1953, for reports of the Japanese reaction.

The absence of a national security law in Japan has also hampered the establishment of unified command procedures or unified operations. Due to sensitivity to individual rights, particularly the freedom of expression guaranteed in Article 21 of the Japanese Constitution, it would seem a remote possibility that one might be passed. Article 59 of the Self-Defense Forces Law provided for the protection of information, but the remainder of the population has remained free to publish any information regardless of classification or sensitivity. That freedom has been practiced with great abandon, particularly by the press and the opposition parties.

The one possible constraint to publication of security information resulted from the Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement (MDAA) of March 8, 1954, in which Japan agreed to protect secrets released in conjunction with the military aid program. However, the law has not been used in a conviction, and there were and continue to be doubts that it would or will be enforced. The security problem restricted training in the operational training programs initiated by the USAF, it hampered the operational turnover of air defense responsibilities to Japan, and it restricted cooperation between the two air forces.²²

Perhaps the major problem in effecting a unified command lay in Japan's unwillingness to establish Rules of Engagement. This was specifically cited in the Burns-Matsumae Agreement:

Interceptor Operation. Interceptor Operations will be performed in accordance with standard operating procedures;

²²Walter S. Higuchi, Historical Study of JASDF Training in the Northern Air Defense Sector, prepared under authority of 39th Air Division, Fifth Air Force, Pacific Air Force, USAF, undated (1966), approximately 170 pages, provided by Office of Air Force History, 5 AF, Japan "Joint Operations," pp. 19-27.

however, JADC interceptors will abide by JASDF Rules of Interception and 5AF interceptors will abide by PACAF Rules of Engagement. Any decision to engage must be made by the respective national commander delegated authority to commit interceptors in action to engage.²³

Authority to engage has not been delegated in the Japanese system. No standards have been established by which Japanese interceptors may fire, even after bombs have been dropped on Japan.²⁴ The ADC must await the order of the Prime Minister.

This has not only affected the U.S.-Japan command relationship, but autonomous Japanese capability. The restriction obviously could be lifted in an emergency, but it has had two harmful effects. No standards for operational practice may be applied with certainty, which could cause confusion in the event mobilization occurred. Secondly, the restrictions have had a psychological effect on the pilots: if there are no conditions which allow them to attack an intruder, what is their mission and why do they sit on alert pads around Japan?²⁵ As a result, they are a police force rather than a defense force, possessing only the authority to shoot in their personal self-defense. This has been one of the few areas where senior JASDF commanders have not hesitated to disagree publicly with current practice.²⁶

Another problem within the autonomous command network has been the status of emergency mobilization procedures. Article 103 of the Self-Defense

²³"Agreement for Conduct of Air Defense of Japan", p. 3.

²⁴General Takahashi, Commander JADC, Interview, December 6, 1971.

²⁵Ibid.

²⁶See for example Chuck Brown, "Russ Have Edge on Japan Planes," Stars and Stripes, March 4, 1970, which quotes JASDF officers complaining of the situation.



Forces Law has been the only legal basis for mobilization steps such as administration of installations, use of land or other properties, the drafting of civilian assistance, and the expropriation of properties. While the article might be relied on for authority in some forms of mobilization, it has provided very little procedural guidance. It does refer to certain articles of the National Disaster Relief Law, Law Number 118 of 1947, but these provisions go only slightly beyond the generalities of Article 103.²⁷ The article also declares that Cabinet Orders will be issued to establish procedures for mobilization; as of 1971, no Cabinet Order on the subject had been issued. There have been efforts from time to time, and the last drafting was done under the authority of Director-General Masuda who served during 1967 and 1968.²⁸ No work on a Cabinet Order was underway in 1971.

There are other laws which could provide the framework for mobilization procedures. One related document is a Basic Law of National Mobilization which was passed by the Diet in 1966.²⁹ Diet discussions specifically excepted it from application to defense mobilization; however, it does provide for disaster control teams, fire fighting squads, and first aid squads. Also included are measures for control of an emergency broadcast system, and an emergency transportation and supply system.³⁰ It authorizes nothing, but has established a limited framework for executing some related emergency measures.

²⁷The applicable articles are 23.2 paragraphs 1, 2, 3; 24, paragraphs 1-5; 25; and 29.

²⁸Major Torino, Interview, February 10, 1972.

²⁹The law was pointed out to me by a Defense Agency official when I suggested that there were no provisions for emergency mobilization.

³⁰Articles 31-35, 109.



Air Force planners have concerned themselves with possible measures in the event of mobilization. For example, they have maintained close relations with Japan's major overseas carrier, Japan Air Lines (JAL), and been aware of its plans and operations.³¹ Regular conferences consider matters of common interest. A former JASDF Chief of Staff was an advisor to JAL and maintained a desk in the JAL operations center. The JASDF has kept abreast of JAL plans and operations, and knows the average number of aircraft overseas in the event a need arose for emergency logistical support.³²

Although measures cited above have had some application and ad hoc plans have been at least discussed, the defense mobilization procedures have remained less than satisfactory. Attempts to apply the Basic Mobilization Law or to draft emergency laws could cause difficult controversies when the emergency was at hand. The ill-fated Mitsuya Kenkyu study dealt with mobilization requirements; it concluded that the mobilization capacity was insufficient.³³ Current mobilization procedures have not improved substantially; emergency air combat supply measures have remained inadequate.³⁴ No integrated, nation-wide communications system suitable for military use has been established.³⁵

The emergency command and control network and related mobilization procedures, political and military, have been poorly defined and would

³¹Captain Kimoto Eijii, Director, Senior Flight Crew Office, Japan Air Lines, Interview, December 7, 1971.

³²Kimoto, Interview, December 7, 1971. Aoki, Interview, October 20, 1971. JAL now has 65 aircraft including 11 or 12 747's; 35 or more 747's are planned.

³³General Ogawa, Interview, March 4, 1972.

³⁴General Sato, Interview, February 28, 1972.

³⁵Nippon No Anzen Hosho, p. 178.

provide little guidance in a defense emergency.

Intelligence and Reconnaissance

One basic difficulty in a defensive posture lies in the advantage of initiative which accrues to the attacker. Accurate intelligence estimates and thorough reconnaissance can help to blunt the disadvantage of a defensive position. The intelligence gathering functions become even more crucial in the event the force structure is not operationally ready in some respects. Time to mobilize and augment the force structure may be obtained only through adequate warning.

The Japanese have recognized this requirement, and Director-General Nakasone emphasized the need for good intelligence to make autonomous defense a reality. He declared that "Japan's posture may be likened to that of a porcupine with the long ears of a rabbit."³⁶

Recent plans proposed by Nakasone included centralization of the intelligence process, using the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency as an example. Each service was to retain tactical collection capacities; however, long-range collection and analysis was to be directed by a civilian office with status similar to the Joint Staff Office and attached to the Joint Staff Council. It would be headed by a civilian and would have its work reviewed by an Intelligence Evaluation Committee led by the Administrative Vice-Minister.³⁷

This plan was met by resistance from all three services. Each feared that its special interests would suffer in the process of integration. Additionally, the uniformed personnel were unwilling to turn over another

³⁶ Nakasone, Perspective of the Defense of Japan, p. 8.

³⁷ Yomiuri, July 5, 1970; Mainichi, May 29, 1971; JPE Aviation Report, July 26, 1971.

facet of military operations to the civilian sector of the JDA. After Nakasone left the JDA, the pressure for centralized intelligence decreased and almost no progress towards integration has occurred.

The "long ears of the rabbit" had not become very long by 1971. The JDA maintained 18 defense attaches overseas; however, they reported directly to the Foreign Ministry. Only after the Foreign Ministry reviewed their reports would relevant data be forwarded to the Defense Agency. Intelligence funding has been quite limited and the intelligence community has relied heavily on the United States.

Japan's physical proximity to China and the Soviet Union has enabled it to use passive techniques in intelligence gathering, including electronic intelligence. The passive, listening techniques have been well suited to JASDF efforts in radar or other electronic analysis. The growing overseas communities of Japanese also have provided a human source of information. Even the limited amounts of data which the Japanese gather independently, often depend on United States analysis for effective application.³⁸

The one reconnaissance squadron has been equipped with 20 RF-86F's. The aircraft is basically the F-86 of Korean war vintage with cameras rather than guns. It is quite outdated, flies more slowly than most civil airliners today, and has no Electronic Counter Measures (ECM) or Electronic Counter Counter-Measures (ECCM) capability.

The F-86 has no independent navigation system, nor does it have the range to be an effective offshore reconnaissance weapon. The MSDF must

³⁸This is not to say that the individual intelligence officers are not capable. They are very professional and well aware of their shortages, but analysis relies on sophisticated equipment which has not been funded. Nor is their reliance on the U.S. a one way street as the U.S. has access to the raw data which they are analyzing for the Japanese.

rely on their P-2 and PS-1 patrol aircraft for maritime reconnaissance. While those aircraft are capable of operating against submarines and unarmed ships, they are helpless against warships. Were the RF-86 to locate a ship and photograph it, the film would not be utilized effectively. The JASDF has not been capable of analysis, and no communications network has been established to transmit these data from air force bases to naval headquarters. The RF-86 could not be expected to have any operational effectiveness outside a close support tactical reconnaissance role.

The RF-86 will be replaced by fourteen RF-4E aircraft which Japan hopes to buy in 1972. The original JASDF request for 21 was first cut to 18 and then 14. The RF-4 will give the JASDF a new generation of reconnaissance aircraft and will enhance their capability, although the small number of aircraft limits the scope and versatility of operations.³⁹

Japan, therefore, will continue to possess a limited intelligence capacity and tactical reconnaissance capability. Both of these functions are basic to autonomous defense. The ears of the rabbit are more predilection than reality.

Mobility-Supply

Aircraft can provide rapid transshipment of men and supplies enhancing the force structure's capability for surprise and flexibility. This mobility may be tactical or strategic, ranging from intra-battlefield transport to inter-continental transport.

³⁹Tachibana Masateru, "Senryaku-Senjutsu Teisatsu to Nippon no Boku" (Strategic and Tactical Reconnaissance and Japan's Air Defense), Gunji Kenkyu (Japan Military Review), December 1971, pp. 94-95.

The GSDF has provided its own intra-battlefield transport, primarily with helicopters. In December 1971, the GSDF inventory included 90 multi-mission, medium capacity helicopters and 30 large transport helicopters. The Fourth DBP tentatively authorized 11 more multi-purpose craft and 4 more transports.⁴⁰ The Chief of Staff of the GSDF was quoted as saying "the strengthening of air mobility" is a major pillar of the Fourth DBP.⁴¹ It has appeared that the GSDF will continue to dominate the intra-battlefield aspect of aviation-based mobility.⁴²

The Japanese force structure has had no capability for long-range, inter-continental mobility. The JASDF Transport Wing consisted of 40 C-46, 10 YS-11 and 2 C-1 aircraft in 1971. The C-46 is pre-World War II vintage and was being phased out of operations. The YS-11 is a Japanese-designed aircraft, built primarily as a commercial carrier. With a 11,900 pound pay load, the operating range is approximately 670 nautical miles (NM). If the payload is decreased to 7800 pounds, the range may be extended to 1200 nautical miles.⁴³ The YS-11 may be operated from

⁴⁰Wing International, January 18, 1972, p. 5.

⁴¹Wing Shimbum, General Nakamura in Interview; p. 10.

⁴²The GSDF's emphasis on airborne mobility has been criticized by some observers who note that the GSDF does not have enough anti-aircraft armament, cannons, or even mortars and pistols. Yet, airborne mobility is useless without air superiority. These views were expressed by Mr. Aoki and Mr. Taoka in "Tokubetsu az Dandai 4 Jibo no Kobu Keikaku or Kiru" (Special Discussion: Review of the Aviation Portion of the 4th Defense Build-up Plan), panel discussion, Koku Joho, (Aireview), January 1972, pp. 75-76. Mr. Kaihara also criticized the GSDF priorities in "We Have to Know Them as Well as Ourselves," pp. 59-63, and noted that the GSDF has many helicopters but only enough machine gun bullets for 11 minutes of sustained firing per gun. Another reason for this priority could be the GSDF's expectation that the helicopters could be later converted to an attack mission, see discussion of air-to-ground attack, infra.

⁴³The maximum pay load is approximately 15000 lbs. (depending on model and configuration), but range is less than 200 NM with reserve fuel and 600 NM to dry tanks with that load.

short runways as it only requires 4300 feet of operating length.

The JASDF has planned to replace the aging C-46 with the C-1, a short-haul military cargo aircraft designed and built in Japan. This aircraft is capable of using short, unpaved fields, and can drop paratroops and palletized vehicles. The C-1, although larger than the YS-11, still faces range limitations. The aircraft cannot carry its maximum payload, approximately 10 tons, from Hokkaido to Kyushu.⁴⁴

Moreover, the inventory requirements generated by the JASDF received an extensive, if common, trimming. Initially, 50 C-1's were contemplated by the uniformed planners. However, the number proposed dropped to "at least 40" of which 4 would be pre-production models.⁴⁵ During October 1970, the number dropped to 32, then "about 30" during 1971 as the Fourth DBP Draft was written.⁴⁶ Of the 22 aircraft proposed in the 1972 budget, 11 were approved.⁴⁷ The JASDF faced the prospect of further pressure on the overall Fourth DBP, and it appeared unlikely that the cuts would be restored later.

Mobilization capacity will remain doubtful during the period of the Fourth Defense Build-up Plan. The JASDF will be operating between 20 and 30 transport aircraft. If pipeline requirements and operational readiness maintenance limitations are considered, the capacity of the entire fleet will be less than 200 tons per mission over 700 nautical mile staging. The Ground Self-Defense Force, because of its small size and its deployment,

⁴⁴JPE Aviation Report, October 19, 1970, p. 4. Ranges: approx. 650 NM at 9.6 tons, 1100 NM at 6.5 tons and 1600 NM at 2.6 tons.

⁴⁵Ibid., October 5, 1970, p. 4.

⁴⁶Ibid., October 19, 1970, p. 3, and May 10, 1971, p. 5.

⁴⁷Wing International, January 18, 1972, p. 5; 1 YS-11 transport was approved for the MSDF which has a limited logistical capability of less than ten aircraft.

would require a rapid reaction if it faced an assault at an unexpected area of the home islands, however, the Air Transport Wing would not provide significant mobility.

Air-to-Ground Attack

The first two categories of aviation power considered do not apply force directly, but perform supporting roles which facilitate the use of force. The final three missions are divisions of one concept, the direct application of force with an aerodynamic weapons system. There obviously is more than one way to categorize the missions of attack aircraft. Missions may be divided by range, strategic or tactical; by individual targets, another aircraft or missile; or by the medium of the target, ground, sea or air.

This last division is particularly appropriate for Japan. There have been no strategic attack forces in post-war Japan, at least in the sense that no Japanese weapons system has had the capability to attack the homeland of an adversary. Therefore, a strategic-tactical categorization has little relevance. In addition to its air defense mission, the JASDF has had a responsibility for support of the GSDF and the MSDF. Those responsibilities correspond to air-to-sea and air-to-ground divisions.

Army support can require two different attack missions, interdiction or close support. Interdiction, or attacks on ground-based supply lines, would be relatively unimportant in the Japanese case. The attacker's supply lines would be on the sea until late in a losing war. Therefore, the primary ground attack mission for the air force has been close air support, direct attacks in support of army movements.

Four of the seven F-86 squadrons in the JASDF have trained for the surface attack role which includes both ground and maritime support.



Approximately 100 F-86F fighters have been dedicated to such missions, however, maintenance limitations would lower the number of operational aircraft available.

The pilots flying in the F-86 fighter-support squadrons do train differently from their counterparts in F-86 fighter-interceptor squadrons. They emphasize tactical support, air-to-ground gunnery and various bombing deliveries rather than the air-to-air phases of combat.⁴⁸ Live practice in the support missions has been limited; the wing at Matsushima, for example, has had an average five periods per year with the ground forces. During those practice periods, the pilots have the chance to operate with forward air controllers on simulated missions using cameras.

The F-86 does not have great flexibility as a fighter-support aircraft. It is an old airplane, and stress limitations have been lowered on the airframe as structural weaknesses appear. A standard weapons load for the F-86 could include 2 1000 lb. bombs, 14 2.5 inch rockets, and 1800 rounds of .50-calibre ammunition. With this load, its combat radius would be 200 NM with five minutes on station.⁴⁹ F-86's based on the northern tip of Honshu at Misawa Air Base could not reach the northern half of Hokkaido. Unless they could operate from Chitose Air Base, the only suitable field in Hokkaido, airborne support would be very limited in the event Hokkaido was invaded in the north.

⁴⁸The F-86 fighter-interceptor squadrons do include some support missions in their annual requirements. The F-104 squadrons do no air-to-surface practice and it is doubtful that they could have any value in a supporting role.

⁴⁹F-104 performance is less satisfactory here, as it has a 100 NM radius (hi-lo-hi) of action on a bombing mission. This, coupled with the high loss rate when using the F-104 as a ground-support aircraft explains why the Japanese have not used the F-104 in such a role.



Close air support requires the closest cooperation between airborne and ground forces, and this has proven difficult in Japan. The ASDF has had no operational command chain dedicated to this role. Air Support Operations Centers (ASOC) have been established in the three regional sectors of the Air Defense Command and the JASDF has envisioned these posts as liaison centers with the GSDF and the MSDF in the event of emergency. As with the internal chain of command, establishing an effective network of command and liaison in an emergency is an extremely difficult task. As has been noted, joint practice periods have been limited, and larger joint maneuvers have been even less frequent.

One of the underlying factors behind the lack of cooperation may be the GSDF's desire for their own airborne support. They have studied the adaption of their helicopter fleet to gunships and rocket platforms, and one of the design goals of the new Japanese helicopter will be an improved weapons delivery platform.⁵⁰ The GSDF leadership has been well aware of ASDF limitations in the ground support role and has believed that the ideal airborne support force should be under an integrated command. This has not become an official GSDF position, but it would appear possible that they might take such a stand in the future.⁵¹ Part of the GSDF's emphasis on multi-role helicopters could be based on the 'secondary' mission of close air support.

⁵⁰ JPE Aviation Report, October 5, 1970, p. 6, and December 7, 1970, p. 2.

⁵¹ General Muraoka, GSDF, Interview, December 20, 1971. They might be supported by the MSDF who also has aspired to its tactical air arm, infra. Such a development would relegate the JASDF to one direct combat mission, air defense. The GSDF has evaluated fixed-wing support aircraft such as the North-American OV-10 and Hawker-Siddeley Harrier (V/STOL).



The ASDF has pinned its future support capability to the FST-2, which will be a development of the T-2 designed by Mitsubishi. It is highly probable that the aircraft was originally designed with the close support mission in mind. It is much larger than necessary for a training aircraft and it resembles similar light attack aircraft in design and performance.⁵² The force level problem also has arisen in this development program although no funds were to be requested until FY 1973 and deliveries were not to begin until 1974. The JASDF request for 126 FST-2's was incorporated into the Fourth DBP draft.⁵³ By October 1971, JASDF delayed the purchase of thirty support aircraft to the Fifth DBP, and it appeared that another 20 to 30 aircraft would be cut in negotiations with the Finance Ministry.⁵⁴ Therefore, JASDF probably will complete the Fourth DBP with 3 fighter-support squadrons of 60-70 FST-2.⁵⁵

The 100 to 120 F-4E(J) Phantoms, primarily air defense oriented, will help to provide the JASDF with greater flexibility in close support. That capability will depend on the training given F-4 pilots, the annual requirements within the F-4 squadrons, and the armament options which are available to complement the basic aircraft. Without substantial reinforcement from the F-4 squadrons, the JASDF close support capability will remain quite limited.

⁵² It is comparable to the British Jaguar or the American F-5.

⁵³ Nihon Keizai, October 22, 1970, JPE Aviation Report, May 10, 1971, p. 5.

⁵⁴ JPE Aviation Report, October 18, 1971.

⁵⁵ Performance data on the aircraft is not available as the fighter-support version is still on the drawing boards. Its basic size and design would suggest a maximum 6-8000 lb. pay load with less than 250 NM combat radius.

Air-to-Sea Attack

Japan is an island nation; the ocean is both an avenue of intercourse with other nations and a barrier to them. A hostile sea could isolate Japan, and there are those who have contended that Japan's sea lanes must be protected.⁵⁶ Interpretation of the Constitution has prohibited the protection of the sea lanes, but there remains an important need for sea power without that consideration. In the words of one Japanese military critic: "Japan is an island country and the basic idea is to prevent a landing by an aggressor."⁵⁷ It is natural that Japan would prefer to defend the state on the sea surrounding it, minimizing where possible the destruction and disruption of the homeland. This concept was emphasized in the draft of the Fourth Defense Build-up Plan:

....to secure air superiority and the control of the sea over the areas surrounding Japan to the extent necessary to limit damages and repel such aggression in its very initial stage.⁵⁸

There are three separate areas where air power may contribute to the control of the sea surrounding Japan. Airborne weapons systems may attack submarines, surface ships or aircraft.

The airborne anti-submarine warfare (ASW) role has been retained by the JMSDF. ASW has been one of the most important MSDF missions and

⁵⁶There are also those who believe such strategies are archaic, for a detailed description of the different views see Auer, op. cit., pp. 276-312.

⁵⁷Mr. Murakami Karu, quoted in Kokujoho, December 1971, p. 51.

⁵⁸The New Defense Build-up Plan, p. 3.

has been the primary purpose of the Fleet Air Force.⁵⁹ The MSDF has relied primarily on the Lockheed P-2V-7 and the P-2J, a turboprop version of the P-2V. The MSDF's request for their new ASW platform, the PS-1 flying boat, was cut drastically and it appeared that they would be forced to continue to rely on the P-2. The ASW electronics package in the P-2 is not completely modern, and the absence of nuclear weaponry makes the submarine localization process even more critical. The MSDF "operational, fixed-wing inventory" for ASW operations in 1971 was less than 50 aircraft.⁶⁰ That inventory is inadequate for a nation surrounded by the ocean, and would appear to have severely restricted its capability to carry out offensive and defensive ASW operations.

Both surface attack and fleet air defense have been the responsibility of the JASDF. However, it has had no capacity for fleet air defense outside its land-oriented Air Defense Command. The only areas in which MSDF might benefit from the air cover are those covered incidentally as a result of the main air defense system. Such overlap has been minimal, and the JMSDF has established an Air Defense Command within the fleet. The MSDF's capability for air defense was limited to one guided missile destroyer in 1971. However, three more guided missile destroyers were programmed and the use of anti-air missiles on other ships has been considered. VTOL aircraft have also been studied with a view toward their

⁵⁹Two excellent critiques of JMSDF ASW posture are Captain Robert J. Harlow, U.S.N. (ret.), "A Review of Japanese Naval Air Posture, 1970," September 1970, courtesy of Captain Harlow (translated and printed in Japanese, Asagumo) and Okumiya Masatake, "Japan's Naval Air Strength," United States Naval Institute Proceedings, December 1971.

⁶⁰Harlow, Ibid., pp. 15-16. Captain Harlow disregarded the S2F aircraft which was being phased out.

possible use on large destroyers or helicopter platforms.⁶¹

Support of the MSDF through surface attack has remained the major area in which the JASDF retained sole responsibility. The air force leaders have recognized the need to support the naval forces and have worked toward such a capability. The 4 F-86F squadrons training for this mission have been the same 4 squadrons which have been preparing for close air support. The aircraft limitations previously discussed apply here as well as other limitations peculiar to attacking naval targets. The F-86 has no internal navigation system, and the overwater portion of a surface attack flight must rely on dead-reckoning (DR) navigation. The F-86F has no special weaponry designed for ships, and must use regular bombs. The range of the F-86 precludes attack support outside 150 NM from the coastline.

Training opportunities have been limited, even for those squadrons dedicated to the support mission. The 7th Squadron at Matsushima has flown an average of 12 sorties every 3 months against surface ships; twice each year a few pilots fly hot missions against naval targets. Some squadron pilots had not flown such a mission though they had been in a fighter support squadron for two years.

As was the case in the GSDF-ASDF relationship, some hesitancy toward further cooperation may result from the MSDF's wish for a more extensive air arm. Naval aviation has been interested in establishing its own fleet air defense system incorporating aircraft and missiles. Realizing that carriers may be far in the future, aircraft with vertical take-off and landing capacity have been investigated. A vertical take-off

⁶¹JPE Aviation Report, September 14, 1970, and November 30, 1970, also Vice Admiral Samejima Hiroshi, Commander, Naval Air Training Command, Interview, December 22, 1971.

and landing (VTOL) aircraft similar to the British Harrier would also give the MSDF an attack capability. MSDF leaders would prefer their own reconnaissance and attack forces, but see no chance before the Fifth DBP.⁶²

The limited weapons system, the restricted training and the absence of joint maneuvers lowered standards; as a result, incidents were likely to occur when the JASDF began to emphasize maritime support. The ASDF was scheduled to participate in a MSDF exercise involving an 'enemy' and 'friendly' fleet during November 1969.⁶³ The enemy fleet waited throughout the day for an attack, and when it did not come they queried the air commanders. They were assured that they had been attacked and all aircraft had returned safely. The enemy fleet later discovered it was the friendly fleet which had been attacked. The aircraft had returned without discovering their error. Then, on March 10, 1971, ASDF fighters mistook a Soviet destroyer for Japanese, and made practice attacks in an incident already described.

These incidents resulted in additional restrictions on joint maneuvers at sea; any progress in maritime support capability was further delayed. The FST-2 will not increase JASDF capabilities significantly unless training techniques and weapons options are modified to focus on the mission. Although air-to-surface missiles have been discussed, no

⁶²The MSDF would have preferred some role in reconnaissance after the selection of the RF-4 to replace the RF-86. No changes in command and control have been announced although the internal bureaus at one point had suggested an ASDF pilot, in command, fly in the front seat while an MSDF pilot fly in the rear.

⁶³This was the "S" maneuver. The story was related to me by Mr. Taoka Shunji, who was aboard the 'enemy' fleet which was to be attacked.

money has been funded for research and development.⁶⁴ The ASDF has not been capable of effectively projecting air power into peripheral seas.

Air-to-Air Attack

Air-to-air combat may take two forms; one pits fighter against fighter in an air superiority conflict, the other sends fighter against bomber in an air defense role. These missions are distinct, and different characteristics are required of the defensive aircraft. An interceptor must have superior climb, airspeed and penetration capabilities. An air superiority fighter is not faced with the evasion problem because the offensive fighter is attacking it. Therefore, acceleration, maneuverability and multiple weapons capabilities are particularly useful to the air superiority fighter. Air superiority has been deemphasized in Japan in favor of pure air defense.

Japan stressed air defense from the inception of the Air Self-Defense Force. The air defense mission, taken by Japan in a formal ceremony on July 1, 1960, has represented the first line of defense. Many reasons, historical, political and technical, lie behind the primacy of air defense. Air defense demands on the budget have been allotted first priority. The only major operational command is the Air Defense Command. It has not been just a primary mission, it has been the primary mission. The other air power roles discussed have been relegated to less than secondary roles.

A significant controversy has arisen recently in Japan over air defense capability. The general presumption during the 1960's was that the air defense role was being filled adequately by the ASDF. Although

⁶⁴Nippon no Anzen Hosho, p. 128, reports that the ASM is being discussed in terms of future DBP's.

it could not defend against a missile attack, its anti-aircraft capability received a rather uncritical analysis, particularly in the United States.⁶⁵

Kaihara Osamu, Secretary-General of the National Defense Council, and Ogawa Raita, editor of Koku Shimbun and long-time observer of aviation affairs have been two of Japan's more outspoken critics of air defense capacity.⁶⁶ Kaihara has stressed the lack of war material, the vulnerability of the radar sites and the airfields, and the lack of operational training. He disagreed with the assumption that a maximum of 500 aircraft can attack Japan and pointed out that the Soviet Union may have over 1600 aircraft in Asia. Ogawa also deplored the vulnerability of the radar network and the bases. He has been particularly critical of the combat command structure and mobilization capacity, and has contended that operational communications and supply have been insufficient. These two informed observers have concluded that the air defense system is very weak. In Mr. Ogawa's words: "there is no complete air defense weapons system."⁶⁷

⁶⁵See Weinstein, "Japan's Air Self-Defense Force--Restrained but Powerful," Air Force and Space Digest, Volume 50, No. 12, December 1967, Willis, "Japan Scrambles in Earnest," The Christian Science Monitor, September 13, 1969, and Major Gilbert M. Billings Jr., "Japan's Air Self-Defense Force," Air University Review, July/August 1965. These men cited weaknesses, but still made the general presumption that JASDF's air defense was a coherent operational system, a presumption which deserves at least to be examined.

⁶⁶Mr. Ogawa was a zero pilot in the IJN and has been a long-time friend of the ASDF. In addition to numerous interviews with both men in which we discussed these views, see the following published sources. Kaihara, "We Should Know Ourselves," pp. 70-87, and Ogawa, "Problems of the Air Self-Defense Force," and "Problems of the Air Self-Defense Force at the End of the Third Defense Build-up Plan," Koku Shimbun, July 28, 1971.

⁶⁷Interview, March 3, 1972.

Another view of air defense capabilities has been most ably expressed by Mr. Aoki Hideo, recently retired from the ASDF and now the editor of KokuJoho.⁶⁸ Mr. Aoki served as a defense planner and has been perhaps the best informed JASDF supporter. Although he has recognized some weaknesses, particularly the vulnerability of the bases, he has disagreed with the pessimism of other critics. He has assumed that the Soviet Union would not launch more than 500 aircraft because it would fear counter-attacks from United States forces. Aoki has argued that the radar network would be capable of handling such a force, and the defensive interceptors would have a great advantage because of radar control and greater endurance. Therefore, the attacker would need a numerical advantage, and he has suggested that the often used ratio of 3 attackers to 1 defender is the minimum required of a force attacking Japan. He has contended that the effects of air attacks on bases and radars have been exaggerated and that emergency deployments of Japan's fighter aircraft would be possible.

Mr. Aoki concluded that the ASDF has not been evaluated properly.⁶⁹ Its critics have tended to overemphasize the power of the potential enemy, and overcriticize Japanese capability because they knew more about it. The deterrent effect has not been considered; it remains important to put yourself in the other man's position; "after evaluating the radar network, alert conditions, SAM missiles and U.S. Treaty structure. This is a very

⁶⁸ In addition to an interview with Mr. Aoki, October 20, 1971, the following articles are especially representative of his views; "It is Possible to Protect The Japanese Sky," KokuJoho, October 1971, pp. 41-50, "Autonomous Defense and Japan's Air Defense Capabilities," Gunji Kenkyu, 1 July 1971, pp. 160-171.

⁶⁹ Aoki "Autonomous Defense," loc. cit., p. 169.



difficult country to attack."⁷⁰

Both viewpoints have been expressed in great detail, but without critical evaluations of the assumptions made in each, definitive comparisons would be repetitive and time consuming. However, there is an alternative approach to the problem. One may agree with Mr. Aoki that it is important to consider the problem from the attacker's position. Before deciding to attack, the enemy would carefully study the Japanese air defense system.

It is possible to examine the air defense system without relying on assumptions regarding the size or nature of the attacking force. The air defense mission requires four distinct operational phases: detection, identification, interception, and destruction. Each of these phases may be considered a link in the chain of air defense. It is only as strong as the weakest link.

Detection is a momentary phase, completed when the enemy aircraft, or bogey, is first observed on the radar screens. Detection range depends on different variables including the altitude of the target, the height and strength of the antenna, and the reflection area of the target. For purposes of system assessment, all variables except bogey altitude may be held constant, and the system may be evaluated in terms of detection distance as a function of altitude.

Theoretically, the range of the Japanese radar system is computed at 350 NM, but actual practice has given an operating detection range of 220 NM at 70,000 feet.⁷¹ Range begins to decrease below 10,000 feet, lowering to 60 NM at 1000 feet. Detection initiates the interception

⁷⁰Aoki, "Autonomous Defense," loc. cit., pp. 169-170.

⁷¹Aoki, "Protect the Japanese Sky," loc. cit., p. 44.

solution and a shorter detection range will provide less time in which to localize and destroy the incoming hostile target.


There are other characteristics of the radar network which bear on its reliability and survivability. Figure 10-2 displays the 24 radar sites which makeup the homeland radar network.⁷² The outer radii drawn from the stations depict an optimum 220 NM range. While detection ranges overlap at optimum detection altitude, the radars are arranged linearly along the coast. If detection range decreases due to altitude or electronic countermeasures, the problem becomes more acute as the inner radii indicate. The destruction of four radar sites would be required to establish a radar-clear track to the coastline at optimum altitude although the failure of any three consecutive sites would hamper detection seriously. A 5000 foot penetration could escape radar detection if one site was destroyed.

The lack of depth in the network has made individual site survival more critical and it has been an area of much concern. The radar sites were built above ground and no point defense system was provided. Their only defense lies with the interceptor fleet. A low-flying, subsonic attack aircraft flying at 1000 feet and 600 knots could be over a radar site 6 minutes after detection making it impossible to launch aircraft in time to defend the sites.

The next phase of interception is identification, or a series of radar localization steps which determine the aircraft to be hostile and refine its location to the extent necessary to launch an interceptor. The Base Air Defense Ground Environment (BADGE) system facilitates these steps and cuts the initial lag time from 4 minutes to 2 minutes or less.

⁷²There were 4 more sites returned in conjunction with Okinawa reversion.

FIGURE 10-2. Air Defense Radar Sites and Detection Ranges





BADGE is a computer system which enables the radar network to handle 300 to 500 aircraft simultaneously. Mr. Kaihara has warned, however, that the system remains radar limited because the computer can not overcome radar parameters.⁷³ While 300 to 500 targets may be handled across the network, a concentrated attack could overload individual sites.

The aircraft are on five-minute alert pads and there would be that additional time delay before they launched. The total detection-to-launch time would be approximately 9 minutes for manual operations and 6 minutes for BADGE identification.⁷⁴ BADGE was operating approximately 10 hours per day in 1971. The system was capable of operations up to 12 hours each day without modification of the computer.


Interception, the third phase of the problem, may be considered both in respect to elapsed time and area of coverage. Three separate weapons systems are dedicated to the air defense of Japan. One other system, HAWK, may be available for the mission. The first defense in chronological terms is the aircraft. Seven F-104 squadrons and 3 F-86F squadrons were assigned to the fighter-interceptor mission in 1971. There were three operational NIKE battallions, located in Hokkaido, Kyushu and Tokyo. There were 8 battallions of the mobile HAWK which is a mach 3 SAM capable of intercepts to 50,000 feet and approximately 18 NM.⁷⁵ Due to their mobility and the unpredictability of the command structure, they are not depicted on Figure 10-3, which illustrates the range of Japanese air defense weapons systems.

⁷³"We Have to Know Them," loc. cit., pp. 21-22.

⁷⁴Aoki, "Protect the Japanese Sky," loc. cit., p. 44.

⁷⁵Boei Nippo (The Defense Daily), April 13, 1965. There were about 600-650 missiles available to the HAWK Battallions in 1971.

FIGURE 10-3. Air Defense Intercept Ranges



Three squadrons of F-86F, totalling approximately 80 aircraft, remain dedicated to interception. The F-86, with a 25,000 foot service ceiling, has a maximum intercept altitude of 35,000 feet with guns and 40,000 feet with missiles.⁷⁶ However, it takes the F-86 17 minutes to climb to 35,000 feet if wing tanks are dropped and 30 minutes if they are not. Severe range restrictions impair operations without tanks. Its slow speed, less than modern airliners, further degrades its capability. In the words of one F-86 pilot; "for the F-86 to have any chance of success, it must be on a combat air patrol (CAP) and be equipped with missiles." The excessive fuel which would be required to keep F-86's on station with CAP procedures would seem to preclude that maneuver. Therefore, it is doubtful that the F-86 can have any effective role in the air defense evolution. It has not been included in Figure 10-3.

The F-104 was Japan's premier air defense weapon in 1971. Its time from launch to 40,000 feet altitude and 150 NM range is approximately 8 minutes in an afterburner climb. If military power is used, the intercept will exceed 12 minutes. The F-104's combat radius does not extend past 150 NM if the bogey penetration speed exceeds Mach 1.⁷⁷ The combat radius was calculated assuming that the aircraft carried two fuel tanks which would be jettisoned.⁷⁸ The fuel tanks use two weapon stations, leaving the aircraft with 4 stations for heat-seeking Sidewinder missiles.

⁷⁶These are optimum altitudes; hot weather, for example, would lower the altitudes.

⁷⁷Regardless of bogey altitude. The F-104 has reduced fuel consumption at 60,000 feet but intercepts downward are difficult because of wind shifts and control sloppiness at that altitude. This information is based in part on published information about the F-104, but primarily on interviews with officers who fly it.

⁷⁸If they are not jettisoned, acceleration to MACH 2 would take 6 minutes versus 90 seconds and use more fuel. If tanks are not carried, the aircraft's combat radius drops to 75 NM.

Intercept at 150 NM would leave the F-104 capable of making one stern missile attack. Upon completion of such an attack, its fuel state would require the aircraft to return directly to base; there would not be enough fuel for any air-to-air combat, even in self-defense.

The ranges portrayed in Figure 10-3 are rather inflexible because of the lack of adequate dispersal procedures and suitable alternative bases. Mr. Aoki noted that other fields may be used in an emergency and that fuels could be substituted.⁷⁹ While that may be correct, the fields would not have armaments, communication networks and the operational support necessary to re-use the aircraft effectively.

Komatsu has been the optimum Japanese air base with relation to its utilization of the intercept capabilities of the F-104. As Figure 10-3 indicates, the intercept areas of the aircraft and missiles overlap to a great extent around the other bases. The overlap tends to detract from each system's capability as the two systems cannot attack simultaneously.

The F-104 is capable of intercepting a 40,000 foot Mach 1.2 bogey 86 NM from the air base if the enemy aircraft is bound for the base. If the enemy aircraft approaches at 5000 feet, interception is still feasible; but at 1000 feet the base is indefensible, even to a subsonic, 600 knot penetration.⁸⁰

The intercept capability is influenced by the number of available aircraft; for example, a large inventory could permit effective deployment of operational detachments. In raw figures, JASDF had 190 F-104's in 1971. However, that basic inventory did not equal the number of operational

⁷⁹"Protect the Japanese Sky," loc. cit., p. 49.

⁸⁰All of Japan is defenseless to a 1000 foot, Mach 1.7 attack. This is not a suggestion that such a threat exists in force, it is an example of the system's parameters.



aircraft available. The first consideration is the aircraft pipeline: "the term pipeline originated with the oil industry and refers to the oil needed to fill the pipes before delivery can commence."⁸¹ An aircraft must return to the factory on a certain cycle during its lifetime. The frequency and length of these periods could vary depending on age, complexity, design, size, and the environment of the aircraft. The pipeline unavailability for the U.S. Navy F-4 has been 22 percent.⁸² If a similar 20 percent reduction was applied to the F-104 fleet, it would leave 152 aircraft available to the squadrons. Those aircraft would then subject to local maintenance readiness requirements, and assuming an optimum 90 percent squadron readiness, 136 aircraft would remain. This limited number of interception aircraft would also limit the flexibility of the force.

Figure 10-3 depicts the ranges of the NIKE missiles which have been estimated at 40 NM in the case of the 4 NIKE-AJAX squadrons in Kyushu and 135 NM in the case of the 4 NIKE-J squadrons in the Tokyo area and the 3 in Hokkaido. Each launcher squadron had 9 launchers, making a total of 36 launchers around the Tokyo area, for example. The missile is capable of reaction and intercept necessary to reach most high performance air-breathing aircraft. Japan did not have an anti-missile capability in 1972.

The ranges depicted in Figure 10-3 also illustrate the sporadic nature of any fleet air defense capability. The optimum 150 NM is not indicative of actual capability in the event of a low altitude attack

⁸¹Captain T. R. McClellan, U.S. Navy, "Aircraft Pipeline, The Tail that Wags The Dog," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, November 1967, p. 64.

⁸²Ibid., p. 65.

on an offshore ship. Low altitude engagement further reduces the range of the F-104 to approximately 100 NM.

Destruction, the final phase of air defense, is the end product of the interception process and is normally evaluated in terms of a ratio of success to failure, or probability of kill (PK). Two factors determine the PK: the armament on the interceptor and its ability to penetrate the defenses of the attacker.

The F-104 carries four heat-seeking missiles and a 20 MM cannon. The cannon is generally ineffective in high speed intercepts, and particularly so in a head on profile where two Mach 1 aircraft close in excess of 116,000 feet per second.⁸³ Heat-seeking missiles must be launched from the stern of their intended targets in order to function properly. Therefore, the stern intercept has been the only effective intercept profile for the F-104(J); this profile requires a speed advantage and is costly in terms of fuel and time.

The F-104's guns are completely ineffective in other than visual conditions. Heat-seeking missiles do not track reliably against a cloud covered background. Therefore, instrument conditions severely limit the probability of kill.⁸⁴

An attacking aircraft has at least two possible defenses against interception, and the first is maneuver. A maneuvering aircraft is particularly effective against a heat-seeking missile. Secondly, it may employ electronic counter measures (ECM). ECM may be utilized during

⁸³ See details of the intercept problem in Harlow, "Some Notes on Air Defense In Japan - 1971," Kokubo (The National Defense), December 1971, original english courtesy of Captain Harlow.

⁸⁴ The NIKE is not hampered by weather, however it is susceptible to ECM. Using conventional warheads, 4-5% PK is an optimistic estimate for the NIKE.

all phases of the air defense evolution. The attacker may attempt to delay detection, slow identification and prevent localization by the interceptor.

Training and practice for ECM and ECCM has been quite limited in the JASDF. It has been forced to rely on U.S. aircraft to provide ECM services for practice. The F-104 has limited ECM capability, and its radar has been ineffective against a target which was emitting ECM. Almost all modern attack aircraft have some ECM capability, and it has become relatively simple and inexpensive to adapt elementary ECM measures.

It was difficult to take exception with one F-104 pilot who conceded that "the Sidewinder (heat-seeking missile) was very good in straight and level flight against a bogey which was day, VFR, and did not employ ECM."⁸⁵

The preceeding discussion has focused exclusively on operational air defense capability in 1971, but some relevant developments have been underway. The extension of radar detection range has been a primary concern to the JASDF. Detection may be extended through sea-borne pickets or by airborne early warning (AEW) aircraft; AEW has been a primary air force objective, but cuts in the 1972 budget reduced a major funding proposal to "research and study on the radar."⁸⁶ There have been significant pressures to put this weapons system on a home-produced airframe, and hope for an operational capacity during the 1970's has dimmed. Possible steps designed to increase the survivability of the detection network have been discussed. These include the construction of mobile radar stations to back-up the fixed sites and point defense

⁸⁵ Quoted from discussion with pilots at the Komatsu Air Base, January 12, 1972. VFR refers to visual flight rules or conditions.

⁸⁶ Wing International, January 18, 1972, p. 3.

missiles to protect the sites. Some progress has been made on both projects, however neither has reached the production stage.

The next major improvement will be the acquisition of the F-4E(J) and its related armament, the radar-guided, Sparrow III missile. This weapons system will exceed the capacity of the radar and controlling network. Delivery of the F-4 was scheduled to begin in 1972, however, squadrons will not be operational until the 1973-1974 period. Eight aircraft were to be delivered in FY 1972 and 24 more in FY 1973. Total inventory will again be a factor in overall readiness. When pipeline and readiness estimates are applied, the JASDF will operate an average of 85 operational F-4's. This will limit their availability for secondary roles. The cost of the Sparrow III may exceed 30 million yen per copy which will also restrict the number to be stocked and the availability for training.⁸⁷

These weapon system improvements will result in increases in the overall air defense capacity. Japan will attain some degree of all-weather capacity which it did not previously possess. The system will remain range-limited by the radar-identification system. Overall probability of kill will increase with the extended range, endurance and improved armament of the F-4.

F-4 deliveries will not be completed until the late 1970's, and for at least the ensuing six years, the system will remain very fragile. Even after the 1970's radar weaknesses will leave the F-4 vulnerable on the ground. Mr. Aoki argued that the system should be examined as an attacker would examine it. After doing so, it is difficult to disagree with Mr. Ogawa who contended that the lack of concern for an operational

⁸⁷ JPE Aviation Report, February 1, 1971. Almost \$100,000 per missile.



structure and the disharmony of equipment has resulted in "no complete air defense weapons system."⁸⁸

Opinions as to the success of the JASDF in the event of attack vary greatly. Mr. Aoki "laughed at the story describing the destruction of the Air Self-Defense Force."⁸⁹ Mr. Kaihara estimated the ASDF would last one hour in a Soviet attack, while one U.S. Air Force officer suggested five minutes.⁹⁰ A senior Japanese officer offered a more balanced view when he predicted some success against a conventional attack by aircraft using bombs; however, air-to-surface missiles and/or ECM penetrations would leave the JASDF helpless. There is little doubt that the vulnerability of the radar sites and bases, the small weapons system inventory, the lack of war reserves, the inadequacy of dispersal procedures, and the absence of rules of engagement severely detract from the operational effectiveness of the Japanese air defense system.

There is a need for perspective when discussing air defense because it is an extremely complex mission. The air defenses in North Vietnam are among the most concentrated in the world. Parallel radar sites control multiple missile launches, radar-controlled anti-aircraft guns provide point defense and fighter aircraft supplement the missile/gun network. While it has not been destroyed, it has never been able to inflict unacceptable damages on the attacking aircraft. The overall kill probability of the system has not exceeded 3 percent.

⁸⁸Interview, March 3, 1972.

⁸⁹Aoki "F-4 wa Nippon no Sona de Dou Tatakauka?" (How is the F-4 Going to Fight in the Japanese Sky?), Gunji Kenkyu (Japan Military Review), March 1969, p. 68.

⁹⁰Kaihara, "We Have to Know Ourselves," loc. cit., p. 50.



Japan faces geographical limits to its ability to extend detection range. In the north, toward the Kuriles and Sakhalin, radar coverage already has extended over Soviet territory. The narrow island provides little depth to facilitate the interception solution. Mountainous terrain makes dispersal difficult.

The Japanese system, with all of its limitations, has become one of the most advanced in the world. Second only to the U.S. air defense system in sophistication, it is similar to the NATO system which will become operational in 1973. Considering the state of the art, it is a very advanced and modern air defense network.

Perhaps one of the most significant differences is the priority which this mission has been assigned in Japan. Because it has become the first line of defense, failure is a more crippling defect in Japanese defense than a similar failure elsewhere. Whatever the perspective, the final operational conclusion was succinctly stated by a senior commander of the Air Self-Defense Force: "we cannot carry out our duty to the Japanese people." The primary line of defense has remained suspect. Air defense was chosen as the first line of defense by the policies which have been pursued in Japan. Those same decisions have shown little concern for operational capacity in the past; they show little for operational capacity in the near future.

VI.

THE POTENTIAL FORCE STRUCTURE

The potential of a nation's force structure may be considered a derivative of the national strength. If a reason may be imagined which would impart the will to mobilize for the use of violence, the resultant force structure would equal a multiplication of resources and capacity to mobilize.

Japan has a superior capacity to mobilize. It is a unitary national state with a well disciplined, highly socialized population. Its literacy rate is one of the highest in the world.

The technical skill of the population is also a valuable resource in the mobilization process. In 1970, approximately 103,000,000 people produced over 12 million television sets, 3 million passenger cars, and 93 million tons of steel.¹ Mining and manufacturing more than doubled from 1966 to 1971 and Japan generated more than 350 billion kilo-watt hours of electricity during 1971. The general electronic and mechanical expertise of the population has been rated among the highest in the world.

Potential, at least short-range potential, in the field of aviation has remained much lower. There were less than 9500 pilots in Japan in 1971, including private, commercial and military types.² There were approximately 1000 civil aircraft in 1970, from single-engine private aircraft to multi-engine jet airliners.³ These figures represent a relatively small base of aeronautical experience.

¹Economic Survey of Japan, p. 159.

²9492 as of December 1971, there were 5646 licensed civilian pilots and 2846 military pilots. Boeicho Koho, December 24, 1971, p. 12, and Interview with Captain Kimoto of JAL, January 25, 1972.

³Kokujo (Aireview), October 1970.

A more basic weakness has resulted from the dependence on foreign natural resources. Japan imported 100 percent of its nickel, aluminum, and uranium in 1971. Imports accounted for 99.9 percent of its petroleum supply, and 91 percent of its iron ore and coking coal.⁴ There would be less than 45 days fuel supply in Japan if the Straits of Malacca was closed and mid-east oil became unavailable.⁵ Beyond these shortages of specific strategic materials, Japan has a low capacity for stockpiling in the broadest sense of national strength. An island nation, it trades around the world and relies on that trade for a great variety of essentials from foodstuffs to iron ore.

Nonetheless, any nation may take steps to enable the mobilization of those resources which might be available to it. Japan has displayed little concern for operational mobilization procedures as noted in Chapter 10. However, there are other, broader aspects of air power in which policies may attempt to achieve a long-term, broad base for air power mobilization.

A national air power structure, particularly an autonomous structure, is based in part on the industrial capacity to manufacture the weapons systems to be used by the air force. Military technology continuously advances and it is particularly critical in aerospace warfare. Therefore, an autonomous air power base also requires research and development in airpower vehicles and weaponry. These two key bases of air power capability will be addressed specifically in the ensuing two chapters.

⁴The International Institute for Strategic Studies, Strategic Survey, 1971 (London: IISS, 1972), p. 60.

⁵Mr. Peter T. Ehara, Managing Director, Osaka Hydrant Co., Interview, January 25, 1972. Mr. Ehara has been active in petroleum supply, particularly aviation petroleum, over the past twenty years.

Chapter 11

THE AIRCRAFT INDUSTRY

The manufacture of aircraft was a special strategic industry in Japan during World War II. From modest beginnings in the early 1920's, it began independent design work in 1932 and was completely independent in all aspects of research and production by 1937. Before bombing took its toll in 1944 and 1945, the industry employed over one million employees and manufactured approximately 2,000 aircraft per month.

In the aftermath of defeat, the industry was dismantled completely.¹ Occupation policies ended all aircraft design and production, aerodynamic studies, and aviation activities of any kind. In addition, the aircraft factories suffered heavily in the massive bombing campaign against Japan. There was little left, and the ensuing seven years left a large technological gap when the aircraft industry began anew in 1952.

The vacuum was not complete, and while the plants, dies and tools of the industry were destroyed, the skills of the technicians and administrators were available to be tapped when the revival began. One respected defense industry author contended that the void of the early Occupation was a benefit to the industry; outmoded processes and methods were stripped away, making adoption of new production methods simpler.²

The major aircraft factories did take steps to preserve their personnel immediately after the Occupation began. Jobs were provided, even living facilities in bombed-out factories were made available. Anything that could be produced was, and wherever possible, private

¹See Chapter 4 for the details of demobilization policies as they affected the aircraft industry.

²Mabuchi Ryoitsu, Interview, November 27, 1971.

studies and individual research continued.³ The Japanese government was favorably disposed towards resumption of aircraft manufacture, as demonstrated by their rapid promulgation of the enabling law less than three months after the Peace Treaty became effective.

The impetus for resumption of aircraft production came earlier, and it came from the United States. United States policy towards Japanese defense posture first shifted in the National Security Council (NSC) decision of November 1948, which "recognized the importance of the security of Japan."⁴ The United States began to place contracts with Japanese firms for supplies and for the repair and rehabilitation of U.S. aircraft in 1949.⁵

The outbreak of war in Korea increased the U.S. demand for supplies and accelerated the offshore procurement program in Japan. Shortly after the war broke out, the U.S. National Security Council called for the "development and utilization of Japanese industrial capacity as a source of current and wartime requirements for the acquisition of supplies and equipment for the United States Forces and in support of the United States Assistance Program."⁶ The new NSC program was justified by

³Mr. Shimomura Makoto, Manager, Business Sector, Aircraft Division Shin Meiwa, Interview, February 16, 1972, told of making pots and pans at Shin Meiwa (formerly Kawanishi Aircraft) during the early Occupation years. Interviews with Mr. Ogawa, December 27, 1971, Mr. Mabuchi, November 27, 1971, and Captain Kimoto, December 4, 1971, amplified the story of the aircraft industry's efforts to remain capable of starting anew. Also see Chapter 3.

⁴Emmerson, Arms, p. 66.

⁵Garret, U.S.A.F. Industrial Planning with the Japanese Air Self-Defense Force, p. 1. A Shin Meiwa brochure reports that they began repair of U.S. Army vehicles in 1946, along with kerosene motors, motor-cycles and threshing machines. The Garret study is probably the most comprehensive account of U.S. involvement in the rebirth of the Japanese aviation industry.

⁶Ibid., p. 6.

three requirements:

- (a) to provide logistical support to the United States and its allies in the Pacific Area.
- (b) to reduce the need for dollar aid to Japan.
- (c) to conserve U.S. resources.⁷

On March 28, 1951, the Department of Defense recognized this new policy and issued a directive which formally recognized Japan as a supply source for military requirements.

Pursuant to the U.S. policy shift, the Far East Air Force (FEAF) established a Division of Industrial Planning early in 1952. In June 1952, a Contract Conciliation Panel and Procurement Coordination Subcommittee were established within the United States-Japan Joint Committee.⁸

The National Security Council further refined U.S. policy on August 7, 1952:

- (a) to develop with Japan a program for Japanese assistance to defense and defense-supporting industries by U.S. offshore procurement with Defense and Mutual Security funds.
- (b) to encourage Japan to expand and stabilize its economy.
- (c) to encourage the development of cooperative relations between Japan and other free nations.⁹

This policy was reaffirmed with minor changes in June 1953, and again in April 1955..

⁷Garret, U.S.A.F. Industrial Planning with the Japanese Air Self-Defense Force, p. 1.

⁸Ibid., pp. 1, 7. The Joint Committee had been established pursuant to the U.S.-Japan Administrative Agreement.

⁹Ibid., p. 2.

An advisory team from the USAF Air Materiel Command visited Japan in January 1953, and primarily dealt with the Aircraft and Ordnance Section of MITI and the Aircraft Production Council, also within MITI. The Aircraft Industry Promotion Law of July 1952, gave the government great power over the industry, and the Aircraft Manufacturing Industry Law of June 3, 1954, further increased their control. MITI has licensed and controlled all aircraft companies, parts manufacturers and related firms. It can control, limit or distribute contracts to benefit the industry, and it can curtail the number of companies.¹⁰ Japanese government control meant that most industrial planning became a government-to-government function, including licensing agreements and private funding measures.

The United States also affected the aircraft industry through another channel. The U.S. Forces began to manufacture military hardware items in Japan early in the Occupation, and by 1948, the ordnance section of the U.S. Eighth Army was producing fully manufactured vehicles.¹¹ Japanese nationals were involved in the construction projects, and a management course began at Tachikawa Air Base in 1947. It graduated approximately 4000 Japanese over the ensuing 16 years. In 1971, over 75 percent of those graduates were in leadership positions in the aircraft industry, the airlines, the electronic industry and the JASDF. As the industry began to revive, these young managers, trained and experienced in U.S. defense production techniques, were quite important in

¹⁰Garret, op. cit., pp. 3-4; Spencer, Military Transfer of Technology, p. 92; also based on a briefing from Major Torino, JASDF, on the contents of the two laws in question, February 25, 1972.

¹¹Spencer, op. cit., p. 30.

industrial development.¹²

By 1953, U.S. military commanders had been specifically charged with implementing the U.S. policy to support the establishment of the defense industry.¹³ Prime Minister Yoshida was unfamiliar with the details of industrial planning and relied on advice from business and two particular government advisors: Mr. Kimura Tokutaro, Director of the Safety Agency, and Mr. Masuhara.¹⁴ Aircraft industrial support became one subject of the 1953 negotiations between Safety Agency officials and FEAF representatives.¹⁵

The United States believed that early Japanese force estimates were overly optimistic, and was quick to caution that the force structure should be streamlined wherever possible. Industrial support was an area which USAF planners felt could be included in the private sector, reducing the size of the air force. In the words of General LeBailly:

Based on recommendations from numerous senior USAF officers involved in logistics we came to the conclusion that in order to save military dollars and manpower, it would be better to try and develop aviation industry along with the Air Force and use it in lieu of a logistics command.¹⁶

This proposal coincided with the Japanese political desire to restrict the military budget and the industrial desire to advance as rapidly as

¹²Spencer, op. cit., pp. 43-47, Spencer explained in detail the progress of this inner circle of Japanese students and instructors who became important in the aircraft industry.

¹³Garret, op. cit., p. 4.

¹⁴General Tatsumi, Interview, February 22, 1972; Mr. Masuhara, February 19, 1972.

¹⁵Ibid., also General LeBailly, letter to author, December 9, 1971, and General Weyland, letter to author, April 30, 1972.

¹⁶Letter to the author, December 9, 1971, my emphasis.

possible. Therefore, the decision was made to actively support and develop the industry through the assistance of both governments.

In July 1954, Prime Minister Yoshida stressed Japan's dependence on U.S. financial assistance and offshore procurement for the development of its industry. The United States already had contributed heavily to the aircraft industry in programs which began in 1951. The earliest assistance was in the form of parts procurement which helped the Japanese to improve the quality of their steel and aluminum. United States purchases totalled 9.5 million dollars from 1951 to 1956.¹⁷ Contracts for aircraft overhaul and repair were let in 1952 and were particularly helpful in updating Japanese aircraft engineering standards. The first five years of that program brought 13.6 million dollars to the industry.¹⁸ The aid continued; U.S. offshore procurement totalled 507 million dollars from 1952 to 1967.¹⁹ The aircraft industry alone has received over 134 million dollars through U.S. procurement.²⁰

U.S. contributions through the military assistance program exceeded the procurement program. Military aid to Japan totalled approximately 1,600 million dollars by the end of the Military Assistance Program (MAP) program which was phased out in 1967 and 1968.²¹ Part of this aid was in the form of equipment transfers and did not directly benefit the private sector. Licensed production of aircraft was the major benefit to the aircraft industry. Negotiation for the eventual production of

¹⁷Garret, op. cit., pp. 69-70.

¹⁸Ibid., pp. 70-71.

¹⁹Nippon no Anzen Hosho, p. 90.

²⁰The Society of Japanese Aircraft Constructors, Directory of The Aerospace Industry in Japan, September 1, 1971, p. 3.

²¹Nihon no Anzen Hosho, 1969, p. 354.

jet aircraft in Japan began early in 1954, before the establishment of the JASDF.²² The T-33, F-86, F-104 and P-2V-7 (for the MSDF) were among the major aircraft produced in Japan through license. The United States bore 67 percent of the cost of the initial F-86 and T-22 program, and its contribution to major aircraft manufacture totalled approximately 200 million dollars.²³

	<u>Program Cost</u>	<u>U.S. Share</u> (million of U.S. Dollars)	<u>Japan Share</u>	<u>% U.S.</u>
F-86/T-33	172.0	80.8	91.2	47
P-2V-7	86.2	44.5	41.7	52
F-104	275.0	75.0	200.0	27

The assistance program was terminated in 1967 and the F-4, although produced under license, has not been financed with American assistance. However, the U.S. contribution has been extremely important; offshore procurement and military aid accounted for more than 25 percent of the total aircraft industry production through 1967.²⁴

The Japanese government also has provided significant support to the aircraft industry. It began direct subsidies to aerospace engineering within the industry and among scholars in 1952. Those subsidies have continued and had totalled 19.8 million dollars through 1971. The government has assisted the industry in machinery purchases with financing totaling 16.15 million dollars. In addition, 11.67 million dollars was invested in the Nihon Aeroplane Manufacturing Company (NAMC),

²²Garret, op. cit., p. 8.

²³Compiled from Garret, op. cit., pp. 77-78, and Mr. Arimori, Interview, February 23, 1972 (from SJAC records).

²⁴U.S. MAP aid to aircraft manufacture, \$200 million plus; U.S. offshore procurement, \$134 million; total value of Japanese aircraft industry production through 1967, \$1,303 million. Compiled from SJAC, Directory, p. 3.

a semi-governmental organization established in 1957 to coordinate production of Japan's first turbo-prop transport. The government has underwritten another 115 million dollars of NAMC debts.²⁵

Government purchases have dominated industrial production, and more than 75 percent of all aircraft production through 1970 was generated by the government. Defense demand was particularly important in the early stages of the industry, and the combined American and Defense Agency purchases accounted for approximately 90 percent of the total industrial production through 1960.²⁶ Civilian sector production grew steadily until 1968 when it reached 44 percent of total aircraft sales. The industry has declared a target of 80 percent civilian demand and 20 percent military demand, but has acknowledged that it cannot hope for more than a 50-50 division before 1985.²⁷ Other estimates have foreseen an even greater dependency on military demands in the future, back up to 70 to 80 percent of all production.²⁸

It would appear likely that the aircraft industry, revived by government policies, will remain under the government's firm control and heavily dependent on its purchases. Dependence on government budgets can be an uncertain business and dangerously unstable. This was one of the primary reasons that the industry has advocated the five-year plans so strongly. They have continued to support the concept although they

²⁵ SJAC, Directory, p. 1.

²⁶ SJAC, 1968 Annual Report (Tokyo, Japan: SJAC, 1969).

²⁷ Nippon No Anzen Hosho, pp. 130-131.

²⁸ Nihon Keizai, January 7, 1971. The present ratio is 60 percent military - 40 percent civil and the delay of a follow on civil transport project (YX) would suggest that this forecast may be fairly accurate.

now prefer that the plan be revised on a rolling basis, every one to two years.²⁹

Another aspect of the Japanese aircraft industry has tended to provide stability against variable government budgets. Japan does not have independent companies; instead, manufacturing is conducted by aircraft divisions of large corporations. Mitsubishi Aircraft, by far the largest aerospace manufacturer, accounted for 5.1 percent of the total sales of Mitsubishi Heavy Industry in 1970. Twenty-six large aircraft divisions averaged 5.4 percent of assets and 4.5 percent of sales of their parent corporations.³⁰ These large corporations have been more capable of absorbing budgetary fluctuations and accepting temporary deficits.

The industry has strived to become more stable and independent, but it has recognized the difficulty of achieving that goal considering the current level of domestic demand. JDA budgets during the Fourth DBP apparently will not increase to the extent initially hoped for by the industry. No aircraft production program was scrapped but budget retrenchments may continue to lower production totals within individual programs.³¹ Civilian demand, though on the increase, has appeared unlikely to produce large dividends or significant growth potential. Without a major technological breakthrough which could support a major new transport or similar venture, large increases in civilian export seems improbable. An alternative potential in the export of military

²⁹ Arimori, Interview, February 23, 1972. This would provide the industry with the best of both worlds, a stable budget with opportunities to increase it.

³⁰ SJAC, Directory, p. 2.

³¹ The aircraft industry produced 84% of all Japan's military aircraft in 1971 so pure domestic production will not produce momentous changes.

hardware has become apparent and the aircraft industry has become quite interested in this field.

Exports of the aerospace industry have shot upward in recent years. Exports totalled 3.6 million dollars and 2.1 percent of sales in 1963; by 1968, those figures had increased to 61 million dollars and 23.8 percent of sales.³² However, this has been achieved primarily in the civil market, and it will be difficult to maintain the current export level without another major transport.

The one untapped source has been arms sales and the industry has openly campaigned to change the government's policies concerning the export of arms.³³ They have realized that such sales may be delicate to negotiate, but they have anticipated weapons systems exports in the future. Although there remain significant pressures against arms sales, it has become possible that the government policy will shift. One reason for such a change has been the concept of jishu boei as it relates to independent production. Domestic production will require large increases in research and development expenditures, and will increase the pressure for mass production. Mass production will require increased domestic purchases or arms exports.³⁴ As Japan's technological level increases pressure also will come from abroad in the form of purchase offers.³⁵

³² Nippon no Anzen Hosho, p. 150.

³³ Shimomura, Interview; Arimori, Interview; also see discussion Chapter 6, the section on aircraft industry defense policy.

³⁴ This view is expressed in "Domestic Arms Production a Rocky Road For Japan," Asahi Evening News, February 1, 1972, p. 6.

³⁵ Mainichi, April 4, 1972, reported that Boeing Co., of the United States, had expressed interest in the Kawasaki developed C-1 transport. The aircraft is described in Chapter 10.



Aerospace exports of all types, including arms exports, will depend in large part on the industry's capability to maintain pace with world-wide development in a more autonomous role. There are indications that such a role is evolving. The United States has discontinued aid, and has displayed some hesitancy in granting licensing agreements. Japan's own desire for an independent industry has led to increased self-reliance.

The aircraft industry experienced tremendous development in all areas of production over the past twenty years. It produced one aircraft in 1952 and 215 in 1969. The personnel base has been quite solid; in fact by 1972 it appeared to be overstaffed with a total industrial employment of approximately 25,600. The income of those employees averaged the equivalent of 3,238 dollars per year in 1970, about double the national average.³⁶ Experienced technicians could be drawn from other divisions of the company in the event of expansion, and aerospace enrollment in the universities has continued to increase. The industry has been able to absorb only one-third of the aeronautical engineering students graduating each year. Therefore, they have had the opportunity to select the top of each year's class, insuring high, industry-wide personnel standards.³⁷

The industry has relied heavily on licensing agreements, particularly in the production of modern military aircraft. As a result of this practice, they have advanced dramatically in production techniques. Mitsubishi Aircraft has begun assembly line production of the F-4E(J) and it represented the most sophisticated advances in aerodynamic and weapons systems engineering incorporated into an operational aircraft by

³⁶SJAC, Directory, pp. 2-3, also see Cecil Brownlow, "Direction of Aerospace Industry Studied by Japan," Aviation Week, January 19, 1970, p. 69.

³⁷Brownlow, "Direction of Aerospace," loc. cit., p. 70.

1971. The Japanese capacity to produce the aircraft represented superior production techniques by world standards.

Licensing has not generated the same expertise in all areas of aircraft production and the industry has enjoyed less success in design and development. Airframe design has been an exception and significant progress has been achieved in this area. The PS-1 seaplane, designed by Shin Meiwa, was revolutionary in its design concept and capable of landing and taking-off in seas much higher than previously thought possible. Kawasaki's C-1, although not unique, is a well-designed, short haul cargo aircraft capable of advanced, short-field operations. Mitsubishi has designed, developed and flown the XT-2, supersonic jet trainer. While the aircraft is similar to the British Jaguar and American F-5, it has placed Japan in an elite group of nations capable of designing and producing supersonic aircraft.

The industry is not without some significant weaknesses, however, and one of those is related to parts design and manufacture. For example, the C-1 has relied on Dunlop of Britain for tires because Japan did not have the facilities to develop them. Both the C-1 and the XT-2 have relied on imports for 40 to 50 percent of their parts.³⁸

One of the weakest points of parts construction has been in the area of detailed casting and forging. The industry has had the capability of making some aluminum and titanium alloys, but it has been deficient in high heat and chemical welding techniques.³⁹ Japan has had no large

³⁸ Nippon No Anzen Hosho, pp. 54-55.

³⁹ Ibid., p. 56, also Mr. Shimomura, Interview, February 16, 1972 and Mr. Ogawa, Interviews, December 27, 1971, and January 21, 1972, Colonel Richard G. Leech, USAF, former Air Attache to Japan. The ensuing discussion of industry weaknesses relies extensively on these sources.



forging press and has not been capable of large panel work. The wing of the C-1 relied on U.S. imports.⁴⁰

Material construction has also constituted an industrial weak point. Japan has lagged far behind other advanced nations in the development of low-weight and heat-resistant alloys including those using boron, nickel, carbon and aluminum. The high-thrust engines in modern jet aircraft require carbon fibre manufacture and hollow turbine blades which have not been produced in Japan.

Jet engine design and production also has lagged behind air frame capacity. Japan designed one jet engine in 1959 which was capable of approximately 3100 pounds of thrust. There were no further developments until 1971 when MITI sponsored a project to develop a turbofan engine with 10,000 pounds of thrust.⁴¹

This project was not aimed at a practical model, illustrating how far behind Japan has been in engine production capabilities. Another follow-on project to produce a 20 to 30,000 pound engine has been planned, and would take an additional four years. The resultant engine, which was planned for production in the 1980's, would be comparable in many respects to the engines operating in the Boeing 747 and USAF C-5.⁴²

The electronics industry has become more interested in aircraft and aerospace related equipment. New guidance devices, fire-control radars, data-link receivers, sonars and navigation equipment are among the devices required by aircraft weapons systems. In some of these areas

⁴⁰Nippon no Anzen Hosho, pp. 55-56.

⁴¹Ibid., pp. 60-61.

⁴²Ibid., pp. 61-62. The thrust on the Japanese engine would be less than the JF-90 on the 747 (43,500 lb. thrust), but perhaps superior in some other technical aspects.



there has been a reverse spin-off phenomena where Japanese sophistication in solid-state electronics has benefitted defense projects.⁴³ For example, Japan's technological capacity in the design and production of small, solid-state radar equipment has been very advanced.

In other, weapons-related areas, the aviation electronics industry has had a much lower capacity. Sonar development has been slow, lagging behind front-line development in this area. Missile guidance systems have also been behind.⁴⁴ The AAM-1, developed in Japan, is an air-to-air, heat-seeking missile comparable to the U.S. Sidewinder, which was developed in 1966. The U.S. missile was operational ten years before and the Japanese model cost four times as much when it was produced.⁴⁵

The Japanese aircraft industry has made great strides forward in the past twenty years and has exhibited an impressive capacity for production of sophisticated aerospace vehicles and weaponry. However, to some extent the appearance of modernity has been misleading, and estimates that Japan's industry was two to three years behind must be considered optimistic. Others view the industry very critically; for example, in 1970 General Okumiya estimated the aircraft industry to be ten to fifteen years behind that of Great Britain and twenty years behind that of the United States.⁴⁶

The industry has appeared to be financially sound and the nature of its corporate structure has provided it with a good deal of flexibility.

⁴³Sankei, June 17, 1970 discussed the rising interest in defense among the big electronics firms.

⁴⁴See Chapter 12 for a discussion of research and development in space vehicles and guidance.

⁴⁵Nippon no Anzen Hosho, pp. 66-67.

⁴⁶The Sky is Full of Danger, p. 69.

Personnel standards have been rather high and also provided the industry with room for expansion. Production techniques have compared with the highest world standards. In view of these strengths, General Okumiya's estimate was pessimistic, but not unrealistic. Engine manufacture, parts construction and material compounds have been production technology areas which have been behind world standards. Based on assessment of these areas, it would appear that the industry was at least seven to nine years behind world technological levels in 1971.

The industry will continue to require government support and rely heavily on government purchases. Although autonomous production has been an oft-quoted goal of the Japanese aircraft companies, the current technological level of the Air Self-Defense Force could not be maintained in the absence of licensing agreements. Although it has now produced front-line aircraft, certain parts of those aircraft and the accessory equipment necessary to make them complete weapons systems could not be produced in Japan.

Therefore, despite governmental support, the industry, at its technical level of 1971, was not self-sufficient; partly because of the industrial goals which had been set so high. The effort to produce major front-line equipment had succeeded but only at the expense of self-sufficiency in many supporting areas.

Chapter 12

RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT

Aerospace research and development cannot be isolated from the aircraft industry; advancing technology continuously contributes to industrial posture. The government's policies toward research and development therefore represent to some degree its general attitude toward the potential side of the force structure.

The industrial weaknesses mentioned in the previous chapter emphasize the need for research and development. Home production can only continue with the support of basic and applied research in aerospace and weapons development. Only research can upgrade the aircraft industry and bring its technology to a level consistent with its production techniques.

The value of all science-related research in Japan was estimated in excess of two billion dollars per year during 1971. The United States, whose economy was four times the size of Japan's, invested ten times that amount in similar research.¹ Only 18 percent of Japanese research and development dealt with projects not developed abroad, 32 percent of the projects were under development outside Japan and 30 percent of the work was on techniques already established outside Japan.² Perhaps the best gauge of Japan's overall research and development effort has been the Japanese balance of payments in technical knowledge. Japan paid 368 million dollars for imports of data in 1969 and received 46 million dollars for its exports.³ In comparison, the United States exported

¹Nippon no Anzen Hoshō, pp. 17-19. These figures are approximate.

²Ibid., p. 26.

³Ibid.

ten times their technical data imports and Britain exported slightly more than they imported.

The disparities between official government expenditures for research was even more startling. In Japan, only 30 percent of all science-related research was government sponsored in 1970; in the United States, 64 percent; and in Britain 54 percent of science research was government financed.⁴ The United States government spent more than twenty times the Japanese budget for scientific research.

One reason for the limited Japanese government investment in research may be related to the high level of economic motivation to Japanese research. Economics-related research accounted for 75.4 percent of all research and development in Japan in 1969 while the comparable figure in Britain was 24 percent, 12.4 percent in France and 3.2 percent in the United States. Additionally, 86 percent of space and nuclear research in the United States related to defense. The figure was only slightly lower in West Germany, France and Britain, where defense related projects accounted for approximately 65 percent of space and nuclear budgets. Japan's proportion of defense-related space and nuclear research amounted to 16.5 percent.⁵

Money actually funded for defense research in Japan comprised a tiny portion of research investment, approximately 2 percent in 1968.⁶ The JDA research and development budget was 4.1 percent of government directed science research in 1969. This compared to 46.6 percent in the United

⁴Nippon no Anzen Hōsho, p. 18. In West Germany the ratio is government - 44%, civil - 56%.

⁵Ibid. These figures were based on 1969 data and Japan's space and nuclear efforts have increased dramatically in the two succeeding years, lowering further the proportion of defense-related expenditures.

⁶Ibid., p. 24.

States and over 40 percent in Britain.⁷ The United States was spending 300 times the amount Japan did on research and development for defense.

Even within the Defense Agency, research and development has received little priority. Its percentage of the defense budget has hovered at 2 percent after 1968 as Figure 12-1 indicates. Figure 12-1 also reveals that Japan has spent less than 130 million dollars on defense over the past 18 years. The 1972 budget included a 12 percent increase, and optimistic estimates forecasted that the research portion of the defense budget would increase to 3.5 percent of the Fourth DBP.⁸

The monies allotted by government have financed approximately one-half the defense research conducted. Figures available for 1967-1968 indicated that the JDA contributed 51 percent to defense research, the aircraft companies contributed 48 percent and other public sources financed 1 percent.⁹ Nearly 70 percent of the research in aerospace was financed by the JDA, but only 31 percent of missile research and 26 percent of research in defense electronics was similarly financed. The total amount budgeted for defense research in Japan each year was still less than 100 million dollars, and only a portion of the money applied directly to research.

The isolation of the Technical Research and Development Institute (TRDI) has exacerbated the scarcity of funds. Other research institutions in Japan, particularly educational institutions, have shunned any

⁷ Nippon no Anzen Hoshō, p. 18.

⁸ Colonel Yamawake Hisashi, JASDF, Development Division, ASO, Interview, February 14, 1972. The Development Division is the Chief of Staff's advisor on technical development and maintains liaison with the TRDI. Original drafts postulated 3.5%, but the revision of the 4 DBP could alter that figure.

⁹ Nippon no Anzen Hoshō, p. 23.

Technical Research and Development Institute:
Budget, 1954-1971

	1954	1955	1956	1957	1958	1959	1960	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969	1970	1971
TRDI Budget (\$ millions)	1.95	3.8	5.0	4.3	5.3	5.85	5.95	7.3	7.5	8.4	9.1	11.0	13.4	18.1	23.6	25.4	30.2	33.6
Annual Growth %	377	100	31	-13	24	11	2	22	4	12	7	18	25	35	30	8	19	11
% of Defense Budget	0.9	1.6	1.8	1.5	1.6	1.6	1.4	1.5	1.4	1.3	1.2	1.3	1.5	1.8	2.1	2.0	2.0	2.0
Actual Research Expenditures (Testing & Contracts) (\$ millions)	1.1	2.2	3.1	2.1	2.2	2.3	2.1	3.6	3.7	4.0	4.2	5.8	7.15	11.2	15.6	16.6	19.8	22.0

Source: JDA Statistics. Converted at 360 yen/\$1 to nearest .1 million.

relationship, or even contact, with the TRDI.¹⁰ The isolation also has extended to government agencies. The JDA obviously has had no contact with the various atomic energy projects underway, but it has shared common interests in space research, particularly with regard to propellants and guidance. Yet space research in Japan "completely excludes" the military.¹¹ The only exchange of information has occurred within private companies which might be conducting projects for both agencies. Even this has been discouraged by the Science and Technology Agency, and such an exchange must be ad hoc without any effective integration of functions or goals.

Within these rather restrictive budgetary and operational limits, the TRDI has borne the responsibility of directing all Defense Agency research. The Institute is divided into five research centers and five test centers where research actually performed by the TRDI is conducted. Four Deputy Directors actually have a more important role, for in their capacity as advisors to the Director, they "plan, design and conduct the experiments" which are related to specific functional areas.¹² The four divisions include ground, naval, air and guided missiles. The divisions are purely functional; all aircraft, whatever branch of service, are developed through the Deputy Director for Air Development.

¹⁰ Major General Tanaka Kanji, JASDF, Deputy Director for Air Development, TRDI, Interview February 14, 1972. General Tanaka felt this situation was critical, particularly in space and missile technology.

¹¹ Mr. Ichinose Teruo, Space Development Counsellor, Space and Technology Agency, February 25, 1972, Interview. Mr. Ichinose confirmed that no intra governmental contacts were made, either through the respective agencies or through individual research facilities.

¹² Japan Defense Agency, The Technical Research and Development Institute, undated (1972), provided by General Tanaka, Deputy Director for Air Development, TRDI, p. 11.

The Deputy Director's most important function has been the guidance of and liaison with the private companies conducting research because all major projects have been conducted by those companies. Over 65 percent of the 1970 TRDI budget was expended through contracts, and approximately 80 percent of all monies expended directly for research were used by private companies.¹³ In 1970 only 70 percent of its staff was dedicated to research activities compared to nearly 90 percent in private research organizations.¹⁴

Official JDA policy has recognized the primacy of private military research. The Equipment Bureau promulgated a "Basic Policy of Production and Research for Military Equipment" in July 1970 which said in part:

Defense power....is based on the industrial power of the nation and independent development, promotion of domestic production, and the utilization of private companies are necessary. ...Independent researchshould be promoted and private companies should be utilized.¹⁵

The Technical Institute has become primarily a bureaucratic apparatus by which defense research is administered. The actual research structure has been a series of decentralized research bureaus of private firms. The lack of centralization obviously results in some areas of duplication and uncertain responsibility.

The TRDI does not have the facilities or equipment to undertake major research projects. This is another reason for the reliance on civil research, because the JDA has emphasized major item research.¹⁶

¹³JDA, The Technical Research and Development Institute, inside cover (budgetary breakdown).

¹⁴Nippon no Anzen Hosho, p. 26.

¹⁵Koho Antenna, #121, August 1970, p. 17.

¹⁶Ibid., this policy is stated in the JDA document.

After 1965, 60 to 80 percent of research funds have been allotted to major aircraft and missile systems such as the PS-1, the XC-1, the XT-2 and a short range surface-to-surface missile. Major systems will continue to be stressed in the forthcoming defense program which includes such items as a multi-purpose, high-speed helicopter and a land-based patrol airplane for anti-submarine warfare. One report indicated that those two projects alone will be funded at 40 billion yen, approaching the total amount allotted to research in the last DBP.¹⁷

The emphasis on major projects has limited the number which can be attempted and escalated the risk involved in a failure. One major program which proved unsuccessful would be a serious blow to the overall development effort. As a result, the TRDI has been very cautious and hesitated to apply funds to high risk projects. The two major aircraft projects already mentioned have illustrated this caution. The helicopter program envisioned a medium-size helicopter with winged, high-speed capability. Its performance parameters are similar to helicopters which have been developed in the United States. The large ASW aircraft project envisioned a central computer system already being utilized in similar U.S. aircraft.¹⁸ These two aircraft may have some unique performance characteristics, but the initial design parameters were within the scope of performance characteristics achieved elsewhere. One source cited several target items in the Japanese research and development proposals that have been built elsewhere and concluded that

¹⁷ Nippon no Anzen Hoshō, p. 27. 47 billion yen was spent on research in the 3rd DBP and a maximum of 150-170 billion yen would be spent in the next plan based on 3.5% of the draft DBP now under revision.

¹⁸ See JPE Aviation Report, February 15, 1971, p. 4, for a general discussion of the two projects.

there was very little worthy of the name research.¹⁹

The TRDI's caution has produced domestic equipment obsolescent before they could be mass produced, or at best, time lags in acquiring modern equipment. The caution the JDA has revealed has been reinforced by the companies which would prefer to conduct research on a project which will be produced, thereby insuring additional profits for their efforts.

The bureaucratic process by which the decision is made to begin a project has constituted another risk-discouraging factor. Viewpoints from other government bureaucracies are considered before the JDA authorizes a research project. In some cases, the decision is controlled outside the JDA.²⁰

The TRDI receives an open requirement for a system from the eventual user service. It works with the service to develop a set of performance requirements. These are then reviewed by the internal bureau before the Director-General issues a Fundamental Design Order.

The Equipment Council within the JDA is the reviewing body which must approve the TRDI's requirements package. The Fundamental Design Order entails selection of a company to do the basic research, and the Equipment Council chaired by the director of the Equipment Bureau is directly influenced by MITI.²¹ Furthermore, formal consultations with MITI are required before a major project is approved.

¹⁹Nippon no Anzen Hosho, pp. 22-23.

²⁰The bureaucratic procedures discussed herein are based on interviews with Colonel Yamawake and Colonel Samejima, February 14, 1972.

²¹The Director of the Equipment Bureau is a MITI bureaucrat only temporarily assigned.

The company which will conduct the research is normally chosen according to three major criteria. The technical capability of the firm receives first consideration. Political considerations come next: MITI is interested in an even distribution of projects among various companies. The same considerations which apply to production contracts are utilized in the field of research. Finally, the companies have specific types of equipment in which they are expert. For example, Shin Meiwa has been the foremost seaplane producer while Kawasaki has produced land-based patrol aircraft, and Mitsubishi has dominated fighter manufacture. Therefore, they would be more likely to be chosen to do research in their particular area of specialization.

The problem of testing exacerbates the delays in aerospace research. The basic geography of a mountainous, island nation is hostile to aircraft testing. The United States test area at Edwards Air Force Base in California is as large as the entire Kanto Plain. Japan's test areas are either in the middle of urban areas, or in mountainous regions as in the case of the major flight test center at Gifu. Weather provides an additional handicap, causing serious delays in testing. Gifu is near the major air routes along Japan, and near the Nagoya urban area where public opposition can delay testing. A similar aircraft, completed on the same day will clear testing much more rapidly where adequate testing facilities are available. Japan's test program may require three to four times the period needed in the United States.²²

²²Okumiya, The Sky is Full of Danger, pp. 74-79, discussed these test difficulties in detail. General Okumiya emphasized the delay factor in an interview, November 18, 1971. He also noted that the decentralization of research is important in this area. He pointed out that the JASDF had no direct responsibility in the initial testing of the XT-2; it was handled through the Development Division and the TRDI without assigning a specific military project officer.

The funding, the objectives, the procedures and problems of defense-related aerospace research and development combine to limit its effectiveness severely. The defense establishment's lack of experience in current combat experience has further hampered efficient weapon development. No serious research has been conducted on the aircraft weapons systems which would follow production models, let alone second generation systems. It would appear improbable that defense-related research is capable of keeping the aircraft industry and the resulting air power structure abreast of technological developments in the 1970's. Furthermore, the emphasis on major systems has made it unlikely that autonomous research can contribute significantly to those production areas where industry has lagged behind.

There are two other areas of research and development which directly bear on defense technology although they are conducted independently. Space program vehicles and nuclear energy have obvious applications to military use. Although neither has been espoused by Japan, technical capabilities in those fields have significance in terms of future options.

Article 2 of the Atomic Energy Basic Law sets forth the Japanese basic policy on nuclear energy:

The research, development and utilization of atomic energy shall be limited to peaceful purposes and performed independently under democratic management, the results therefrom shall be made public to contribute to international cooperation.²³

That basic policy would have to be revised before military applications of nuclear research could be undertaken; however, other factors exist which limit technical advance in this area.

²³Law No. 186 of December 19, 1955 as revised July 20, 1967, official translation.

A Japanese nuclear option would require a core of nuclear scientists and engineers. Perhaps 400 to 500 key personnel with training and experience could provide the nucleus for an effective nuclear weapons program.²⁴ In the prevailing atmosphere in 1971 in Japan, few nuclear scientists and engineers in Japan would cooperate with a military project, and time would be required to establish such a nucleus of personnel.

An effective program would require a stockpile of Plutonium or Uranium 235. Japan almost certainly would opt for the more sophisticated uranium weapon, and it could take several years to stockpile the reserve necessary. The alternative methods of obtaining adequate material are the fast breeder reactor or a uranium enrichment program. These also would take years to complete; however, a fast breeder reactor is under development in Japan.

Japan also faces the problem of geography again. A suitable location for bomb assembly and nuclear enrichment would require industrial and power support, yet demand safety separation and pollution control provisions. Even if such a site could be established, Japan would face the additional problem of testing. Japan has no remote islands or desert hinterland, and underground or other controlled testing would meet stiff opposition. The dangers from pollution, earthquakes or other phenomena would deter homeland tests of any kind.

Geography also affects the ultimate strategy for the weapon's use.²⁵ A large, anti-city system would be easier to construct, but unreasonable

²⁴Y. Suenaga, "Nixon Shocks, Muckrackings Preempt Japan's Manuever," part of 8-part series "U.S.-Japan Relations" in The Daily Yomiuri, January 29, 1972, provided a critical view of Japanese nuclear capacity which I have utilized as a basis of this viewpoint.

²⁵The options of nuclear strategy are discussed in Chapter 2.

for Japan. Large land-based missiles would be vulnerable on the islands of Japan and increase the probability that the population would be struck. Sophisticated anti-force strategic weapons or defensive weapons would require even more advanced technology.

While these technical vulnerabilities have militated against any decision to 'go nuclear,' there have been significant advancements in Japanese nuclear research. Japan's first atomic energy budget was appropriated in 1954 and the basic law was enacted two years later. That first budget of 250 million yen grew to nearly 50 billion yen in 1971.²⁶ Private funding has more than doubled this investment, putting the annual funding in nuclear-related areas in excess of 100 billion yen.

There are nine different ministries which have some function related to nuclear energy, but three major operative bodies and one advisory body dominate the governmental organization.²⁷ The advisory body is the Atomic Energy Commission which is attached to the Prime Minister's Office. It is directly concerned with the promotion of research, development and utilization of nuclear energy. The Atomic Energy Bureau within the Space and Technology Agency is an administrative center where basic policy has been formulated. The Japan Atomic Energy Research Institute was founded in 1956 through joint investments of government and industry, and is the central research organ in Japan. An independent offshoot, the Nuclear Ship Development Agency, has been concerned with

²⁶ Atomic Energy Bureau, Atomic Energy in Japan, undated (1971), provided by Atomic Energy Bureau.

²⁷ Detailed organizational description may be found in Gensi Ryoku Nenkan-1971 (Atomic Energy Yearbook-1971) (Tokyo: Nihon Gensi Ryoku Sangyo Kaigi (Atomic Energy Industrial Association), March 1, 1971), pp. 281-283; also see Atomic Energy Commission, Fourteenth Annual Report 1969-1970 (english translation), p. 104 for some government organs listed in english.

nuclear ship construction. The last major institution is the Power Reactor and Nuclear Fuel Development Corporation.

This reactor and fuel corporation is particularly relevant to Japan's future military nuclear options. It has been concerned with power generation, and has experimented with advanced nuclear fuels and fast breeder reactors. The fast breeder reactor will produce more Uranium 235 than it consumes and would provide Japan with unlimited amounts of weapon-grade fuel. Japan's development program has progressed to the stage that a prototype fast breeder reactor was under construction and due for experimental operation by 1973-1974.²⁸ Japan also began to produce enriched uranium in a centrifugal reactor in April 1972.

Japan has been quite active internationally where several agreements guaranteeing outside uranium sources have been negotiated.²⁹ Japan recently signed an agreement with Australia which gave it access to the rich uranium sources there; thus, Japan has come to have access to all the major non-communist uranium sources.³⁰

Education in the nuclear field expanded rapidly in Japan. Nine universities had nuclear science and engineering programs in 1970, of which seven began in the 1960's.³¹ There were more than 10,000 people engaged in nuclear related projects in 1969. This number was expected to increase to more than 15,000 by 1973, including approximately

²⁸AEC, 14th Annual Report, p. 26.

²⁹Emmerson, Arms, p. 313, discusses the many agreements in this area which Japan has signed.

³⁰Asahi Evening News, February 22, 1972 reports the signing. Australia has the 4th largest uranium deposits in the non-communist world.

³¹AEC, 14th Annual Report, p. 111.

6,600 scientists.³²

Japan faces many technical liabilities in any attempt to add nuclear weapons to its arsenal. However, it has pursued the use of nuclear energy through large and varied fields of research and has added to its general body of knowledge on the subject. A great deal of experience will have been compiled by 1980, and an unlimited supply of uranium will be available when fast breeder reactors become operational. At that time, the decision to attain nuclear weapons will be a relatively minor one in technical terms. The time period between a decision to obtain nuclear weapons and achievement of the goal will have become minimal.

If nuclear weapons do become a relatively simple technical challenge to Japan, they alone do not constitute a weapons system. A warhead must have a delivery system. Japan has license produced the NIKE missile which has been equipped with nuclear warheads in the United States. The F-4, produced at Mitsubishi, is capable of carrying nuclear weapons on combat missions in excess of 800 NM and could provide a tactical delivery system.

Japan has not developed either a strategic delivery system nor an anti-missile defense system. The effort to attain either capability would utilize missiles as the delivery vehicle. Japan could depend on aircraft to deliver nuclear weapons, however, such an option would appear to be quite unattractive. Base dispersal has been a problem in Japan and any attempt to build an effective strategic force would require greatly expanded dispersal capacity, among other measures. Such a force would increase the probability of direct attack in the event of hostilities. A sea-based missile force would be a more natural strategic structure

³²Atomic Energy Yearbook, p. 107.

for Japan.

The majority of space vehicle and related research has been conducted by the Science and Technology Agency. Space research in Japan began in February 1955, when the Institute of Industrial Science at Tokyo University began the development of sounding rockets.³³ By June 30, 1958, two stage rockets were being launched, and two years later a National Space Activities Council was organized to advise the Prime Minister on space-related matters. The existing development agencies were reorganized into the National Space Development Center in 1964. That center has become the major focus of space-related activity in Japan, although six separate ministries received appropriations for space research in the 1972 budget.³⁴

Japanese industry also has participated actively in space endeavors. Keidanren, the Federation of Economic Organizations, dated its space-related activities back to 1961. It established the permanent Space Activities Promotion Council on June 10, 1968, which has promoted "the study, development and utilization of space technology."³⁵ The Council, which consists of 53 firms and professional organizations engaged in space activities, has maintained close relations with the government in the formulation of space projects.

This formidable infrastructure has made significant strides; fifteen years after the first decision was made to pursue space research, Japan successfully launched its first satellite. As KokuJoho proudly noted:

³³See Science and Technology Agency and Keidanren, Space in Japan, 1971 (Tokyo: Asahi Evening News, December 1971), pp. 18-20 for a brief chronological history of space activities in Japan.

³⁴Japan Times, January 21, 1972. Those included the Education, Transport, Posts and Telecommunication, MITI, and Construction as well as the Science and Technology Agency.

³⁵Space in Japan, p. 108.

Japan thus became the 4th Nation in the world to succeed in launching satellites of her indigenous design and make with her indigenous rocket, after the Soviet Union, the U.S.A., and France.³⁶

Japan launched two satellites in 1971 and has planned an ambitious launch schedule including nine launches in the next five years.³⁷ It also has anticipated expending approximately 220 billion yen in government funds over the ensuing five years. The 1972 space budget climbed to 24 billion yen, more than a 50 percent increase over 1971. Perhaps more important, space research was in the enviable and unusual position of receiving all the government funds necessary to pursue its proposed projects.³⁸

Some aspects of the space vehicle program have developed at an excellent rate. Japanese metallurgy technology has been quite advanced, and Japan has enjoyed significant progress in rocket motors. Solid propellants have been used extensively in Japan, in fact, almost exclusively. They are much easier to store and handle which makes them desirable for use in military missiles. Liquid fuels are more commonly used in large thrust engines, and lack of experience in handling and utilizing liquid fuels was one of the factors which prompted a recent licensing agreement to produce the U.S. Thor-Delta in Japan.³⁹

³⁶"First Japanese Satellite 'Ohsumi' in Orbit," loc. cit., April 1970.

³⁷See JPE Aviation Report, October 26, 1970, pp. 10-11, for a schedule of the launches planned through 1976.

³⁸Mr. Ichinose, Interview, February 25, 1972. Mr. Ichinose said while they would like more, their funds were all that they could use effectively.

³⁹Ibid., also see "Drastic Changes in Japan's Space Development Program," KokuJoho, February 1971. The license agreement to produce the Thor-Delta was made and one satellite booster program was terminated and another begun using the new vehicle as stage 1. This shift in a major space program decision one year after its inception (the expense involved)

Despite these indications of technological strength in space vehicle research, there are two vulnerable areas which directly affect the possible military application of the space program. The first of those is reentry. Japan has never attempted reentry and has done little research on heat dispersal, ablative materials or other aspects of the reentry problem.⁴⁰ A strategic ballistic missile must be able to reenter the atmosphere.

Equally important is accuracy, and guidance has been an 'Achilles heel' in the Japanese space vehicle program. The Japanese guidance effort has been most rudimentary; they have yet to launch a fully guided ballistic missile. Their satellites have been launched with unguided rockets and the orbits later established by observation and calculation.⁴¹

The decision to license the Thor-Delta also was prompted by this lack of guidance sophistication. The license agreement will not bring Japan up to the Thor-Delta level of guidance because portions of the system have been sold as 'black-box' components, not subject to Japanese production.⁴² Japan had not planned to launch a practical satellite until fiscal year 1978 though they hope that this schedule will be accelerated by three years through Thor-Delta licensing. Therefore, the first large Japanese guided missile will be launched in 1975 or 1976. Even at that time, Japan may be unable to launch such a guided vehicle independently.

Japan will remain a novice in the field of inertial guidance and ballistic vehicle guidance for some time after its first satellite is

again indicates the priority of this aspect of Japanese scientific research.

⁴⁰Ichinose, Interview, February 25, 1972.

⁴¹Ibid.

⁴²Ibid.

launched into a predetermined orbit. Its lack of sophistication in guidance would limit strategic application of the current Japanese space program in the 1970's.

There are potential military applications in the fields of space vehicle and nuclear energy research, but the body of knowledge and experience necessary for effective development has been lacking. Japan generally has deemphasized research and development in the post-war era. Japanese industry might be capable of the procedures and standards necessary to produce sophisticated aerospace weaponry, but it remains doubtful that the general level of Japanese technical capacity in aerospace science would be capable of designing and engineering equally modern weapons systems.

The neglect of defense research has left it incapable of supporting technological standards in 1972; it was even less qualified to design or adapt second generation aerospace weaponry. While the broad, long-range potential of Japan and its industry is significant, the weaknesses which have been mentioned have seriously restricted Japan's capacity for strategic employment of its technological base within any useful time frame.

VII.

POLICY OPTIONS AND THE FUTURE

In the post-war era, the Japanese government has assigned air power a primary role of providing for Japan's autonomous military defense. Yet, the development of the air force structure has not optimized operational capability. Governmental concern with aircraft industry growth, allocations within the Air Self-Defense Force and training and operating procedures have stressed future development. This emphasis provided the air force with a nucleus of highly skilled pilots and technicians who are capable of effecting a mobilization or change in missions utilizing high performance weapons systems. Deemphasis of research and development has limited the independence of the force structure, but industrial priority increased mobilization capacity if technical assistance was available.

The deemphasis of operational readiness in the air force structure has been reflected in the other two branches of the Self-Defense Forces.¹ The priorities of Japanese military policy have raised further questions about its relationship to and compatibility with national security policy.

National security policy may include ideological, economic, political or military measures. Policies may directly respond to infringements on the state or they may develop internal cohesiveness, increasing the state's resistance to disruptions. Such policies are in part developed in response to the international milieu perceived by a state; they also are affected by the relevant societal and institutional factors internal to the state.

Security policy may be examined from various aspects. One alternative is to view the policy from an international viewpoint, thereby treating

¹See Kaihara, "We Should Know Ourselves as Well as Knowing Them," loc. cit., where the lack of war reserves and operational incompatibilities of all three branches were discussed.

the reaction of national policy to the milieu as a unitary response. The policy may also be perused from a national perspective, emphasizing the social and historical factors which condition a state's response to its environment.

The national perspective has been particularly important in the Japanese case as historical and social factors have had increased significance due to the relatively low level of perceived threat and the drastic experience of defeat and occupation. Examination of the internal elements impinging on all aspects of security policy is a large task which defies definitive assessment of the relationship between the elements and a particular aspect of policy.

This study has focused on one functional partition of the military aspect of national security policy. This is the finite rather than the comprehensive approach. It is a fragmentary view of national security policy rather than a broad view. While there are risks in such an approach, there are also advantages. The finite view assesses the nature of the elements relevant to the particular policy aspect, air power in this case; it examines the process by which the policy evolves; finally, it definitively assesses the nature of the policy response. Because of this closer perusal, the findings may either buttress or alter the common presumptions about the particular policy response. That, in turn, may give new insight to conventional views of overall Japanese security policy.

The introduction to this study described some of the common theories concerning the basis for Japanese security policy. Both Weinstein and those who emphasize U.S. influence make the assumption that Japanese policy has been responsive to the situations which it has faced. A rather comprehensive, and non-theoretical exposition of these views

has been presented recently in Forecast for Japan: Security in the 1970's, edited by James Morley.² This volume dealt with Japanese security policy primarily through emphasis on the various elements which pertain to it. Morley, after discussing the Japanese milieu in the concluding chapter, recognized that Japan perceived no imminent or serious threats. Based upon that conclusion and drawing from the remarks of the various contributors, he hypothesized that Japanese security policy can be characterized by four distinguishable elements.

The first element is "the balanced development of Japan's total power," emphasizing economic growth.³ All governmental needs are evaluated and answered with primary reference to their affect on the economic base. In addition, the government has relied on "peace diplomacy," or diplomacy designed to ameliorate tensions and ease confrontations in Asia. Japanese Asian diplomacy has included a growing aid program. The final two elements of Japanese security policy more directly pertain to the response to physical threat. Morley identified those as reliance on the American alliance and the "systematic build-up" of the defense forces.⁴

The last two policies have often been considered complementary. The alliance was designed to provide for those threats which Japan could not defend against and the defense establishment was designed to supplement the treaty. In Weinstein's words:

Their role in defending against external attack was...to hold off an attacker until powerful American units could

²(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1972); contributors include Helmann, Langdon, Thayer, Weinstein and Young.

³Ibid., p. 210.

⁴Ibid., p. 212.

enter the battle. In effect...the function of the Self-Defense Forces became the strengthening of the American guarantee. The Self-Defense Forces perform this mission by being able to defend against low-level, probing attacks, thus assuring that if and when a Soviet initiative is taken, it will have to be on a large enough scale to call for a strong, quick American response. That is still their function today.⁵

Based on this type of assumption, Morley concluded that future Japanese defense build-up would continue to emphasize a complementary role:

Such a build-up (Fourth DBP) should enable Japan to play a much greater role in its own defense and to exercise a greater degree of surveillance over its own and contiguous air space and over the surrounding waters, particularly between the home islands, the Bonins, and Okinawa and to a certain extent possibly as far as Guam and Taiwan. Its defense industry can be expected to expand, so that by 1975 Japan will probably have stockpiled sufficiently for a reasonably prolonged war.⁶

The policy described by these theoreticians is rational, balanced and based primarily on the lack of immediate military threat to Japan. They assumed that the various aspects of policy were integrated in order to provide security through a balance of economic, diplomatic and military measures.

Such a theory depends on specific assumptions about the nature of the defense forces and specifically the Air Self-Defense Force. Is air power designed to meet low-level attacks, to operate with the U.S. Forces, to control the contiguous air space, and to fight a prolonged war? If it is not, and the evidence presented in this study suggests that air power goals have been different, then the general conclusions regarding national security policy are suspect. In fact, the air power

⁵Weinstein, "Strategic Thought and the U.S. Japan Alliance," Forecast, p. 71.

⁶Forecast, p. 212.

perspective has provided a somewhat different interpretation of the four aspects of national security policy. It is not as rational, flexible and responsive to external influence as the general analysis would suggest.

Economic growth has been a primary Japanese concern and has at various times been legitimized in terms of national security. Balanced growth was a part of the basic defense policy promulgated in 1957. This policy has been interpreted and executed by the bureaucracy which rules Japan and in this process it has grown to more than a security guideline. Economic growth has become more than a basis for national security. It has been translated into a series of ratios by which money is distributed to the sectors of government. Relative needs or changing priorities seem to have limited affect on disbursements. Morley noted that the proportion of public money distributed to various governmental functions remains remarkably constant from year to year.⁷

The point is that the government assigned an extremely low priority to defense spending in an era of bipolarity during the late 1950's. This principle has been institutionalized in the bureaucracy at less than one percent of GNP for the military and significant changes in the international environment have not altered this percentage. The lack of flexibility suggests that the process is somewhat insulated from external pressures.

Japan has continued to emphasize peaceful diplomacy, and has attempted to broaden and consolidate economic and official relations throughout Asia. The primary thrust of this effort has been to conciliate or in some way accommodate different views. There has been little or no Japanese attempt to impose Japanese views through anything outside

⁷Morley, "Economism and Balanced Defense," Forecast, pp. 18-19.

diplomatic measures. Force in support of diplomacy has been absolutely prohibited outside the territory. Japan has even refused to consider participating in a United Nations peace-keeping mission.

The final aspects of Japanese security policy mentioned by Morley deal with active defense against the use of force. This study has demonstrated a tenuous relationship between the Security Treaty and the Air Self-Defense Force. The force structure has not been designed to defeat low-level, probing attacks. It has not allocated resources to raise the threshold of war, or to prolong it in order to benefit from U.S. support. Training procedures and programs have not emphasized the limited force concept. Command procedures have not been designed to facilitate a joint U.S.-Japanese effort. Equipment selection has not reflected concern with limited, local war. The aircraft industry has not developed in order to support a small, autonomous force.

There are elements which do explain the manner in which the force structure has evolved. The Security Treaty cannot be considered in terms of its response to a direct threat. The Japanese assessment that no threat exists has not depended on the Security Treaty. Therefore the autonomous force structure has not been built to complement the treaty or respond to any existing threat.

The bureaucratic process in post-war Japan has left the defense forces in a vacuum. They have been dominated completely by civilian control but have received little or no guidance. The government, satisfied with maintaining low priorities for military funding, has not effectively directed the development of the Self-Defense Forces. Opposition political forces, fearful of legitimizing the defense forces and foregoing use of an effective political weapon, have avoided substantive defense questions.

The limits which have circumscribed the development of the Air Self-Defense Force have not been related primarily to the threat or to strategy. The historical experience of World War II, a close relationship with the USAF and the broad objectives of the military air power planners have had an unnaturally large effect due to the vacuum surrounding the JASDF. The planners have not faced assigned or self-imposed goals, but have planned in terms of directions.

Outside the uniformed services, the nature of defense structure evolution has also been significantly affected by the defense industry. While it has not advocated an independent force structure, pressures for an autonomous and technologically advanced industry have supported the military preference for a greater degree of autonomy.

What has emerged is an air defense force which is supposedly the front line of Japanese autonomous defense, but is instead a highly professional nucleus. It would require a great deal more money to realize its potential, and it has not been funded nor equipped primarily as an operational force structure.

The bureaucratic insularity of the defense establishment has made it relatively unresponsive to changing government perceptions or international pressures. Therefore, a shifting international environment has not caused significant changes in the Fourth Defense Build-up Plan. The step-by-step development of the Air Self-Defense Force has not been made with any fixed goal of limited capability in mind, but an unlimited direction, independent air power.

The Morley assessment provided a picture of a cohesive, balanced national security policy capable of responding to a broad range of threats. It did not fully consider the importance of process and internal variables that are particularly significant in the Japanese bureaucratic

environment. Two aspects of this environment have had particular relevance to national security policy.

The bureaucratic process has inhibited flexibility and made the policy rather insensitive to change. The number of participants in defense policy formulation has exacerbated this problem. Secondly, military aspects of Japanese security policy have been demeaned and deemphasized for historical and social reasons. The resulting isolation of military planners has tended to increase the policy's unresponsiveness.

A somewhat different, more fragmented picture of Japanese security policy emerges from this analysis. The one point of agreement in Japan is that there is little threat. The threat has been assessed primarily in terms of indirect aggression or social disruption. Therefore, economic emphasis has not only been a principle but the primary tool of national security. Possible controversies have been resolved where possible or avoided. Physical response to threat outside the territory has received no consideration, and direct threat to the territory has been considered minimal. In those circumstances, the Air Self-Defense Force has become part of the core of a military force which primarily provides a capability to exercise future military options.

The airpower choices in the post-war era have been characterized by a willingness to sacrifice operational capability in order to maintain an infrastructure capable of a more rapid development pace. The disregard for war reserves, the choice of high performance weapons system's units, and the concern with industrial development have illustrated this preference. The options available are not without limitation: the development of air power has not been a comprehensive, government-wide evolution, and there remain problems of technology and operations which would be difficult to overcome. This does not negate the basic proposition that

a capability for expansion or mission modification are the basic results of post-war air power policies. Such a capability is particularly important in the 1970's in view of an increasing probability that some shift could occur in Japanese national security policy which would increase the emphasis on military measures.

There are many different possibilities concerning the evolution of the international system in Asia.⁸ Whatever the forecast, it invariably has included the prediction that political and strategic diversification of the bipolar system will continue. Many disagreements exist over the extent of this evolution, for example, the affect of latent nuclear bipolarity has often been argued.

Although these questions of degree will continue, there can be little doubt that the evolution of a multi-centric regional system is underway in Asia. The Nixon Doctrine has recognized the growing influence of national centers in Asia, in particular China and Japan. Diversification of power has been accompanied by a relaxation of tensions and growing intercourse between the four major powers.

These international momentums have exacerbated domestic instability in Japan and have led toward reexamination of the Japanese concept of national security. Although 1975 has been suggested as a proper time to reevaluate the Security Treaty, no firm date or program of security policy revision has been established. However, it seems likely that momentum will continue to build, and that future revision of Japanese security policy is almost certain.

⁸See Chapter 1 for discussion of possible political-military sub-systems, also see Alastair Buchanan, "Power-Relationships in the Far East: A European View," Survival, May-June 1972, pp. 106-113 for several different alignments in East Asia which are at least theoretically possible. Also Morley, ed., Forecast, Chapter VI and VII included possible systematic developments in Asia.

It would be very difficult to forecast the extent or direction of change in the various aspects of security policy, nor would it be possible to conclude that all policy assumptions will be altered. Japan has recognized the evolution of the international system, the possible implications of the Nixon Doctrine, the existence of Chinese nuclear capability and the presence of the Soviet fleet. Internally, the lessening aversion to military affairs and acceptance of the force structure have contributed to the momentum. If these trends continue, it seems likely that some additional emphasis in Japanese security policy will be accorded to military capabilities.

Acceptance of this reordering of priorities and support for it would be in the interest of all states in Asia. If Japan's strength is the stability of its government, its weakness is bureaucratic inflexibility. There is great resistance to any policy revision, particularly in security affairs. Reinforcement of this inertia would be counter-productive because a realignment of policy which was delayed until an emergency could result in a drastic shift of priorities. The effort to compensate for previous unpreparedness could result in overemphasis of military alternatives as opposed to the current disinterest in military oriented security measures. Technological weaknesses which would emerge in the event Japan exercised an independent rearmament option could exacerbate such a shift.

This does not mean that major Japanese rearmament is inevitable or that other states cannot affect Japanese decisions. The United States, for example, would remain in Asia in its own self-interest. Massive disengagement would almost inevitably cause the Japanese to rearm. At the same time, the U.S. presence will not deter all rearmament nor should that be a U.S. goal. Selective rearmament in non-provocative fields

which support the Japanese defensive posture should be encouraged.

Japan's air power, like other military alternatives, will play a larger role in Japan's future security policy. Non-recognition or non-acceptance of this transition could eventually cause an irrational shift in Japanese security priorities emphasizing the use of force. External support for policies which reflect the reality of the power balance are most likely to assist the Japanese in adapting to the power balance. Such attitudes on the part of Japan's allies and neighbors would provide the highest probability that Japan will continue to pursue a variation of their current national security policy which emphasizes non-military alternatives.

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- Colonel Aoki J., JASDF, Planning Section, Defense Division, Air Staff Office, February 14, 1972.
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- Mr. Arimori Mitsuo, Executive Director, The Society of Japanese Aircraft Constructors, February 23, 1972.
- Lieutenant General Arinuma Genshiro, JASDF (ret.), Member of Systems Investigation Committee and Air Preparatory Office, responsible for formation of the ASDF, March 7, 1972.
- Captain Wilton L. Atkinson, U.S. Navy, U.S. Defense Attache, Tokyo, Japan, October 5, 1971.
- Lieutenant Commander James E. Auer, U.S.N., Political Advisor, U.S. Naval Forces Japan, February 13, 1971, on a regular basis from October 1971 to March 1972.
- Lieutenant Commander Baba Toshihaya, JMSDF, Aide to Chairmen, Joint Staff Council, and naval pilot, December 9, 1971, and on a regular basis until March, 1972.
- Captain Franklin Hess Barker, U.S. Navy, U.S. Representative, Okinawa Negotiating team, Tokyo, Japan, February 9, 1972.
- Major William R. Barret, USAF, Planning Division, Fifth Air Force, February 2, 1972.
- Major Claude C. Blanch, USAF, Air Advisor, Defense Objective Branch, Commander U.S. Forces, Japan, November 16, 1971.
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January 25, 1972.

Lieutenant Commander Kermit R. Ellis, U.S. Navy, Commander Naval
Scientific and Technical Group, Tokyo, Japan, January 27, 1972.

Colonel Robert A. Fromm, U.S.A.F., United States Air Attache to Japan,
October 5, 1971.

Lieutenant Colonel Fujii Tsutomu, JASDF, Faculty, Air Staff College,
Ground Control Intercept Officer, November 30, 1971.

General Genda Minoru, JASDF (ret.), former Chief of Staff JASDF, now
Member of House of Councillors, National Diet, November 17, 1971.

Lieutenant General Goto Kiyotoshi, JASDF, Commander, Technical Training
Command, Hammamatsu Air Base (South), January 11, 1972.

Major General Harada Kiyoshi, JASDF, Commander 4th Tactical Wing,
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Captain Jack Harlow, USN (ret.), Military analyst and formerly member of
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Colonel Hase Kiyoshi, JASDF, Chief of Defense Branch, Defense Division,
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Hata was temporarily assigned to JDA as Air Planning Officer of
the Finance Division, Accounting Section, November 22, 1971.

General Hayashi Keizo, former Chairman of the Joint Staff Council of the
Self-Defense Forces 1954-1964, December 9, 1971.

Colonel Robert F. Hemphill, U.S.A.F. (ret.), former Air Attache to Japan,
now author residing on Tokyo, October 19, 1971; November 4, 1971;
March 3, 1972.

Lieutenant Colonel John Holman, U.S.A.F., Headquarters Fifth Air Force,
formerly instructor with new Japanese Air Self-Defense Force,
February 24, 1972.

Aviation Cadet Hoshina Yozo, JASDF, Student, Air Officer Candidate
School, Nara Air Base, January 14, 1972.

Mr. Ichinose Teruo, Space Development Counsellor, Space and Technology
Agency, February 25, 1972.

Major Ishihara I., JASDF, F104 Pilot and Operations Officer, 1st Training
Wing Attachment, Matsushima Air Base, January 19, 1972.

Major General Ishii Shintaro, JASDF, Commander 5th Technical School,
Komaki Air Base, January 12, 1972.

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February 17, 1972; March 7, 1972.

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Agency, February 25, 1972.

Major General Ito Kimio, JASDF, Chief Administrative Section, Joint
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Professor Ito Kobun, Faculty, National Defense College, November 4, 1971.

Major Itonaga Yoshiteru, JASDF, Faculty, Air Staff College and Aircraft
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Lieutenant Iwasaki Katsuhiko, JASDF, F-86 Pilot, 4th Tactical Wing,
Matsushima Air Base, January 18, 1972.

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School, Nara Air Base, January 13, 1972.

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Major Iwata Junkichi, JASDF, Instructor, Air Officer Candidate School,
Nara Air Base, January 13, 1972.

Major Jominaga Shigefumi, JASDF, Research Faculty, Air Staff College
and NIKE officer, November 30, 1971.

Mr. Kaihara Osamu, Secretary, National Defense Council, November 10, 1971;
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Mr. Kanae Kanemitsu, Instructor, Air Officer Candidate School, Nara Air
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Division, Air Staff Office, February 25, 1972.

Mr. Kato Mikio, Program Officer, The International House of Japan,
November 22, 1971; January 20, 1972.

Mr. Gene Y. Kawakami, Liaison Officer, Shin Meiwa Industry, Aircraft
Division, February 16, 1972.

Major Kenmizaki Masaru, JASDF, Faculty, Air Staff College, F-104 Pilot,
November 30, 1971.

Mrs. May H. Kikuchi, Headquarters, U.S. Forces Japan, involved in liaison
with the JASDF Medical Division since its inception, February 24, 1972.

Mr. Kimoto Eiji, Director, Senior Flight Crew Office, Japan Air Lines,
December 4, 1971; December 7, 1971; January 25, 1972.

Professor Kosaka Mataka, Kyoto University, Political Affairs Analyst,
January 1, 1972.

Mr. Kosuge Hironaka, Civilian, JASDF, Chief of Legal Branch, Administrative
Division, Air Staff Office, December 13, 1971.

Master Sergeant Kozasa Kumio, Public Information Office, Flying Training
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Vice Admiral Kuwabara Torao, Imperial Japanese Navy (ret.), one of first
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February 16, 1972.

Lieutenant General, Eugene B. LeBailly, U.S.A.F., working director of
Air Advisory Group Japan, December 9, 1971 (by letter).

Colonel Richard G. Leech, U.S.A.F., former Air Attache to Japan, Tokyo,
Japan, January 27, 1972.

Mr. Mabuchi Ryoitsu, Advisor Defense Production Committee, Keidanren,
author on Japanese Defense Industry, former Aeronautical Engineer
for Imperial Japanese Army, November 27, 1971.

Lieutenant Maeda Kazuo, JASDF, 3rd Tactical Wing, Komaki Air Base,
January 11, 1972.

Major Masakari Keiske, JASDF, F-86 pilot and Administrative Officer,
6th Tactical Wing, Komatsu Air Base, January 12, 13, 1972.

Mr. Masuhara Keikichi, former Director of National Police Reserve, former
Director General of Defense Agency, Member of House of Councillors,
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Aviation Cadet Nishikawa Kinichiro, Student, Air Officer Candidate School, Nara Air Base, January 14, 1972.

Mr. Obata Hiroaki, Chief Librarian, Air Staff College, JASDF, November 15, 1971.

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Mr. Ogawa Raita, former IJN pilot, presently Vice President and Managing Editor, Koku Shimbun (Wing Newspaper), December 14, 1971; December 27, 1971; January 21, 1972; February 18, 1972; March 3, 1972.

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Lieutenant General Okumiya Masatake, JASDF (ret.), former IJN and ASDF officer, Advisor to PHP Institute, Japanese Defense Analyst and Historian, November 18, 1971; March 7, 1972.

Mr. Orihara Toshihiko, Instructor, Air Officer Candidate School, Nara Air Base, January 15, 1972.

Professor Edwin O. Reischauer, Harvard University, former Ambassador to Japan, March 21, 1971.

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
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